ML20154Q614
| ML20154Q614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1988 |
| From: | Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154Q612 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-88-10, GL-84-11, IEB-80-11, IEB-82-03, IEB-82-3, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-7, NUDOCS 8810040019 | |
| Download: ML20154Q614 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1988010
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U. S. "HCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
_50-271/88-10
CJckt:t No.
50-271
License No. OPR-28
Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
RD 5, Box 169
,
Brattleboro, Vermont
05301
Facility:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At: Vernon, Vermont
Inspection Conducted: July 1, 1988 - August 22, 1988
Inspectors:
Geoffrey E. Grant, Senior Resident Inspector
John 8. Macdonald, Resident Inspector
Joseph E. Carrasco, Reactor Engineer, Materials and Processes
Section (MPS), Engineering Branch (EB), Division of Reactor
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Safety (DRS)
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Robert A. McBrearty, Reactor Engineer, MPS, EB, DRS
Approved by:
o d / w*d M
4/dlif"
Donald R. Haverkamp, CWief
Date
Reactor Projects Section No. 3C
Inspection Sumn ary:
Inspection on July 1, 1988 - August 22, 1988
(Report No. 50-271/68-10)
Areas Inspceted:
Routine inspection on daytime and backshif ts by two resident
inspectors of:
actions on previous inspection findings;
operational safety;
security; plant operationc; maintenance and surveillance;
licensee event
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reports; licensee response to NRC initiatives; and, periodic reports.
Results:
1.
General Conclusions on Adequacy, Strength or Weakness in the Licensee's
Program
The licensee response to the reactor trip of July 3,1988 was a noteworthy
strength. The review process was much improved over recent performance in
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this area.
The review and PORC analysis were excellent and provided a
number of internal commitments for various corrective actions.
However,
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the evens itself highlighted a number of potential weaknesses including:
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lack of ade:quate training or understanding of reactor pressure regulator
operation and response, and indications that operators failed to utilize
all available plant parameter indications in their analysis of the press-
ure transient portion of the event (Section 6.1).
881004:.Ulv weuyte
ADOCK 05000271
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Inspection Summary (Continued)
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The licensee identified violation concerning failure to post a required
fire watch demonstrated several potential weaknesses including an inabil-
ity to adequately distinguish the difference between Technical Specifica-
tion .(TS) and non-TS 'related portions of fire protection system surveil-
lance and a failure to correctly determine the safety significance'of a
mali
ance action associated with the TS-related portion of the system
(Scr .an 6.4).
2.
Violations
The licensee identified a violation of a TS requirement to post a fire
watch when a portion of a fire protection system was inoperable.
No
Notice of Violation was issued (Section 6.4).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
1.
Persons Contacted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.
Summary of Facility Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
3.
Status of Previous Findings (IP 92701) . . . . . . . . . . .
2
3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 88-08-07:
Licensee to Revise LER 88-05. . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
3.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 88-08-01:
Establish a Fuel Oil Sampling Program in
Accordance with ASTM 0975-68 and TS . . . . . . . . .
2
3.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-10-12-
Standby Liquid Control System (52) TS Submittal. . .
2
3.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-18-02:
Degraded Block Walls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
3.5 (Closed) Violation 86-17-01:
Lack of Procedure for Original 1980 Masonry Wall
Survey.
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3.6 (Closed) Violation 86-17-02:
QA Audit of 1980 Masonry Wall Activities Not
Documented for Evidence of Completion .
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3.7 (Closed) Deviation 86-17-03:
Masonry Wall Design Used Unverified, Non-Conservative
Mortar Strength. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-17-04:
YAEC Evaluation of Wall 22 Using Strain Criteria
Required Verfication Based on NRC-Approved Stress
Criteria. . . .
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3.9 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-17-05:
Inadequate Data on Extent and Cause of Crack
Observed by the NRC in Three Unreinforced Walls
and Calculation Revised to Account for Cracks . . . .
3
4.
Operational Safety (IP 71707, 71710,). . . . . . .
. . . .
