IR 05000271/1988002
| ML20196J631 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1988 |
| From: | Loesch R, Shanbaky M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196J626 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-88-02, 50-271-88-2, NUDOCS 8803140426 | |
| Download: ML20196J631 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-271/88-02 Docket No.
50-271 Category C
License No.
DPR-28 Priority
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i Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation i
RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station i
Inspection At:
Vernon, Vermont i
Inspection Conducted:
February 1-5, 1988
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Inspectors:
M N-A44:/--
a ML ilf R.Loesch, Radiation Specialist date l
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Approved by:
M 2/2kfY
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anbaky, ChT5,
aci les Radiation daT.e
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i Protection Section
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ection Summary:
Inspection conducted on February 1-5, 1988 (Report No.
5b7T788-02 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of radiological controls
including: control of radioactive materials, respiratory protection, and external exposure controls.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified in the review.
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8803140426 880304 PDR ADOCK 05000271
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DETAILS
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1.0 Personnel Contacted I
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1.1 Licensee Personnel
- J. Pelletier Plant Manager
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- B. Wanczyk Operations Superintendent
- B. Leach Radiation Protection Supervisor
- R. Morrissette Plant Health Physicist l
- J. McCarthy ALARA Engineer M. Ball Mechanical Engineer i
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R. McCullough Assessment Coordinator i
1.2 NRC Personnel i
G. Grant Senior Resident Inspector
- denotes attendance at the exit interview on February 5, 1988.
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I 2.0 Status of Previously Identified Items i
2.1 (Closed) 85-25-03 (Ins ector Follow-up).
Perform a PRM 6/Nal survey
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of the owner controlled area.
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The licensee hrformed a survey of the North and South 40 areas
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utilizing a P 6 portable count rate meter equipped with a Na!
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i detector. No areas of contamination were identified.
This was
documented as part of the 1986 Annual Site Survey. This item is
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closed.
j (Closed 86-22-03 I
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2.2 of drywe)ll work pra(Unresolved). NRC to determine if a follow up review ctices is warranted.
The licensee's radiolocical practices pertaining to outage activities
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and ALARA were reviewec during the 1987 refueling outage as described I
in Inspection Report 87-15. Tours of the facility and discussions
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with licensee personnel indicated that health physics practices,
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particularly controls applied to the drywell, were consistent with i
accepted ALARA concepts. This item is closed.
2.3 (Closed 87-15-02 LUnresolvedi of the r)adiologically controlle. Allegation of contamination outside d area (RCA).
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The licensee performed an extensive investigation of the allegation
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which verified the existence of the contamination, determined the root
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cause, and established both short-term and long term corrective
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i actions (see Section 3.0 of this inspection report for details). This j
item is closed.
3.0 Control of Radioactive Materials The inspector reviewed the posting, labeling and control of radioactive
material with respect to criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for
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Protection Against Radiation."
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The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based upon:
l discussionswifhcognizantpersonne$;toursofthefacility; observations b the inspector durin
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independent radiation surveys performed by the inspector;
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review of licensee's report Summary of Investigation into
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Contamination Found Outside of the Radwaste Building on 8/12/87",
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review of the 1986 and 1987 Annual Site Surveys; and i
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review of licensee memo, "Trash Removal from the Radiation
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Control Area", dated September 29, 1987.
I The NRC received an allegation on August 10, 1987, concerning contaminated
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radioactive material outside the radiologically controlled area. This allegation was discussed in NRr Inspection Report No. 271/87-15 (section
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5.0).
The licensee's investigation into the allegation was performed by i
individuals not associated with the plant Radiation Protection Program and l
appeared adequate and complete.
The investigation team made the following
six recommendations:
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1.
RP Management should reexamine their philosophy regarding i
actions that need to be taken when contamination is founo
j outside of the RCA to ensure future discoveries receive more immediate attention.
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2.
VY Management should assess the area outside of the cask room i
to determine the need for additional controls / confinement
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necessary to preclude the migration of contamination from the RCA.
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3.
RP should evaluate high background areas that do not receive
i attention during the annual site survey.
RP should consider development of special monitoring techniques / procedures to incorporate such areas into the annual site survey.
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4.
RP/ Chemistry should perform a radiological survey of the internals of the adjacent storm sewer, j
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Evaluate future contracts to ensure high technical experience J
and minimize turnover of HP technicians.
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Develop a mechanism to ensure that all RP contractors are i
trained on the desired sequence of reporting problems, in order to i
provide VY Management an opportunity to address concerns prior to elevating a problem to the NRC.
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i Item 5 was contract related and was not reviewed by the inspector. All of the remaining five items are complete with the exception of evaluating a
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technique to survey areas with high backgrounds (Recommendation No. 3).
This is scheduled to be completed by April 1, 1988.
The root cause identified by the licensee was contaminated water from the cask room exiting the building under the doors around the railroad track penetrations and its subsequent draining into the exposed soil.
In addition, high backgrounds in that area prevented its timely detection. The licensee has taken corrective actions to contain the wash water and prevent reoccurrence. The contaminated area was excavated, backfilled, and sealed with asphalt. The contaminated soil has been placed into drums for shipment to a burial site. Additional long term measures were recommended
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and are under evaluation. The inspector noted that a programmatic
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breakdown resulted in an incident Report not being gelierated and a lack of
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aggressive follow up by RP management. The licensee stated that due to misapplied priorities initial actions were delayed. The generation of an incide'it report would have resulted in a more timely resolution of the
?roblem.
