IR 05000206/1988028

Insp Repts 50-206/88-28,50-361/88-29 & 50-362/88-31 on 881118-890112.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Radiological Protection, Security,Evaluation of Plant Trips & Events & LERs Review

ML20235S809
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	02/13/1989
From:	Andrew Hon, Huey F, Johnson P, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13316B994	List: IR 05000206/1988028 ML20235Q761 ML20235S799
References
50-206-88-28, 50-361-88-29, 50-362-88-31, GL-87-12, GL-88-17, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8903080022
Download: ML20235S809 (17)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No /88-28, 50-361/88-29, 50-362/88-31 Docket No , 50-361, 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee: Southern California Edison Company P. O. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility Name: San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection at: San Onofre, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted: November 18, 1988 - January 7 and January 12, 1989 L M 7 Inspectors: [rT. R[ Iuey, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Insp tor, Units 1, 2 and 3 MW d j hJ. E atum, Resident Inspector Date Signed

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/6fh A.- on, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved By:  %/n Date Signed P. II. g6 inson, Chief Reacto Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on November 18, 1988 through January 7 and January 12, 1989 (Report Nos. 50-206/88-28, 50-361/88-29, 50-362/88-31)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Units 1, 2 and 3 Operations Program including the following areas: operational safety verification, radiological protection, security, evaluation of plant trips and events, monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, refueling activities, independent inspection, licensee events report review, and follow-up of previously identified items. Inspection procedures 30703, 35502, 37700, 40700, 40701, 60705, 60710, 61715, 61726, 62700, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 93702 were covere i u- e PDR ADOCK oc;ogo;.06 O PDC l

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i Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items: None Results:

General Conclusions and Specific Findings: ,

1 The licensee failed to identify a Unit 2 plant tampering event in a timely manner (paragraph 4.a). Deficiencies were noted with regard to compensatory actions imple-mented by the licensee to comply with Unit 1 technical specification action statements during periods of source range nuclear instrument inoperability (paragraph 3.a). Reactivity monitoring weaknesses were identified in the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. The licensee initiated appropriate procedure revisions and committed to submit an amendment request (paragraph 3.b).

Significant Safety Matters: None Summary of Violations:

One violation for failure to use the proper revision of the procedure for reactor coolant system boron sampling (paragraph 3.a).

Open Items Summary:

During this report period, 2 new followup items were opened and 20 were closed; 5 were examined and left ope i

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t DETAILS 3 Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company

• C. McCarthy, Vice President - Site Manager

• H. Morgan, Station Manager D. Heinicke, Deputy Station Manager D. Herbst, Quality Assurance Manager D. Stonecipher, Quality Control Manager

• R. Krieger, Operations Manager D. Shull, Maintenance Manager J. Reilly, Technical Manager P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager D. Peacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager P. Eller, Security Manager J. Schramm, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 V. Fisher, Operations Superintendent, Units 2/3 L. Cash, Maintenance Manager, Unit 1 R. Santosuosso, Maintenance Manager, Units 2/3 C. Chiu, Assistant Technical Manager

• M. Wharton, Assistant Technical Manager

• C. Couser, Compliance Engineer

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting on January 12, 1989.

The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control room supervisors, control room operators, QA and QC engineers, compliance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technician . Plant Status Unit 1 The unit operated at 92% power during this inspection period, until November 28, 1988, when the unit shut down for the scheduled Cycle 10 refueling outag Unit 2 The unit operated at full power during this inspection perio Unit 3 The unit operated at full power during this inspection period until a '

reactor trip occurred on January 6, 1989, resulting from failure of a non-1E uninterruptible power suppl __-_____

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. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed the tagout log and verified proper return to service of affected components. Particular attention I was given.to housekeeping, e' amination for potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration, and verification that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors also observed selected activities by the licensee's radiological protection and security personnel to confirm proper implementation of and conformance with facility policies and procedures in these area Improper Control of Reactivity Monitoring Activity (Unit 1)