3
4.1 Plant Operations Review . . .
3
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4.2 Safety System Review.
4
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4.3 Feedwater leak Detection System . . .
4
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4.4 Inoperable Equipment.
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4.5 Review of Lifted Leads, Jumpers and Mechanical
Bypasses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.6 Review of Switching and Tagging Operations. . . . . . .
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4.7 Operational Safety Findings .
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Table of Contents (Continued)
PAGE
5.
Security (IP 71707). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.1 Observations of Physical Security . . . . . . . . .
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5.2 Fitness for Duty Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6.
Plant Operations (IP 71707, 93702, 82201, 94703) . . . . . .
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6.1 Reactor Trip: July 3, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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6.2 Loss of Wind Speed Indication . .
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6.3 Steam Leak from "2A" High Pressure Feedwater Heater . .
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6.4 Failure to Establish a TS-Required Fire Watch . . . . .
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7.
Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 71710, 61726, 62703, 61700) . .
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8.
Licensee Event Reporting (LER) (IP 90712, 92700) . . . . . .
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8.1 LER 88-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8.2 LER 88-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8.3 LER 88-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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9.
Review of Licensee Response to NRC Initiatives:
(IP 92703) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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9.1 Generic Letter 84-11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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9.2 NRC Bulletin 88-07: Power Oscillations in Boiling
Water Reactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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10.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports (IP 90713). . . . . .
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11. Management Meetings (IP 30703, 40700). . . . . . . . . . . .
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The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure (IP) or temporary instruc-
tion (TI) or the Region I temporary instruction (R1 TI) that was used as
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inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Interviews and discussions were conducted with members of the licensee
staff and management during the report period to obtain information per-
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tinent to the areas inspected.
Inspection findings were discussed per-
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iodically with the management and supervisory personnel listed below.
Mr. P. Donnelly, Maintenance Superintendent
- Mr. R. Grippardi, Quality Assurance Supervisor
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Mr. S. Jefferson, Assistant to Plant Superintendent
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Mr. G. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
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Mr. R. Lopriore, Maintenance Supe-visor
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- Mr. R. Pagodin, Technical Services Superintendent
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- Mr. J. Pelletier, Plant Manager
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- Mr. R. Wanczyk, Operations Superintendent
Mr. T. Watson, I & C Supervisor
- Attendee at post-inspection exit meeting conducted on September 12, 1988.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VYNPS) was r(covering from a two-
week maintenance outage at the beginning of this inspection period.
The
reactor was taken critical on July 2,1988 and power ascension was com-
menced. On July 3, with plant power at 58% a reactor shutdown was initi-
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ated following the discovery of a through-wall leak in the "3B" low press-
ure feedwater heater steam extraction inlet piping. During the shutdown a
reactor scram occurred from approximately 5% power due to a malfunction in
the mechanical hydraulic control (MHC) system which was exacerbated by
procedural weakness and personnel error (Section 6.1). The heater repairs
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were completed and the reactor was taken critical on July 7.
On July 14
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power was reduced to facilitate the isolation of a leaking sight glass on
the "2A" high pressure feedwater heater (Section 6.3).
The licensee per-
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formed an emergency preparedness (EP) practice drill on August 5 in pre-
paration for the EP exercise later this month.
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NRC Region I specialists performed a confirmatory measurements inspection
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during the period August 7-12,1988 (Inspection Report 88-12). An emerg-
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ency preparedness inspection was performed by Region I specia?ists during
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the period August 16-19. 1988 (Inspection Report 88-11).
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3.
Status of Previous Inspection Findings
3.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 88-08-07:
Licensee to Revise LER 88-05.
The licensee submitted LER 88-05 to report a potential loss of the
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Inspector review of the LER noted
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areas requiring correction or clarification.
The licensee subse-
quently revised LER 88-05.
This item is closed.
