IR 05000271/1997007
| ML20216G790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216G783 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-97-07, 50-271-97-7, NUDOCS 9709160048 | |
| Download: ML20216G790 (7) | |
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U. S.' NUCLEAH REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Docket No:
.50-271-
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Report No:
-50 271/97 07
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Licensec.
- Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation'
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Facility:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
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Location:
Vernon, Vermont
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. Dates:
_ August 26,1997
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inspectors:
- G. C. Smith, Sr. Security Specialist R. Rosano, Sr. Program Manager-
' Approved by:
Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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197o9160048 970904 -
PDR ADOCK-05000271
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On August 19,1997, an Individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and
- Vermont that left it,ur people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a confrontation with Vermont law anforcement authorities. Law enforcement authorities -
later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence.
Because the individual had been granted access to three nuclear power plants, special NRC inspections were initiated at each of the plants to determine if the access authorization programs, as implemented, identified information that should have precluded the indiv' dual
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from being granted unescorted access.
The licensee's access authorization program was inspected August 27 and 28,1997, and
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determined to meet the regulatory requirements. The NRO did not identify any information, used by the licensee in processing the individual for access authorization, that shou!d have
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precluded the licensee from granting the individual unescorted access to the secured i
portions of their plant.'
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j Reoort Details
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i iSSl Miecellaneous Security and Safeguards issues
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- S8.1: General 1-F On August 19,-1997, an individual was involved in shootings in New Hampshire l
and Vermont that left four people dead. The individual was subsequently killed in a
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confrontation with Vermont law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement-authorities later found bomb making materials stored at the individual's residence in
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New Hampshire.: Because the individual had been granted unescorted access to__
three nuclear power plants, specialinspections'were initiated at each of the plants
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to assess implementation of the licensee's access authorization (AA) programs in i
order to determine if they met the regulatory requirements and the licensee's i
physical security plans, and to determine if any information was or should have.
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been identified during the AA process that shc,uld have precluded the individual j
being granted unescorted access.
j The individual had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee in 1992 and 1995 and to Pilgrim In 1997 based on completion of all components of the access
' authorization program. The individual was granted unescorted access to Indian
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. Point (IP) 3, based on a transfer of access authorization from Pilgrim and an update
- of his activities for the approximate 2 month yeriod between the time he left Pilgrim
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and began work at IP-3, as provided for in the AA requirements. The NRC inspection included a review of the AA programs at Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim and
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IP 3.
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S8.2 Access Authorization Proaram and Procedures
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insoection Scone
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's security plans and access authorization e
procedures and conducted interviews to assess the licensee's access authorization program,
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Observations and Findinas-l The review of the licensee's security plan (the plan) and AA procedures disclosed that the Plan and procedures,.as written and implemented, satisfied the
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requirements of 10 CFR_73.56, " Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants," and followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.66, " Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants." Interviews with -
_ ersonnel disclosed they were knowledgeable of the' AA requirements contained in p
_ the regulations, the Plan and the AA procedures.-
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Conclusions I
The inspectors' review disclosed that the licensee's AA program, as implemented, met all regulatory requirements.
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S8,3 Backaround investiaation (BH Elements a.
inspection Scoce The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews in order to determine the adequacy of the program in determinin0 the true identity of the individual and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history and character and reputation of the individual prior to granting unescorted access, b.
Observation and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the results of the individual's background investigation (BI)
and determined that the scope and depth of the BI met the licensee's program commitments and provided the information required by the program commitments on which to base a determination for access authorization. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted access authorization and for considering all information received from the U.S. Attorney General. One licensee (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation) submitted fingerprint cardt to initiate the criminal history check twice (once in 1992 and once in 1995), in both cases, prior arrests were identified. The inspectors determined that the informatio. had been properly evaluated and adjudicated prior to granting unescorted access. Another licensee, Boston Edison, submitted fingeiprint cards to initiate the criminal nistory check in December 1990. The information received back from the criminal history check indicated no prior arrest data. The NRC is pursuing this issue with the FBI to determine why the prior arrest data was not identified during the 1996 criminal history check, c.
Conclusion Although the 1996 criminal history check did not identify any prior arrests, the inspectors concluded that there were no deficiencies in the processes used by either lice nsee to initiate the criminal history checks.
S8.4 Psycholoalcal Evaluations a.
Insoection Scone The inspectors reviewed the licensee's psychological testing program procedures to insure they met applicable requirements, b.
Observations. Findinas and Conclusions The licensee contracted with licensed psychologists to provide oversight of the psychological testing program and to perform the requisite evaluatio'
After the psychological tests were administered, the answer sheets were %q wad to the psychologist for evaluatinn, and if the need for a clinicalinterview was indicated,
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the psychologist conducted the interview and recommended either access or denial to the licensee. The individual was psychologically tested in 1992,1995 and 1996.
The 1992 test indicated the need for a clinicalinterview and the psychologist conducting the interview recommended, after conducting the interview, that site access be granted.
The inspectors determined that the licensees' psychological evaluation program was being implemented in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.
S8.5 Behavior Observation Proaram (BOP)
e, insoection Scgna The inspectors reviewed the Behavior Observation Program training procedures and lesson plans and conducted interviews to determine the effectiveness of the
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licensees' programs.
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Qbservations and Findinas The programs were instituted as part of, and as an element in common with, the licensees' Fitness-for Duty (FFD) program. Review of the procedures and lesson plans indicated that they met all regulatcry requirements. ~nterviews with several of the individuals' past supervisors indicated that they had a knowledge of program requirements and they demonstrated an awareness and sensitivity to detect and report adverse changes in behavior, c.
Conclusios The inspectors concluded that the BOP was being effectively implemented.
S8.6 Temocrarv Access Authorization a.
insoection Sggpa The inspectors reviewed records that included the results of abbreviated scope investigations, which were used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted access authorization, as permitted by the rule, b.
Observations. Findinas and Conclusions The records of the abbreviated scope investigations were determined to contain adequate information (character and reputation from a de, eloped reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on whien to base teinporary access authorization. The inspectors noted that, in these records of abbreviated scope investigation, there was no data which necessitated rescission of access authorization following receipt ef the full 5-year investigatio...
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f!LA.7 Audits
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- a,1 ADansction Sggen.
l The inspectors reviewed the most recent audits of the contractors used by each licenses to conduct'Bl.
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Observations and Findinas l
j The inspectors' review disclosed that the audits were comprehensive in scope and depth. The audit findings were administrative in nature and no programmatic
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- deficiencies were identified.
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- S8.8 Search Eaulomant l
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Insoection Sngna The inspectors reviewed the licensees' procedures for testing perdonnel and package search equipment, reviewed maintenance records for search equipment and
- observed licensee testing of the search equipment to assess its effectiveness.
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Qhservations and FindlD91 Test procedures were adequate to properly evaluate the search equipment performance, maintenance records indicated that the equipment was not
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experiencing any unusual maintenance problems, and testing of the equipment
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determined that it was operable.
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Conclusion
- The inspectors determined that the personnel and package search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with applicable security plan
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requirements and was capable of performing its intended functions.
X1-Ealt interview -
. An exit interview was conducted by telephone on September 3,1997. At that i
time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary-findings were presented. The licensees acknowledged the preliminary inspection-
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findings.
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_ PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED _
Licensee -
R. Wanczyk Director of Regulatory ' Affairs and Safety
- G. Morgan, Security _ Manager D. McElway,- Liaison Engineer J. Moriarty, Security Operations Specialist State of Vermont W. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer-
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- All of the above licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting conducted by
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- telephone on September 3,1997. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel.-
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