IR 05000271/1986021

Mgt Meeting Rept 50-271/86-21 on 860729.Major Areas Discussed:Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves,Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves,Rhr Solenoid Valves & Namco Switch Blocks

ML20203L592
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	08/08/1986
From:	Elsasser T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203L589	List: IR 05000271/1986021 ML20203L588
References
50-271-86-21-MM, NUDOCS 8608280271
Download: ML20203L592 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.: '86-21

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Docket No.: 50-271 License No.: DPR-28 ' Priority: --

Category: C Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Meeting At: NRC Region I, King of Prussia, PA.

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Meeting Conducted: July 29, 1986 Reported by: J. Schumac R ctor Engineer Approved by: /- ' _ /up A

' T. C. Elsa ief, Reactor Projects Section 3C Dht(

, Meeting Summary NRC requested management meeting to discuss identification of material deficiencies during procurement, installation, and testing of system components. The licensee presented the results of their investigations into material deficiencies associated with: (1) the standby liquid control squib valves, (2) the scram pilot solenoid valves, (3) the residual heat removal (RHR) solenoid valves, (4) the NAMCO switch blocks, and (5) the intermediate range monitor (IRM) detectors. Tneir discussion

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included the methods of discovery, corrective actions, and conclusions. The NRC explained their concerns with the current methods of procurement at Vermont Yankee and discussed ways to improve discovery of material deficiencies. The meeting ended with a brief discussion of NRC 10 CFR 21 reporting nethods and disposition.

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860E280271 860815 PDR ADOCKOLOOOgi G .

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DETAILS Licensee Attendees J. Pelletier, Plant Manager R. Wanczyk, Technical Services Superintendent NRC Attendees E. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

P. Eapen, Chief, Quality Assurance Section, DRS 0. Haverkamp, Project Engineer, DRP J. Schumacher, Reactor Engineer, DRP J. Prell, Reactor Engineer, DRS Background Vermont Yankee has recently identified a number.of material deficiencies which could have affected system operability. These deficiencies were identified durin; procurement, installation, or testing raising questions as to the ef-fectiveness of Vermont Yankee's receipt inspection program. The systems /com-ponents affected are listed below along with the inspection report numbers which discuss the incidents in detail.

l Inspection System / Component Report Number Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves 50-271/86-05; 86-10 ASCO Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves 50-271/86-10 RHR Service Water Solenoid Valves 50-271/86-15

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NAMCO Switch Blocks 50-271/86-01; 86-10 IRM Detectors 50-271/86-15 Discussion The licensee p esented a brief review of the events that led to the identifi-cation of material deficiencies. The details of this presentation are in-cluded as Enclosure 2. The presentation included discussions of the adequacy of the licensee's receipt inspection program and whether material deficiencies later discovered could have been prevented by a more comprehensive receipt inspection program. The licensee stated that in some cases Vermont Yankee had a fal'se sense of security that components would operate once installed

. based upon the vendors certification that the materials were acceptabl Procedure revisions have been made by the licensee to improve receipt inspec-tion methods and conduct pre-installation testing as appropriate, thus in-creasing the surveillance of vendor supplied material .. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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The licensee also presented a discussion of the generic impl.ications of the noted material deficiencies. This included a matrix which shows the process by which material received by Vermont Yankee is inspected, installation checked, and tested to prove system operability. The licensee stated that even if the vendor's QA program fails to supply an adequate part/ component, the systematic program in effect at Vermont Yankee will discover the defi-ciency at some stage in the process. This discovery will be made either dur-ing receipt inspection, installation checks, or functional / operational testing depending on the particular component in questio The NRC asked how the licensee could improve their program so that more mate-rial deficiencies could be found during receipt inspection, thus preventing defective material from entering the plant. The licensee stated that some -

material deficiencies, due to the nature of component design, could not be identified until actual testing is performed. The licensee stated, however, that identifying deficiencies as early as possible was their goal and that, considering the extensive amount of material entering the plant during their recent outage, only a few part/ component deficiencies were failures that were detected after installation. They further stated that their process for identification and correction of deficiencies regarding components installed in plant systems was effectiv The meeting ended with.a brief discussion by the NRC concerning 10 CFR 21 re-porting. The NRC explained how Part 21 reports are tracked to identify mate-rial deficiencies and what information is supplied to licensees when reported deficiencies have generic implications. The NRC also stated that the licen-sees are responsible for review and evaluation of 10 CFR 21 reports for potential applicability to their facilities, as well as being responsible for ensuring material received is capable of performing it's intended functio At the conclusion of the meeting, the NRC had no further questions or concerns regarding the previous material deficiencies that were identified at Vermont Yankee or regarding the licensee's planned actions to prevent recurrenc The NRC will continue to follow the licensee's program for identif' ation of material deficiencies as part of the routine inspection program.