3.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 88-08-01:
Establish a Fuel Oil Sampling
Program in Accordance with ASTM 0975-68 and Technical Specifications,
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The licensee fuel oil sampling program performed per TS 4.10.C.2 did
not fully conform to ASTM 0975-68 Table 1 requirements. The liceasee
has modified the sampling program to expand the analyses to include
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all of the ASTM 0975-68 Table 1 criteria. ^ Additionally, in order to
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increase the quality assurance of the John Deere and fire pump
diesels, the licensee has expanded the new analysis program to
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include these diesels as well.
This item is closed.
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3.3 (Closedl_ Unresolved Item 86-10-12:
Standby Liquid Control System
(SLC) TS Submittal.
This item remained open pending submittal of a
TS amend. Tent to clarify and upgrade SLC squib vrive trigger assembly
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surveillance testing. As noted in IR 50-271/87-02, Proposed Change-
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No. 136 was submitted by the licensee on January 16, 1987 and is
under review by NRC:NRR.
This item is closed.
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3.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-18-02:
Degraded Block Walls.
Several
deficiencies were noted in safety related masonry block walls in IR
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50-271/86-17 and 86-18. Justificatinns for continued operations were
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reviewed and found acceptable in IR 50-271/86-22. Licensee plans to
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correct block wall deficiencies were reviewed and found acceptable in
IR 50-271/87-04. Work to correct the deficiencies was performed dur-
ing the 1987 refueling outage. The specialist inspection during this
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report period that reviewed and closed out IR 50-271/86-17 open items
related to block wall deficiencies also reviewed the effectiveness of
the physical repairs and found no deftetencies.
This item is closed.
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3.5 (Closed) Violation 86-17-01:
Lack of Procedure for Original 1980
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Masonry Wall Survey.
The inspector verified the existence of proced-
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ures to ensure the adequate scoping and implementation of bulletin
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In addition, the four turbine building walls that had
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been omitted were modified to prevent any damage of adjacent safety
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related equipment during a postulated event.
This item is closed.
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3.6 (Closed) Violation 86-17-02:
QA Audit of 1980 Masonry Wall
Activities not Documented for Evidence c
.ompletion.
The inspector
determined that revised controi and imple,nenting procedu es provided
retrievable documentation of activities associated with-the IEB 80-11
program. This item is closed,
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3.7 (Closed) Deviation 86-17-05:
Masonry Wall Design Used Unverified,
Non-conservative Mortar Strength.
The inspector verified that mortar
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samples were obtained and independently tested. The samples exhibited
the following results:
the minimum mortar strength for any mortar
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sample tested was equal to 2000 pounds per square inch (psi).
Since
this exceeded the value which was used in the calculation (1800 psi),
the mortar used was appropriate and acceptable.
This item is closed.
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3.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-17-04:
YAEC Evaluation of Wall 22 Using
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Strain Criteria Required Verification Based on NRC Approved Stress-
Criteria.
The inspector veri,fied that this wall was re-analyzed
using stress criteria consistent with the ACI 531-79 code.
The
analysis results showed that the subject masonry wall structural
integrity was adequate for all loading conditions.
This item is
closed.
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3.9 (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-17-05:
Inadequate Data on Extent and
Cause of Crack Observed by the NRC in Three Unreinforced Walls and
Calculation Revised to Account for Cracks.
The inspector determined
that the calculation was approached conservatively by assuming the
worst case (i.e. the effective shear area was taken as the width of
only one nominal block flange width).
Based on this assumption, the
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resulting shear stress was below the allowable.
The licensee agreed
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to maintain the structural integrity of this wall and to take the
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proper corrective and preventive actions required.
This item is
closed.
4.
Operational Safety
4.1 plant Operations Review
The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift
tours of the following areas:
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Control Room
Cable Vault
Reactor Building
Fence Line (Protected Area)
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Diesel Generator Rooms
Intake Structure
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Vital Switchgear Room
Turbine Building
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Control Room instruments were observed for correlation between chan-
nels, proper functioning, and conformance with Technical Specifica-
tions. Alarm conditions in effect and alarms received in the control
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room were reviewed and discussed with the operators. Operator aware-
ress and response to these conditions were reviewed. Operators were
found cognizant of board and plant conditions.
Control room and
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shift manning were compared with' Technical Specification require-
ments.
