IR 05000213/1985007

Insp Rept 50-213/85-07 on 850307-0509.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiation Protection,Physical Security,Fire Protection, Maint,Surveillance & Followup on Previous Insp Items

ML20127A960
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	05/29/1985
From:	Mccabe E, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127A947	List: IR 05000213/1985007 ML20127A944
References
50-213-85-07, 50-213-85-7, IEB-83-08, IEB-83-8, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8506210308
Download: ML20127A960 (9)

Text

.

.

I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I i Report No. 50-213/85-07 Docket No. 50-213 License No. DPR-61 Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at: Haddam, Connecticut Inspection conducted: March 7 - May 9, 1985 Inspector: 47f]Ib ,4, th/pf Da'te Signed aul D. 5 Wetland, Sepor/ Resident Inspector Approved by: 4/ E /

C. McCabe, Chief 4 -

r//f/5r'

eptorProjectsSection3B Date Signed Inspection Summary:

Routine resident inspection (89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br />) of plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previous inspection findings, followup on IE Bulletins and Information Notices, followup on events occurring during the inspection, and site review committee activitie Five open items were closed. One Licensee Event Report remained open pending licensee completion of planned corrective actions and evaluation of the absence of a fire damper specified in the plant fire hazards analysi No violations or unacceptable conditions were identified.

i 850621030885h213 DR ADOCK 0

- -

-. . - __

r

.

.

DETAILS Review of Plant Operations The inspector observed plant operation during regular plant tours of the following plant area Control Room --

Security Building

--

Primary Auxiliary Building --

Fence Line (Protected Area)

--

Vital Switchgear Room --

Yard Areas

--

Diesel Generator Rooms --

Turbine Building

--

Control Point --

Intake Structure and Pump Building Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between chan-nels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. The in-spector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowl-edged. Operator awareness and proper response to these conditions were re-viewed. Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with regulatory requirements. Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was inspected. Compliance with Radiation Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel monitoring devices were verified. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including control and storage of flam-mable material and other potential safety hazards. The inspector also ex-amined the condition of various fire protection systems. During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries were properly made and communicated equipment status / deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, )rocess computer printouts, and Plant Information Reports. The inspector o) served selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical barriers, and personnel monitoring. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activi-ties for compliance with requirements and applicable codes and standards, QA/QC involvement, safety tags, equipment alignment and use of jumpers, per-sonnel qualifications, radiological controls, fire protection, retest, and reportability. Also, the inspector witnessed selected surveillance tests to deterime whether properly approved procedures were in use, test instrumenta-tion was properly calibrated and used technical specifications were satis-fied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, procedure details were adequate, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned. The following activities were reviewed:

--

Emergency diesel generator air system repair and redundant systems test onMay7,1985(WO-85-01580&84-09908)  ;

--

Feedwater system pipe repair on March 16,1985(WO-85-01782)

l l

l

\

l

!

.

.

3

--

Charging pump A repair on May 5, 1985 (WO-MA6051)

--

Auxiliary feedwater system temperature alarm (TIA-1300) calibration on August 29, 1984 (WO-84-04311)

--

Cable vault CO2 system surveillance on March 20, 1985 (SUR 5.5-20, Re-vision 4)

--

Nuclear instrumentation overpower trip setpoint surveillance, March -

April 1985 (SUR 5.2-9, Revision 7 and 8)

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

3. Followup on Previous Inspection Findings Three NRC open items were reviewed. The inspector found licensee actions on those items to be sufficient. Details follow.

I 3.1 (Closed) Followup Item (213/84-28-01) On November 3, 1984, a technician disconnected a cable while making reactivity computer connections in a nuclear instrument drawer. This activity was not specifically covered by procedure. An instrumentation spike occurred. A high startup rate reactor trip resulte Procedure 8.2-1, Nuclear Instrument Drawer Re-placement, contains appropriate safeguards against such consequences and has now been made specifically applicable to reactivity computer evolu-

tions. Departmental training has been conducted on the event. The inspector had no further question .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (213/84-32-02) The licensee was to revise lic-ensee event report (LER) 84-29 to correct inconsistencies in the original LE Revision 1 to LER 84-29 was submitted on March 29, 1985. The in-spector verified the accuracy of the revised informatio Subsequent surveillance tests have identified no significant load runback setpoint drift. No further action is contemplated unless the problem recur This item is closed.