On December 26, 1988, the inspector reviewed the controls being implemented by the licensee to monitor core reactivity during periods of outage modification work on the nuclear instrumentation system. On November 30, both channels of source range nuclear instruments were taken out of service for modification. The instruments remained out of service until December 24, when the modified instruments were returned to service. The plant technical specifications required that reactor coolant samples be analyzed for proper boron shutdown margin every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during this period. The inspector reviewed the controls exercised by plant operations and chemistry personnel during this period to ensure that required reactivity monitoring was performed. The inspector noted the following:

(1) At 0340 on November 30, 1988, when both channels of source range instruments were taken out of service, plant operators initiated tracking form LC0AR 88-190, as required by station procedures. The purpose of the form was to provide a formal measure for ensuring that the limiting conditions for plant operation specified in the plant technical specifications were me The inspector reviewed the LCOAR form and plant chemistry logs to confirm that all required boron samples were performed between November 30 and December 2 However, the inspector noted that the LCOAR form was not properly revised on December 24, following return of source range instruments to servic Although plant operators notified chemistry personnel that shiftly boron samples were no longer required, they failed to revise the LCOAR to so indicate. The inspector reviewed his concern with the shift superintendent, who took immediat action to correct the LCOAR form. In response to the inspector's concern, the unit superintendent reemphasized the importance of rigorous implementation of LCOAR tracking requirements with cognizant plant operator (2) The inspector reviewed the actions required to draw and analyze a reactor coolant sample with one of unit chemistry technicians who had performed these activities. The technician provided the inspector with a copy of the procedure being used and walked through the specific steps. The inspector questioned

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why the technician used a temp' rary o ' portable pump and < sample

~ flushing times different from those addressed in the procedur Theftechnician stated that the provisions in the procedure covered samples taken when the plant was not depressurized, as was the case for refueling. The inspector questioned why the procedure had not been revised. The technician stated that the-changes were not considered to be major; however, the procedure

, probably should have been revise Although the' sampling performed was determined to satisfy the Technical Specifications requirements, the inspector, discussed his concern about the improper use of chemistry procedures with the station chemistry supervisor. Following his review, the chemistry supervisor indicated that the applicable chemistry ,

procedure (S0123-III-1.6.1, Normal Operation of the' Reactor '

' Sampling System) had been previously revised to address the use of a temporary pump for a depressurized plant. He stated that the involved chemistry technician had failed to obtain the proper revision of the station procedure, and had failed to comply with the requirement to verify proper procedure revision during previous chemistry sampling evolutions. This was identified to licensee management as a violation (206/88-28-01).

b. Inadequate Technical Specification Requirements for Reactivity Monitoring-(Unit 1)

During the review of licensee actions to monitor core-reactivity during the Unit I refueling outage, the inspector noted the following deficiencies in the plant technical specifications:

(1) Technical specification 3.5.1 appeared to be incorrect with respect to compensatory reactivity monitoring requirements during Mode 5 operation when both channels of source' range nuclear instrumentation are out of servic In particular, the technical specification action statement (Action 5) required that the licensee confirm a minimum shutdown of 1.9% at EOL, instead of the minimum shutdown margin of 5% defined for Modes 5 and 6 in section (2) Technical specification 3.8 appeared to be weak regarding com-pensatory reactivity monitoring requirements during Mode 6 operation when both channels of source range nuclear'instrumen-tation are out of service. Although the technical specifica-tion precluded any further activities that could increase core reactivity, it did not include any action statement to assess

>; shutdown margin or perform other compensatory' reactivity monitoring, pending return of source range nuclear instruments

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to operatio The licensee concurred that the technical specifications werefin l need of improvement. The station operations manager stated that the licensee would take prompt action to correct station procedures and

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would request necessary changes to the unit technical:

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InadequAt e Operator Attention to Detail (Unit 2) -

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On November 30,- the inspector. performed a walkdown of plant

. electrical equipment in the vicinity-of the Unit 2 reactor coolan pump deluge actuation switches (see item below). During thi walkdown, the> inspector noted'that the charging spring motor: switch-for the 480V breaker for control drive mechanism cooling fan'E404A was in.the "off" position. The normal position'for this switch is

"on". The licensee-investigated.the-reason for this improper switch po's ition and determined that the switch had not been properly returned to the. required position by a plant operator following post-maintenance return of the breaker to operation. This breaker

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is not safety related and would not have prevented. remote opening of-the breaker, since the. charging springs are not required for breaker opening. The-Operations Manager took action to reemphasize.the

'importance of thorough attention to procedure requirements during return of. equipment to servic This item is closed (361/88-29-01).