Posting and control of radiation, contaminated and high radt-
ation areas were inspected.
Use of and compliance with Radiation
Work Permits and use of required personnel monitoring devices were
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checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed including control
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of flammable and other hazardous materials. During plant tours, logs
and records were reviewed to ensure compliance with station proced-
ures, to determine if entries were correctly made, and to verify cor-
rect communication of equipment status.
These records included var-
ious operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, and
Potential Reportable Occurence Reports.
Inspections of the control
room were performed on weekends and backshifts including July 5-8,
18-22, 25, 26, and August 22, 1988. Operators and shift supervisors
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were alert, attentive and responded appropriately to annunciators and
plant conditions.
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4.2 Safety System Review
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The emergency diesel generators (EOG's), core spray, residual heat
removal, residual heat removal service water, and
high pressure
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coolant injection systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment
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and operational status in the standby mode.
The review included
verification that:
(i) accessible major flow path valves were cor-
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rectly positioned, (ii) power supplies were energized, (iii) lubri-
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cation and component cooling was proper, and (iv) components were
operable based on a visual inspection of equipment for leakage and
general
conditions.
No
violations
or
safety
concerns
were
identified.
4.3 Feedwater Leak Detection System Status
The inspector reviewed the feedwater leakage detection system and the
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monthly performance summary provided by the licensee in accordance
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with VYNPC letter FVY 82-105.
The licensee reported that, based on
the leakage monitoring data for July 1988, there were some deviations
in excess of 0.10 from the steady state value of normalized thermo-
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couple readings, and no failures in the sixteen thermocouples in-
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stalled on the four feedwater nozzles.
The deviations are related
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to the plant shutdowns and startups experienced in late June and
early July and do nut appear to be abnormalities. The inspector had
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no further questions in this area.
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4.4 Inoperable Equipment
Actions taken by plant personnel during periods when equipment was
inoperable were reviewed to verify that technical specification
limits were met, alternate surveillance testing was completed satis-
factorily, and equipment return to service upon completion of repairs
was proper.
This review was completed for the following items:
traversing incore probe drive ball valve,
"A"
radiation monitor, stack air flow monitor, and fire deluge valve (see
Section 6.4).
4.5 Review of Lifted Leads, Jumpers and Mechanical Bypasses
Lif ted lead and jumper (LL/J) requests and mechanical bypasses were
reviewed to verify that controls established by AP 0020 were met, no
conflict with the technical specifications were created, the requests
were properly approved prior to installation, and a safety evaluation
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was prepared if required. Imphmen-
tation of the requests was reviewed on a sampling basis.
4.6 Review of Switching & Tagging Operations
The switching and tagging log was reviewed and tagging activities
were inspected to verify plant equipment was controlled in accordance
with the requirements of AP 0140, Vermont Local Control Switching
Rules.
Implementation of the requests was reviewed on a sampling
basis.
4.7 Operational Safety Findings
Licensee administrative control of off-normal system configurations
by the use of LL/J, mechanical bypass, and switching and tagging pro-
cedures, as reviewed in Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 was in compliance
with procedural instructions and was consistent with plant safety
with the exception of a failure to station a fire watch for the
inoperable fire deluge valve. Licensee efforts to minimizo active
lif ted leads, jumpers and mechanical bypasses is noteworthy.
5.
Security
5.1 Observ,ap
af Physical Security
Selected
. acts of plant physical security were reviewed during
regular ant. backshif t hours to verify that controls were in accord-
ance with the security plan and approved procedures.
This review
included the following security measures:
guard staffing; vital and
protected area barrier integrity; maintenance of isolation zones-
and,
implementation of access controls, including authorizatic.,
badging, escorting, and searches.
No inadequacies were identif b .
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5.2 Fitness for Duty Testing
On August 12, 1988, the licensee received information from a local
law enforcement agency which implicated two site contractors in the
usage of illegal controlled substances.
The licensee immediately
escorted the individuals offsite, suspended their site access and
subjected them to drug testing in accordance with the VYNPC fitness
for duty program.
