IR 05000271/1987022

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-271/87-22 on 871201-04. No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Insp & 871202 Annual Exercise

ML20149E312
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	12/11/1987
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149E302	List: IR 05000271/1987022 ML20149E296
References
50-271-87-22, NUDOCS 8801130292
Download: ML20149E312 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-22 Docket N License N DPR-28 Priority Category C Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5 Box 169 Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Brattleboro, Vermont Inspection Conducted: December 1 - 4, 1987 Inspectors: D / "

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C. Conkl jin' Team Leader, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS T. Tuccinardi, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS K. Christopher, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS Geoffrey Grant, SRI John MacDonald, RI Harold Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee Cynthia Carpenter, RI, Yankee Approved By: h /> /7 I W. J /_.14tarut/ Chief, EPS, date EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 1-4, 1987 (Report N /87-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on December 2, 1987. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I personne Results: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi ~8801130292 871230 l PDR ADOCK 05000271 0 DCD

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contactec The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on December 4, 198 J. Gary Weigand, President and Chief Executive Officer Warren Murphy, Vice President and Manager of Operations James Pelletier, Plant Manager Reid Smith, Assistant to the President Edward Porter, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Stanley Jefferson, Exercise Coordinator William Riethle, Manager Radiation Protection, YNSD The team observed and interviewed 5.everal licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercis . Emergency Exercise The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station full participation exercise was conducted on December 2, 1987 from 4:30 PM to 11:30 PM. Subsequently, The States of Vermont and New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts conducted field monitoring activities and an ingestion pathway exerc'ese on December 3, 1987. These activities were observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agenc .1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee represent-atives to discuss objectives, scope,and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on December 2,1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

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- An earthquake and subsequent after shocks;

- A loss of "A" Standby Gas Treatment Train;

- An Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS), with subsequent core damage;

- A LOCA, outside of containment, with release to the atmosphere;

- Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Classifications;

- Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and

- Recommendation of protective actions to state official .2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team members made detailed nbser/ations of the activation and augment-ation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilitie The l following activities were observed: Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; i Direction and coordination of the emergency response; l Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; 1 Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of I pertinent plant status information: Communications /information flow, and record keeping; Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; j Provisions for inplant radiation protection; Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control; 1 Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions;

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11. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; and 1 Preparation of information for disseminatlon at the Emergency News Cente .0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facil-ities, and use of the facil ties were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedure .1 Exercise Strengths The team also noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions-

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Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities (ERF's) was demonstrated by the respective managers; Cla:;sifications made by the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) staff were prompt and correct, and subsequent notifications were timely;

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Dose Projections were performed often and utilized plant conditions as well as field condition Subsequent Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) were timely and conservative;

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Staff augmentation was prompt and each ERF was setup and activated in a timely manner; and I

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Staff members in each ERF demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the l plant and coordinated effectively with their respective counterpart l 3.2 . Exercise Weaknesses l l

The NRC team identified the following areas where weaknesses were i observed which could have degraded the response and should be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. This item is tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI).

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50-271/87-22-01: Initial notification forms do not allow for approval by the Plant Emergency Director. Additionally, the forms are not required when state EOC's are activated. This could result in necessary information not being transmitted to the states, ;

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including Protective Action Recommendations at a Site Area Emergenc .3 Other Areas Requiring Follow-up The NRC team identified the following areas which did not degrade the response, however these areas should be evaluated by the licensee to determine whether improvements could strengthen the respons The state and licensee work area in the Emergency News Center (ENC)

is poorly lighted, excessively small, crowded and difficult to work in. It is doubtful that the ENC staffs could function effectively for prolonged periods in an actual emergency. The licensee needs to evaluate the ENC and make improvements to improve the staff work are .0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during previous inspections (Inspection Report Nos. 50-271/85-13, 50-271/86-26 and 50-271/87-07 BaseduponobservationsmadebytheNRCteamduringtheexercisethe).

following open items were acceptably demonstrated and are closed: -

(CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-01: Control Room personnel took action independently and were slow to pass information to the TS (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-05: Overall direction of plant activities (TSC)

did not appear to be fully coordinate (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-06: Excessive noise levels in the TS (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-07: TSC did not aggressively followup and :

coordinate plant activitie l (CLOSED) 50-271/85-13-08: Technical reviews in the TSC were inadequat (CLOSED) 50-271/86-26-01: The offsite monitoring teams reported their locations by using landmarks. Many of these landmarks were not labeled on the map and presented some difficulty in determining the precise location of the individual team (CLOSED) 50-271/86-26-02: The TSC Coordinator was not actively '.nvolved in EAL discussions with the Control Room and E0F and in fact declined to participate in an EAL discussio i (CLOSED) 50-271/87-07-01: Shift staffing and augmentation method and tests need to be evaluated for validity and ability to staff in a timely manne i

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The licensee conducted an announced augmentation drill on November 22, 1.987 at 6:30 PM. The results of this drill indicate that the licensee would be able to staff key emergency positions in a timely manne Additionally, the annual exercise conducted on December 2,1987, was unannounced and outside of normal working hours. The licensee also demonstrated the ability to augment and staff in a timely manne Followup actions based upon the augmentation drill results include evaluation of the pager system .,4 preparation of a notification procedure to encompass all affected department Based upon the above review, this area is acceptabl .0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on December 4, 1987, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observa-tions of the exercise. The licensee indicated these observations woeld be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions take .0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercis ,

I The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there :

were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC teat determined !

that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licenseo management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified open ite At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written l information to the license l