Text

Submits Summary of 980715 Workshop with Representatives from All Region II Facilities Re Operator Licensing Exam Techniques.Invitation Extended to Members of Operations & Training Staff to Attend 981105 Training Manager Conference
	ML20153H197
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/24/1998
From:	Peebles T; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Greenman R; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
	NUDOCS 9809300343
	Download: ML20153H197 (96)
	v • d • e

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l August 24,1998 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. Robert Greenman Training Manager Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, AL 35609-2000 l

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SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

AND

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

- JULY 1998 NRC REGION 11 EXAMINATION WORKSHOP AND NOVEMBER 1998 TRAINING MANAGERS' CONFERENCE - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

Dear Mr. Greenman:

l Region 11 facilitated a workshop on Operator Licensing Examination Techniques on July 15, 1998, conducted at the Richard B. Russell Building. The workshop attendees included l representative 3 from all Region 11 facilities. It is our opinion that the workshop was beneficial l

and provided an excellent opportunity for open discussion on the operating test portion of the operator licensing examination process. ]

During the workshop, we covered a preliminary response to concerns expressed at the January 1998 workshop and a synopsis was promised, but due to the status of the program, cannot be provided. The slides used for our discussions are enclosed.

Also, I would like to extend an invitation to you, and to members of your operations and training .

staff, to attend this year's Training Managers' Conference to be held on November 5,1998. Our I goal for the meeting is to provide an open forum for discussion of operator licensing issues.

The site for this year's conference will be in the Richard B. Russell Building Auditorium on Spring Street in downtown Atlanta. As of this date, the agenda is open. We encourage you to submit, via telephone, a list of topics that you would like to have discussed.

Additionally, we would appreciate an update of the home addresses of your licensed operators.

Please send them in an envelope marked "To Be Opened by Addressee Only" to either Ms.

Beverly Michael or myself. If you have any questions or need additionalinformation, please contact Bev at (404) 562-4640 or me at (404) 562-4638.

l Sincerely, (Original signed by T.A. Peebles) i Thomas A. Peebles, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch j Division of React:r Safety j

Docket Nos.: 50-259; 50-260, and 30-296 License Nos: DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68

Enclosures:

As Stated 9809300343 980824 PDR ADOCK 05000259 -

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TVA 2 cc w/encis:

' C. M. Crane, Site Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

..T. E. Abney, Manager, Licensing &

Industry Affairs Distribution:

PUBLIC

- B Michael, DRS f )

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OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP Richard B. Russell Auditorium 1 July 15,1998 i 8:00 Opening Remarks (Johns Jaudon) 8:20 Standard JPM format (SSNTA) 8:40 JPM critical tasks (Hopper & Mellen)

What constitutes a critical task?

The importance of measurable criteria?

Good examples l

Bad examples '

Discrimination (it has to be failable!)

Good examples

Bad examples 9:30 JPM Questions (Baldwin)

Direct look up. As defined in ES-602. Attachment 1 B.2.e (p.15)

examples

fixes" to those examples

' Use of Open and Closed Reference items as defined in ES-301, D.1.1 (p.9) which l states: " closed reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions for I emergency and other procedures, certain automatic actions, operating ,

characteristics, interiocks, and set points.. " !

examples

" fixes" to those examples 10:30 Administrative JPMs (Steiner) 11:00 Scheduling (Steiner)

ways to optimize the material developed

simulator bottle necks

cont ol room JPMs

reasonable daily work loads

candidate stress

exam delays 11:30 Lunch 1:00 Exam predictability and exam security (Payne) 1:30 Simulator scenario development (Payne & Hopper)

scheduling and crew makeup

evaluation tool

malfunctions in relation to major event

level of detail 3:30 Questions and Answers l

4:30 Closing l~

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REGION ll WORKSHOP - OPERATING TEST JULY 15.1998 Richard B. Russell Building Strom Auditorium David Lane Examiner - Sonalysts Larry Kelley. Training Advisor - OHN/Pickering John Brewer Manager- Authorization Training - Ontario Hydro Nuclear Carolina Power and Liaht Company Tom Hackler Requal Training - Brunswick Curtis Dunsmore initial Training - Brunswick Tony Pearson Initial Training - Lead - Brunswick Terry Toler Instructor - Harris Rick Gamer Sperviisor- Ops Training - Harris Dwayne Coffey LOCT Supervisor - Robinson Dave Neal OIT Lead - Robinson Scott Poteat Support Lead - Robinson Duke Eneroy Corporation - Catawba. McGuire. and Oconee David Re Training Instructor Charles Sawyer Senior Tech Spec James Presten Instructor Brent Moore Instructor Bill Caudill Nuclear Instructor E. T. Beedle instructor - Catawba Reggie Kimray Nuclear instructor - Catawba John Supte Operations - Catawba Rob Billings Instructor - McGuire Steve Helms instructor - McGuire Robby Pope Supervissor - Mcguire Rick Robinson Ops Training Coordinator - Oconee Robin Lane Training Instructor - Oconee J. R. Steely Training Instructor - Oconee David Covar Nuclear instructor - Oconee Randall Yarbrough Nuclear instructor - Oconee Bobby Ayers Ops Instructor - Oconee l

Florida Power Corooration Ivan Wilson Ops Manager Jack Springer Supervisor - Training - Crystal River Johnie Smith Ops Training Supervisor - Crystal River -

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Operating Test Workshop 2 July 15,1998 Florida Power and Liaht Company Dave Brown Initial Training - St. Lucie Tim Bolander Simulator and Exams - St. Lucie Mike Croteau Instructor - Training - Turkey Point Rich Bretton LOCT Supervisor - Training - Turkey Point South Carolina Electric and Gas Comoany Jim Callicott Senior Instructor Perry Ramicone instructor - V. C. Summer Southern Nuclear Operatina Comoanv. Inc. (SNC)

Tom Blindauer Senior Plant Instructor - Simulator - Farley Bill Oldfield Training - Farley St3ve Be Training - Hatch Ken Drawdy Training instructor - Vogtle Thad N. Thompson Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle ,

Peny Tucker Ops Training instructor Vogtle Michael Henry Nuclear Instructor - Vogtle Leon Ray Ops Training Supervisor- Vogtle Fred Howard ops Reg instructor - Vogtle Perry Vannier Initial Training - Vogtle Charlton Sal Requal Training - Vogtle Steve Dyer Requal Training - Vogtle Tennessee Vallev Authority Phillip H. Case Simulator Instructor - NC Training Denny Campbell Ops instructor -Browns Ferry Marvin Meer Ops Instructor- Browns Ferry Jim Keamey Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Dave Davidson Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Steve Taylor Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Ricky C. King Sunior Ops Instructor - Sequoyah l

Ed Keyser Simulator Instructor - Sequoyah I

l Tom Wallace Supervisor - Watts Bar Terry L. Newman Ops Instructor- Watts Bar

! Jack Cox Training Manager - Watts Bar John Roden Ops Training Manager - Watts Bar Randy Evans HLT Lead - Watts Bar

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Operating Test Workshop 3 July 15,1998 Viroinia Electric and Power and Power Company i

W' alt Shura Supervisor - Training - North Anna l Steve Crawford - Ser.ior Instructor (Nuclear) - North Anna Ken Grove SeniorInstructor Surry Ray Simmons Senior Instructor - Surry I

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EXAM REVIEW GUIDELINES I. TECHNICAL ACCURACY Is there more than one correct answer?

Is the given answer correct?

Adequate data in the stem?

Is data in the stem consistent and plausible? l I

1 II. PSYCHOMETRICS: The process of applying sound qualitative processes to l mental measurements.

PSYCHOMETRIC FLAWS THAT COULD DIMINISH THE VALIDITY OF THE EXAMINATION!

FLAW . GUIDANCE APPENDIX B REFERENCE

l. Low level of Question should be written to reflect App. B

./ knowledge the level of knowledge most 1.d appropriate for a specific K/A.

When there is a choice, try to write the question to reflect the higher level.

SEE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BELOW

2. Low operational Does the question test the intent of App. B validity the K/A? 1.a/b/e Could someone do the job safely and 2.k effectively without being able to answer the question?

3. Low discriminatory Will a less than competent candidate App. B validity miss the item? 1.d Can a person understand the principle 2.g being tested and still miss the item?

SEE LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY BELOW.

4. Implausible Can a distractor be eliminated with App. B Distractors out understanding the concept being 2.b/f/h/m i

tested?

5. Confusing or State the question as concisely as App. B ambiguous language possible but provide all necessary 1.c information.

6. Confusing negatives Avoid negative stems. App.B 2.e

7. Collection of Each item should focus on one K/A App.B l true/ false item determined by the stem. 1.f 2.c

8. backwards logic Examine on a topic in a way that is App.B consistent with how the K/A should be 1.h remembered and used.

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LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY l l

Establish a level of difficulty that will enable an ap311 cant who is capable i of safely operating the plant to complete and review t1e examination within l l four hours and achieve a grade of 80 percent or greater. [ES-401 p.4] '

Since item difficulty can usually be decreased or increased by revision, the j examination author need not be overly preoccupied with difficulty when writing the items. - The author should focus on achieving a valid measure of the concept he is attempting to evaluate. [ Appendix-B. p. 6]

LEVEL'0F KNOWLEDGE Level 1: FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 1

The recall or recognition of discrete bits of information.