The individuals submitted to the testing.
On
August 15, 1988, test results for both individuals came back positive
and their site access was permanently suspended. The two contractors
are employed by TTI Engineering and had worked within the maintenance
department primarily in support of stores / procurement and work pack-
age preparation activities.
All projects in which the individuals
were involved received several levels of management review.
The
inspectors had no further questions.
6.
plant Operations
6.1 Reactor Trip: July 3, 1988
The plant experienced an automatic reactor trip on July 3,1988 due
to high flux rate on the intermediate range monitors.
The plant was
in the process of shutting down to repair a feedwater heater leak and
was at less than l's power at the time of the trip. Just prior to the
trip, operators had observed a decrease in reactor pressure from 930
to 872 psig.
In response to the pressure decrease, the operators
attempted to establish the mechanical pressure regulator (MPR) e.cds
of the mechanical hydraulic control (MHC) system to control reactor
pressure.
This effort continued for approximately five minutes with
little apparent MPR setpoint response.
During this period of time
reactor pressure had decreased to 850 psig.
The operators then at-
tempted to establish reactor pressuro control with the bypass valve
opening jack (BP0J). Because the BP0J regulator was not set for the
lowest demanded pressure, the BP0J could not assume pressure control
at the desired pressure. When the BP0J did assume pressure control,
the setpoint manipulations resulted in greater b, sass valve opening,
a further reduction in reactor pressure, and subsequent reactor
pressure and level oscillations. The single operating feedwater pump
tripped on a high reactor water level signal resulti.1g from a high
water level oscillation. Reactor water level then decreased until a
standby feedwater pump started and delivered relatively cold water to
the vessel, resulting in a rapid neutron flux and power increase
sufficient to cause the IRM high flux scram from less than 1% power.
All systems performed as required following the trip.
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Several concerns were identified in review of this event. During the
period when the operators were attempting to establish pressure con-
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trol with the MPR (and subsequently the BP0J), two IRM high flux half
scrams were received as a result of reactor pressure induced power
oscillations. The inspectors believe that, based on the uncertainty
as to the effectiveness of the actions the operators had taken to
control pressure as well as the pressure, level and flux oscillations
experienced at less than 5% power, a more prudent operator action
might have been to manually trip the reactor.
Existing plant pro-
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cedures did not address operator response to a low reactor pressure
condition with the reactor mode switch not in "RUN" as was the case
in this event.
Further, the operators on shift did not realize that
the use of any MHC pressure regulating mode during the decreasing
pressure trend would have further reduced reactor pressure. It also
appeared that the operators did not utilize all of the plant opera-
ting parameter indicators available when interpretting the impact of
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their actions with regard to pressure control.
The PORC reviews of the event and post trip report were thorough and
comprehensive.
The committee discussions of the event and causal
analysis were perceptive and probing.
Significant licensee internal
actions and commitments resulting from the PORC review included:
I&C replacement of the IRM recorders with more reliable units
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less prone to recorder pen hang ups.
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Operations assurance that operators were made aware of the above
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recorder problems.
Operations assurance that operators utilize all plant parameter
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indicators
available when diagnosing
transient conditions.
Operations implementation of appropriate precedure revisions to
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address this event.
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Operations to attempt to reproduce this event on the site
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specific simulator.
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Training to determine the fidelity of the site specific simula-
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tor with respect to this event and MHC pressure control in
general.
The content and completeness of the post trip report improved mark-
edly from recent similar reports.
The increased quality of the
report enabled FORC members to perform an exhaustive review of the
event and to propose comprehensive actions to improve operator and
equipment performance and response with respect to the transient
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experie-
'd in this event.
Inspectors previously documented concerns
about c...
iences in post trip reports. The unresolved item (50-271/
88-08-03) which addressed this issue remains open pending completion
of licensee corrective actions.
The inspectors had no further
questions.
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6.2 Loss of Wind Speed Indication
On July.21,1988, at 3:00 a.m., the shift supervisor determined that
an emergency assessment capability had been compromised when a loss
of all wind speed indication was discovered. All appropriate notifi-
cations were made at that time.