- 4.p Evaluation of Plant' Trips and Events (93702) Plant Tampering on November 26, 1988 (Unit 2)

on November 26, 1988, plant operators observed that the fire deluge system for Unit 2 reactor coolant pump P002 had spuriously activa-ted. The spurious activation did not result in any equipment damage or actual spray down of the pump, since water flow was prevented by a properly closed containment isolation' valve. .Although the licen-see initiated an immediate investigation into'the cause of'the spurious actuation, plant management did not establish..until 7 November 30 (four days later) that the incident involved'unautho-F rized tampering with the deluge. system' actuation switch.~The ,

licensee subsequently identified two licensee. subcontractors who admitted to the tampering incident. These individuals had their

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employment terminated. During'the exit meeting,ithe inspector addressed the following concerns- .

(1) Licensee management' appeared to underreact to this event-in

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that they did not identify-that tampering was involved until ,

four days after the event. This situation allowed the involved

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individuals to retain access to plant vitel: areas througliout

!! this perio (2) Following the identification of plant tampering, station management was slow in implementing a: physical search and i, walkdown of plant equipment in the' vicinity of the tampering L event to determine whether additional tampering activity had

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4 . occurred. Such a walkdown by knowledgeable plant operators was

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subsequently performed and identified no other instances of tamperin This item is closed (361/88-29-02). Reactor Trip on January 6,1989 (Unit 3)

On January 6,1989f at 11:35 p.m. , while at 99% power, the reactor tripped on low steam generator level. Shortly before the trip, non-1E uninterruptible power supply (UPS) inverter YO12, which-supplies power to the feedwater regulating valve controllers,-

developed an electrical fault. The fault caused the feedwater regulating valve for steam generator E-089 to shut, resulting in low steam generator level. Prior to the trip, the steam dump bypass control system was in manual mode with a lower than normal pressure setpoint inserted to support routine surveillance testing on the turbine governor valves ~. This caused a faster RCS cooldown after the trip and resulted in reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure falling below the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) setpoin No emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water was injected into 'ie

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fRCS because RCS pressure recovered before the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) discharge pressure was reached. The operator

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1 stabilized _the plant without difficult Upon completion of the- .

,, , post-trip review and corrective actions, the unit was taken critical; .

'. i at.1:37 a.m. and entered Mode 1 at 5:25 a.m. on January 9, 198 *

[ -While investigating the electrical fault on inverter Y-012, the'

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. licensee found that a temporary jumper was installed on the' neutral

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bu The jumper had been used to ground the neutral bus in 1j - electrical panel Q083 to facilitate temporary power installation during the previous refueling outage, but this condition was not~

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electrical panel was restored. Although it is not likely that the

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jumper caused the electrical fault, installation of the jumper ,

, compromised the ability of plant operators to detect and correct the-cause of the inverter ground before the inverter was lost. Although the inverter transferred power to the alternate power source, this

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did not occur quickly enough to avoid closure of the feed regulating valv This item remains cpen pending additional NRC review of deficiencies associated with the post trip review of this event (362/88-31-01).

No violations or deviations were noted during the inspectio . Monthly Surveillance Activities (61726)

During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted followup inspection of the following surveillance activities:

a-. Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 1)

S01-12.3-26 (TCN 1-3) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test (G-10)

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a S01-I-2.84 (TCN 0-1) Main Steam System Safety Valve Pressure' '

-Setpoint., Check and Adjustment (Trevitest

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S01-12.3-10 (Rev-5) Diesel. Generator Load Test (DG-2)

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501-12.9-19 (TCN 0-7) Functional.TAst of the' Safety Injection System-

'S01-12.8-11 (Rev-3) . Steam Dump' Valve Test ~ 0bservation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 2)

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S023-V-3.4.4 (TCN 5-1) 'High Pressure Safety Injection Inservice Pump Test (HPSI 2P019)

- Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 3)

S023-II-1.15 (TCN 8-8) Toxic Gas Isolation System Train A Channel

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Functional Test and Channel Calibration No violations or deviations were noted during the inspectio , Monthly Maintenance Activities (62703)