- knowledge of terminology

- definitions

./ - set points

- other specific facts Level 2: COMPREHENSION Involves the metal process of understanding the material through relating it to its own parts or some other material.

- describing or recognizing relationships

- recognizing how systems interact

- consequences or implications of events .

Level 3: ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS OR APPLICATION Involves assembling, sorting or integrating information to predict an event or outcome. Requires mentally using the knowledge and its meaning to solve problems.

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NUREG-1021. APPENDIX B.' GUIDANCE

1. Generic Princioles

a. Ensure that the concept being measured has a direct, important relation '

ship to the ability to perform the job.

l b. Make sure that the question matches the intent of the K/A.

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! c. State the question unambiguously and precisely.

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d. Write the question at the highest level of knowledge reflected in the testing objective.

! e. Avoid questions that are unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant.

.f . Limit the question to one concept or topic. unless a synthesis of concepts is being tested.

9 ,. Avoid copying text directly forma training or other reference material..

h. Avoid backward logic questions.

2. Other Construction Guidelines

a. Use four answers,

b. 'Do not use "none of the above" or "all of the 'above",

c. Do not present a collection of true-false statements.

d. Define the question, task or problem in the stem,

e. Avoid using negatively stated stems when possible.

f. Provided sufficient counter balance in questions with multi-part answers.

g. Include common misconceptions as Distractors.

h .- ' Make all answer options homogeneous and highly plausible.

I. If the answers have a logical sequence. put them in order.

.j. Avoid overlapping answer options.

k. Do not include trivial distractors with more important distractor 3.

1. Vary the location of the correct answer.

m Avoid specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer.

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(1) distractors that do not follow grammatically from the stem.

(2) options that can be judged correct or incorrect without reading the stem.

(3) equivalent and /or synonymous options which rule out both options.

(4) an option which includes another option.

(5) implausible distractors.

(6) a correct answer which is longer that the distractors.

(7) cualifiers in the correct answer unless they are used in cistractors. (e.g. probably ordinarily)

(8) words such as ~never" . "always" which suggest a wrong answer.

a correct option that differs from the distractors in (9)

./ favorableness. style, or terminology.

III. BEANS 1

!!k!G. .55d5. .!! *25 l

BEAN LIMIT REFERENCE Kpowledge level questions < 50 ES-401 p.4 SRO / RO overlap 5 75 ES-401 p.5 i

Questions from training class quizzes 5 25 ES-401 p.5 OR last two NRC exams.

Questions from licensee audit exam 50 ES-401 p.5

.(same author for audit exam)

.e Questions from licensee audit exam 55 Ei-401 p.5 (independent author for audit exam)

Questions from licensee bank 5 50 ES-401 p.5 New questions at comprehension or > 10 ES-401 p.5 analysis

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e JPM CRITICAL TASKS l l

AND MEASURABLE CRITERIA G. - 033ER

, W W M O M M M M

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3. Develop Performance Criteria -

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The JPM should have meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the examinee's ability to safely operate the system or the plant. Artificially subdividing ., '

existing tasks to generate new ones may dilute the value of the JPMs to a point where they become meaningless. '

The JPM shall identify specific performance standards, or check points, !

that will permit the examiner to evaluate successful progress toward completing the task in accordance with the procedural references.

Detailed control and indication nomenclature and criteria (e.g., switch !

positions and meter readings) should be identified whenever possible, i even if these criteria are not specified in the procedural step. The JPM should also note any important observations that should be made by the examinee while performing the task.

i The JPM must clearly identify the task standard; i.e., the predetermined outcome (qualitative and/or quantitative) against which task performance will be measured. Hv.e.t;ysp.t;o.cedura]< step that .the ~e (dbfrect<lyfg(ireygaccurately,iin the proper sequehce.xaminee ,

must and-atathe perform proper,:.

ididi)TdIi2orde$toEaEcomplish?the task standard shall .be identified as'*d critica7 step'and shall have an associated performance standard.

i If.there are any specific procedural restrictions on the sequence in which the steps are performed they shall be clearly noted in the JPM.

. Measuraale 3er=ormance Inc-ica : ors A measuraa~ e Jer =ormance incica:or consis:s o= Jositive actions :la: an o] server can 03jec:ive y icen: 1=y taken ay an incivicua~ (/ crew) .

Exama es:

Ac: ions :acen in :le E03s suc1 as in res 3onse :o an A~~WS. ,

Con ~:ro~ mani'au~a:1ons suc1 as a s:ar: =

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manua reac:or :ri 3 or :le o an ECCS Jum3.

Veraa~ re'Jor:s or no: 1=ication o=

3arame:ers or conci: ions.

a3 norma l

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l \on-measura.3 e >er =ormance i ::nci.ca : ors :

Veri =ica: ion :la: an ex'Jec:ec res]onse ,as occurrec:

.) Veri =ica: ion anc/or ensure s:e']s w1ic1 recuire no ac: ion. ,

1 3assiVe oJserva: ions suc, as moni :oring :le 'Jer =ormance o = a sys:em.

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DE TINED TAS( S~~AN)AUS ~

l asc s:ancarcs slou c inc~uce ~~ ~

03jec:ive recuiremerr:s wi:1 a owa] e

o'erances agreec u'Jon Jy :le

~=aci ~ i :y anc :le \ RC.

The accentance criteria must Je ab~e to discriminate /identi=y noor performance !

3ac Exam]~ es:

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3ressure =a s Je ow :. LOO 3si, s:ar: "

is Juma ... a Jer=ormance ~~

measure :la: is no: 03jec :i ve. 1e oJera :or Der =orming

lis :as< cou~ c conceiva]~ y s :ar: ~;1e Jum] w1en ~

Dressure reacles 0 ']si anc s:i' ncr:

vio~a:e :le 'Jer=ormance measure s:a:ec in :le Jrocecure, even ~;1ougl

~:le =aci~i:y icensee ex]ec:s :le oJera:or :o s:ar: :le Jum] sooner. ~ ~

1e \ RC anc ~=aci~ i :y icensee slou c

~~

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agree in wri~: ing :1a: :le ~imi:s =or i

eac1 CS or C~~ are acce3 a31e Je = ore -

! :le examina: ion Jegins. or :le exam] e given a30ve, accing an

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acce'3ta]~e ']ressure to erance (e.g..

witlin 200 asi) wou~ c c~ ari =y :le s :ancarc o = 'Jer =ormance ;1a : is ex'Jec :ec .

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":.mmecia :e~ y ,Jora :e :le RCS i = .Je ow imi:s": 1ere is no

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roc inser: ion ce=ini: ion o= immecia:e in :lis si~:ua :i on . Anywlere =orm one :o :en minu;es migT: .]e arguec as

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acce'J :a.J e.

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, . Proper Cueinc

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.X :erna s:imu us s,ou c aroma: an oJera:or :o res'Jonc ,]y ~; acing cer~;ain

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4 ac: ions. 1e incica: 1ons 0= a sys:em

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or a.com'Jonen~; ma =unc: 1on (inc~ucing ~

]assive =ai~ures)Dy me: ers anc a arms l must be accurate anc incluce a

ex'3ectec inc.ications.

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. l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l

v Provide this page to the Candidate I

l Initial conditions:

A Station Blackout has occurred on Unit 2. Unit 1 is in a LOOP with both Ernergency Diesel Generators in service. The NPS and ANPS have deterrnined the need to crosstie electrical j power from the 1 A EDG to the 2A3 4.16 KV switchgear via the SBO AB Bus Crosstie, initiating Cue:

The ANPS has directed you to accomplish the Unit to Unit crosstie to the 2A3 4.16 KV Bus by performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7 and then 2-EOP-99, App. V within 10 minutes.

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Page 16 of 16 0821129. Rev 02

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE f

(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

1. (C) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following startup transformer breakers: -

A. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-30102)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN B. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-30202)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-20102) j Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-20302) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l

l 2. (C) Element / Step Ensure the following breakers are GREEN FLAGGED and OPEN:

A. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-30101 ) (2WB7)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l

. Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-30201) (2WBS)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l

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s JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicale's a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

2. (Cont'd) 'B. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-20101) (1W86)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-20301) (1W84)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Element / Step Tie breakers between normal and emergency 4160V buses:

Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A2-2A3 (2-20109)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A3-2A2 (2-20209 Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l

Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B2-283 (2-20309)

Cue: GREEN LIG'HT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B3-2B2 (2-20411)

Cue: GREEN L(GHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Element / Step 4.16 KV Bus 2AB Tie breakers Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20208)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2A3 (2-20505)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Page 7 of 16 l DB21129, Rev 02 l

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i JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE f

l (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 2;D. (Cont'd) Standard: Incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2B3 (2-20504) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN I Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20409)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN .

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3. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 4.16 KV feeder breakers to the station service transformers:

A. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A1 (2-20110)

.- Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A5 (2-20210)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A2 (2-20213)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON

?