3.3 (Closed) Followup Item (213/85-01-01) The licensee was to complete corrective actions for the nuclear instrumentation (NIS) power range overpower setpoint drift and submit an LER. The licensee submitted LER 85-04 on March 14, 1985. The inspector verified the accuracy of the event details and reviewed the implementation of committed corrective actions. The setpoint potentiometers for NIS drawers 31 and 32 were re-placed as documented in work orders 84-09908 and 85-01580. In order to identify other contributors to the setpoint drift problems, the licensee

,

planned to monitor drawer bias power supplies and any difference between power range indications on the main control board and on the NIS pane As of May 9, 1985, the licensee had not implemented the comparison of power range indicators. Upon notification by the inspector, this action was promptly implemented as a weekly preventive maintenance requiremen Any 1/2 percent deviation in channel readings will result in recalibra-tion of that NIS drawer and reevaluation of the drift problems. Licensee trend data for weekly NIS surveillance has shown a reduction in overpower

. _ _ . . _ _ _

m

.

.

setpoint drift since the setpoint potentiometers were replaced. NRC will continue to monitor NIS performance in accordance with the routine in-spection program. This item is close . Followup on IE Bulletins (IEBs) and Information Notices (ins)

4.1 Licensee action on the following IE Bulletins was reviewed for forwarding to appropriate management, licensee review for applicability, response timeliness, response appropriateness, response accuracy, corrective ac-tion commitments, and corrective action completio IEB-83-08. Electrical Circuit Breakers with Undervoltage Trip Features Other Than Reactor Irip Breakers The Bulletin identified that the design, maintenance, and surveil-lance deficiencies which contributed to reactor trip breaker under-voltage (UV) trip feature unreliability may also apply to other safety-related breakers. Licensees were asked to review their de-signs to identify such applications and to describe the surveillance and maintenance programs for the breakers involved along with any changes planned. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated March 21, 198 The facility had 31 UV trip applications, with 29 of these being backup protective circuits. The licensee documented that vender approved surveillance and maintenance pro-grams had been performed on these circuit breakers at refueling intervals and that no UV trip feature failures had been experience The licensee also noted that all UV trip devices would be removed during the 1984 refueling outage in order to install improved over-current trip devices. This modification necessitated adding an active UV trip feature (similar to that installed in the 29 others)

to the two breakers currently relying on the installed UV trip de-vice. The inspector verified the completion of the Plant Design Change Request (No. 616) which implemented these modification The inspector had no further questions in this are IEB 84-02. Failures of General Electric HFA Relays This bulletin documented the continuing failure history of HFA re-lays in safety-related applications and requested licensees to pro-vide a plan for replacement of HFA relays. On July 10, 1984, the licensee reported that all six HFA relays had been replaced by Cen-tury Series relays during the 1983 refueling outage. The inspector verified, by checking documentation of work order nos. MA 4380 &

4381 that this replacement had been completed. No inadequacies were identifie .2 Licensee action concerning IN 84-06, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, was reviewed to determine that the notice was forwarded to appro-priate licensee personnel, that the stated concern was evaluated, and that necessary corrective actions were implemented. The licensee had

.