During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted followup inspection of-the following maintenance activities: Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 1)

M087101945 Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test and Adjustment -

M088090133 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor. Test and Calibration M088041614 Support the Ten Year Hydrostatic Overpressure Test of the Safety Injection System at 1750 psia Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 2)

M088010828 Remove, Inspect, Install Rotating Element and Related Components for HPSI Pump 2P-019 M088120164 Chiller ME335 Experienced 15 Amp Swings During Operation Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 3)

M088120137 Battery Charger for Battery 3D1 Tripped While on Equalizing Charge - Replace Parts M088071290 Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 Fan Maintenance

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M088061095 Change Auxiliary Turbo' Filter and Clean In-line

.Y-Strainer for Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 Use of Diesel Generator #1 Air Start Accumulator for Maintenance Activities (Unit 1)

On December 18, 1988, the inspector observed that an air. hose was attached to starting air storage tank DSS-C-13 Air was being used from the storage tank to perform outage work that was in progress on diesel generator #2, and the inspector observed that no' administra-tive controls were implemented by operations personnel to keep track ,

of this condition. The inspector verified that the other air 2 storage tank was not impaired and that diesel generator #1 was still operable. The Unit 1 Superintendent initiated a flag EDMR to address the existing impairment and stated that such impairments would be properly controlled in the futur This item is closed (206/88-28-03). Use of Safety Belts (Unit 1)

While observing Unit 1 outage activities the inspector noted several instances wherein maintenance personnel were not using safety belts when warranted. In one instance, an individual was vacuuming at the i edge of the reactor cavity; and in two other instances individuals were working near the edge on" top of the'"B" steam generator dog-house and climbing up the access ladder. The refueling Jsupervisor took prompt action to resolve the inspecto'r's concern This item is closed (206/88-28-04).

No violations or deviations were noted during-the inspectio . Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)

During this report period, while the unit was in" Mode 1, the inspector  ;

walked down the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System utilizing p' ocedure r l S01-12.3-36 (TCN 1-3) "AFW System Safety Related Alignment." The inspector found that the system was properly aligned and the material condition appeared to be satisfactory.

l No violations or deviations were noted during the-inspectio . Unit 1 Refueling Activities (60705, 60710)

Unit I went off-line at 1:43 a.m. on November 28, 1988 for the Cycle 10 i refueling outage (expected to last 98 days). Major activities during this outage include installation of new nuclear instrumentation channels, automation of the third (West) auxiliary feedwater pump, upgrade of the L diesel generators to 6,000 KW by replacing the piston skirts, installa-l tion of diesel generator slow start capability, modifications to resolve the deficiencies identified during the single failure analysis and transshipment of spent fuel from Unit 1 to Units 2 and I

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. Operations During Reduced RCS Inventory Condition (Mid-Loop) ---

Generic Letter 88-17 In' order to support steam generator inspection and maintenance activities during Modes 5 and 6, the Unit 1 RCS was drained to mid-loop for the period December 7 through December 31, 1988. The

licensee implemented the.following short term " expeditious program" , l'

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to address concerns relative to NRC Generic Letter No. 88-17, " Loss ,

of Decay' Heat Removal".

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• (1). Loss of Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Events'and Training

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The licensee developed a training video which was viewed b,y all y control room operations personnel and selected engineering and , j

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maintenance personnel whose work activities could affect RCS inventory. The training video covered GL 87-12 and GL 88-17,

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relative to loss-of DHR events, and lessons learned from '

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specific events which occurred at Diablo Canyon, SONGS Unit 3

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and other sites. The inspector reviewed the training v' ideo and

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, verified that training had been completed by appropriate ,,

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t (2) Containment Closure (GL item 2) .

