IR 05000271/1993034

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Insp Rept 50-271/93-34 on 931213-17.No Violations Noted. Major Areas inspected:follow-up of Previously Identified Security Items,Security Mgt Effectiveness & Audits,Protected Area Access Control of Personnel & Security Training
ML20059K243
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 01/12/1994
From: Albert R, Mccabe E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059K227 List:
References
50-271-93-34, NUDOCS 9402020021
Download: ML20059K243 (6)


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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION I

INSPECTION REPORT

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l Report No.

50-271/93-34 Docket No.

50-271 i

License No. DPR-28 Licensee:

Vermont Yank.ge Nuclear Power Corooration i

Facility Name:

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At:

Vernon. Vermont Inspection Conducted:

December 13-17. 1993

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Inspectors:

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R. J. Albert, Physical Security Inspector

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I f 11b4 Approved by:

E. C. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Section date i

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SCOPE l

Follow-up of previously identified security items; security management effectiveness and l

audits; protected area access control of personnel; and security training.

l RESULTS The licensee's security program was found to be directed toward public health and safety.

No safety concerns or violations of NRC requirements were identified.

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DETAIIE 1.0 Kev Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensee

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  • G. Morgan, Security Manager
  • J. Herron, Technical Services Superintendent

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1.2 Contractor

  • F. Harper, Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)

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  • B. Kindilien, Director, Quality Assurance, TWC

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  • Present at the exit meeting The inspector also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel.

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2.0 Follow-Un of Previously Identified Items

2.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-271/93-15-01:

During prior inspection of the licensee's implementation of the Access Authorization Rule, the inspector noted that the licensee's program regarding

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Background Investigation Elements, specifically employment history, utilized the elements of Suitable Inquiry from 10 CFR 26. However, all the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 were not incorporated, in that an inquiry was not specified regarding information that adversely reflected upon the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual as it related to unescorted access. The

inspector reviewed Revision 2 to the Access Authorization Program and

j determined that this omission had been rectified. This item is closed.

2.2 (Closed) IFI 50-271/93-27-01:

During a previous inspection, security training documentation was found not to be maintained in a centrallocation. This method of record maintenance made auditing difficult and indicated that tracking the completion of training was difficult as well. In addition, the training records indicated that the licensee used a combination of five methods for qualification: audit, examination, observation, performance, and verbal. The audit method, as applied, appeared ambiguous in that it was not clear if the date of completion of a task, such as completing a vehicle search log, was the date that the task was audited or the I

date that the task was performed.

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i-3-i During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective measures, which included a revised, centrally located training record, and the development of specific guidance for the audit method of recertification. These measures were found satisfactory. This item is closed.

i 3.0 Management Effectiveness and Audits 3.1 Mananement Effectiveness Management support for the licensee's physical security program was assessed as good by the inspector. This conclusion was based upon the inspector's I

review of various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection, as'

documented in this report. In addition, the following management initiatives to make the program more effective were noteworthy:

3.1.1 Development of a " Safeguards Event Analysis of Repetitive Events "

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methodology to track, trend and assess safeguards events. Based on a review oflicensee analysis and of safeguards events logs for calendar year 1993, this licensee initiative resulted in significant reduction m j

loggable events.

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3.1.2 Development of a " Security Department Self-Assessment" System.

I Through this system, the licensee evaluated its security program against industry safeguards events, such as a vehicle penetrating the protected j

area barrier at another nuclear facility, 3.1.3 Implementation of a 4-Day-On/4-Day-Off 12-Hour work schedule for the on-duty security shift to maximize shift coverage and reduce overtime. The licensee provided the inspector with documentation on i

reduced overtime. Security force members spoke positively to the inspector on the 12-hour work schedule.

3.1.4 Contracting an independent consultant to evaluate major components of

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the security program and make recommendations for improvements.

One major component slated for upgrade was the protected area barrier, which may include a vehicle trap to accommodate vehicle searches.

3.1.5 Purchase of new, tactically-orientated uniforms. Security force members were generally complimentary about these uniforms.

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-4-3.2 Audits J

The inspector reviewed annual security program audit report VY-93-04C and verified that the audit had been conducted in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan). Inspector review found that the audit was comprehensive in scope and did not identify any programmatic weaknesses. The audit produced no findings and four observations with recommendations. Audit results were reported to appropriate levels of management. The inspector reviewed management's actions regarding the audit and found them appropriate.

4.0 Protected Area (PA) Access Control of Personnel

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f 4.1 Personnel Access Control The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA. This determination was based on the following:

4.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key-cards.

4.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee had a search program, as committed to in the Plan, for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials. The inspector observed visitor access processing and personnel access processing during shift changes, and

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interviewed members of the security force and the licensce's security i

staff about personnel access procedures. No inadequacies were identified.

4.2 Permanent Corrective Measures To Resolve Potential Circumvention of Access Control Reauirements Licensee Audit No. VY-92-04 identified that, because the x-ray conveyor belt was uncovered and was installed directly adjacent to the metal detector, incoming personnel could place an item on the belt, process through the metal detector, pick up the item before it was x-rayed, and carry the item into the PA without it being x-rayed.

The licensee's corrective actions included writing specific post instructions for

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the security officers who perform access control duties. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions and found that the post instructions did not adequately address the vulnerability.

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-5-The licensee revised the post instructions and committed to reevaluate this matter to ensure effectiveness.

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During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's permanent t

corrective measures, which included extending the x-ray tunnel to cover the entire length of the conveyor belt, and found them acceptable. The permanent fix was effective and allowed the licensee to reduce the number of security personnel needed during peak access control activities.

No current inadequacies were identified in this area.

5.0 Security Trainine Several security force members were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that the security personnel interviewed were professional and knowledgeable of theirjob requirements.

The inspector observed members of the security force undergo enhanced tactical training at the firing range, which was set up with a mock building and a tactical obstacle course representative of possible contingencies at the station. The training incorporated contingency equipment that would be used at the station, search and clear techniques, tactical movement and firing discipline, tactical weapon loading, weapons retention, hostage situations, and the challenge of physical stress.

The licensee provided the inspector with documentation of the contingency drills conducted during calendar year 1993. That documentation showed that drills were conducted several times each month throughout the year, except just before and during the refueling outage which ended in early October. The inspector also observed the licensee conduct three contingency drills, each with a different scenario. These drills were assessed as realistic and representative of the design basis threat. The security force demonstrated good tactical control and maneuvers.

The inspector attended a counterpart briefing conducted by the licensee for members of local law enforcement agencies, the State Police, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That briefing consisted of good exchange of information critical to a joint contingency effort, an overview of station security capabilities, a tour of the station, and an invitation forjoint training for the station and any or all of the law enforcement agencies in attendance.

No deficiencies were identified in this area.

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. Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on December 17, 1993. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the preliminary inspection findings were presented. The licensee representatives present acknowledged the findings of the inspection.

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