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{ ENCLOSURE 2 MANAGEMENT MEETIND TO DISCUSS IDENTIFICATION OF MA12 RIAL g DEFICIENCIES DURING PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATION, AND

. TESTING OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS

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NRC REGION I OFFICE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA JULY 29, 1986 INTRODUCTIONS JPP I PURPOSE FOR MEETING AND OBJECTIVES JPP II DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS, METHODS /TIMEFRAME RJW OF DISCOVERY, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, CONCLUSIONS STANDBY LIGUID CONTROL SQUIB VALVES ASCO SCRAM PILOT SOLENOID VALVES RHR SERVICE WATER SOLENOID VALVES NAMCO SWITCH BLOCKS IRM DETECTORS I DISCUSSION OF GENERIC IMPLICATIONS RJW CONCLUSION JPP

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ISSUE: STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SQUIB VALVES

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BACKGROUND: DURING A POST-CYCLE SURVEILLANCE TEST THE SLC SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE INOPERABLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO ACTUATE THE EXPLOSIVE SQUIB VALVE THE TEST PERFORMED WAS NOT

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REGUIRED TO SATISFY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, BUT TO DEMONSTRATE VALVE OPERABILITY DURING THE PREVIOUS CYCLE.

, DUE TO AN INTERNAL MISWIRING OF THE DETECTOR IT WAS IN A STATE THAT SHOWED CIRCUIT CONTINUITY YET WOULD NOT HAVE FIRED USING THE INSTALLED CONTROLS.

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METHOD OF AS DESCRIBED ABOVE 1 DISCOVERY:

WHY NOT GIVEN THAT THE REPLACEMENT CHARGES HAD BEEN MANUFACTURED i DISCOVERED AND TESTED UNDER THE VENDORS GA PROGRAM, AND THAT WE HAD

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EARLIER: RECEIVED CERTIFICATION ATTESTING THAT THEY WERE WHAT WE REQUIRED, WE HAD A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT THEY WOULD OPERATE PROPERLY IF NEEDED ONCE INSTALLE NO INFORMATION HAD BEEN PUBLISHED INDICATING THERE WAS ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THE VENDORS' PERFORMANCE WAS ANYTHING BUT ACCEPTABLE.

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CORRECTIVE -PROCEDURE REVISIONS REGUIRING PRE-INSTALLATION ACTIONS: CONTINUITY CHECK REVISED PRE-INSTALLATION TESTING METHODS USING' INSTALLED CIRCUITRY-REQUIRE VENDOR TO EUPPLY THE LATEST REVISION OF DESIGN DRAWING TO ALLOW REVIEW OF CHANGES THAT MIGHT IMPACT OPERATION CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM RESULTED FROM A WIRING ERROR MADE BY THE MANUFACTURE IN HINDSIGHT WE CONCLUDE THAT ADDITIONAL STEPS SHOULD HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY VY TO VALIDATE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CHARGE PRIOR TO INSTALLATION SINCE THE ONLY 4 FUNCTIONAL TESTING PERFORMED WAS AFTER THE FACT, ie, DURING THE NEXT GUTAGES' SURVEILLANCE TES .

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ISSUE: SCRAM PILOT SOLENOID VALVES

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B ACKGROUND: DURING THE 1985/86 REFUELING OUTAGE ALL 89 CONTROL RODS HAD THEIR SCRAM PILOT SOLENOID VALVES REBUILT BASED ON A RECOMMENDATION FROM THE VENDOR (SIL 128). THE REBUILDING'

OF THE VALVES ENTAILED REPLACEMENT OF THE EXHAUST AND PRESSURE DIAPHRAGM DISCS, 0-RINGS ANO SEALS, AND REPLACEMENT OF THE SOLENOID PILOT HEAD SUBBASE AND CORE ASSEMBL METHOD OF WHILE CONDUCTING SINGLE ROD SCRAM TIMING TESTS, SIX CONTROL DISCOVERY: EXHIBITED UNACCEPTABLE RESULT TROUBLESHOOTING IDENTIFIED ONE PROBLEM RELATING TO AN INSTALLATION ERROR AND THE REMAINING PROBLEMS DUE TO MANUFACTURER-INDUCED DISCREPANCIES WITH THE SUPPLIED PART WHY NOT THE PRACTICE IN PLACE AT THE TIME HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL FOR A DISCOVERED NUMDER OF YEAR GIVEN THAT THE REPLACEMENT PARTS WERE EARLIER: ORDERED UNDER THE VENDOR 'S GA PROGRAM AND CERTIFIED TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS, WE HAD A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT THEY WOULD OPERATE PROPERLY WHEN INSTALLE CORRECTIVE -EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING / ANALYSIS ACTIONS:

-INSTALLATION OF 100% GC-VERIFIED REPLACEMENT PARTS-REVISION OF PROCEDURE TO REQUIRE PRE-OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONAL TEST OF AIR SCRAM VALVES WHEN REQUIRE PURSUE ISSUE WITH THE VENDOR CONCLUSION: EXCEPT'FOR'THE ISOLATED PROBLEM RESULTANT FROM THE INSTALLATION ERROR, THIS PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY A FAILURE OF THE SUPPLIER TO PROVIDE ACCEPTABLE REPLACEMENT PARTS.