D. Standard: Station Service Transformer 281 (2-20310)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON E. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2B2/2B5 (2-20402)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON Det21129. Rev D2 9' 8 Of 16

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

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,, 1 (C) indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

4. (C:) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following 480V feeder breakers from the station service transformers:

A. Standard: 480V Bus 2A1 Feeder (2-40103)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN B. Standard: 480V Bus 2A5 Feeder (2-40361)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: 480V Bus 2A2 Feeder (2-40219)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: 480V Bus 2B1 Feeder (2-40419)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN

,.. E. Standard: 480V Bus 2B5 Feeder (2-40653)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 4 F. Standard: 480V Bus 2B2 Feeder (2-40503)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN SAT UNSAT Comments:

0621129, Rev C2 Page 9 of 16

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicatis a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

5. (C) Element / Step QEEN the following 480V bus tie breakers A. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2A2-2AB (2-40220)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2A2 (2-40702)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON l C. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2B2 (2-40706) 1 Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON '

D. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2B2-2AB (2-40504)

,.- Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON l

SAT UNSAT Comments:

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! JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicaiss a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

6. (C) Element / Step Establish communications with Unit 1 Standard: ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS with Unit i via Gai-Tronics or plant radio (if available).

Cue: COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED

7. Element / Step PLACE the following pump switches in the PULL TO LOCK position:

(C)' A. Standard: 2A ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK B. Standard: 2B ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK

,. Standard: 2C ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK (C) D. Standard: 2A CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK i

E. Standard: 2B CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK Standard: 2C CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK SAT UNSAT l

Comments

Page 11 of 16 0821129. Rev C2 I

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l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

< (C) indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

8. (C) Element / Step Verify the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus is open Standard: VERIFY the EL-1 output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus (2-20211)is QPEN ,

l l l Cue: GREEN LIGHT IS ON. REPORT UNIT 1 IS READY TO 4 l CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV BUSES. '

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9. (C) Element / Step Close in the Unit 2 SBO breaker Standard: CLOSE IN the Unit 2 SBO breaker 2-20501.

Cue: RED LIGHT ON

10. (C) Element / Step Request the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker

! Standard: REQUEST the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker

, 1-20501.

i .-

l Cue: UNIT 1 ACKNOWLEDGES REQUEST.

l END Element / Step TERMINATION Standard: Student requests Unit 1 to close the Unit 1 SBO crosstie breaker.

Comments:

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0521129. Rev D2 Page 12 of 15

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I JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE I (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST s

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1. Element / Step: Review the EOOS log and determine if channel RM-26-18 (PAG-

203) has been declared out of service.

Standard: Verifies RM-26-18 is not out of service. 64 p'*

Cue: RM-26-18 IS NOT OUT OF SERVICE g#(

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2. Element / Step: . Check the Met Tower for operai- -

Standard: Verifies Met Tower chart recorder workit iperty..

Cue: MET TOWER CHART RECORDER TRACKING PROPERLY. {

3. Element / Step: Verify gas release permit property filled out and authorized, enter release permit number and tank to be released on procedure.

Standard: Verifies permit filied out property and authorized, enters release permit number (98-007) and 2C GDT on procedure.

Cue: 98 007 AND 2C GDT ENTERED ON PROCEDURE

4. (C) Element / Step: \/erify the following valve alignment:

VS745 Closed V06142 Open V7071 Open V7070 Open V7072 Locked Closed VS742 Locked Closed Standard: Verify all above listed valves in proper positions

~

Cue: V6745 FULLY CLOCKWISE V06142 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE

V7071 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE l

V7070 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE VT072 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED V6742 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED SAT UNSAT i

l Comments:

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ne21153.novoo Page 5 of 12

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l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l

- (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST j

4. Element / Step Check closed FCV-25-9," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge l Control Valve Filter inlet."

Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:

VERIFY CLOSED FCV-25-9 i

Cue: 0%, GREEN LIGHT ON, RED LIGHT OFF i

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SAT UNSAT l Comments:

5. (C) Element / Step Throttle FCV-25-28," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Bypass" to approximately 10% OPEN position.

Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POSITION FCV 28 to the open position UNTIL the valve position indicates 10% OPEN

.- Cue: 10%, BOTH RED & GREEN LIGHTS ON SAT UNSAT Comments:

6. Element / Step Start HVE48," Shield Building Exhaust Fan."

Standard: At the B TRAIN EMERGENCY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:

POSITION HVE4B control switch to START l

l Cue: RED LIGHT ON, GREEN LIGHT OFF l

l SAT UNSAT Comments:

0E21058. Rev 06 % M12 1

e l

7 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l C. 8 The system / equipment status reflects the overallintent of what the JPM required upon completion.

D. Conectly perform all critical steps.

All steps where procedural guidance exists may be considered critical. Performance of l

Off-Normal Operating Procedure immediate actions will be from memory.

During the course of the JPM, there may be some tasks you will have to perform that will requite you to implement contingency actions in order to complete them. Even in these' cases, you are expected to make decisions and take actions based on the indications available and in accordance with the facility's' procedural guidance.

f ait%c Cue (s):

l The ANPS has directed you to respond to the abnormal alarm LAW 1-0120035.

l Beferences-ONP 1-0120035, Rev 18 During the performance of the task I will tell you which steps to simulate or discuss.

Vertaalize each step before you do it. This gives you a chance to self-check and use STOP during the performance of each task element.

Verify the position or cc Adition of equipment or components by pointing to the instrumentation and providing a brief explanation of how the indication is used for verification.

i t

l -

I will provide you with the appropriate cues for steps which are simulated or discussed.

. You may use any approved reference materiais normally available in the execution of this Job Performance Measure, including logs.

. Do you understand these directions?

. tf you have any questions, ask them now, and I will answer them.

. During the test I cannot answer questions.

. When you complete all steps correctly, you will pass this job performance measure.

. Begin the task now.

I os21043. Rev D6 % "'O

4

\

!. JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE f # PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

1. Element / Step Verify pressurizer spray, proportional and backup heaters are operating properly in automatic.

Standard: OBSERVE any of the following Pressurizer pressure indications on RTGB 103 and/or RTGB 106 to DETERMINE improper automatic response:

PR-1100 PIC-1100X PIC-1100Y 1 l

PI-1102A PI-1102B PI-1102C PI-1102D l PlA-1102ALL PIA-1102BLL PIA-1102CLL PIA-1102DLL Observe the proportional heater control and indication for P-1 and P-2 Observe the B/U heater control and indication for banks B-1 through B-6

, Observe the spray valve controller HIC-1100 l

l NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CUES should provide sufficient information to diagnose the failure of the selected pressure channel LOW. It should be recognized that Pressurizer pressure is actually increasing. All of the indicators listed may not be used by the operator when diagnosing this problem. The student may refer to Appendix "A" for expected automatic responses.

Cue: For PR-1100, PIC 1100X, PIC-1100Y :

SELECTED CHANNEL- DOWNSCALE LOW, NONSELECTED l CHANNEL IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For other Piinstruments:

INDICATED PRESSURE IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For Pressurizer heaters:

SWITCHES IN AUTO, HEATERS LIGHTS INDICATE ON For Pressurizer spray controller HIC-1100:

INDICATES NO OUTPUT SAT UNSAT Comments:

052100. Rev D6 Page 5 ef 10

_~ - . . . - - _ _ - - - . . . . - - . . .. .. - . - - - _ . . - ~ . -

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE s (C) Indica [es a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

2. (C) Element / Step ff the selected pressure channel has failed, Then shift to the operable I pressure channel. I Standard: At RTGB 103: POSITION HS-1100 to the attemate pressure control channel Cue:~ ALTERNATE CHANNEL SELECTED. PROPORTIONAL HEATER OUTPUT REDUCING, SPRAY VALVE OUTPUT RISING, PZR 2

PRESSURE RETURNING TO NORMAL /

NOTE -The ANPS directs that the rest of the ONP be carried out.

SAT UNSAT 1 Comments:

3. Element / Step Verify SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 " Auxiliary Spray Valves", are closed

{ Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE keyswitches and indicating lights for SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 to be CLOSED Cue: SE-02-03, SE-02-04 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:

4. Element / Step Verify power operated relief valves are c!ased.

Standard: At RTGB 103:: DETERMINE position indicating lights for both power operated relief valves CLOSED J

Cue: PORV-1402, PORV-1404 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT

Comments

i as21oc.Rev os % 8'"O a

. . - . . . ~ . .. -_ -. ... - - . - - - - _ - - - . - - . - ~ . - _ - - . . . - .

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 8 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 9

5. Element / Step Ensure that POPVs V1402 and V1404 hand switches are in the proper position for existing plant conditions.

Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE PORVs hand switches are in NORMAL

~

Cue: PORVs HAND SWITCHES IN NORMAL SAT. UNSAT i

Comments:

S. I Element / Step Verify pressure anomaly is NOT caused by a large rate of change of Tavg. l Standard: At RTGB 103: OBSERVE any of.the following indications and l DETERMINE that Tavg is fairly stable:

TR-1111X/1121X, Ti-1102A, TR-1115/1125. TI-11028. T!A-1111X, TI-1102C, TIA-1121X, Ti-1102D, TIC-1111Y, TIC-1121Y Cue: Tavg HAS BEEN STABLE THROJ' GHOUT THE EVOLUTION SAT UNSAT Comments:

. END Element / Step- TERMINATION

- Standard: The pressurizer pressure control system is responding property to contesi pressure at 2250 psia.

mM. h 06 Page 7 of 10

i.~-

l

. 1 l l l OPERATING TEST I

! WORKSHOP i RUSSELL BUILDING

JPM QUESTIONS

! RICK BALDWIN i

! JULY 15, '

998 1

ES-301, D1(l)

Sta:es:

4 T1e orescriatec cuestions 'or l i

Categories A anc B may incluce a com 31 nation of o3en- anc c osec-i

reference items. Open-reference i': ems that rec uire a 33licants ':0 acolv their knowledge o"the alant to '36s':ulatec normal a3 normal anc emergency i situatio,ns are oreferred. Closed-i reference iterhs may be used to

! eva uate t1e immeciate actions o' i emergency anc other arocecures certain automa':ic actions

characteristics., inter oc <s,set o 3eratin, 30infs asc a33roariate to :he acility., Minimize t1e

! use of closed-reference cuestions tlat

! re y sglely on memory use o~ 03en-reference a,uestions anc avoid the

! whose answer can sidi alv be looked

! un if the anolicant can "idd the J c6rrect doic'ument.

l Re"er to Sec: ion B.6 o" Appendix C for j more guidance regarcir

ceveloament anc use o~jc 17e03en reference i c uestions for t7e wal < ':1rouc 1 test.

~

Appendix C:

States:

6. Develoa Pre-scriatec Fo low-ua Questions If the JPM will be usec curing an initial licensinc examination, it sha Tincluce a sufficieri: num3er of 3rescriatec questions references<'\with answersthe to evaluate ancexaminee's understancinc of two knowlecqe anc/or

! ~ a3ility (K/A1 s:atements relatec to the '

system or fask. More than one l 1 cuestion may ae recuirec to effectively j evaluate some K/A sta':ements.

i T1e mos': a33roariate format "or this

a33lication is the short-answer c uestion recuires the examinee

to compo,se which a response ratler than

! select rrom among a set of alternative i res3onses as is tTle case with multiale-l choice ma,tching, anc true/fa se

! questio,ns. Kee3 the following

! uicelines in accition to the generic

kem const'ruction 3rinciales in A33encix

B, in minc when are3arinc" t7e c uestions:

a. Provice clear, exa icit cirections

/guicelines for answering t.he cuestion so that the examinee uncerstancs what constitutes a fully correct response.

Choose words carefully to ensure that the sti3ulations anc 1 requirements of the cuestion are a33roariately conve ec. Worcs such as " evaluate." y'out ine," anc "ex3 ain " can invi':e a ot of cetai

~

tha': is n,ot necessari y re evant.

3. Make sure ': hat the answer key res matches (and to) ponse the re in the is limitedquestion.quiremen When a33roariate incica':e the amoun': o" 3artial,crecit to 3e grantec for an incomalete answer.

For questions recuirinc com3utation, specify the dearee of precision

. expected. Try'to make the answer turn out to 3e w, ole num3ers.

c. Avoic givinc away 3 art or al o the answer 3)LYle way the cuestion is '

worc ec -or exam 3le: .

"If the letcown line 3ecame obstructec, coulc 3 oration of the plant 3e accomalislec slortly after a reactor ~:ria to aut the alan':

in colc shutcown? If so, how?"

A test-wise examinee can realize l that ':he answer has to 3e yes, or else the seconc 3 art o tne cuestion woulc have reac sometling ike "If

~

not, why not?"

c. Avoic wlat cou c ae consicerec

" trick" cuestions in w1ic, t7e answer

<ey coes not arecisely ma':ch t1e ue q'co'stion.

For exam a e, as <ing "How the Si termina': ion criteria Bhdnge followinc a Si reinitiation?"

imalies that the":ermina: ion criteria will change, when in ac':ua ity t1ey do not.

l

! e. Avoid direct look-up questions i that only require the examinee to i recall where to find the answer to l the question. ,

i The 03erational orienta': ion rec ~uirec of cuestions on the wa k-throuch test i anc the examinee's access to" l l reference cocuments, araue acainst

! the use of cuestions ~:haf' test for i recall anc memoriza': ion. Any l questions that do, not require a.ny l l analysis, synthesis, or application of inTormafion by the examinee

~

i l l should be answerable without the l

, aid of reference materials. Refer

' , for a more

':o ES-602, Attac1 men ~:

c etailec ciscussion o" cirec': loo <-u a

! c ues': ions.

Form ES-602 "NRC Check is': for

! 0 3en-Reference, Tes': Items "

! corr:ains a ist of cuestions that can

3e usec to evalua':e t7e suita3ii~:y o" i the follow-ua cuestions alannec "or I the wal< ':hrouc h 3ortion o" the

!' 03erating test." A thouc 1 the clec<lis': was ceve 03ec for use in

l evaluating recua ification written examinations,t most 9 of the criteria

<'i.e., all exce a ' 0 ' 1 anc tJe DA3 .ratin3lg on item, 7), are, genencal y 3llca a e anc coulc 3e usec as a basis for revisina or re rectinc aroposec walk-through cues: ions.

I 4

i ES-602 NRC Checklist for Form ES-602-1 Open-Reference Test items Test item Level l

l 1. Does each test item have a documented link to important licensee tasks, K/As, and/or facility learning objectives?

2. Is each question operationally oriented (i.e., is there a correlation between job demands and test demands)?

3. Is the question at least at the comprehension-level of knowledge?

4. Is the context of the questions realistic and free of window dressing and backwards logic?

5. Does the item require an appropriate use of references (i.e., use of analysis skills or synthesis of information either to discern what procedures were applicable or to consult the procedures to obtain the answer)?

6. Is the question a " direct look-up" question, or does one question on the examination compromise another? A " direct look-up question"is defined as a question that immediately directs an licensee to a particular reference where the answer is readily available.

7. Does the position? question possess a high K/A importance factor (3 or greater) for the job

8. Does the question discriminate a competent licensee from one who is not?

9. Is the question appropriate for the written examination and the multiple choice format?

10. Do questions in Section A take advantage of the simulator control room setting?

11. Does any question have the potential of being a " double-jeopardy" question?

12. Is the question clear, precise, and easy to read and understand?

13. Is there only one correct answer to the question?

14. Does the question pose situations and problems other than those presented during training?

15. Does the question have a reasonable estimated response time?

i

. l i

4 CONCLUSIONS I l

! @ 03en-reference cuestions whose l 1

answer can sim3ly De lookec ua if i the a33licant can finc the correct cocumen': are NOT acceata3le.

@ Analy. sis, Synthesis, Comorelen.sion cues': ions sloulc 3e usec to avoic

cirect look-up aroblems. l

l i

@ On all questions where the expectec

resoonses are multiaart. we wtl

! notify the cancicate of t1e number of known correct answers anc the e

num3er neecec for full crecit.

i @ Examiners will ask non-arescriatec follow ua cuestions, as necessary, to

clarify or confirm the cancicate's i uncerstancing of 3rescriatec

! questions or are-alannec tasks. The i followua cuestions shoulc 3e ':0 further ex3 lore the lack of cancicate knowl 4

j quest.ecge ion in the saecific area in

S

@ Assian aoint values to eac1 answer that h.as mu tia.le ':0 ensure examiner gracing aar:s,istency. cons

@ Icentify on the cancicate's sheet t7e status of reference material usage.

@ There is proaosal':0 im aose an allowance o" on y 3C% closec-reference c uestions of ei':her Category A or B.

l

i

=

4 DIRECT LOOK QUESTIONS l

WITH ACCEPTABLE l

CORRECTIONS

i .

1 1

i RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1

! 2.1.23 3.9/4.0

~

\

QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

. . Reactor shutdown for refueling outage l

i . Unit offline: 1/1/9712:01 AM e Entered Mode 3: 1/1/97 2:10 AM l

. Entered Mode 4: 1/1/97 6:17 AM

, . Entered Mode 5: 1/1/97 11:45 PM l What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/97 6:10 AM 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown

REFERENCE:

GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1

?

I L

l l

01/06S 8 5:43 AM

l

AUTHORIZED COPY I e INIT

~

5.2:28 IF needed for SFP water clarity, THEN place the SFP

, skimmer in service IAW OP-910.

'~" ~

5.3 Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement

! NOTE: A case evaluation has been performed IAW PLP-037 for each

, major evolution in this section. The case determination is defined prior to each applicable evolution.

i W 5.3.1 Check that the Reactor has been suberitical for at least r

100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months AND record hours suberitical. (TRMS 3.12) hrs 5.3.2 Verify EST-001 is complete.

ENG NOTE: The following equipment tests need to be completed prior to moving fuel.

