IR 05000271/1986016

Insp Rept 50-271/86-16 on 860723-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program & Previously Identified Open Items.Concern Re Protective Action Recommendations Identified

ML20212N608
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	08/20/1986
From:	Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212N593	List: IR 05000271/1986016 ML20212N591
References
50-271-86-16, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8608280303
Download: ML20212N608 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-16 Docket N License N DPR-28 Category C Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 - Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Vern'on, Vermont Inspection Conducted: July 23-24, 1986 Inspectors: r *\ Y !/l !R C. Z. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness / da Spe ialist Approved by:JL[, _arus e&ar - Emergency Preparedness Cf.hief

[ date fd 5ection Inspection Summary: Inspection on July 23-24, 1986 (Report No. 50-271/86-16)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced followup inspection of changes to the emergency preparedness program and previous identified open item Results: No violations were identifie The licensee has continued to make progress in ungrading the emergency preparedness program since 1985. Commit-ments made in the enforcement conference held in July 1985 are expected to be completed prior to the December 3, 1986 exercise. One area of concern was identified regarding the methodology for recommending protective action recom-mendations (PAR) to offsite authoritie PDR ADOCK 05000271 O PDR

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i i DETAILS

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{ 1.0 Persons Contacted 1 J. Babbitt, Training Instructor

! *S. Jefferson, Assistant Plant Manager j *E. Keegan, Environmental Coordinator

B. Lindquest, Shift Supervisor

B. Metcalf, Shift Supervisor

- *R. Monitette, Health Physicist ,

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• D Reid, Operations Superintendent

*W. Riethle. Manager, Radiation Protection, YNSD

! E. Solomon, Emergency Plan Coordinator

* Denotes those present at the exit interview.

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2.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items

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l (Closed) 50-272/85-13-01: Control Room (CR) personnel took accion in-

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dependently and were slow to pass information to the TSC during the Alert

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and Site Area Emergency. It was not clear that the TSC coordinator was directing the response. At one point it took 5 minutes to inform TSC of stuck open safety relief valve.

j The inspector reviewed proposed changes (rev.18) to Procedure No.0P-3504,

" Emergency Communications" and noted that a new form for tracking plant parameters from the Technical Support Center was developed. To further i improve information flow a status board that allows critical plant in-j formation to be displayed was developed and was available in the TSC, and a 'runnar' who hand carries technical information sheets between the l control room and TSC will be instituted during emergencie I

(Closed) 50-271/85-13-11

Personnel exposures were not effectively 1 tracked; cumulative total exposure during the exercise was not being re-

] corded. This item was previously identified by NRC inspectors.

i The inspector reviewed Procedure No.0P-3507 " Emergency Radiation Exposure

! Control", Rev.15, dated September 1985, and determined that the revision is

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adquate to allow radiation exposures to be cumulatively maintained on a j shift basis. The forms are logged and reviewed by appropriate representa-i t

tives of the Chemistry and Hcalth Physics Department.

I (Closed) 50-271/85-18: (a) Real-time instantaneous wind data was not i

available to the dispersion modelers in the EOF / Recovery Center. (b) No t topographic maps were available in the dose assessment area.

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, The inspector reviewed Procedure No.0P-3502, Appendix III, Rev.18, and

determined that the procedure has been adequately revised to provite for i

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the TSC Coordinator to assign an individual in the Control Room to comm-unicate real-time meteorological and radiological information from control room instrumentation to the EOF. -Licensee representatives stated that a direct line to the EOF to provide readouts of meteorological information would be considered. The inspector also reviewed the capabilities of the METPAC computer model and noted that many environmental factors are con-sidered including terrai Results of METPAC calculations when used to-gether with existing area maps are adequate to make accurate dose assess-ments to varying elevations.

