IR 05000213/1986012
| ML20206M248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1986 |
| From: | Amato C, Ronald Bellamy, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206M246 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-86-12, NUDOCS 8607010114 | |
| Download: ML20206M248 (10) | |
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8 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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J Report No.
50-213/86-12
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Docket No.
50-213 License No.
DPR-61 Priority
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Category B
Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant Company f
Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant i
P.O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270
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Inspection At:
Haddam and Berlin, Connecticut l
Inspection Conducted. April 25-26, 1986 Inspectors:
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j W. L(p fus,4fnior Emergency Preparedness date Specialif(
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0.&xh
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l C. Ama'to, Emergency Preparedness
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l Specialist (Team Leader)
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C. Z. Gordon, RI J. Hawxhurst, RI
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F. Carlson, PNL E.
cke, PNL
Approved by:
4 I ftS i
R. pffl amy/,fhief, Emergency ffeparedness
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M Radhflogical ProtectiWBranch, DRSS
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l Inspection Summary:
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced emergency prepardness inspection and i
observation of a full-scale emergency exercise at the Haddam Neck Plant and I
Northeast Utilities Corporate Office conducted on April 25-26, 1986. The j
inspection was performed by a team of four NRC Region I and two NRC contractor i
personnel.
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Results: The licensee's onsite and corporate headquarters response actions j
for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
No violations were identified.
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8607010114 860623
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PDR ADOCK 05000213
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_ DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on April 26, 1986.
J. F. Opeka, Senior Vice President C. F. Sears, Vice President Nuclear and Environmental Engineering E. J. Mroczka, Vice President Nuclear Operations R. Graves, Superintendent, Haddam Neck Plant R. Bouchard, Superintendent Station Services, Haddam Neck Plant R. Rogers, Manager, Radiological Assessment E. Molloy, Supervisor, Emergency Prepardness W. T. McCance, Haddam Neck, Emergency Prepardness Coordinator D. Alloi, Emergency Prepardness staff P. Luckey, Nuclear Training Department In addition, the inspectors observed the actions of numerous licensee personnel during the conduct of the exercise.
2.
Emergency Exercise The Haddam Neck Plant full participation, unannounced emergency exercise was conducted on April 25, 1986, from 4:30 p.m. until 11:15 p.m.
2.1. Pre-Exercise ictivities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had
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telephone discussions with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the objectives and scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to certain scenario data by the licensee.
In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on April 25, 1986.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
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Abnormal weather conditions
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Loss of one offsite power supply line Turbine trip - no immediate reactor trip
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Overpressure of primary loop Safety valve lifts and sticks 100% open i'
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PORVs open and close normally
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Pressure Relief Tank diaphram ruptures Primary loop water flows to containmen
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Manual reactor trip, 30 seconds after turbine trip Tornado impacts site
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Loss of all offsite power
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Only available diesel electric generator starts Site evacuation and personnel accountability
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Available diesel electric generator fails
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Activation of emergency response facilities.
Station blackout
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Core uncovery
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Top of plant stack topples, falls on and ruptures purge line
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Ground level release of radioactive material to the environment
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Diesel electric generator restarts
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Core recovery
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Operation of containment sprays Termination of atmospheric release by equalization of
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containment and atmospheric pressure.
The events and accompanying scenario details were prepared to meet on-and offsite objectives and respond to nineteen open items resulting from observation of the previous, observed exercise.
The open items were reported in inspection report 50-213/85-06.
2.2. Exercise Observations During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
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Recognition of scenario initiating conditions Correlation of scenario initiating conditions with Emergency
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i Plan Implementing Procedures Classification of scenario events with Emergency Action Levels
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Notification of onsite personnel and offsite agencies
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Activation and operation of Emergency Response Facilities Technical support to operations
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Personnel accountability
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Use of procedures and other Emergency Plan related documentation
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Dose assessment Radio net controller management of Radiological Monitoring
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Teams Assembly, briefing and dispatch of inspection, repair and
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radiological monitoring teams Support of the Emergency Operation Center by the Connecticut
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Yankee Corporate Organization for Nuclear Incidents (CONI)
Briefing of Emergency Response Facility staff
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Maintainence of communication with the State of Connecticut
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Operation of Nuclear Emergency Status System (NESS)
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Order of Repair and Corrective Actions
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Formation of Protective Action Recommendations
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EOF security and Health Physics control
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Establishment of shift relief
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Arrangement for external support and replacement equipment
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Rumor Control print-outs and press releases
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The NRC team noted the licensee's activation and augmentation of the l
emergency response organization and activation of the Emergency Response Facilities were generally consistent with the emergency
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l plan, implementing procedures and the Corporate Organization for
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Nuclear Incidents Plan.