5.3.3 Verify the following equipment necessary to support fuel l

- off-load has been tested IAW EST-030 AND mark the equipment that is not needed to support fuel off-load N/A.

- Fuel Transfer System (Section 8.6.2)

ENG

- Manipulator Crane (Section 8.6.3)

ENG CV RCC Change Fixture (Section 8.6.4)

ENG

- New Fuel Handling Equipment (Section 8.4)

ENG

- NFB New Fuel Lift (Section 8.5.1)

ENG

- SFP New Fuel Monorail (Section 8.5.2)

ENG

- SFP Bridge Crane (Section 8.5.3)

ENG

- SFP New Fuel Elevator (Section 8.5.4)

ENG Rev. 36 Page 24 of 79 l

9 I

Decay Time I 3.12 3.12 DECAY TIME TRMS 3.12 Movement of fuel within the core shall not be l sCTS 3.8.1.h) initiated prior to 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown, i

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

1 COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TRMS A.1 Susand movement of fuel Immediately not met, wit 1in the core.

TEST REQUIREMENTS l

TEST FREQUENCY 4

None. NA I

l l

l I

3.12 1 l

j .-

Decay Time E 3.12 B 3.12 DECAY TIME l BASES I

l The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown reduces the consequences of a fuel bandling accident by providing for decay of short lived fission products and the reduction of fission gas inventory in any potentially failed fuel. Fuel handling accidents in containment and the Spent Fuel Building have been evaluated by postulating that the failure of all fuel rods in one assembly occurs 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown.

l t

l i

i B 3.12-1 -

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 1.9/4.0 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

. Reactor shutdown for refueling outage

. Unit offline: 1/1/9812:01 AM .

Entered Mode 2: 1/1/9812:38 AM l Entered Mode 3: 1/1/98 2:10 AM l

Entered Mode 4: 1/1/98 6:17 AM l Entered Mode 5: 1/1/98 11:45 PM What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/98 6:10 AM (100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months after shutdown) l

REFERENCE:

l GP-010," Refueling", step 5.3.1 PLP-100 (Technical Requirements Manual), section 3.12 j\ ;> a..~-

l l

I 02/13/98 9:58 AM

4 RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 K103 s 4.2/4.3 1

QUESTION: ,

l Given the plant conditions:

j

= Mode 1,100% power '

. Accumulator levels / pressure "A" 68% 600 psig "B" 70 % 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated Describe the basis for NOT being allowed to raise the pressure in the "A" Accumulator and lower the pressure in the "C" Accumulator by simultaneously opening the vent valves for the two accumulators.

ANSWER: !

S,imultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops ("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" l

01/06/98 5 43 AM

UPDATED FSAR

3. Finally the second low level alarm on the RWST sounds. At this time, the-operator performs the switchover operation.

The changeover from injection to recirculation is effected by the operator in the Control Room via a series of manual switching operations according to written procedures. Valves SI-856A and B are manually closed at the valves.

Remotely operated valves for the injection phase of the SIS (Figures 6.3.1-1 and 6.3.1-2) which are under manual control, (this is, valves which normally are in their ready position and do not receive a SI signal) have their positions indicated on a common portion of the control board. At any time during operation, when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, it is shown visually on the board. Table 6.3.2-1 is a listing of the instrumentation readouts on the control board which the operator can monitor during recirculation. In addition, an audible annunciation alerts the operator to the condition.

6.3.2.2.5.1 Location of the major components required for recirculation. The RHR pumps are located in the RHR pump pit (Elevation 203 l ft 0 in.) which is below the basement floor of the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). The RHR pump pit is located between the Containment Building and the Auxiliary Building. The residual heat exchangers are located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building.

The high head SI pumps, component cooling pumps and component cooling heat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in).

l The service water pumps are located in the intake structure, and the redundant piping to the component cooling heat exchangers is run underground.

6.3.2.2.6 Accumulators. Th2 accumulators are pressure vessels filled I with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal plant l

operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series.

Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open a:.d borated water is forced into the RCS. Mechanical operation of the swing-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulators to the core via the cold leg.

The accumulators are passive engineered safety features (ESF) because the gas forces injection; no external source of power or signal transmission is needed to obtain fast-acting, high-flow capability when the need arises.

One accumulator is attached to each of the cold legs of the RCS.

The design capacity of the accumulators is based on the assumption that flow from one of the accumulators spills onto the containment floor through the ruptured loop. ine flow from the remaining accumulators provides sufficient water to fill tne volume outside of the core barrel below the nozzles, the bottom plenum, and one-half the core.

6.3.2-6 Amendment No. 12

. . - - . . . > . . m _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . - . . _ . _ _ . - . . _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ . _ . _ . . . _ _ . . . _ . - . _ _

l 4.0 (Continued)-

t-i

, 16. A case evaluation has been performed for each section of this i

procedure IAW PLP-037 The case determination and any associated

! additional requirements are defined at the beginning of each section.

I j 17 The Dedicated Operator utilized for filling SI Accumulators shall 1

be any active licensed individual other than the Reactor Operator on watch, and shall remain at the RTGB until the filling evolution is complete.

l l

18. If any SI Accumulator level increases greater than 10% (70 gal) due to inleakage when the RCS pressure is >1000 psig, then the affected accumulator shall be sampled within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

(ITS'SR 3.5.1.4)

19. When drawing an oil sample from an SI Pump, remove the Control Power Fuses. Reinstall the Control Power Fuses when sampling has been completed AED the oil reservoir has been refilled to the

\

normal level. During the interval with fueses removed, the SI '

Pump is inoperable.

20. Do U2I open more than one SI Accumulator Vent valve at a time

. when the SI Accumulators are required to be operable to prevent invalidating the LOCA Analysis. (Westinghouse Memo CPL-96-210)

~

21., Operation with RWST level greater than the high level setpoint should be avoided to prevent water level at the Spring Line of the RWST.

i i

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l'.

OP-202 Rev, 44 Page 10 of 120 l.

9-i.., , - . . _ _ _ _ ..

.y ., 7.%. - -

'~ ~ ^ - '

RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 Kl.03 4.2/4.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the plant conditions:

Mode 1,100% power

. Accumulator levels / pressure "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" 70% 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "S1 ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated QUESTION A:

Determine which accumulator parameter (s) are outside the normal operating band.

ANSWER A:

"A" Accumulator pressure is low (normal band = 614 to 646 psig)

REFERENCE ALLOWED l l

QUESTION B:

Can this evolution be perfonned and describe the basis for your response.

ANSWER B:

No, not allowed. Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops

("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" l

g

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4.07 3.2/3.5 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

RCS cooldown is in progress

!

Plant is in Mode 4

RCS T.vg is 348*F

.* RCS pressure

+ PT-402 = 468 psig

+ PT-403 = 470 psig l + IT-404 = 472 psig 1

~'

What must be done to operf M'OV-750n51 to place RHR in service?

l l

ANSWER:

Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig l . Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed l with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", : .

System

Description:

Residual Heat Removal System I

01/08/98 12:51 PM

AUTHORIZED COPY 0-

\

4.0 PMECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ;

4.1 Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be less than 350*F and 375 psig before the Residual Heat Removal System is put iri service, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values.

4.2 To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should not be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is greater than 200*F. (CR 95-00565)

C.3 'Neither RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless the following conditions are

! satisfied.:.

- The breakers fo'r SI-862A and B are closed.

- The breakers for SI-863A and B are closed.

- The control power switches for SI-862A and B are in NORMAL.

- The control power switches for SI-863A and B are in NORMAL. j m.

, Valves SI-862A and B are closed. i l

- Valves SI-863A and B are closed. (

- RCS pressure is less than 465 psig.

4.4 SI-862A & B, and SI-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig.

4.5 When the Residus! Heat Removal System is providing Core Cooling AND seal injection flow is desired to maintain a positive AP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 ;

should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.

4.6 When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed,3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowed / required by approved test procedures for which flowrates on F1-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps. !

Rev.34 Page 6 of 67 i

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 ;

005 K4.07 3.2/3.5 l

REFERENCE ALLOWED j l

QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

. RCS cooldown is in progress

. Plant is in Mode 4

. RCS T,,,is 348'F e RCS pressure

+ PT-402 = 461 psig

+ PT-403 = 470 psig

+ PT-404 = 472 psig l

l What conditions must be satisfied to open MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service?

ANSWER: i

. [.5] Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig

. [.5) Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", step 4.3 System

Description:

SD-003, Residual Heat Removal System I~

l l

'k; e ,l J. v .s.

02/13S8 9:58 AM l

l

\

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 L ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion T,,, < 500"F.

Time of Condition A not met.

E DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16 1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor goolant gross specific 7 days activity s 100/E pCi/gm.

SR 3.4.16.2 - - -

- - - - - - - - - NOTE - - -

Only required to be performed in MODE 1.

h Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 14 days I 131 specific activity 5 1.0 gCi/gm.

AND Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after a THERMAL POWER change of a 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period (continued) 3.4 46

l RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 I

BASES (continued)

I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.16.1 REQUIREMENTS i SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as l a measure of the gross specific activity of the reactor '

coolant at least once every 7 days. The analysis shall consist of a qualitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of Ci/gm.

While basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This

, Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LC0 limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with T at least 500*F. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikel%ood of a gross fuel failure during the time.

~

SR 3.4.16.2 l This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14_ day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level, considering gross activity is monitored every 7 days. The Frequency, between 2 and b 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after a power change a 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 7 period, is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following fuel failure: samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.

SR 3.4.16.3 A radiochemical analysis for $ determination is required every 184 days (6 months) with the plant operating in MODE 1

equilibrium conditions. The E determination directly l relates to the LCO and is required to verify plant operation within the specified gross activity LCO limit. The analysis for E is a measurement of the average energies per disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than 1

(continued)

B 3.4 102

l SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 2.1.14 .2.5/3.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM)

Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM)

A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM

e Recovery actions are in progress QUESTION A

What are the chemistry sampling requirements for this plant condition?

ANSWER A:

[.5] Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following a reactor power change of t 15% in I hour (in Mode 1), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified < 1.0 micro-curies / gram.

(Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM)

NO REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION B:

l What is the basis for the time frame after the power change?

ANSWER:

[.5] Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following a power change of t 15% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period is established because this is when the lodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

l OMM-001-13," Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 ITS, SR 3.4.16.2

! I i\_ c-! u ~

02/13/98 9:58 AM

\

l l

l SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 2.1.14 - 2.5/3.3

' 1 l

1 QUESTION:

( Given the following plant condith ,s:

l The plant is at 100% power, %. Sibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM)

Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM)

A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM e The plant is now stable at ~68%

. Recovery actions are in progress What are the chemistry sampling requirements and basis for this plant condition?

ANSWER:

Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1),

RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified s_ l.0 micro-curies / gram. (Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM)

Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months following a power change of 215% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 l

SR 3.4.16.2 l l

I l

r 01/08/98 1038 AM

. _ _ - .__ .-.-. -.. . - . - _ ~ . . - ... _- .- - . ..- _--... -. . ... -. .

POOR QUESTIONS KA: 062AA1.01 Importance: 3.4/3.8 Reference allowed (FSAR) l l Question: What is the limiting factor on the amount l of current that can be passed from Unit 1 to Unit 2 l

through the SBO crosstie?

l Expected Response: The electrical cable between the two units is the limiting factor.

l l

I

d KA: 033000K303 Importance: 3.0/3.3 Reference allowed Question: What is the response of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 'KF;, and why, regarding temperature and level following a Blackout?

l l

' NOTE: Assume NO operator action is taken' Expected Response: Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature will increase due to decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies.

4

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t 1 i l I

. Conduct of Operation (SRO 1) 1 l . Fire Brigade l

! KA: 194001K116 3.5/4.2 ;

l Lesson Plan: EAP-SEP i l

Reference:

Fire Plan, (E-Plan) RP/1000/29 Fire Brigade l Response, NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, ,

i Training, and Responsibilities 1 l Task: 2610000, 3710001 Source: NEW PRA 3-18-97

4. As the Operations Shift Supervisor serving as the Fire Brigade Leader during an actual fire or fire drill, you have several responsibilities. Describe the normal duties as the l Fire Brigade Leader at the fire scene?

ANSWER:

1- Serve as the Fire Brigade Commander and direct the Fire Brigade during the event.

2- Obtain support as needed such as Security, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Offsite Fire Department and Hazmat.

(3- Ensure all fire-protection equipment is restore to full capability immediately following the event).

(4- Complete the Fire Emergency Report and forward the report to the EP (Emergency Planning) Section).

I

._. m-. .. . _- -- ------ - - - -- - --- ---- -

KA: 062000A401 (3.3/3.1)

Lesson Plan: EL EPD Objective R8 page 25

Reference:

OMP Task: 002630001 Source: Bank EL 96 (JPM CRO 08) RO QUESTION:.

Describe the safety and personnel requirements for manual operation of switchyard disconnects.

ANSWER:

Rubber safety gloves and safety glasses must be worn.

At least two people in the crew performing the task, one of which is a supervisor.

Nomex suits should be worn by the breaker operator.

E -

l l

Conduct of Operations (SRO 1)

Self Checking / STAR KA: 194001K101 (3.6/3,7) l ' Lesson Plan: -ADM-OMP

Reference:

OMP 1-22, Job Assignments L

Task: 3610052 Source: PRA 3-6-97 NEW l

1.- As an SRO (Shift Supervisor) you have the responsibility of

. performing Pre-Job Briefs with other operators on your shift, you make the decision of the level of detail and information within the Pre-job Brief.

What are several guidelines that you will use to determine the amount of detail of-the. Pre-Job Brief presentation and describe the " STAR" component of the Pre-Job Brief?

ANSWER:

(2 of 5)

1) Complexity of the task Consequences of the task Importance of the task Frequency of the task Unfamiliarly of the task to the performer ;

i

2) " STAR" is a self checking method (that operators use to reduce the potential of errors).

("S" - Stop) l

("T" - Think) '

("A" - Act)

("R" - Review) l l

l l

,m . -- _, ., . , , . --. .-

ACCEPTABL$ QUESTIONS Importance: 2.6/3.0 j

Reference:

Steam Tables

! Question: The RCS is at 2250 psia, Quench tank l l pressure is 3.5psig. If a small leak developed in l l the seat of Code Safety V 1201, what temperature l would you expect to see on TIA-1107?

l Expected Response: 230 degrees l

I l

Question #1.

KA: 001K5.02 Importance: 2.9/3,4

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves

Question: Unit 2 has 6,000 EFPH on the core and experiences a dropped rod resulting in the NI power level changes from 100% to 93%, what is the

( approximate worth of the dropped rod?

l Expected Response: Approximately 75 to 100 pcm.

Question # 2. l l KA: 001K5.28 Importance: 3.5/3.8

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: In order to withdraw the same CEA without changing the power level or temperature of the RCS, how much would RCS boron concentration have to be changed?(PPM) 1

- lf Question 1 is missed: Assuming the worth of a dropped CEA was 100 pcm, how much would boron concentration have to be changed to withdraw the rod without changing power level or temperature?

Expected Response: approximately 12 PPM (Boron worth for the present conditions is 8.38pcm/ ppm) i

i

~

1 "HLC EIAM DEVELOPMENT EXAM BANKH TEST ITEM DATA SHEET

===========================================================

I. CROSS-REFERENCE DATA RECORD NUMBER: 1427 TYPE: General Use LESSON 1: LOR-SIM-JP-019-A05 LESSON 1 OBJECTIVES: 01 STYLE: Short Essay /Other POINT VALUE: 1.00 REVISION: 3 TIME TO COMPLETE: 4 Minutes I ENTERED BY: DATE ENTERED: 10/10/94 MODIFIED BY: '

DATE MODIFIED: 04/27/98 DATE LAST USEU:

4 (approved by:

ASSOCIATED TASKS:

No Tasks are currently referenced to this question.

ASSOCIATED K/A's:

206000 A1.01 ROI: 4.3 SROI: 4.4 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM REACTOR

WATER LEVEL: BWR-2,3,4 controls

REFERENCES:

2 APP A-01 3-1 /R21

===========================================================

II. QUESTION:

HPCI started on high drywell pressure, but tripped on high RPV level.

Explain how HPCI responds as level lowers from the high level trip to Lo Level 3.

Additionally, if you wanted to restart HPCI at 120", what actions would be required to perform that action?

===========================================================

III. ANSWER:

As level lowers, HPCI will not restart until level reaches LL-2 (105").

HPCI will then reset its trips and start and inject with no operator action. HPCI will continue to run as level lowers to LL-3.

To restart HPCI prior to reaching LL-2, depress the high water level trip reset pushbutton, the drywell signal will then restart HPCI and" cause it to inject.

a PAGE 1 OF 1

.- -..-. -. .. . - . - . . - - ~ . - . -_ .- . -. - . - . . . ~ - - ..- -

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l i

l

- HNRC JPM 98, Rev 0" EXAMINATION ** !

l l

l QUESTION 3 POINT VALUE: 1.00 f s

Using the attached diagram, explain how it is possible to reset a scram with the mode switch in SHUTDOWN.

1

)

l I

l PAGE 3

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-.LK13A A1 .]

K13C A2 p_ NEUTRON ..)__ ,

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m REACTOR WANUAL SCRAW m I m SHUTDOWN SCRAW RESET INTERLOCK m f TRIP CHANNEL "A3" "t' TRIP SYSTEM 't 7j i

l 1

Figure 03 Shutdown Scram Reset Interlock L

CSC-C3 : a ', l'

. Page SC Of : C'

b 1 ;

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1 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE i

1 I

l Provide this page to the Candidate I

! Health Physics has performed a survey of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms and hallway. Given a survey map, determine how each room and hallway should be l posted. ,

l Page 6 of 7 l

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JPV SC- D J _::NG PAUL STEINER el

[

l J 3v SC El ::\G C0\S::JERA-~::0\S ,

Amount of material to be generated:

Licensee Cost.

Licensee Manpower.

