IR 05000271/1988018
| ML20206C681 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1988 |
| From: | Markley M, Shanbaky M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206C658 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-88-18, NUDOCS 8811160369 | |
| Download: ML20206C681 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report No.
88-18 Docket No.
50-271 License No.
DPR-28 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Rd Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
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Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Vernon, Vermont Inspection Conducted: October 5-7, 1988 Inspector:
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date M. Markley, Radiatio [ specialist Approved By: # #1 A
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Chief Fifc111 ties Radiation d aT.e M.ShanbakyIonSecfion Protect Inspection Summary:
Inspection conducted on October 5-7, 1988 (Report No.
50 271788-18).
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced inspection of radiological safety relative 1988 access corstrol incident where personnel defeated door totheseptember28[ogainaccesstoapostedhighradiationarea.
locking mechanisms Areas management involvement, and licensee corrective actions.gical controls, inspected relative to the incident included: the radiolo Results: Within the scope of this review, one apparent violation was idenUTied. The violation was for failure to observe the radiological postings.
Programatic weaknesses were identified and are noted in section 3.0 of this report.
Short term corrective actions were adequate in ensuring immediate radiological safety.
However, long ierm corrective actions and upgrades to address programatic weaknesses will be examined during a future inspection.
Ge11160369 001104 ADOCR 0500
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted During the course of the inspection, the following personnel were contacted or interviewed:
1.1 Licensee Personnel
- D. Oyer, Quality Services Group
- R. Grippardi, QA Supervisor
- S. Jefferson, Assistant Plant Manager M.Neteli,RadiationProtectionSupervisor
- B. Leach Engineering Support Supervisor
- R. Morrissette, Plant Health Physicist
- R. Pagodin, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. Pciletier, Plant Manager J. Sinclair Plant Services Supervisor
- R. Wanczyk, Operations Superintendent
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- T. White,dperationsSupportEngireer 1.2 NRC Personnel
- G. Grant, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Mcdonald, Resident Inspector Other persornel were contacted or interviewed during this inspection.
- Attended the exit meeting on October 7, 1988.
2.0 Purpose
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The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's radiolacical 1988 access control incicent safety program relative to the September 28,h radiation areas.
Specific involving unauthorized entry into posted hig
areas reviewed were:
radiological controls;
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management involvement; and
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licensee corrective actions.
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3.0 Radiological Controls The licensee's radiological controls was reviewed against criteria contained in the following:
10 CFR 20 "Standards for Protection Against Radiation";
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site Technical Specifications;
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review of station procedures.
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Evaluation of licensee performance in this area was based on the following:
tours of the facility;
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discussions with licensee personnel;
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review of Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) and associated surv;js; and
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review of the following procedures:
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AP 0502, Rev. 19, "Radiation Work Permits";
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AP 0503, Rev. 9 "Establishing and Posting Controlled Arees";
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AP 0529, Rev. 2, "Health Physics Incident Reports";
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OP 0532, Rev. 7, "Radiation Protection Department Key Control";
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DP 0537, Rev.1, "Radiological Deficiency Reports";
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AP 0503, Rav. 9, 0. W. 1, "Fstablishing and Posting Controlled
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OP 0532'.
/. 7, DI No.1, "Radiation Protection Department Key
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Control Within the scope of this review, one apparent violation was identified.
On September 28 1988 a radiation protection (RP) technician observed two Instrument and dontrol I&C technicians attempting to defeat the lock on the door of(the)"B" recombiner access hallway in th(pry open)d e Advance Offgas (A0G)tated that()osted High Radiation Area, RWP Required) ion prior building The RP
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technician s le directed them to get proper authorizat to entering the room.
One of the I&C technicians returned to the Control Point to obtain a key and dose rate instrument. The cognizant Radiation Protection Assistant (RPA) stated that the I&C technicians were provided with a key to the area technician returned to the area and opened the "B" g processed, the I&C and a dose rate instrument. While the RWP was beinrecombiner door.
The two I&C technicians entered the area and completed their tasks without proper RWP authorization.
