IR 05000271/1989011
| ML20247N270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1989 |
| From: | Lazarus W, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247N249 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-89-11, NUDOCS 8909260182 | |
| Download: ML20247N270 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
Report No.
50-271/89-11 Docket No.
50-271 License No. DPR-28 Category C
Licensee: Vermont-Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5. Box 169 Brattleboro. Vermont 05302 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At:
Bratt.leboro. Vermont Inspection Conducted: Auaust 22-24, 1989 Inspectors:
D.Vito,/PS,FRSSB,DRSS
/date M. Fairtile, VY Project Manager, NRR R. Hogan, PEPB, NRR J. Macdonald, Resident Inspector Approved by:
4N f
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)6/J.L(2)rus, Chief,EmergencyPreparedness date Section, FRSSB, DRSS Inspection Sunnary:
Inspection on Auaust 22-24. 1989 (Inspection Report No. 50-271/89-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise on August 23, 1989.
The inspection was performed by a team of four NRC Region I and Headquarters personnel.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the
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public.
G909260182 890914 PDR ADOCK 050002?1 a
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following key licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on August 24, 1989.
J. Gary Weigand, President and Chief Operating Officer Warren Murphy, Vice President and Manager of Operations James Pelletier, Plant Manager Edward Porter, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Al Chesley, Exercise Coordinator The inspectors also observed the actions of, and interviewed other licensee personnel.
2.0 Emercency Exercise The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station full participation exercise was conducted on August 23, 1989 from 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M.
The States of Vermont and New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts fully participated in the exercise. State and local activities were observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I and Headquarters representatives held meetings and had telephone conversations with the
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j licensee to discuss the objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, certain portions of the scenario were revised to I
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ensure that offsite exercise objectives would be met.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on August 22, 1989 and I
i participated in discussions of emergency response actions anticipated during the exercise.
The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupted.
l The exercise scenario included the following events:
l 1.
Failure of a diesel generator lockout relay resulting in a l
shutdown required by the technical specifications; l
2.
Moisture Separator level control problems resulting in a turbine I
trip and a reactor scram; I
3.
A partial reactor scram (ATWS);
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A stuck open safety relief valve resulting in increasing containment radiation levels; l
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Failure in a torus to reactor building vacuum breaker resulting in a release to the environment, l
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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency; 7.
Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and 8.
Recommendation of protective actions to state officiais.
2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the exercise, four NRC team members made observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; 4.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information; 5.
Communications, information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 7.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; 8.
Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; 9.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 10.
Performance of technical support, repairs and corrective actions; 11.
Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; and 12.
Preparation of information for dissemination at the Media Center and Media Center operation.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with the Vermont Yankee emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
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3.1 Exercise Strenaths The NRC team noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
1.
The interaction by the States of Vermont and New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was substantial during the exercise and contributed to scenario realism; licensee interaction with state representatives was effective and informative; 2.
Dose assessment activities were proactive and aggressively attempted to evaluate potential radiological conditions based on projected trends in plant conditions;
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3.
Emergency Action Levels (EAls) were effectively utilized, event l
classifications were correct, and subsequent notifications were timely; 4.
Emergency Response Facility (ERF) communications, interactions, and overall command and control were effectively demonstrated; and 5.
Staff augmentation was prompt and each ERF was activated in a timely manner.
3.2 Areas for Improvement The NRC team identified the following areas which did not have a significant impact on overall performance during the exercise but in which improvements could be made. These areas for improvement should be evaluated by the licensee to determine whether improvements could strengthen the emergency response effort. The areas for improvement are indicated as follows:
1.
Although appropriate event classification notifications were made, there is no provision in the notification documentation for the Unusual Event and Alert event classifications for Shift Supervisor / Plant Emergency Director (SS/ PED) signoff after appropriate notifications have been made. A signoff of this type would denote acknowledgement by the SS/ PED that the notification documentation is accurate as well as providing a historical record of the SS/ PED review.
2.
In the E0F, NRC inspectors observed a number of conversations between the licensee and state officials. On several occasions, it was necessary for the licensee to clarify these discussions by drawing simplified system diagrams on boards located in the state briefing area. These technical discussions could have been facilitated by the availability of prepared system diagrams in the briefing area for use as visual aids.
3.
The E0F Site Recovery Manager (SRM) developed Protective Action i
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Recommendations (PARS) for the evacuation of several towns in the EPZ prior to the declaration of a General Emergency (GE). The GE was declared shortly thereafter (within 10 minutes) due to worsening plant conditions. After the GE was declared, an immediate change to the initial PARS was required, i.e., a recommendation for the evacustion of an additional town was called for by PAR guidance providid in the procedure which governs licensee actions after the declaration of a GE.
It should have been recognized that in considering anticipatory PARS, the SRM was, in effect, simultaneously concluding that the emergency condition had escalated to that of a General Emergency.
The inspectors noted that while this did not adversely affect the exercise, the relationship between the declaration of a GE and the I
issuance of PARS should be reemphasized in the licensee's EP training program in this area. This issue will be reviewed as part of a subsequent routine EP inspection.
4.
The quality of the licensee's presentations in the Media Center could have been better in terms of technical content and could have been improved by the use of additional visual aids. Also, the Media Center presentations were often disrupted by the volume of the public address system.
The inspectors also noted that the licensee does not currently have procedures for the establishment of radiological access control for the Media Center, should it be required in an emergency.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previpusly identified items Several areas requiring improvement were identified during the previous emergency exercise (NRC Region I Inspection Report 50 271/88-13). The licensee's actions in response to these items were observed by the NRC team.
1.
The licensee adequately demonstrated that the NRC would have been notified of changes in plant status which do not necessarily prompt an escalation in the event classification.
2.
The Vermont and Massachusetts press releases included the date and I
time.
(Since the States retain control of this item, the licensee cannot be held responsible for providing assurance that the omission of the date and time from state press releases will not recur.)
3.
The Media Center lighting conditions and provisions for the use of visual aids were adequate. However, more visual aids could have
been provided to facilitate technical discussions (see Section 3.3 of this report).
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The licensee recognized Site Area Emergency and General Emergency conditions. based on a worsening trend in plant conditions and entered these event classifications accordingly.
5.0 Licensee Critiaue The NRC team attended.the licensee's post-exercise critique on August 24,.1989. The VY exercise _ coordinator discussed the licensee's observations.of the exercise and indicated that the observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken. The critique was thorough nd. comprehensive and demonstrated the licensee's ability to perform r proper self-evaluation.
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6.0 Exit Meetina and NRC Critiaue The NRC team leader met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a nanner which could adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management ackm wledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate the NRC comments and observations and take corrective actions as appropriate.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide written information to the licensee.
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