The primary meteorological (MET)
tower parameter printer was out of service since a lightning strike
on July 16.
Local indication of primary MET tower wind speed was
discovered out of service on July 21. The back-up wind speed indi-
c.ator was judged inoperable by the shif t supervisor because it had an
outstanding maintenance / inoperable equipment sticker on it.
Subse-
quent I&C investigation revealed that the back-up wind speed indi-
cator was previously repaired and the sticker was not yet authorized
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for removal. The back-up wind speed indicator was declared operable
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at 5:00 a.m. cn July 21, 1988.
The shif t supervisor properly reported this event based on the infor-
mation available to him.
Failure of I&C to remove the maintenance /
inoperable equipment sticker was an isolated instance of personnel
inattentiveness. It was not indicative of a programmatic deficiency.
The inspectors had no further questions.
6.3 Steam Leak from "2A" High pressure Feedwater Heater
On July 15, 1988, the licensee performed a power reduction in order
to isolate a steam leak that had been discovered on the "2A" high
pressure feedwater heater sight glass.
Once the heater was isolated
operators entered the heater bay area and closed the sight glass
isolation valves.
The sight glass will probably not be repaired
until the 1989 refueling outage.
Local heater level indication will
be lost during this period.
The inspectors had no further questions.
6.4 Failure to Establish a TS-Required Fire Watch
The VYNPS Technical Specification (TS) 3.13.F.2 requires that from
and after the date that one of the sprinkler systems specified in
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Table 3.13.F.1 is inoperable, a fire watch shall be established
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within one hour to inspect the location with the inoperable sprinkler
system at least once every hour.
Contrary to the above, from Jt
Aupust 2, 1988, the licensee
failed to establish a one-hour firs
a of the area served by the
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cable penetration area sprinkler sy sem after the system failed
surveillance testing on July 28.
On August 2, a management review
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of the surveillance identified this situation and a one-hour fire
watch was immediately established.
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During routine surveillance testing of the cable penetration area
sprinkler system, deluge valve DV-301 failed to open and the system
was therefore rendered inoperable.
A maintenance request (MR) was
issued to initiate repairs to the valve. However, the shift super-
visor review of the MR failed to identify the system as being
inoperable and thus did not establish a fire watch.
The immediate root cause of this event was personnel error, in that
the initial shift supervisor and Operations Supervisor review of the
MR failed to identify.the cable penetration area sprinkler system as
The inspectors addressed an additional concern to the
licensee that ?.he fire protection system surveillance procedure con-
trols testing of TS- and non-TS related portions of the system with-
out distinction.
Although not a contributor to this event, proced-
ures written in this style increase the probability of TS require-
ments not being properly implemented following a failed surveillance.
The licensee reviewed this event with'each operating shift. Emphasis
was placed on proper equipment operability determinations.
Because
the failure to establish a TS-required fire watch was identified by
the licensee, was of a low severity level, had prompt corrective
actions, was reported in LER 88-10, and was not related to corrective
actions for a previous violation, no notice of violation will be
issued in this instance.
However, long term review of licensee
actions to ensure proper operability determinations are made and
review of clarifications to the surveillance procedure remains an
open issue (50-271/88-10-01).
7.
Maintenance / Surveillance
On July 11,1988, the #3 traversing incore probe (TIp) drive machine ball
valve failed to close following withdrawal of the probe. The ball valve
failure occurred during the reactor startup from a two-week mini outage.
Because the TIp machines must be readily available to perform traces as
required by reactor engineering procedure and the probes must be in the
shields for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to entry into the TIP room, the valve was not
replaced until the reactor attained a steady power level. On July 14, 1988,
I&C personnel removed the 3/8 inch ball valve and its actuator, and leak
rate tested and installed a replacement valve under the direction of '4R
88-1649. The maintenanca effort was well supervised and coordinated.
The
engineering support department (E50) provided technical guidance to the
I&C department for testing and installation requirements for the valve and
actuator. This was a routine example of typical support provided to the
maintenance department by ESD.