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.. ISSUE: RHR SERVICE WATER SOLENOID VALVES

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B ACKGROUND: ATTEMPTS TO INSTALL EG-GUALIFIED VALVES DURING THE PREVIOUS OUTAGE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, A JCO WAS PREPARED AND PLANS WERE MADE TO UPGRADE THE VALVES DURING THE 1985/86 OUTAGE. WITH -

ASSISTANCE FROM THE VENDOR, A PLAN WAS DEVELOPED TO " CONVERT" THE INSTALLED SOLENOID FROM A NON-EG STATE TO A GUALIFIED STATE WITH THE INSTALLATION OF RADIATION RESISTANT ELASTOMERS l

AND A STAINLESS STEEL DISC HOLDER.

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l METHOD OF DURING THE INSTALLATION PROCESS, IT WAS DETERMINED BY THE DISCOVERY: INSTALLER AND GC INSPECTOR THAT THE UPGRADE PARTS SUPPLIED BY '

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THE VENDOR DID NOT COMPLETELY DUPLICATE THE PARTS CONTAINED IN THE EXISTING VALVE. THE PLUGNUT/ ADAPTER SUBASSEMBLY WAS ONE PIECE IN THE "OLD" VALVE AND TWO PIECES IN THE REPLACE-MENT, OF WHICH ONLY ONE PIECE WAS PROVIDED.

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WHY NOT WITHOUT DIS-ASSEMBLING THE VALVES THAT WERE INSERVICE , IT DISCOVERED COULD NOT BE READILY DETERMINED BY VERMONT YANKEE THAT THE EARLIER: PLUGNUT/ ADAPTER SUBASSEMBLY WAS ONE PIECE IN THE OLD DESIGN AND TWO PIECES IN THE NEW DESIGN. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE VENDOR REGARDING THE PLANNED CONVERSION DID NOT REVEAL THE NEED TO ORDER THE ASSEMBLY AS TWO PARTS.

CORRECTIVE THE MISSING PART WAS OBTAINED FROM THE VENDOR, INSTALLED AND ACTIONS: THE VALVES WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE.

! CONCLUSION: A LACK OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE VENDOR ORGANIZATION AND POOR DETAIL ON THE VENDOR'S PARTS DIAGRAMS WERE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS PROBLEM.

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THIS TOPIC IN NO WAY DEALT WITH DISCREPANT PARTS, IT WAS STRICTLY A COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM WITH THE VENDOR RESULTING

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COMPLETE THE TASK.

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ISSUE: NAMCO SWITCH BLOCKS ,

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BACKGROUND: ALONG WITH EG PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE, EFFORTS WERE PLANNED TO REPLACE THE LIMIT SWITCH CONTACT BLOCKS ON ALL MSIV'S,

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FOR PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANC METHOD OF DURING PRE-INSTALLATION CHECKOUT, A TECHNICIAN IDENTIFIED THAT DISCOVERY: THE NEW REPLACEMENT BLOCKS HAD PIECES MISSIN WHY NOT THE SUBJECT BLOCKS WERE PURCHASED AND RECEIVED AT VERMONT DISCOVERED YANKEE IN 198 A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING OF THE BLOCKS EARLIER: DONE AT THAT TIME DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY DISCREPANCIE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RECEIPT INSPECTION AREA HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 198 CORRECTIVE -EXTENSIVE EXAMINATION ON INSTALLED AND STOCK PARTS WAS ACTIONS: DONE-USE OF NAMCO ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AS PART OUR OUR RECEIPT INSPECTION PROCESS IS BEING CONSIDERED-PURSUE NAMCO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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CONCLUSION: IT APPEARS THE VENDOR IS EXPERIENCING FABRICATION PROBLEMS AND IS INEFFECTIVE IN DISCOVERING THESE PROBLEMS IN-HOUSE.

! THIS IS THE ONLY ISSUE THAT POTENTIALLY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO RECEIPT INSPECTION DEFICIENCIES FAILING TO DISCOVER BAD PARTS; HOWEVER BECAUSE THIS IS AN ISOLATED CASE AND BECAUSE THE RECEIPT INSPECTION PROCESS WAS RECENTLY UPGRADED, WE FEEL THAT ADDITIONAL CHANGES ARE NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIM .

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ISSUE: IRM DETECTORS

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BACKGROUND: SIX NEW IRM DETECTORS AND FOUR NEW SRM DETECTORS, MANUFACTURED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, WERE INSTALLED DURING THE 1985/86 REFUELING OUTAG BECAUSE OF DRY TUBE REPLACEMENT EFFORTS, THESE DETECTORS WERE LOADED INTO THE DRYTUBES AND INSERTED FROM THE TOP OF THE VESSE ALL PREINSTALLATION CHECKS WERE SATISFACTOR METHOD OF DURING REACTOR STARTUP IT WAS IDENTIFIED BY STATION GPERATORS DISCOVERY: THAT IRM'S B, E AND F WERE NOT RESPONDING TO NEUTRON FLU .

WHY NOT TESTING, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE VENDOR, WAS PERFORMED PRIOR TO DISCOVERED INSTALLATION AND ALL DETECTORS WERE FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABL EARLIER: IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO EXPOSE THE DETECTORS TO NEUTRON FLUX TO DEMONSTRATE OPERABILITY PRIOR TO INSTALLATIO CORRECTIVE -IRM DETECTORS B, E, AND F WERE REPLACED WITH NEW DETECTOR ACTIONS:

-FAILED DETECTORS WILL DE RETURNED TO GENERAL ELECTRIC FOR ANALYSIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUS PLANT PROCEDURES WILL BE REVISED TO REGUIRE A COMPARISON OF DETECTOR BREAKDOWN VOLTAGE MEASUREMENT DATA TAKEN AT THE TIME OF RECEIPT AND THAT TAKEN POST INSTALLATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETECT ANY DETERIORATION OF THE DETECTORS.

! -ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FACTORY DATA ON BREAKDOWN VOLTAGES TO USE IN CONCERT WITH THE TRENDING EFFORT DESCRIBED ABOVE.

l l -PENDING MORE INFORMATION ON THE CAUSE OF THE DETECTOR FAILURE

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DISCONTINUE INSERTION OF NEW DETECTORS FROM ABOVE THE REACTOR VESSE .

CONCLUSION: FINAL CONCLUSIONS CANNOT BE DRAWN UNTIL DESTRUCTIVE TESTING IS PERFORMED ON THE FAILED DETECTOR PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS l

APPEAR TO SHOW THAT THE " ACCEPTANCE" RANGE ADVERTISED BY THE j VENDOR MAY BE TOO BROAD AND/OR THAT INSTALLATION FROM ABOVE THE VESSEL IS CAUSING FAILURE ~

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5 LIMITOROUE LIMIT SWITCHES. HALWORTH VALVE PARTS. UNION PUMP PACKING.

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VEN60R o APPROX. 290 SAFETY RELATED PURCHASE ORDERS WERE PROCESSED DURING THE 1995/86 REFUELING. OUTAGE LIMITORGUE LIMIT SWITCHES. WALWORTH VALVE PARTS. UNION PUMP PACKIN CCNAX THERMOWELLS

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DECEIPT INSPECTION o APPROX. 55% OF ALL SAFETY RELATED ORDERS RESULTED IN MDR *S DRYTUBES. RWCU HT EX. LPRM CABLE. VALVE PARTS. ET INSTALLATION CHECKS

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VENDOR o APPROX. 280 SAFETY RELATED PURCHASE ORDERS WERE PROCESSED DURING THE 1985/86 REFUELING O'JTAGE

LIMITORGUE LIMIT SWITCHES. WALWORTH VALVE PARTS. UNION PUMP PACKIN CONAX THERMOWELLS

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RECEIPT INSPECTION

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o APPROX. 55% OF ALL SAFETY RELATED ORDERS RESULTED IN PWR'S i

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DRYTUSES. RWCU HT EX. LPRf1 CASLE. VALVE PARTS. ETC.

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LIMITO'lGUE LIMIT SWITCHES. WALWORTH VALVE PARTS. UNION PUMP PACKIN CONAX THERMOWELLS i

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-RECEIPT INSPECTION e APPROM. SSX (F ALL SAFETY RELATED ORDERS RESULTED IN der'S DRYTUSES. RWCU HT EN. LPRM CASLE. VALVE PARTS. ET .

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VENDOR o APPROX. 200 SAFETY RELATED PURCHASE ORDERS WERE PROCESSED DURING THE 1985/86 REFUELING OUTACE LIMITOROUE LIMIT SWITCHES. WALWORTH VALVE PARTS. UNION PUMP PACKIN CONAX THERMOWELLS

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ECEIPT INSPECTION 3 y M TV mELATEp Onesas ngsutTED IN Men's VALyg PART3. ET enviveEs. RMCU HT Ex. LPWM CASL .

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, >;2000 MAINTENANCE REeUEsTs THIS OUTAGE INSTALLATION g,.A RELAvs. seAMCO. RNR8W CHECKS

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