.

previously addressed this industry concern by installation of an auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP) discharge pipe temperature sensor and an alarm on the main control board. Additionally, procedure 5.1-13, AFP Monthly Functional Test, was modified to limit pump discharge pressure so the check valves are not unseated during routine testing. Operators are cautioned to monitor AFP discharge pipe temperature, after testing, to insure no check valve leakage. The inspector checked the satisfactory calibration of the AFP temperature sensor as documented on work order no. 84-04311. The inspector also determined that licensed operators were knowledgeable of this potential problem and were able to describe pre-ventive features and appropriate recovery actions. The inspector had no further questions in this are . Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection

'

5.1 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The following LERs were reviewed for clarity, accuracy of the description of cause, ard adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also verified that the reporting require-ments of 10 CFR 50.73 and Station Administrative and Operating Procedures had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification Limit Nuclear Instrumentation Overpower Setpoint Drift event de-tailed in paragraph 3.3 of this repor *--

85-06 Feed Pump Suction Pipe Ruptur *-- 85-07 Plant Trip Due to Feedwater Recirculation Valve Failur *--

85-08 Inoperable Cable Vault Ventilation Isolation Syste Inoperable Fire Doo " Event described belo .2 Plant Trip Due to Feedwater Recirculation Valve Failure On March 12, 1985, with the plant operating at 100% power, an electrical short to ground in the 18 condensate pump overheated the pump circuit breaker ground resistor bank. The switchgear room fire suppression sys-tem actuate Operators responding to the fire system actuation reported a fire in the

'

switchgear room because the Halon system discharge had spread a cloud of dust and insulation particles into the air. The cloud appeared to be smok The source of the electrical ground was identified by abnor-

.

<

l mally high amperage on the 1B condensate pump. Plant load was rapidly reduced to 50% power, and the IB condensate pump and one cain feed pump were secured. After the particulates settled in the switchgear room

atmosphere, the licensee determined that no fire had occurred. Dirt and dust rising from the condensate purp resistor bank had actuated two nearby smoke detectors, thereby actuating the Halon system. . The licensee initiated repairs to the condensate pump and recnarged the Halon storage tank Later on March 12, with power remaining at 50% because of the inoperable condensate pump, the plant experienced main feed system flow oscillation Operators rapidly reduced power level when a low feed pump suction pres-sure occurred and only the 1A condensate pump was available. The main turbine was unloaded faster than reactor power decreased. The resulting ,

reactor pressure transient caused a high pressurizer pressure reactor trip. Plant s reactor trip, ystems however,functioned automaticnormally operation inof response to the automatic one pressurizer spray valve was known to be out of service prior to the event, and this valve was manually opened to mitigate the reactor coolant system pressure spik The redundant spray valve functioned normally. The licensee determined that the feed system flow oscillations resulted from a failed open feed pump recirculation valve which drew more feed flow than the single con-densate pump could deliver. The recirculation valve failed open when its control air suppl by system vibration. yThe linelicensee severed replaced due to cyclic this fatigue control failure air linecaused and

.!

developed a program for routine replacement of similar control air lines

'

subjecttocyclicloads. Repair of the automatic pressurizer spray valve control was not completed at the end of this inspection period due to unavailability of spare parts. This item will be followed during routine resident inspector observation of control room and maintenance activities.

Ine inspector reviewed the licensee's response to these events. NRC and state notifications were ticely, operator actions were correct, and post-a event reviews were accurate. The plant returned to 50% power on March 13, 1985 while repairs to the 1B condensate pump and replacement of a main feed pump seal were ongoing. After completion of these repairs on March 16, the plant returned to full powe .3 Main Feed Pump Suction Pipe Rupture On March 16, 1985, after attaining full power following the above de-tailed outage, the plant was manually tripped when a feed system pipe rupture in the area of the main feed pumps threatened to cause electrical '

grounding of the main feed and heater drain pump motors. The plant re-sponded normally to the plant trip. Decay heat was removed using the atmospheric steam dumps because main condenser vacuum was lost during the event. The licensee located and isolated the leak in the main feed pump suction piping immediately downstream of the IB feedsater heater normal level control valve. The rupture occurred because the flow exit-

ing this valve impinges directly on the pipe surface and severely eroded

- - - -

. .. . _ - - - . -.

.