The inspectors had no further questions.
',;
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8.
Licensee Event Reporting (LER)
The inspector reviewed the below licensee event reports (LER's) to deter-
mine that with respect to the general aspects of the event:
(1) the re-
port was submitted in a timely manner; (2) description of the event was
accurate; (3) root cause analysis was performed; (4) safety implications
were considered; and (5) corrective actions implemented or planned were
sufficient to preclude recurrence of a similar event.
8.1 lj_R88-06
The LER 88-06, "Source Inventory and Leak Test" addressed a licensee
identified failure to adequately document a sealed source survey in
accordance with TS 6.5.F.
The details of the missed survey were
previously reviewed as documented in IR 50-271/88-06, Section 9.1.
The LER fulfilled the above criteria with the exception of timeli-
ness.
The licensee had originally intended on making a special re-
port to the NRC to describe this licensee identified violation.
On
that basis, a notice of violation was not issued and item 88-06-02
was considered closed.
The licensee subsequently determined that a
special report was not appropriate but a voluntary LER would be sub-
mitted.
This determination took an excessive amount of time and
resulted in an LER submittal four months af ter the event date. Expe-
dited submittal of the LER occurred after inspector inquiry of the
status.
8.2 LER 88-07
The LER 88-07, "Main Turbine Trip and Reactor Scram from Feedwater
Flow Controller Malfunction" addressed a plant trip f rom a high
reactor water level caused by a component failure in the feedwater
ficw controller.
The details of the scram were previously reviewed
as documented in IR 50-271/88-08, Section 6.1.
The LER fulfilled the
above criteria and no deficiencies were noted. Additionally, the LER
was a good example of detailed and thorough event analysis and
reporting.
8.3 LER 88-08
The LER 88-08, "Unanticipated Scram Due to Malfunction of Turbine
Vibration Probe" addressed a plant trip due to an end-of-life failure
of the #10 main turbine bearing vibration monitoring probe. The LER
fulfilled the above criteria and no deficiencies were noted.
Licen-
i
see event description, analysis, and corrective actions detailed in
the LER were comprehensive,
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9.
Review of Licensee Response to NRC Initiatives
Inspections conducted at several boiling water reactors (BWR's) re-
vealed intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in large
-
diameter recirculation and residual heat removal piping.
Based on
the results of those inspections which were conducted pursuant to IE
Bulletins 82-03, Revision 1 and 83-02, and the NRC August 26, 1983
Orders, the Commission concluded that an ongoing program for similar
reinspections at all BWRs was needed.
Generir Letter (GL) 84-11 was
issued on April 19, 1984 to provide licensees with NRC recommended
actions to accomplish the a forementioned reinspections.
The GL
listed the following actions as an acceptable response to the IGSCC
concerns:
Inspections should include 20% of the welds in each pipe size
--
of IGSCC sensitive welds not inspected previously (but no less
than four welds) and reinspection of 20% of the welds in each
pipe size inspected previously (but not less than two welds) and
found not be cracked.
This sample should be selected primarily
from weld locations shown by experience to have the highest
propensity for cracking.
Inspection of all unrepaired cracked welds.
--
Inspection of all weld overlays on welds where circumferential
--
cracks longer than 10*.' of circumference were measured.
Inspection of any veld treated by induction heating stress
--
improvement which had not been post treatment UT acceptance
tested.
In the event that cracks or significant growth of old cracks are
--
identified, expand the inspection scope in accordan.:e with IEB 83-02.
All Level !! and Level IIT UT examiners should demonstrate com-
--
petence in accordance with IEB 83-02, and Level I examiners
should demonstrate fie*d performance capability.
Leak detection and
leakage
limits
should be sufficiently
--
restrictive to ensure timely investigation of unidentified
leakage.
The inspector reviewed licensee actions in response to IE Bulletin 83-02 and Generic Letter 84-11 to ascertain that regulatory require-
ments regarding IGSCC concerns were met.
.