Through the licensee's investigation, it was determined that the two I&C technicianshadpreviouslycompletedsimilartasksinsideanotherposted High Radiation Area (the A" recombiner hallway in the A0G) without proper RWP authorization and without using the access key.
The two I&C technicians worked in these areas without knowledge of the current radiological conditions based on the RWP survey and without following the RWP requirements.
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Technical Specification 6.S B. states that radiation control standards and procedures shall be approved, maintained and made available to all station Procedure AP 0502, "Radiation Work Permits" requires in personnel.
section B.
6., in part, that all working party personnel shall observe all posted and written instructions given by the work party supervisor and/or the assigned Chemistry and Health Physics representative. The I&C technicians entered the "A" and "B" recombiner hallways which wei'e posted
"High Radiation Area, RWP Required" without a RWP. Failure to observe the radiological posting constitutes an apparent violation (50-271/88-18-01).
Later the cognizant I&C foreman went to the Control Point to discuss the radiciogicalpostingwiththeRPA. He asserted that although the I&C technicians' conduct was wrong, the dose rates did not constitute a high radiation area, did not require locking and should not have required a Radiation Work Permit. The inspector discussed the dose rates with the radiation protection staff who stated that the dose rates are subject to transient changes depending on which system is being used.
The inspector noted that no significant exposures resulted.
However, important physical and administrative barriers were violated.
On October 4,1988, a local lock specialist performed an evaluation of all high radiation area locks.
He determined that seventeen out of forty-three door locks showed evidence of phy ical tampering. On the same day, senior site management held a meeting to inform the staff of the unacceptability of tampering with locks and to delineate immediate corrective actions.
The inspector determined through evaluation of the licensee's actions and circumstances leading to this incident that:
a. An apparent disregard to radiological physical and administrative safety barriers existed.
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b. A lax attitude toward high radiation area controls by plant personnel including radiation protection management existed, c. The I&C technician and RP staff actions reflected an apparent weakness in tne effectiveness of radiological safety training.
AP d. Significant weaknesses were identified in procedures AP 0502,k OP 0532, and DP 0537.
Procedura AP 0502,"Radiation Wor 0529}ts" has a high threshold for reouiring RWPs, in that, work Perm in area dose rates as high as 100 mR/50ur does not require an RWP authorization.
Procedure OP 0532,* Radiation Protection Department Key Control" allows the Radiation Protection Assistant
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to give verbal permission to individuals to enter high radiation areas without an RWP.
Procedures AP 0529,"Health Physics Incident Reports" and DP 0537,"Radiological Deficiency Reports" do not provid; guidance for the timely notification of appropriate management prior to the processing of incident documentation.
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4.0 Licensee Corrective Actions Inspector evaluation of this area was based on the following licensee corrective actions:
discussed the incident in a special department meeting on October 4,
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1988; counseled the I&C technicians and placed a disciplinary letter in their
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personnel files; charged the I&C training coordinator with assembling a training module
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on security and radiation protection postings and processes; placing a note in the procedure rewrite "tickler" file to identify a
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need to contact radiation 3rotection prior to going to the A0G building for surveillance OP 4380,"Functional / Calibration Hydrogen Detection System";d other OP 4380 surveillances to determine if this incident had evaluate
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occurred previously; reviewed the key log and removed high radiation area (11A) keys from the
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Control Point; Revision forgroceduresAP0503andOP0532, Revisio com>1eted Department Instructions (dis) Areas
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"Establishing and Posting Controlled 9,diation Protection Department Key Control";
Rafixed door locking mechanisms to prevent future tampering;
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performed an inplant radiological survey to determine high radiation
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areas requiring locks and the appropriateness of current postings; posted a list of doors with locks at the Control Point;
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- marking radiological surveys to indicate areas requiring RWps; and
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- established a Task Force to determine long term corrective actions.
The inspector considered these actions to be adequate in ensuring immediate radiological safety. However, long term corrective actions and the noted programatic and procedural weaknesses including licensee upgrades will be examined in a future inspection.
l 6.0 Exit Meeting I
The inspector met with licensee management listed in section 1.0 on October
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at the conclusion of the inspection. The findings of the inspection were discussed at that time.