The NRC team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and
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i efficiently implemented:
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Use of procedures
Augmentation of emergency response staff for an unannounced
and rapidly paced scenario
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Diagnoses of potential causes based on available
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Anticipation of probable scenario accident trends
Efficient and knowledgeable Technical Support Center staff j
Good command and control by the Director of Site
Emergency Operations Protective Action Recommendations for.nulated using
i appropriate procedures and correlated with Connecticut
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j State Posture Codes Good communication with the State
Very good radio net control of the Radiological Monitoring
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i Teams
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Very well trained Health Physics para professionals who
i formed the Radiological Monitoring Teams
PORC meeting held in TSC when needed for approval of
j temporary procedures j
Very good leadership by the No. I Radiological Monitoring
Team leader I
Good technical management at the Corporate Emergency
Operations Center Knowledgeable actions by the Manager Radiological
Consequence Assessment I
Observation of actions relating to open items from the previous exercise, demonstrated adequately there was no repetition and the following open items are closed.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-01) NRC contractor observers assigned
j In Plant and to the Control Room were not escorted by a member i
of the Plant Security force and were not authorized access, prior to the exercise, to two vital areas involved in the
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scenario.
These limitations on the observers movements impeded observation of some activities.
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Access to vital areas was authorized and there were no impediments to NRC team observations.
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(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-02) The Control Room requested
delivery of three portable radios prior to an Unusual Event being declared which was considered to be prestaging.
Observation indicated no prestaging in any form.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-03) The required notifications to the
NRC were simulated and the timeliness of the notifications could not be confirmed.
The EPIP's 1.5-1, 1.5-2, and 1.5-33 should be reviewed regarding the NRC notification requirements.
EPIP's 1.5-1, 1.5-2 and 1.5-33 were revised (they are dated March or April 1986).
The required notifications were made in a timely manner meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3).
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-04) There were many radio
communications made without the notice that a drill or exercise was in progress.
Observation of the radio net controller indicated the statement
"this is a drill" was always used.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-05) The plant public address system
was not used effectively for notification of events, classification, and plant status information.
(Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)
Generally, accurate and timely information was communicated using the public address system.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-06) It took almost one and one half
hours to obtain requested administrative help in the site TSC.
Administrative support personnel arrived at the TSC twenty (20)
minutes after public address announcement of a possible tornado impacting site.
They were among the first to arrive at the TSC.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-07) It took over one half hour to get
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the repair team out of the OSC for gagging the relief valve to terminate the release.
Repair and inspection teams were formed, briefed and dispatched in a reasonable time and with no apparent delays.
First team was ready to go in ten (10) minutes.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-08) There was some confusion in
information coming out of the CR regarding the plant trip since the TSC thought the plant was tripped and was later informed of a controlled shutdown in progress.
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TSC manager was regularly briefed in the E0C.
He, in turn, briefed TSC staff.
TSC status board recorded only key events.
Information flow was acceptable; no confusion was observed.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-09) The site TSC activities regarding
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corrective actions were incomplete, in that special procedures were not drafted, reviewed, and approved by a multi-disciplined body as the Plant Operations Review Committee.
TSC activities regarding corrective actions were complete. A PORC was formed to review procedures when such a committee was needed to do so.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-10) Certain health physics practices
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in plant contributed to a degraded performance:
Air sample filter paper and cartridge handled with bare hands.
Portable survey meter not battery checked and stack gas sampling area approached with radiation survey instrument turned off.
An emergency dosimeter was issued to CR personnel without being checked after it was dropped on a hard tile floor.
An air sample was started without noting the time the sampler was turned on.
All Health Physics practices were adequate.
Air sample filter paper and cartridges were glove handled, survey meter batteries and sources were checked before being taken into the field, and all dosimeters were properly handled.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-11) The Fire Brigade Team left spare
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air bottles and CO fire extinguishers standing upright and
unrestrained in a passageway.
" Housekeeping" of this nature is not an emergency prepardness item.
This matter lies within the area of Fire Detection and Prevention. (see Open Item FDP 50-213/86-12-11 onpage9)
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-12) There was no equipment in the
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offsite monitoring kit to zero dosimeters in the field.
(Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)
Chargers were available to zero dosimeters in the field.
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(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-13) A source check of the R02A
instrument, was not performed by the offsite monitoring team prior to departure from the EOF.