I (Closed) 50-271/85-13-24: Monitoring procedure 0.P. 3509 does not require window open/ closed window measurements to assist in determining presence in the plum The inspector reviewed procedure 0.P. 3509, " Environmental Sample Col-lection During and an Emergency", revision 9, held discussions with lic-1 ensee representatives and determined that the equipment available for environmental monitoring and sample collection is adequate. The inspector

! also reviewed procedure 0.P. 3510, "Offsite and Site Boundary Monitoring",

i revision 13, and determined that the survey instruments available are adequate to monitor areas downwind from the site and provide an immediate

indication of the magnitude of a release of radioactive material. The instruments also have the capability to continually assess the impact of a releas ! (Closed) 50-271/86-13-27 (a) Continuous accountability procedures were not

, formalized (i.e., location of monitor, forms and communication methods).

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(b) Status boards provided little useful information to participants, due

to their size, location, and information displayed. (c) Documentaiton of

messages and data transmitted between ERFs did not always include time

(sample / transmitted), method of collection (actual / projected / estimated 1 from meter), source and the verifying individua :

, The inspector reviewed proposed revision to 0.P. 3501 " Alert" and deter-f mined that the procedure now provides for continuous accountability in the control room, Operations Support Center and Technical Support Cente Status boards were observed in the TSC and EOF and appear adequate to allow trending of historical informatio Procedure 0.P. 3504, dEmergency l1 Communications" also contains a proposed revision that instructs commun-i ications assistants in each emergency center to log all messages on a i

three part form (0.P.3504, figure 2), and transmit each part to the appropriate center coordinator for repl .0 Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program The inspector reviewed the licensee records of initiated changes to the '

Vermont Yankee Emergency Plan implementing procedures resulting from re-l commendations made in NRC Inspection Reports No.85-09 and 85-13, and

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Meeting Report No.85-27.

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Changes have been made to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Imple-menting Procedures (EPIP) in the evaluation of authorities and functional responsibilities of key managers. These include classification of actions to be taken by the E0F Coordinator, specific instructions to be provided by the Site Recovery M5 nager when recommending protective actions to off-site authorities, and assignment of Individuals performing specific dose assessment functions by the Radiological Assistant. Other changes have been proposed to core procedures 0.P.-3501 (Alert), 0.P.-3502 (Site Area Emergency), and 0.P.-3503 (General Emergency) and have undergone the in-ternal review process, but offical distribution was not completed. The proposed changes were adequat Another area in which inspector followup was performed was in changes to the licensee's training program. In the Meeting Report 85-27 the licensee committed to modification of the training orogram for key managers. The inspector found that emergency training which included instructions in changes to EPIP's was ongoing since 1985 but remained incomplete (50-271/86-16-01).

The inspector also reviewed revisions to Procedures Nos. 0 P.-3513,

" Evaluation of Radiological Data" and 0.P. 3511 "Offsite Protective Action Recommendations", and held discussions with shift supervisors and Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) representatives regarding accident eval-uation and subsequent methodology for recommending protective measures to Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. We found that 0.P. 3511 and 0.P.-3503 directs the Plant Emergency Director to consider projected dose data in relation to EPA Protective Action Guidelines as the primary criteria for PAR's. The inspector referred the licensee to the NRC guid-ance described in IE Information Notice 83-28 which has the PED consider -

degraded core conditions for development of PAR's prior to a radiological release. In addition, the specific PAR's to the states contained in 0.P.-3503 indicate that sheltering be recommended to the general public with no instructions provided as to distances, location, or wind direct-ion. Based on this discussion the licensee is considering the keyhole concept when issuing FAR's, i.e., sheltering 2 miles 360 around the plant and 5 miles in the downwind and adjacent sectors once a General Emergency is reached. The licensee acknowledged the concerns and indicated that the Emergency Plan and EPIP's would be revised to reflect the NRC guidanc This item will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (50-271/86-16-02).

4.0 Exit Meeting On July 24, 1986, the inspector met with the individuals listed in Section 1 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspecto __ _