IR 05000271/1998099
| ML20239A276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20239A274 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-98-99, NUDOCS 9809080360 | |
| Download: ML20239A276 (7) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1 SALP REPORT - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION l
50-271/98-99 1.
BACKGROUND l
The SALP Board convened on July 30,1998, to assess the nuclear safety performance of l
the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station for the period January 19,1997, through July 18,1998. The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.6 (see NRC Administrative Letter 93-20). Board members were: James T. Wiggins (Board Chairman), Director, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region I (RI); Richard V. Crlenjak,
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Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Rl; and Cecil O. Thomas, Director, Project
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Directorate 13, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Board developed this i
assessment for the approval of the Region i Administrator.
l The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC MD 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - OPERATIONS The conduct of operations at Vermont Yankee continued to be good during this SALP period. Operations personnel executed their responsibilities in a capable manner.
J Management efforts to improve routine operator communication and prejob briefings have been effective in improving operator performance in dealing with both routina activities and
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unexpected occurrences. The control of significant planned evolutions, such as reactor j
startup and shutdown, was typically very good. Oversight of daily activities by Operations
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department management contributed to the safe operation of the unit. Oversight committees were generally effective in their assessments of operations. The licensed operator training program was effective in providing license candidates with sufficient knowledge to successfully complete the licensing process.
Operator performance during the conduct of routine activities was typically very good, although some human performance errors contributed to plant transients. Placing two
"down-scale" average power range monitors (APRM) in service, and poor coordination of switchyard activities are two examples of human performance errors that led to reactor scrams.
Operator performance in response to abnormal conditions and plant transients was also very good with few exceptions. In response to a recent reactor recirculation pump trip, operations crew performance was excellent, as exemplified by clear communications and coordination of recovery actions. In contrast, following an appropriate initial response to the June 1998 reactor scram, operator followup actions complicated the recovery.
Operators failed to remove the standby reactor feedwater pumps from service, and crew j
supervision failed ta conduct a full-shift briefing prior to re-energizing a balance-of-plant bus, i
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l-Initial screening of deficiency (event) reports by Operations provided appropriate bases for
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continued operation in light of the particular degraded plant conditions. Some recent problems occurred, however, when initial deportability assessments by on-shift personnel I
were inadequate, contributing to delays in making the required notifications. An example included a required 4-hour report for a potential common mode failure of the standby gas treatment subsysterns that was delayed for 14 days.
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Weaknesses in the quality of some procedures used to control plant operations were revealed during reviews of plant events. These procedure inadequacies resulted in notable performance problems, including complications in recovery from the June 1998 scram and one example of containment inerting complications. Also, licensee annual self-assessments continued to identify problems with procedure quality. As a result, operations management recently dedicated additional resources to improving procedure quality and review.
The Operations Area was rated Category 2.
111.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE During this assessment period, the conduct of on-line preventative and corrective maintenance activities and surveillance testing was good. This was evidenced by the overall good plant material condition and the demonstrated high reliability of safety-related equipment. However, some human performance and procedure adequacy problems resulted in plant events and operational challenges. A notable example involved the accidental shorting of a station vital battery. In addition, poor oversight, job planning, and control of contract employee work activities resulted in problems during the outage torus modification project and chamfer work on certain motor-operated valves.
Equipment performance and overall material condition was very good and resulted in a high state of readiness of standby safety systems. Positive surveillance test program results confirmed that safety-related equipment was well maintained. The work control process was effectively implemented and included appropriate prejob briefings, contingency planning, and post-maintenance testing. The successful startup transformer troubleshooting and repair at power was a noteworthy example of the work control process effectiveness. The on-line maintenance program was a strength.
Regarding the corrective action program, when degraded equipment conditions were identified the licensee took appropriate cornpensatory actions and the equipment was either promptly repaired or appropriately scheduled for repair. For example, response to failed stroke testing of several containment isolation valves was prompt and troubleshooting efforts were well planned and executed. In some cases, however, the licensee failed to use the corrective action program to fully resolve problems. An example included the inadequate resolution of out-of-tolerance conditions on residual heat removal system (RHR) system over-current relays. The maintenance backlog was routinely tracked, trended, and prioritized to appropriately allocate available resources. Overall, the backlog of maintenance work was effectively manage _
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While improvement was noted in reducing the number of surveillance test procedure problems since the last SALP, some additional deficiencies were observed indicating that continued effort to improve procedure quality is warranted. Test procedure inadequacies resulted in the mispositioning of a RHR system minimum flow valve and an improper test of the APRM down-scale trip function.
The maintenance rule was effectively implemented and contributed to maintaining equipment reliability. The licensee's scoping efforts, as well as the level of detail and quality of the facility's probabilistic risk assessment, were appropriate for allowing the performance of risk categorizations.
The Maintenance area was rated Category 2.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING in the engineering area, management focused on important areas for improvement and provided appropriate oversight of routine activities. These included the system engineering function, the Configuration Management Improvement Project, and the merging of the design and systems engineering functions into a composite site engineering organization.
Management effectively factored NRC design inspection techniques into planning for design basis document validation. A large volume of engineering work in the areas of problem resolution, performance of operability evaluations, and support of licensing actions, as well as work associated with the design of modifications, continued to challenge the engineering organizations and resulted in some instances where engineering products were not comprehensive or timely.
Some root cause evaluations and corrective actions for identified problems were not comprehensive or timely. For example, the licensee failed to perform an operability evaluation when reviewing the effects of a loss of instrument air to the control ventilation system. Also, the root cause evaluation that was performed failed to identify that the affected components were previously overlooked during engineering reviews performed in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-14, " Instrument Air Supply Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."
Engineering support to operations and maintenance contributed to reliable equipment performance during this period. Operability evaluations provided by engineering included a sound technical basis to support the conclusions and provided appropriate interim actions and controls to ensure safe operation. The number of open BMOs (Bases for Maintained Operation) was significantly reduced during the 1998 refueling outage. However, some operating and surveillance procedure deficiencies resulted from incorrectly translating design information into those procedures. For example, early in the period, operating procedures were inconsistent with design requirements regarding residual heat removal system pump minimum-flow requirements and pump motor starting frequency.
During the period, several problems were identified with the licensee evaluation of issues with respect to deportability requirements. Required NRC notifications were sometimes
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delayed and frequently required supplemental reports due to delays in completing root cause analysis or delays in formulating long-term corrective actions. For example, the licensee failed to report to the NRC that the plant had been operated outside of its design basis when the torus temperature exceeded the design value on at least two occasions.
i Design and modification activities reflected the use of sound engineering principles and l
contributed to the effective resolution of issues. The high pressure coolant injection /
reactor core isolation cooling systems vacuum breaker and the steam tunnel blowout panel modifications were thorough and effectively resolved these old design deficiencies.
Overall, engineering design personnel were knowledgeable, and the minor modification, commercial grade dedication and equivalency evaluation programs were functioning well.
The licensee implemented comprehensive measures, in the form of the Configuration Management Improvement Program, to review and document the plant's design basis. The activities to date have been rigorous, as evidenced by the number and significance of the issues identified during the development and validation of the system design basis documents.
License amendment submittals were generally complete but occasionally untimely. In one case, associated with a torus repair, the licensee did not initially recognize the requirement to submit an ASME code relief request.
The Engineering area was rated Category 2.
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V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT In general, radiation protection activities were effectively controlled during the period.
Internal and external personnel radiation exposures were well managed through an ALARA l
program that established reasonable occupational exposure goals for both the non-outage and outage years. Radioactive materials and contamination were generally well controlled.
Very good efforts were made to effectively reduce the extent of facility contamination and to monitor materials (e.g., tools and equipment) released from radiologically controlled areas.
Regarding the torus suction strainer modification activities, the NRC review identified notable performance deficiencies that involved ineffective planning, oversight, and control of work. Man-hour estimates for the project were not wellintegrated into ALARA planning. Also, inter-and intra-departmental communications related to torus cutting
. activities were weak and radiological briefings of workers conducted prior to the start of work were ineffective. Additionally, there was ineffective radiological oversight of work, in part due to insufficient radiation protection staffing and equipment. In response to the NRC-identified problems, senior licensee management suspended work, changed the pace of work activities and provided additional radiation protection and quality assurance (QA)
staff to better control and monitor work activities. Later in the project, during torus grit blasting, the licensee experienced problems involving breakthrough of the temporary torus ventilation system, which caused some airborne radioactive materials to be exhausted into
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the reactor building. The licensee suspended blasting work and took appropriate corrective actions prior to resuming work.
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Overall, radwaste processing and transportation activities were carried out well. An area
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for improvement was related to the documentation of training for those individuals involved in radioactive waste classification for shipping purposes. The effluents and environmental monitoring programs continued to be effective. The programs included effective quality assurance, with prompt action on identified deficiencies.
Site management continued appropriate oversight of the security program. The security staff was knowledgeable about program requirements and made effective use of the process for the identification and correction of problems. Late in the period, the NRC identified deficiencies in the perimeter alarm system and observed a security force member performing an incomplete search of a package at the site access point. While these deficiencies did not result in an immediate challenge to plant security, they did reflect inattention to detail in implementing important elements of the security program. The licensee's corrective actions for those deficiencies were appropriate.
The licensee established and maintained an overall effective emergency preparedness program. During the full participation exercise, the emergency response organization accurately diagnosed and classified the event. Appropriate mitigation actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner.
Performance in the area of fire protection was good. General plant housekeeping was good and improving. The final closeout inspection of the torus found no significant issues relative to general cleanliness. This was particularly noteworthy considering the scope of the work that was performed during the refueling outage.
Overall, the licensee conducted comprehensive surveillance and audit activities to assess the quality of program performance. The licensee actively solicited comments and recommendations from contract radiation protection technicians to enhance improvement efforts.
The Plant Support area was rated Category 2.
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