Examiner Review Time.

Validation Time on Simulator During Prep-Week.

l

The current trend is a shift towards a single JPM set, administered piece by

. piece, with all applicants receiving the same piece each day.

Considerations with this technique:

Availability of both Simulator and Booth Operators for two shifts.

Sequestering.

Candidate Stress.

Examiner Stress. (No laughing please!)

. _ _ . = . - . _ _ - - . - . . .

~

Currerr: 3roi ems l-

JPMs are lssting 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Longer is not better.

Take the time it takes a staff instructor to perform the task, with questions, and double it.

The last three examinations have run past 10:00 pm and were scheduled to end at 6:00 pm.

Applicants are arriving at 7:00 am and are not being xam.ined until 7:00 pm.

No margin for error or simulator failure.

l

4 T

t C 3 E RA-~I \ G EXAV :: \ A~~::0\

A0V::\:: S-~RA~~IV E ~~0 3:: CS n

m 3Vs vs w : S_.0\S Paul Steiner 4

d d

(

ES-301 Specific Instructions for Category A l l

Although Admin topics may be examined separately, it is preferable, whenever possible, to linF, associate, or integrate them with tasks and events conducted during Categories B and C '

Using a single Admin JPM is generally preferred, however, two prescripted questions may be used.

If the applicant has a "U" in only one Admin topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category A depending on the .

importance of the identified deT1clency.

- Topics in the administrative portion of the NRC initial examination are weighted the highest of all examination areas, and are thus the most likely to result in a l failing grade.

- A single knowledge weakness / or applicant error can result in an initial examination failure.

l .

1 i

Common Single Failure Points:

l l-

Clearance Error.

Reactivity Balance Error.

The key is a balance between questions and JPM's..

All JPMs will result in a long Admin exam, with a high potential to fail a candidate for a single error.

All questions usually results in a weak Admin exam.

r 9

l Exama~es o= Gooc Acmin J ^s

Shutdown Margin Calculation.

Approval of a Clearance Order.

ECP Calculation.

Manual Leak Rate Calculation.

l

Risk Matrix Utilization.

Off-Site Dose Projection.

Review a Survey Map and Demonstrate Knowledge of Radiological Hazards in a Work Zone. '

Evaluate the Applicants Scenarios for Emergency Plan Application and Make Protective Action Recommendations.

The key to success with these types of '

1 tasks is solid and thorough validation.

l 1

- If the task is not clear, and well defined, the applicants will become confused.

- If the task is too long, it will begin to loose its evaluating ability.

1

4 Examples of Poor Admin JPMs l

\

l e Check out a key from the key locker. !

Make a log entry.

Frisk out an item. i Do you want an -applicant to fail for touching the surface? ;

l

Make a call-in for emergent work while l reading from a procedure.

Perform a pre-job brief.

These are items of Low Discriminatory Validity, and if performed poorly can result in severe grading.

I

l l

i Otler Jifficu~

ties Wit 1 Acmin

=

SRO applicants should be evaluated at greater depth on Admin topics.

There must be a difference between the R0 and SRO Admin examinations.

Control Room Software not available on the simulator or applicants don't have the proper password.

The question does not solicit the answer.

Put validators in the mind set of l appli cant.

Assigning point values to multiple answer questions.

The limit is 80%. If there are four answers, the applicant must get a7 7 four correct.

Don't require applicants to catch integrity issues, or misspelled words when approving clearances or valve line-ups.

Direct look-ups are prohibited!

4 i

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.EXAF::NK ::0N S CR::~~Y

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EX/MINATION SECURITY ;

PER 10 CFR 55.49 - " APPLICANTS, LICENSEES, AND FACILITY LICENSEES

' SHALL NOT ENGAGE'IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT COMPROMISES THE INTEGRITY OF ANY APPLICATION, TEST, OR EXAMINATION BY THIS PART" l

RULE IMPLEMENTED IN NUREG-1021

ES-201 - C.1 & C.2 & C.3 (RESPONSIBILITIES) e ES-201 - D.2 (PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS) e ES-201 - ATTACHMENT 1 (PHYSICAL SECURITY & EXAM BANK LIMITATIONS)

ES-201 - FORM ES-201-3 (SECURITY AGREEMENT) ,

e ES-205 - GFES EXAM ADMINISTRATION

ES-402 - C.1 (RESPONSIBILITIES)

ES-402 - E.3 (POST-EXAM REVIEWS)

ES-501 - POST-EXAM DOCUMENTATION

e APPENDIX D SECTION F (SIMULATOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS)

{

EXAMPLES .-

l INSTRUCTOR SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSED EXAM CONTENT WITH !

EXAMINEES '-

REVEALING OF WHAT IS NOT ON THE EXAM (APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES) ,

BIAS OF SCOPE, CONTENT, OR LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY OF AN EXAM TO ENHANCE CHANCES OF CANDIDATES PASSING TEST !

LOSS OF CONTROL OF EXAM MATERIAL (NOT LOCKED UP WHEN LEAVE OFFICE, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN COPIER, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN. SIMULATOR BOOTH -

AFTER VALIDATION)

INSTRUCTOR ON SECURITY AGREEMENT INTERACTS WITH SR0(U) CANDIDATE DURING REQUAL (TAUGHT CLASS, EVALUATED SIM. SCENARIOS, SAT ON AUDIT BOARD)

WRITE EXAM TO SAME FORMAT EVERY TIME S0 IT BECOMES PREDICTABLE CHANGING K/A NUMBERS ON OLD QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO FIT NEW SAMPLE PLAN PERSONNEL NOT ON SECURITY AGREEMENT IGNORE WARNING SIGNS AND WALK IN ON EXAM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DRAFT EXAM MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY PACKAGED WHEN SENT TO NRC AND WAS -

DELIVERED OPEN ,

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CONSEQUENCES NUREG-1600, " GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" APPLIES .

IF HAVE INDICATION OF COMPROMISE, ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESS. INCLUDES:

NOT GIVING EXAM ,

e MAKING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO EXAM e VOIDING EXAM RESULTS IF EXAM ALREADY GIVEN --

e '

REEVALUATING LICENSING DECISIONS PER 55.61(b) . ,

o POSSIBLY IMPOSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDING:

CIVIL PENALTIES ORDERS IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT RULE (10 CFR 50.5)

~

EXAM PREDICT /BIllH _-

APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT CR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES ~

EXAM DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES OR RULES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CANDIDATES (e.g., 25% OF WRITTEN WILL BE OFF THE MOST RECENT EXAM)

EXAM METHODOLGY SHOULD BE VARIED FROM EXAM TO EXAM (e.g., SECTION A.4 SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE " CLASSIFY THE SCENARIO" FOR SRO's)

EXAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE THE BASIS OF THE EXAM CONTENT (e.g., NO OVERLAP WITH THE AUDIT TEST SHOULD NOT BE A RULE STRICTLY FOLLOWED WITH NO EXCEPTION) IF DONE CANDIDATES CAN EXCLUDE EVERY THING FROM THEIR AUDIT AS NOT BEING ON THEIR TEST WHICH NARROWS THE SCOPE.

ALLOW AUDIT AND LICENSE EXAMS TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY AND IDENTIFY TO THE CHIEF EXAMINER THOSE AREAS THAT OVERLAP WITH A PROPOSED RESOLUTION, IF NEEDED.

AREAS TO WATCH: NO OVERLAP FROM AUDIT EXAM -

25% FROM THE LAST TWO NRC EXAMS 50% FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE NO TEST ITEM REPEATS FROM DAY TO DAY WRITTEN EXAM ANSWERS FAVOR a,b,c, OR d ALL JPMs DONE ONLY ON A SPECIFIC UNIT

-- . . - - - ...--~~ -,.. -- .--_-..- - ..-- n,- -.-a-,--na_. +u. .- .. - - . - - - - - - n--s.a a x. .-nu.an-.--n,----..---.

3

$ 9 l .

i l

i i

d I

i l

I SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT l

C. 3AY\E G. -033ER

C R::~~::CA_ ~~AS (S da: cons:1;u:es a cri:1ca~

as(?

~~ ~

1e recua i =ica: ion examina: ion uses cri :1ca~ :as(s (C-~s) =or eva~ ua :ing crew Jer=ormance on :as(s :la: lave !

sa=e:y signi=icance :o :le '3 an: or

~

le 'Ju,3 ic. The cts are objective ,

measures for determining whether an individua~l's or a crew's performance is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

A~ ~:lougl C-~s

~

are no: cirec:~ y usec to eva ua:e 0Jera:or 'Jer=ormance on ~;1e ini:ia~ ~ icensing examina: ions, le conce'J: o= focusing on those tasks that have a significant im]act on t1e safety of the plant or t1e puiic remains valid anc slou c .Je :acen

~

in~:0 consicera: ion w1en eva ua:ing

le com'Je:ence o= ini:ia~ ~icense a-]J ican:s.