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Before entering a reduced RCS inventory condition, the licensee

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implemented procedures which would achieve containment closure prior to core uncovery in the event of a loss of DHR. The l ,

i necessary administrative controls and action requirements were included in the following procedures:

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S01-3-10 (TCN 0-4) Plant Operations During Cold Shutdown

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S01-2.1-9 (TCN 3-5) Loss of RHR System These procedures defined containment closure responsibilities and required the use of quick disconnect fittings on cables and hoses going through the personnel hatch, escape hatch or equipment hatc Such installations were required to be tagged and walked down daily. These procedures also required strict accountability of work orders that could affect containment integrity. The inspector reviewed the list, walked down containment, and interviewed selected individuals, and found the' controls to have been effectively implemente (3) Reactor Vessel Temperature (GL item 3)

In order to monitor the core exit temperature data when at mid-loop, the licensee established controls to maintain at least two independent core exit thermocouple and a temporary RCS high temperature alarm in service. The core exit temperature would also be recorded at least hourly whenever the alarm was not available and at least every 15 minutes when less

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'than two independent and continuous core exit temperatur indications-were available in the concrol room. -The inspector

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reviewed the licensee's measures in the control room and found them to be satisfactor ' (4) RCS Level (GL' item 4)

In order to obtain reliable RCS water 1evel data during reduced inventory conditions, the licensee installed temporary RCS level indication capability in addition to the permanently installed Refueling Water Level Detector (RWLD).

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The RWLD was a wide range instrument which spanned.from the pressurizer vent to the bottom of "A" RCS loop hot le It provided control room indication and local sight glass indicatio a ,'

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' fitted with a scale and placed adjacent to:the RWLD sight

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' glass for level comparison purpose'. s ,

- The other temporary level indicator consisted?of a= leve transmitter which was connected to,the differential'

pressure taps for the "C" loop RCS flow instrument, which provided narrow range level' indication'from the top to the? ,

bottom of RCS loop'"C" hot leg.. ,The level transmitter provided indication and. alarm in the! control roo Installation and calibration of the hardware associated with this level indication was" controlled as safety related, receiving management and QC attention. During, mid-loop operation, the licensee also established controls that require a daily walkdown of this system and recording of RCS level at least hourly whenever the RCS low level

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alarm is unavailable and at least every 15 minutes' when'

less than two independent and continuous level indications are not available in the control roo The inspector walked down the instruments in the control room and in containment and reviewed the licensee's controls, and found them to be satisfactor (5) RCS Perturbations (GL item 5)

The licensee established measures to control RCS perturbations during reduced inventory operation. Attachment 11 to S01-3-10 identified the types of activities that could directly or indirectly affect RCS inventory. The procedure required a review of all Work Authorization Requests (WARS) for potential RCS perturbations. Any WAR or activity tnat could cause RCS perturbations was required to be added to the RCS Perturbation

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required in the control room to assure that appropriate precautions were being taken. The inspector reviewed the l- licensee's procedure and found it to be satisfactor .(6) RCS Inventory Addition (GL item 6)

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In order to provide two available means of adding water to the RCS upon a loss of DHR event, the licensee established controls to maintain at least one charging pump operable. The other method was either the other charging pump, the refueling water pump or the primary makeup water pump. Furthermore, at least '

l one of the Safety Injection. Recirculation trains was required l to be operable. The inspector reviewed the daily equipment

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i status and found them to be satisfactor , , ,

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(7) Nozzle Dam Usage (GL iteme7) '

In order to prevent rapid RCS inventory!1oss due to pressurization caused by boiling in conjunction with hot ldg i i

blockage, the licensee establish controls'to vent the RCS by:

establishing an open hot leg or pressurizer manway before the i cold leg manway could.be opened. The inspector reviewed the licensee's daily equipment status and found"it to be satisfactor I i

The licensee was developing a responne for-the long term program !

enhancement recommendations identified in GL 88-17. This item I remains open pending further review of the licensee's response and :

implementatio ! Spent Fuel Pool Anti-Siphoning Protection (Unit 1) ,

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The inspector reviewed the Unit I plant design.and procedures ;

associated with protection f rom inadvertent siphoning of 'the spent fuel storage pool. The inspector reviewed each of the piping pene-trations to the spent fuel pool and confirmed proper anti-siphoning protection. The inspector noted that the licensee had installed a J temporary purification system associated with the reactor refueling cavity, and had designed the system and operating procedures with i anti-siphoning protection in mind. In particular, the system included suction line vacuum breakers that were required to be valved in any time the system was not in operation. During system operation, trained operating personnel were required to monitor proper system operation on a full time basi j This item is closed (206/88-28-05).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports (90712, 92700)

i Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, or i j

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' . review of;the records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs).wer .