.

the pipe in this area. The licensee replaced the affected section of pipe and has added this and similar flow control valve configurations to their reliability engineering, program for monitoring erosion of sec-ondary system pipe elbows. The inspector had no further questions on this even .4 Inoperable Cable Vault Ventilation Isolation System On March 20, 1985, while conducting routine surveillance testing of the cable vault fire protection system, the licensee identified that the ventilation exhaust fan did not shut off upon actuation of the system as required by system design. The licensee determined that the exhaust fan had been wired improperly. Previous tests had not identified this design deficiency because operators misinterpreted the required system function verifications. Instead of verifying the fan was off as speci-fied, the operators secured the fan and then verified it was of The fan was repaired and retested satisfactorily. The licensee committed to revise procedure 5.5-20, Cable Vault C02 Flow Test, Valve and Ventila-tion Damper Test, prior to its next scheduled use to clarify the require-ment for verification of fan and damper actuation. During the review of LER 85-08, the inspector noted that the licensee stated that the plant Fire Hazards Analysis stated that an automatic fire damper was installed in the cable vault exhaust duct. This damper was not tested by 5.5-20. The inspector brought this discrepancy to the licensee' s procedure atten-tion. Subsequently, the licensee determined that no such exhaust damper exists. The licensee committed to investigate the effect of this dis-crepancy on the conclusions of Fire Hazards Analysis and to revise the LER if necessary. This item will remain unresolved pending licensee completion of this evaluation and the procedure revisions noted above (213/85-07-01).

5.5 Failure of the "A" Charging Pump On May 1, 1985, the plant was operating at 100% power when charging flow to the reactor coolant pump seals was lost, and the operating charging pump (A) indications became erratic. The "A" charging pump was secured and the "B" pump started. Charging flow was restored and plant conditions were stabilized. Inspection of the "A" charging, pump revealed that the pump shaft had sheared just outside the pump casing. The licensee had a spare rotating assembly for the pump in stock and preparations for re-placement began promptly. Plant Administrative Technical Specifications allow continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with only one charging pump oper-able. At 11:35 p.m. May 4, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period expired, and the pump repair had not been completed. The licensee began a controlled plant shutdown, as required, and made the necessary notifications to NRC and the state. The pump repair was completed at 1:48 a.m. May 5, and the plant shutdown was terminated at 60% power. Full power operation resumed on May 5. The licensee and the pump vender are evaluating the cause of the pump failure. This pump had been newly installed during the August-

.

.

November 1984 refueling outag Preliminary causal indications, upon disassembl

, material (y of the pump, were of severe pump binding due to foreignposs stages of the pump. The licensee has now rebuilt both installed charging pumps within the last year and is confident that no extraneous material was left inside these pumps. The failed pump was assembled by the manu-facturer, who is assisting the licensee with the failure analysi No generic 1mplications have been identified to date. The inspector will follow the final determination of the cause of the pump failure during a subsequent inspection (IFI 213/85-07-02).

l Site Review Committee Activities The ins 3ector reviewed meeting minutes of the Plant Operations Review Commit-tee (PORC) to ascertain that provisions of the Technical Specifications deal-ing with membership, qualifications, and execution of responsibilities were satisfied. Meetings reviewed included:

-- 85-01R through 85-40R Inspector review of the PORC meeting minutes for special meeting 85-04 on January 14, 1985, identified that a quorum of four PORC members were not present at this meeting. The inspector brought this discrepancy to the lic-ensee's attention. This item had been previously identified during offsite review committee review of PORC minutes in February 1985. The licensee had determined that four members had, in fact, attended PORC meeting 85-04, but the minutes had omitted one attendin This fact was verified by re-view of the procedure approval sign g member.offswhichwerethesubjectofthis s3ecial meetin Although NRB caught this error, the inspector noted that tie minutes for meetin a subsequent meeting. g 85-04 had been reviewed and approved by PORC ing its own review proces The licensee revised the minutes of PORC meeting 84-04 to reflect the corrected attendance lis No further discrepancies were identifie . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occur-rence. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

--

Monthly Operating Reports 85-02 through 85-04 These reports covered plant operations during the period February 1 - April 30, 1985.