~

The Importance 0 = Sa:=ety Significance and Measurable Criteria

n reviewing eac13ro30sec C- , assess

le :as( :o ensure :1a: i: is essen~;ia~ :o sa=e:y. A task is essentia' to safety if t1e im3ro3er performance or omission of this task by an operator will result in cirect adverse cortsequences or in significant degracation in t1e mitigative capability of the plant. i

= ~

an au;oma :1ca~ y ac:ua :ec

~

']~ an:

sys:em wou c lave ,Jeen recuirec :o l mi: iga:e

le consecuences o= an incivicua~'s incorrec:'Jer=ormance or

~;1e 'Jer=ormance necessi:a:es :le crew ~

acing com'Jensa;ory ac: ion :1a: wou c com'D ica:e :le even~: mi: iga: ion s ;ra :egy, :le ~;as( is sa=e:y signi =ican~;.

L . Exam]~ es of C- s invo~ ving essencia~

sa=e y accions inc~uce close for w1ic1 o]eracion or correc l performance 3revenus--

l

. degracation o= any .Jarrier 3o "ission Jrocuc re ease.

~

e c.egracec emergency core coo ing l sys em (ECCS) or emergency Jower caJaci y.

a vio~ation o= a sa=ecy imin.

. a violation o= c1e "aci~ icy license conci:: ion.

. incorrec reac ivi y con:ro- (suc1 L as =ai~ ure 20 inicia e emergency Jora ion or scancJy icuic con:ro', or manua ~ y inser

~

con:ro rocs).

. a signi=ican recuccion o= sa=ecy margin .Jeyonc cla: 1rreJaraJ y incrocucec .Jy le scenario.

l

~

Exam 3 es o" C s invo~ ving essencia~

sa=e::y accions inc~ uce close "or l W1ic1 a crew cemons races le aJi~ icy 20:

e""ec ive~ y

~

. cirec: or mani 3u a e engineerec sa"ecy =easure (EST)

~ ~

i con:ro s cla wou c Jreven; any concision cescri3ec in le !

3revious Jaragra]1.

e recognize a "ai~ure or an incorrec au oma:ic ac uacion o" an ES: sys em or com]onen .

. nace one or more accions cla

~ ~~ ~

wou c 3reven; a cla enge 30 ] an:

sa'e*".

. 'Dreven ina3Jro3ria

~~

e accions cla

~ ~

crease a cla enge no ] an: sa- ecy (suc1 as an uninnenciona~ Reaccor j 3roseccion System (R3S) or ES:

! ac uacion).

i

/

.. /

... , q.-

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 i

Facility: Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 l

Obiectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital i

480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator level transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined ' ~

with an Excess Steam Demand (EOP-15) ._

initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.

Tumover: Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. the 2B Charging pump is out of service for packing acement, expected back in four hours. The 2A Heater Drain Pump has a uniso able oil leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. Shift 3 instructions is to reduce power to 92% and remove the 2A Heater Drain Pump from service.

Additional failures: 2A Containment Spray Pump fails to start on CSAS s - - -

i

. Event Malf. Evuit Event

, . No. No. Tvoe' Descriotion

.- 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 92%

R-RO L cn u 2 l-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure transmitter) driftWoh 3 C-BOP, 2AB Load Center deenercizes _._,l.~ a ,,L ,~.A 4 C-RO 2B CCW Pump trios 5 l-BOP FIC-9011,2A Steam Generator flow transmitter fails

, low.

6 M- 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM),2A BOP main steam line break inside' containment on reactor M-RO trio.

t.

- k,. waar we no r i n b TS W l,

i i

i l

l ,

.<- - (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

{ 'i l

_. - _ . _ _m . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ ._._-._ ___. __._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .

4 ,

e

/

Facilityf Scenario No.: 1a Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator steam flow transmitter; toperform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Stearn Generator Tube Rupture combined with a Main Feedwater line break inside containment (EOP-15)

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.

Tumover Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. The 2A Charging pump is out of senrice for a lube oil PM, expected back in three hours. The 28 Mam Feedwater Pump has a unisolable discharge flange leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. 2A Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service, not expected back this shift. 2-HVS-1 A containment cooler is out of service. Chemistry reports a 15 GPD tube leak on the 28 S/G. Management has decided to continue Shift instructions are to reduce power to 45% andpower operations remove due the 28 Main to the system Feedwater Pump load.

from service. Thunderstorms have been reported to be approaching the St. Lucie County area Additional failures: A train CSAS fails to actuate and FCV071 A fails to fully open 2B Containment Spray pump develops a sheared shaft on start.

2A Main Feedwater pump fails to trip on low suction _ pressure 2A Main Feedwater isolation valves fail to close on MSIS Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type' Description 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 45%

R-RO 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure setpoint) drifts high 3 C-RO 2AB Load Center deenergizes,2B Charging pump trip 6ap 4 N-BOP Realignment of charging and letdown 5 C-BOP 2B CCW Pump trips

---6 '99 2" SOP. 2A E!G der

f > 5 -ter f !!: 5!;5 7 M-BOP 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM), 2A main 2 M-RO feed line break inside containment on reactor trip C A train CSAS fails to actuate !

C 2A Main Feed isolation valves fail to close on MSIS (MFIV failure, continues to feed containment)

C FCV 071 A fails to fully open (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor )

1 pw , - - - - - - ,-

I e i

i 4

j ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Assurance Checklist Form ES-301-4 >

1 l

i Feelhty- Does of Exam: Seeneno hmbers / / --

t -- -; Test No.:

i l OWUTA1WE ATTNSUTES initials a

e b c i 1. The econeries have oleedy stated.shfwe.i.w.ee in the econene summenes j -.

2. The initial condleens are vuehotic, in that some espapment and/or instrumentomon rney be

! eut of serwooe but it dose not eue the operatore into espected events.

3. The scenenes eeneset naastly of reisted ewones.

l 4. Each owent aleseripmen eenesets of f

the point in the seeneno when it is to be iresseed

.

the malfunstante) that ero encored to inniste the event

the symptome/ouse that will be visible to the evow j

ll

the esposted operator accens Iby shift peereon)

the event somenneen point Gf sopiiesbie) 1

5. b more then one norwneohematic failure de.g., pipe breek) is incorporated into the i seenerf.o enthout e erschbie preceding inondent such as e seismic event.

l S. The evenes are welid with regard to physses and thermedvrismies.

]* 7. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonsbie, and allows the examination team to obtain esmplete oweiuemen results commensuroes with the eoenerio objectives.

8. ff time compreemen technsques are used. the sceneno summary oleerty so indicates.

Operseers hows sufnesent time to carry out espected scaweses wrthout undue tirne

constroints. Cues are given.

i

! 9. The emuletor enodeling is not ettered 3

10. The sooneries howe been weisdated

11. Every operecer will be evolveted using et seest one new seenario. All other scenenes have been enedified in eooordance writh Section D.4 of ES-301.

l l 12. Allindividual operecer sempotenmes een be owskmeed, as wonned using Form ES.301-6 a

(submit the form along erith the ownulator scenense).

J f 13 Each appissent will be . E-ry inwelved in the vnwinnum number of trennente end events specified on Form ES-3015 doubmrt 14 e form along writh the emulator scenenos).

.14. The lowel of difficulty is appropriate to support lisoname deosmens for each crew peerson.

TAAGET GUANTITATWE ATTUlmUTES (PWI SCSIAftIO) Actual Attributes - - -

1. Teesi enstfuncaons (5-8) / /

2. Ms8 functions after EDP entry (12) / /

3. Abnsment ever ts (2 4) / /

4. Meier transients (1-2) / /

5. EOPs entered /reouiring subetontive actions (12) / /

6. EDP contingencies roouiring subetontive actnene (0 2) / /

7. Critical teoks 12-3) / /

NUREG-1021 24 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

l .

, i ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Fom ES-301-5 OPERATING TEST NO.:

Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number 1 2 3 4 Reactivity 1 Nomal 1

- RO Instrument 2 Component 2 l

, Maior 1 l

Reactivity 1 1

Normal 0 l l

As RO Instrument 1 Comoonent 1 l Major 1 l

. SRO-I Reactivity 0 Normal 1 As SR0 Instrument 1 Component 1 Major 1 Reactivity 0 Normal 1 SRO-U Instrument 1 Component 1 Major i Instructions: (1)' Enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1

! event numbers for each evolution type.

l (2) Reactivity manipulations must be significant as

! defined in Appendix D.

, Author:

! Chief Examiner: .

t !

1 NUREG-1021 25 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 ;

1

G 1

P ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 i 1

Applicant il Applicant #2 . Applicant #3 RO/SRO-I/SRO-U R0/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO

_ , , , , SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Understand and Interpret Annunciators and Alarms Diagnose Events j

and Conditions '

Understand Plant I and System Response Comply With and Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control Boards (2)

Communicate and Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an R0.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SR0s.

Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competency for each scenario in the set.

Author:

Chief Examiner:

NUREG-1021 26 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

/

ML20153H197

Contents

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SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

Dear Mr. Greenman:

Enclosures:

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ML20153H197

Text

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

Dear Mr. Greenman:

Enclosures:

REFERENCE:

REFERENCE:

REFERENCE:

REFERENCE:

REFERENCE:

Description:

REFERENCE:

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