The licensee has reemphasized Procedure OP-0529, "Incident Reports" to all RP departmental personnel.
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Due to past incidents where radioactive materials were discovered outside the RCA mixed in with clean trash, the licensee has implemented, by memo a new )olicy for trash removal from the radiologically controlled area. All
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tras) is surveyed in a low background area measuring less than 100 cpm over background (less than 300 cpm) and trash is considered clean.
Certain items typically used in contaminated areas (those yellow in color for examp e) are automatically considered contaminated. Clean material is bagge, appropriately tagged and ) laced in a locked plywood box located in
the T rbine Bay.
This prevents tie accidental placement of contaminated
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i objects with trash reviously surveyed and determined to be clean.
Bags
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from the Turbine Ba box are later checked for proper tagging, and again
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surveyed in a low b ckground area less than 100 cpm.
This new methodology should be effective in(preventing the rec)urrence of previous
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incidents where contaminated material was discovered mixed with clean
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trash.
The licensee has yet to formally incorporate this policy into procedure.
This will be reviewed in a future inspection (88-02-01).
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4.0 Respiratory Protection
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The licensee's program for respiratory protection was reviewed against criteria contained in the following:
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10 CFR 20.103, "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of
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radioactive materials in air in restricted areas";
NUREG-0041, "Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne
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Radioactive Materials"; and Licensee procedure AP-0505, Rey, 15, "Respiratory Protection",
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dated November 19, 1987.
Evaluation of licensee performance in this area was based upon the following:
Discussions with tognizant personnel;
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Review of training lesson plans for respiratory protection;
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Review of personnel training records; and
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Tour of the fit testing facility.
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During the previous outage, the licensce's aerosol booth used for quantitative fit testing of respiratory protection devices became inoperable and was supplemented by equipment from an outside contractor.
Recently, due to the inability to obtain repair parts for the fit booth the licensee purchased two units which perform quantitative tests utilizing the particles and concentrations that occur in ambient air rather than with the generation of a controlled aerosol.
The new units have been incorporated into the Respiratory Protection Program and are currently operational.
The inspector noted, however, that the equipreent has not been adequately tested onsite nor has the licensee obtained and evaluated other tests which would document the ability of the units to effectively replace the current industry standard aerosol booth.
Thd inspector informed the licensee of an existing U.S. Army test report.
The licensee ordered a halt on the use of the new equipment until such assurances are obtained. This matter will be reviewed in a future inspecticn (88-02-02).
5.0 External Exposure Controls The licensee's radiological controls for access to and work in the drywell during spent (he following: irradiated) fuel movement was evaluated against criteria contained in t General Electric (GE) Operating Experience Report (OER) No. 78,
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"Radiation levels and S11elding Recommendations for the Upper Drywell Area During fuel Transfer", dated May 31, 1973; GE Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 354, "Potential Radiation
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AlD No. 55"pper Drywell Areas During Fuel Movement Activities -
Levels in U, dated February 18, 1981; and NRC Temporary Instruction 2500/23, "Evaluate BWR Licensee Radiological
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Controls for Drywell During spent Fuel Movements", dated March 13, 1987.
Evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based upon the following:
Discussionswithcognizantgersonnel;
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Review of licensee report, Dropped fuel Bundle Dose Calculations",
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dated August 17, 1987; and Review of licensee's procedure OP-1101
"Fuel Assembly Movement",
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Rev. 13, dated December 2, 1987 and proposed draft of Rev. 14.
The licensee has installed, prior to the first refueling outage, additional stainless s("cattle chute") comprised of 5" of lead and a total of 1 1/2" of shielding teel which effectively reduces dose rates in the upper drywell region to manageable levels.
The licensee currently allows workers in the drywell during fuel movement.
Although the current revision of procedure OP-1101
"Fuel Assembly Movement",doesnotaddressthenecessaryradiologlcalprecautions,thenew draft incorporates the following three additional requirements:
two dedicated lines of communications between the refueling operation
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and the drywell control point; immediate notification of the drywell control point upon a fuel mishap
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or reduction in reactor vessel water level; and contacting Radiation Protection (RP) management prior to commencement
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of fuel movements.
The inspector noted the following weaknesses in the operations procedure:
notification of RP management alone may not ensure that the
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appropriate individuals at the drywell control point are made aware of impending fuel operations; and resumption of fuel movements after a temporary halt in operations
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procedural prerequisites (i.e). notification of RP personnel) aremay not necessar (minor equipment malfunction satisfied prior to restarting fuel movements.
In addition, no specific RP procedures exist which document requirements and controls necessary when allowing work within the drywell during fuel movements, instead, the licensee plans to utilize the outage surveillance system to generate memos detailing the applicable radiation safety precautions. These memos will then be placed in each outage manual.
The ins ector questioned the effectiveness of a memo as compared to a formall implemented and approved procedure. The licensee stated that the appropr ateness of using the outage manual to document the drywell radiological controls would be evaluated.
Specific training, as specified in Tl 2500 with an understanding of the drywell hazar/23, to provide affected workers ds has not been fully implemented.
This training should clearly define worker actions and responsibilities during normal and emergency operations associated with fuel movement. The licensee indicated that training improvements would be implementi
_ lor to the next scheduled refueling outage.
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Licensee actions in this area will be reviewed in a future inspection (88 02-03).
6.0 Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee >ersonnel denoted in Section 1.1 at the r bruary 5 19 The scope and findings conclusion of the inspection on oftheinspectionwerediscussedatthattIme.88.
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