IR 05000213/1985025

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Insp Rept 50-213/85-25 on 851203-860108.Satisfactory Performance in All Areas Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation,Radiation Protection,Physical Security,Fire Protection & Maint & Surveillance Testing
ML20198J067
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/1986
From: Mccabe E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198J064 List:
References
50-213-85-25, NUDOCS 8601310171
Download: ML20198J067 (7)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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REGION I

Report N /85-25 DCS Nos. 50-213/11-01-85 50-213/11-65-85 Docket N '213 50-213/11-10-85

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50-213/11-14-85 License N DPR-61 50-213/11-21-85 50-213/12-11-85 Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company 50-213/01-04-8p,6 ,

P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 Facility: Haddam Neck Plant, Haddam, Connecticut Inspection at: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection conducted: December 3, 1985 - January 8, 1986 Inspectors: Paul D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector Stephen Pindale, Resident Inspector Approved by: &bO i 23l86 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Summary:

Areas Inspected: This was a routine safety inspection of licensed activities in-volving 113 inspection-hours by two resident inspectors. The following activities were inspected: plant operation, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection, maintenance and surveillance testing, and follow-up on licensee event Results: Inspector review of plant activities identified satisfactory performance in all area Inspector followup items were opened for NRC assessment of the quality of the licensee's design change / modification program and for the licen-see's final corrective action on six main steam system safety valves found in-operable during this inspection period.

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P 9601310171 060124 PDR ADOCK05000gg3

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag i Sununa ry of Faci l i ty Acti vi ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

i Review of Plant Operations...................................... 1 l Observation of Maintenance and Surveillance Testing ............ 2 t-

' Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection.............. 3 Fol l owp on Al l e gati ons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

, Review of Periodic and Special Reports.......................... 5

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DETAILS Summary of Facility Activities The plant operated continuously at about 92 percent of full power in an end-of-core-life coastdown mode. On January 4, 1986, a controlled shutdown was accomplished beginning a planned eight week refueling / maintenance outag . Review of Plant Operations The inspector observed plant operation during regular tours of the following plant areas:

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Control Room --

Security Building

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Primary Auxiliary Building --

Fence Line (Protected Area)

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Vital Switchgear Room --

Yard Areas

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Diesel Generator Rooms --

Turbine Building

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Control Point --

Intake Structure and Pump

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Containment Building Building Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements. The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledge Operator awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements. Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was inspecte Compliance with Radiation Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel monitoring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including control and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection system During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were properly made and communicated equipment status / deficiencie These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tag-out and jumper logs, process computer printouts, and Plant Information Reports. The inspector observed selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical barriers, and personnel monitoring. No operating inadequacies were identifie Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings on January 4, 8, 10, and 11, 1986. Technical Specification 5.5 require-ments for required member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included procedural changes and design change packages. The meetings were characterized by frank discussions and questioning of the proposed changes. Items for which adequate review time was not available were postponed to allow committee members time to review and comment. Dis-senting opinions were encouraged. During this period, 2 of 18 design change packages were rejected by PORC for clarification and/or revision of the design change package. This is indicative of the quality and success of the upgraded PORC review process. The inspector noted that

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a significant amount of interaction between site and corporate engineer-ing had been required to improve the recent design chance packages to the point where they could be submitted for PORC review. The inspector discussed this with the Unit Superintendent on January 4,1986, Site and corporate managers have identified the need for clarification and enforcement of design change package standards at the draft stage in order to reduce the volume of interaction and improve the timeliness nf design change package review. NRC will continue to ironitor the quality of design changes during routine inspectf ons. (IFI 213/85-25-D1)

3. Observation of Maintenance _ and Surveil _ lance Testing The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activi-ties for compliance with requirements and applicable codes and standards, QA/QC involvement, safety ta0s, equipment alignment and use of jumpers, per-sonnel qualifications, radiological controls, fire protection, retest, and reportabilit Also, the inspector witnessed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, test instrumenta-tion was properly calibrated and used, technical specifications were satis-fled, testing was performed by qualified personnel, procedure details were adequate, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned. The following activities were reviewed:

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Main Steam Generator Safety Valve Testing on 1/4/86, (SUR 5.5-2).

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New Fuel Inspection and Repair on 12/4/85, (SNM 1.4-3 and SPL 10.7-234),

3.1 During the plant shutdown for refueling on lanuary 4, 1986, the licensee s

conducted surveillance tests on all 16 main steam system safety valves (MSSYs). Six valves failed to lift within the test acceptance criteria -

of 1 percent of the required lift setpoint (10 psig for setpoints less than 1000 psig). Four valves lifted early, one valve lifted about 20 psig above the setpoint and one valve failed to lif t within the 90-100 psig test limit of the safety valve test air-lift moto The MSSVs are set to lift at 985, 1015, 1025 or 1034 psig. MSSVs that open below the setpoint can affect the design basis release limits of the main steam generator tube rupture analysis. MSSVs that open late can affect the reactor coolant system design pressure transient analyses. Plant Tech-nical Specifications (TS) require all 16 MSSVs to be operable during plant operation above 80 percent power. At the time of the test, the *

plant was at zero percent power, so no TS action was required. However, s since this was the first test of the MSSVs following their setpoint verification during the previous refueling outage, the licensee reported ,

the identification of plant operation during this cycle with one or more MSSVs outside the lif t setpoint tolerance assumed in plant safety analy-ses. The inspector observed the performance of the MSSV testing on Janu-ary 4 to be in accordance with surveillance procedure 5.5-2, MSSVs. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's reporting and initial disposition of the test findings as documented in Plant Information Report 86- The licensee plans to remove, overhaul and retest all 16 MSSVs prior to J

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start-up from this refueling outage. The inspector will review the dis-position and corrective actions from this test and previous MSSV test results upon completion of the planned MSSV rework and retest (IFI 213/85-25-02)

3.2 The inspector reviewed the detailed inspection and rework of new fuel assemblies conducted in July and August 1985 and on December 4, 198 The qualification of inspectors and the calibration of the test gauges were verified. The fuel inspections were conducted in accordance with procedure SNM 1.4-3, New Fuel Detailed Inspection. A total of 52 fuel assemblies were inspected. Five discrepancies related to bent or missing flow deflector vanes were initially identified. The missing vanes were found to have been adequately dispositioned by the fuel vender. The remaining bent vanes were reworked on-site by the vender using approved procedure SPL 10.7- 234, Rework of Batch 14 Fuel, on December 4,198 Expanded inspection of flow vanes on suspect assemblies on December 4, 1985, identified four other bent vanes which were also repaired and re-inspecte The inspector noted that the nonconformance report (NCR 85-214) for the initial inspections was processed over one month after the completion of the inspections. Also, this NCR did not reference the missing vanes which were identified as inspection discrepancies, and were dispositioned as acceptable to use as-is by the fuel vender. While the final record of disposition for these inspection findings is accurate and complete, the timeliness of the NCR documentation and the disposition of certain findings outside of normal administrative control procedures were brought to management attention as areas for improvement of the quality assurance for this evolution. Future fuel receipt and inspection will continue to be reviewed under the routine NRC inspection progra The inspector had no further questions in this are . Followup on Events Occurring During the Inspection 4.1 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The following LERs were reviewed for clarity, accuracy of the description of cause, and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also verified that the reporting require-ments of 10 CFR 50.73 and Station Administrative and Operating Procedures were met, that appropriate corrective action was taken, and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification Limit Fire Barrier Penetrations

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85-28 High Steam Flow Reactor Trips - Events detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-213/85-2 . . - - .. . _ .

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85-29 Probability of Loss of Motor Control Center 5 - Detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-213/85-2 Systems Integrity Inspection Missed 4.2 On December 11, 1985, the licensee reported a momentary release of waste gas to the plant vent stack when a waste gas decay tank (WGDT) relief valve inadvertently opened. The solenoid-operated relief valve (set to lift at 215 psig in the WGDT) lifted at 205 psig and relieved the tank to 200 psig. The resultant filtered release of 2.4 Curies of noble fission product gases exceeded the licensee's instantaneous release rate reportability limi However, it was 42 percent of the Technical Speci-fication allowed release limit. The licensee calculated an estimated dose consequence at the site boundary from this release to be 0.002 mre This calculation was confirmed by an NRC Region I radiation specialis The licensee has been unable to ascertain the cause of the premature lifting of the WGDT relief valv A similar release occurred in November 1985 and was documented in NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-213/85-2 The licensee has scheduled further troubleshooting and repair activities for this refueling outage, in order to simulate the observed conditions and identify the event cause after the waste gas system can be emptied and purged with nitrogen. In addition, the licensee lowered the WGDT transfer pressure from 205 psig to 185 psig in order to maintain the waste gas storage pressure well below the relief setpoin No further such releases occurred. NRC will continue to follow the licensee's cause investigation and corrective action activities under the previous in-spector follow-up item (IFI 213/85-21-09).

5. Followup of Allegations (RI-85-A-88) Followup inspection was performed regarding licensee corrective action following a General Employee Training (GET) examination incident on July 23, 1985. The licensee committed to upgrade the standards of examination administration to reduce the likelihood of cheating on GET exams. The in-spector reviewed the Nuclear Train.'ig Manual (NTM) 5.06, Control Guide for Exams. This instruction upgraded the training program with stringent re-quirements for exam administration. On December 19, 1985, an Experienced Radiation Worker training session for contractors was attended by the inspec-to There was a sufficient number of proctors to monitor the exam, student seating was controlled to allow for sufficient spacing between students, and different exams were given to all adjacent examinees. The exams included written instructions stating that:

a) talking is forbidden b) cheating will not be tolerated and will be cause for disciplinary action

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c) students shall raise their hand and consult with the instructor if they do not understand a questio These instructions were read outloud prior to administering the exam. All items observed were in compliance with NTM 5.06. The inspector had no further questions in this area. The next scheduled GET examination (October 1986)

was identified as an item for inspector review (IFI 85-25-03).

6. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9 were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and per-formance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following periodic report was reviewed:

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Monthly Operating Report 85-11 This report covers plant operation from November 1 - 30, 198 No unaccept-able conditions were foun . Exit Interview Curing this inspection, meetings were held with plant management to discuss the findings. No proprietary information related to this inspection was identified.