. _ _ _ _
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12
Bulletin 83-02 required that licensees of BWR facilities identified
in Table 1 of the Bulletin perform a demonstration of the effective-
ness of the ultrasonic testing (UT) methodology used to examine welds
in recirculation system piping.
The demonstrations were to be per-
formed at the EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina on service
induced cracked pipe samples made available for this purpose.
In response to the above mentioned requirement, on March 10-11, 1983,
the licensee sent a five member team of Magnaflux Quality Services
personnel, its inservice inspection ISI vendor, to the EPRI NDE cen-
ter to perform the required demonstration.
The team included one
level III examiner, three Level II examiners and one Level I trainee.
Scanning and data recording were performed by the Level II examiners
aided by the Level I trainee, and the Level III team member was
responsible for data evaluation and classification of the findings
into two Categories, "Crack" or "no Crack."
The team performance was found to be acceptable in that eighty per-
cent of the total number of cracks were detected within the six hour
time limit and the number of false calls was within the pre-estab-
lished limit.
The licensee's letter dated June 5,
1984 to the NRC compared the
licensee's Generic Letter 84-11 reinspection program to the staff's
recommendations listed in GL 84-11 and provided additional in fo rma-
tion requested by the NRC.
The licensee's reinspection program was
found, with two exceptions, to meet the Ceneric Letter.
The 11cen-
see's June 5,1984 letter identified the exceptions to the GL taken
by the licensee which involved the number of weld overlays to be
inspected on welds of identical joint geometry in the same system,
and the definition of "ef fective overlay thickness." The NRC Inspec-
tion Report No. 271/84-13 identified the exceptions as an unresolved
item.
The item was closed in NRC Inspection Report No. 271/85-32
based on licensee actions in 1985 regarding the replacement of recir-
culation and residual heat removal piping which eliminated the basis
l
'er the unresolved item.
I
Prior to the replacement of the recirculation and residual heat
removal system piping, the licensee initiated the use of moisture
sensitive tape as a leak detection method for the early detection of
leaking pipe joints. Since the completion of the replacement program
the tape is no longer used.
The licensee is bound by its Technical Specification 3.6.C requirements regarding leak rate limits and leak
detection methods.
The inspector determined that IGSCC inspections at Vermont Yankee
have met the requirements contained in IE Bulletin 83-02, and Generic
letter 84-11.
No violations were identified.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - -
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9.2 NRC Bulletin 88-07:
Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors
The inspectors reviewed the initial licensee actions in response to
NRC Bulletin 88-07, which documented the LaSalle dual recirculation
purrp trip and power ocsillation event.
Operations management placed
Bulletin 88-07, previously issued NRC Information Notice 88-39, and
INPO SER 14-86 in the control room night orders book for all licensed
individuals to read.
During shift turnovers, an assistant to the
operations supervisor held discussions and addressed questions relat-
ing to the event.
THe VYNPS TS requires that in the event of a dual recirculation pump
trip, power be immediately reduced to below TS limits and the plant
be in hot shutdown within the next twelve hours.
These requirements
are implemented in plant procedure OT-3118, "Recirculation Pump Trip
- Procedure."
Inspector discussions with several operators determined that they
were familiar with the LaSalle event and also that, if a similar
event were to have occurred at VYNPS, the operators would have pro-
perly executed the above requirements and avoided the power oscilla-
tions experienced at LaSalle. The inspector had no further questions
regarding immediate licensee actions in response to this bulletin.
10. Review of periodic and Special Reports
Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports submit-
ted pursuant to Technical Specifications. This review verified, as appli-
cable: (1) that the reported information was valid and included the NRC-
required data; (2) that test results and supporting information were con-
sistent with design
predictions and
performance
specification;
and
'
(3) that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the
problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information
'
should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following report was
reviewed:
Monthly Statistical Report for plant operations for the month of
--
July 1988.
No violations or safety concerns were identified.
11. Management Meetings
At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with
senior plant management to discuss the findings.
A summary of findings
for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspec-
tion and prior to report issuance.
No proprietary information was
identified as being included in the report.
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