_ _ . _ _ . ._-

r

- - .

.

.

8. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is recuired in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or violations. lnresolved '

items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interviews During this inspection,ietary the finding No propr information related to this inspection wasmeet identified. The inspector also highlighted NRC generic concerns regarding the reportability to NRC of multiple component failures, as documented in IE Information Notice 85-2 .

'

[ ,

1 203 267 2571 -

'

.- c

.

,,

e CONNECTICUT YANKEE .\T O M ic r> O w :. ., , 4 , 3 .4y Cj ,j B E H L l N. CONNECTICUT e o roo< vo amono cowscncut esm.ono March 18,1985 m w "55" Docket No. 50-213 A04661 Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief Projects Branch #3 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 References: (1) E. C. Wenzinger letter to W. G. Counsil, dated February 11, 198 (2) W. G. Counsil letter to T. E. Murley, dated January 24, 198 Gentlemen: y N Haddam Neck Plaat -

Response to I&E Ins'pection N'o. 50-213/84-32 -

I Reference (1) raises concerns abAt an apparent fal on the part of the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Cbmp.g-(m 0) to identify and correct inaccuracies contained in our original response to IE Bulletin 80-06, Engineered Safety Features (ESP) Reset Controls, and later addressed in Reference (2).

The purpose of this letter is to provide the requested response to each of the items identified by the Staf .

The items are addressed as follows:

'

(1) Assessment of the Situation As the NRC has confirmed through independent evaluations, post-TMI reviews and mandated modifications challenged licensees, including CYAPCO, in that the volume of work required by the NRC was near the peak of what could be accomplished with proper controls. As a result of this post-TMI impact, the test program documents did not receive the desired level of technical revie Four of the five test procedures in place at the time, though they did not mect the letter of the bulletin requirements, did adequately address operator action to provide the desired end result V

'

Specifically, they required that the control switches be placed in the

" TEST" position prior to resetting the HCP relays. (This is the same sequence as described in Reference (2).)

.

Although CYAPCO operators were well aware of the necessity to shutdown the containment sump and air activity pumps via general knowledge of the TMI event, the requirernent was not specifically addressed via plant procedur L' LUJ J f _

~, -

6 a w j

[ *

i 203 267 2571

__._7__;. w

+

,

2-(2) Potential for Similar I. apses Considering changes made to internal procedures for technical review and commitment tracking coupled with the casing of unique workload requirements resulting from post-T MI mandated modifications, CYAPCO does r.ot believe that there is any significant potential for similar lapses. Additional bases are provided in item (3) belo (3) Corrective Actions Taken or Planned Procedures within the Nuclear Engineering and Operations Departments have been revised to require extensive technical review and evaluation of all projects. A corporate saf ety ethic program is in place and serves to instill an increased awareness of safety issues and stresses the need to "do it right the first time."

The Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) being developed for use by CYAPCO will provide for a thorough and systematic analysis of projects with the goal of evaluation against available resources before commitments are made. The program is designed to consider resource management from a more global standpoint to ensure that resources are not stretched beyond reasonable limit Internal and external task groups have been appointed to evaluate past work done at the Haddam Neck Plant in connection with plant design changes in accordance with the terms of the December 13, 1984 Order Modifying Licens The methods of internal tracking and review of commitments to the NRC have been revised to improve commitment trackin (4) Date by which Actions are to be Completed All currective actions mentioned above have been completed or are on-going programs previously described to the NRC. The Plant Design Change Task Group is scheduled to finish its work in accordance with the terms of the above mentioned orde In addition, we are taking this opportunity to clarify several statements made in the Reference (2) submittal. Attachment I contains the corrections and associated explanation This attachment consists of a revised page 3 of Reference (2) and a supplemental page of clarifying notes. These do not substantively change any conclusions but more clearly explain the configuration and operation of the aff ected equipmen Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

$l@W . . .

W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President