All teams performed source check of instruments.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-14) The offsite monitoring team was
delayed from leaving the site twice during the exercise because of a requirement to have the vehicle surveyed for radioactivity by site personnel.
There was no observed delay due to survey requirements.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-15) While an air sample was being
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taken offsite the vehicle motor was started and remained in operation for radio communication.
The sample flow rate increased about 25 percent and was not accounted for in total volume.
Good Health Physics practices were followed.
Air sample times were recorded.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-16) During collection of an air
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sample, the team congregated at the back of the van doorway, which could restrict the collection of a representative sample.
In addition the sampler was set back a shcrt distance inside the van which could also impair collecting a representative sample.
(Repeat item from 1984 exercise.)
proper H.P. practices were followed. Air samples were properly collected.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-17) Security personnel were wearing
respiratory equipment outside the EOF while other site personnel were not.
It was also noted that Security personnel removed the respiratory equipment to use the telephone.
Security and other plant personnel did not wear respirators outside of the EOF.
(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-18) EPIP 1.5-10, Rev. 8, "Off-Site
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Emergency Radiological Surveys", should be clarified regarding
the check out of kits, use of designated or private vehicles,
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obtaining background counts, marking and counting of particulate filters, and personnel, equipment, and vehicle surveys.
EPIP 1.5-10 Rev. 9 was issued February 7,1986. Observation indicated good Health Physics procedures were followed.
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(Closed) IFI (50-213/85-06-19) Security personnel opened the
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i Corporate E0C and established access controls about 30 minutes
before activation was started.
There appeared to be several
licensee personnel prestaged in the EOC area.
There was no evidence of prestaging.
There was no evidence of
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the premature establishment of access control.
I The following areas were identified which require licensee attention.
Many of these findings were also identified by the licensee as part
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of their post exercise critique.
(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-01) Improper use of terminology when.
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member.
ALERT and Site Area Emergency (SAE) were interchanged.
This
usage is not in accordance with the classification scheme of
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Table 4-1, EPIP 1.5-1, Rev. 12 and Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654,
Rev. 1.
i (0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-02) Evacuation was ordered at the Site
Area Emergency (SAE) while a severe weather watch was in effect (tornado was imminent).
It was not clear that the risk of
evacuation, rather than remaining in the plant within areas j
which might provide protection against tornado passage or i
impact, was acequately considered.
(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-03) There were several problems with
notifications and messages originating in the Control Room.
Due to scenario pace, at least one pager message was not updated in a timely manner.
In addition, the SSSA, within thirty (30)
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minutes of initiating the radiopager message plays back the recorder to verify response of appropriate Level personnel.
Due
to scenario pace, there may have been an over-lap between
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response of Level one and Level two verifications leading to confusion, (messages were being changed while verifications were being made).
(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-04) One person in the control did not
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obtain emergency dosimeters until a General Emergency-Bravo was declared.
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(Open) IFI (50-213/86-12-05) The Director of Station Emergency
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i Operations (DSE0) did not formally advise the Manager of Control l
Room Operations (MCRO) he was assuming the DSE0 function.
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i (0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-06) The E0F public address system could
not be heard in the TSC and NRC rooms. The DSE0 could not ac-cess this system.
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(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-07) The basis for emergency classifi-
cation escalation was not made clear to the Director of the
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Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CE0C).
The basis for the SAE Charlie Two classification was thought to be, in the CEOC, a tornado striking a facility vital area. The correct basis was barrier failure.
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(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-08) Posting of information was not
always timely and correct in the CEOC and among the Emergency
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Response Facilities (ERFs) within the EOF.
(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-09) Environmental Monitoring Teams
(EMTs) controlled from the CE0C were dispatched into scenario
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heavy thunderstorms during a tornado warning period without j
being briefed as to these conditions or instructed as to the j
steps they could take to protect themselves.
(0 pen) IFI (50-213/86-12-10) Radiological Monitoring Teams
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(RMTs) directed from the EOF were not briefed as to severe weather conditions and possible tornado impact on or near site.
(0 pen) FDP (50-213/86-12-11) The Fire Brigade Team left spare
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air bottles and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers upright and unrestrained in a passageway.
2.3. Licensee's Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 26, 1986, during which lead licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The critique adequately addressed the areas which require further attention.
3.
Exit Meeting Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.
The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the findings of the inspection as noted in this report.
The licensee was informed that although no violations were identified, there are areas which required additional licensee attention. The licensee demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and Corporate Organization for Nuclear i
Incidents Procedure Manual in a manner which would adequately provide
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protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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Licensee management ackncwledge the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified items of concern.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide written information to the licensee.
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