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j87.-17:RI.- Entries Into Technical Specification 3.0.3 to Perform . .

2 . Vents'of Safety. Injection Header: p -

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88-08 R1, Omission of Safety. Injection Vent' Valves from Local . ,

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88-14- ~ Exposure in Excess of Quarterly Limit Due to Personnel

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I 88-15 Improper Containment' Airlock Surveillance Pressure Test.

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88-16 Refueling Water Pump Control Circuit Wiring Discrepancy-L Unit 2 88-10 R1 lInoperability of Both Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS)

-Trains Due to Low Freon Level

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88-27 Shutdown ~ Cooling (SDC) Isolation Valve Inverter Deficiency

.88-29 Fuel Handling Machine Operation with Inoperable Fuel Handling Isolation System (FHIS): Monitors

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-88-24 ControliRoom Isolation System (CRIS) Train A Spike on Radiation-Monitor

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88-28 Plant Operation Above 100%. Power Due to Decrease-in Indicated Plant Power Relative to Actual Plant Power 88-30 Spurious Actuation of AFW Valves - 3.0.3 Entry

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88-33 Improperly P'stad Fire Watch Due to Personnel Error Unit 3 87-17 Unit 3 Trip on Low Condenser Vacuum During Influx of Seaweed 88-10 Lost Steam Generator Blowdown Liquid Composite Sample No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup'of Previously Identified Items (92701)

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[v (Closed) Open Item (206/87-24-02), Failure of ASCO Solenoid Valves-i. .

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This item involved the previous failure of ASCO solenoid valves, i

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The licensee determined that the four failed ASCO valves were Model

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1. 206-380-2/3. Eight of the solenoid valves used at SONGS are these

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models. The licensee attributed the failure of these valves to close when'deenergized to a seal between the plunger and the housing. The seal caused a pressure difference, which overcame the spring force when the solenoids:were deenergized. The licensee believed that heating of the plunger to 220 degrees for extended periods'of time when the solenoids were energized had caused a sticky film to form from a coating applied to the plunge The. licensee disassembled all eight solenoid' valves and inspected and cleaned the plungers during the mid-cycle outage in March, 198 The On Site Review Committee-reviewed and accepted the= resolution on May 24,-1988. In addition, the licensee planned tolenhance.the maintenance procedures to' require' inspection and cleaning of the plunger when valves of these model numbers are service The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective' actions and found them satisfactory. This, item is close b. (Open) Open Item (206/87-27-02), ESF Single Failure Problems The licensee identified an additional ESF single failure conditio Specifically, non-safety related 480 Bus #3 would not be stripped from 4160 V safety related bus 2C during periods when power is' lost on 4160 V safety related Bus #1C. This was-due to the fact that-stripping power for the 480 V Bus #3 fesder breaker was only supplied by 4160 V Bus IC. The licensee planned to ressive this deficiency and other previously identified single failure conditions during the current refueling outag This item remains open pending additional revie c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (206/88-19-01), Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration Error Due to Feedwater Flow Indication Error The licensee removed the feedwater flow orifice for the flow instrument and verified that it had been installed backwards during the' previous outage. This confirmed the licensee's explanation regarding the calorimetric calculation erro The licensee revised maintenance procedures to ensure proper installation of the feedwater flow orifices in the futur The inspector considered that the licensee's corrective actions were satisfactory. This item is close d. (Open) Open Item (361/85-27-01), Electrical Separation of Lighting Circuits from Safety Related Circuits This item remains open pending NRC revie e. (Open) Unresolved Item (361/86-27-02), Effects of Pipe Break in Auxiliary Feedwater Penetration Doghouse This item remains open pending NRC revie _

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.. . (Open) Open Item (361/87-13-01), -Evaluate Adequacy of Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation Startup Rate Circuits This item remains open pending NRC revie (Closed) Unresolved Item (361/87-28-02),TInadequate Attention to Detail During Diesel Generator Surveillance Testing During a previous inspection, the inspector. observed 'several , diesel generator starting evolutions for post-maintenance testing. During the initial start, the inspector observed,that.the. equipment operator followed the procedure step-by-step. During a subsequent start of the diesel generator, the inspector observed that the procedure was not used as rigorously and the equipment operator did not verify that'each engine lube oil pressure'was greater than 35 psig, as required by the operating procedure. The inspector also observed that the governor lube oil levels on the operable diesel generator (20003) were too high and outside of the acceptable indicating rang The licensee completed a review relative to the inspector's observations, and appropriate corrective actions were taken. The diesel generator operating procedure was enhanced to include instructions for multiple starts of a diesel engine, and operations

surveillance procedures were changed to require shiftly monitoring of governor oil levels. Also, diesel generator governor oil level requirements were emphasized in required reading assignments for operations personne This item is close (Closed) Deviation (361/88-15-03), Spent Fuel Pool Anti-siphon Protection The licensee's response to the Notice of Deviation stated that inadvertent siphoning of the spent fuel pool via the spent fuel pool purification system would be avoided by either valving in the skimmer piping (which would act as a siphon break),.or by ensuring protection administrativel In subsequent discussions, however, the Operations Manager stated that some form of siphon i break would always be in service on the spent fuel pool purification l system. This item is close (Closed) Violation (361/88-15-04), Failure to Adequately Control Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)

In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee had taken action to remove all "information only" M&TE from the plan In addition, all maintenance personnel had been advised that only M&TE l

which is included in the station calibration program may be used for l future maintenance activities. This item is closed.

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• (Open) Unresolved Item (361/88-25-01),' Restricted Operation Due to Power Calorimetric Uncertainties ]

The licensee submitted informational LER 88-028, applicable to Unit .

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2, which addressed this issue. The inspector made the following observations relative to the licensee's LER:

- The cover letter to the LER stated that the submittal was

"...for an occurrence in which the plant was operated at an estimated actual power in excess of the licensed power limit."

License Condition 2.G appears to require such conditions to be reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephone with confirmation of the report to the Regional Administrator no later than the first working day following the violation, and with a written followup report within 14 days. The licensee's reasons for not considering this requirement to be applicable were not apparen The LER stated that because the plant was never continually operated at greater than 100% indicated power and was not operated at greater than'102% estimated actual power, the initial power assumptions used in the safety analyses were preserved. The licensee took the position that the inaccuracies introduced in the calorimetric calculation were well within the 2% tolerance that is allowed and for which credit is taken in the power calorimetric calculation and in the safety analyses. However, the licensee did not know specifically what the basis was for the 2% tolerance in questio The licensee concluded that there was no safety significance to this event, but there was no discussion addressing reactor safety system settings. Specifically, the potential impact of calorimetric errors on core protection calculator and nuclear instrument response was not addresse This item remains unresolved pending resolution of the inspector's observation k. '(Closed) Violation (362/88-20-05), Failure to Comply with Procedure for Use of Temporary Pump in the Spent Fuel Pool

'i The licensee took the following actions to address this problem:

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All personnel that perform water transfer evolutions were instructed regarding the details of this event, with particular emphasis placed on lessons learne Specific training on water transfer evolutions is now required for maintenance personnel who perform water transfer "

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issue were acceptable. .This item is close . Review of NRC Bulletin Response (Un'ti 1)

As requested by c: tion item e. of Bulletin 85-03, " Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," the licensee identified the selected safety-related valves, the valves' maximum differential pressures, and the, licensee's program to assure valve operability in their letter dated May 19, 1986. Review of this response indicated the need for additional information which was contained in Region V letter dated August 28, 1987 and subsequently revised by Region V letter dated September 22, 198 NRR review of the licensee's October 23, 1987 response to this request for additional information indicated the need for yet additional information, which was requested by Region V letter dated May 10, 198 NRR review of the licensee's November. 18, 1988 response to this request for additional information indicated that the licensee's selection of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valves' maximum differential pressures met the requirements of the Bulletin, and that the program to assure valve operability, as requested by action item e. of the Bulletin, was acceptable. The review of the licensee's final response required by action item f. of the Bulletin will be addressed in a future repor No violations or deviations were identifie .12 . Exit Meeting (30703)

On January 12, 1989 an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in the Results section of this repor The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and noted that appropriate corrective actions would be implemented where warranted. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio _ _ _ _ _ - _