ML20205A182
| ML20205A182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Fredrickson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Scalice J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903300319 | |
| Download: ML20205A182 (22) | |
Text
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March 19, 1999 Tennessee Valley Authority
. ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 6A. . akout Place 1101 Market Street '
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 l
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW- BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
Dear Mr. Scalice:
Ori February 8,1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC managament to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect :urrent performance. The PPR for Browns Ferry involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period April 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of May 21,1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on June 11,1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2,1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that she NRC has suspended its ,
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its :
SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at r uclear l power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
During the last six months, Un.ts 2 and 3 operated at or near futi power, with the exception of one automatic reactor scram of Unit 2 on October 1,1998, caused by high Ltator cooling temperature. A refueling outage was also conducted for Ur6t 3 during the period.
1 Overall, performance at Gowns Ferry was acceptable. Long operating runs of both units and a i small number of transients demonstrated effective performance. Operators performed in a safe /
and professional manner. Corrective maintenance and refusiing outage activities were well-planned and executed. Surveillance activities were conducted in an effective manner, with a few instances of inadequate procedures, some of which were related to improved Technical Specification implementation. Design controls were generally effective and engineering support
, of plant operations and maintenance was technically adequate. Security, fire protection, radiation prdection and plant chemistry continued to be a effective.
9903300319 990319 PDR ADOCK 05 COO 259 G PDR SGOI ,
TVA 2 Operations performance was consistent. Effective performance in operations was demonstrated by both units operating well during the per.iod. Refueling activities continued to be well-controlled. Operators continued to effectively respond to equipment problems and plant transients, and also continued to demonstrate professionalism in the control room. Following the implementation of the improved Technical Specifications on July 27,1998, there wete several instances of poor performance and lack of necessary knowledge demonstrated by the operators which *vas caused by the deficiencies in the licensed operator training program. For l example, during start up of Unit 3 in October 1998,150 psig reactor steam dome pressure was exceeded with an inoperable high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The operators ,
failed to meet Technical Snecification 3.0.4, which requires HPCI to be operable prior to I increasing pressure above 150 psig. Although the operator requalification training program was adequate, the activation / reactivation of operator licenses was not effectively controlled.
Performance during the period does not warrant any additional i,1spection effort above the core NRC inspection program.
Performance in Maintenance was consistent as demonstrated by maintenance and outage activities continuing to be well-planned and executed in accordance with requirements. In {
@neral, calibration and surveillance activities were also well-planned and executed in accordance with applicable requirements and procedures. Examples of inaaequate test procedures continued to be identified during this period, as were difficulties in using measuring and test equipment. Overall, material condition of the pbnt was adequate. Fewer equipment i failures occurred during the period, resulting in a decrease in equipment and operator I challenges. Inservice inspection activities continued to be well-planned and conducted in accordance with ASME Code requirements and documerged commitments. Maintenance personnel continued to be effective at problem identification and implementation of the corrective action program. Performance during the period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the core NRC inspection program.
Performance in Engineering was consistent. Design controls were effective in oreparing and implementing plant modifications for the HPCI system as part of the power uprate project.
Safety evaluations were technically adequate. Engineering support of site activities effectively coritributed to surveillance procedures meeting the Technical Specifications and applicable code requirements. Engineering programs and processes generally were implemented in an i adequate manner, to include implementation of the Generic Letter 89-10 program. Inattention '
to detail contributed to several design calculation deficiencies and to several poor quality !
licensing submittals for the power uprate project. Weaknesses in engineering problem identification were demonstrated by the failure to identify inoperable rod block monitor channels ,
and to disposition nonconforming flappers prior to placement in the warehouse for issue and use. In addition to the core inspections, a regional initiative is planned to evaluate engineering performance and review issues '.Jentified in the 1998 HPSI Safety System Engineering Inspection.
Plant Support performance was consistent. Radiological control practices continued to be effective in keeping exposures well below regulatory limits. The chemistry control program was also effective in maintaining good water quality. Security performance continued to be effective.
Security personnel demonstrated that they were fully capable of performing their duties on a day-to-day basis. In addition, security personnel were highly trained and equipped to respond to contingency events. Security equipment was well-maintained as a result of excellent
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1 TVA 3 engineering and'instrumenW. ion and control support. Fire protection activities continued to be performed in an effective manner. Surveillance testing of fire barrier penetration seals was effectively implemented. Performance during the period does not warrant any additional inspection effort above the core NRC inspection program.
Enclosure 1 centains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee perfortgance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other 1 docketed correspondence between the NRC and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Browns Ferry PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling
, conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance ofinspector arrival onsite.
Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listcd due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We will inform you of any changes to the inspe: tion plan. If you have any questions, please contact Paul Fredrickson at (404-562-4530).
Sincerely, (Original signed by Paul E. Fredrickson) l l
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 i Division ceactor Projects <
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 i I
f 1
i
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TVA 4
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan <
l cc w/encis:
Senior Vice President .
Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Jack A. Bailey, Vice President Engineering and Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street ;
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Karl W. Singar Site Vice Presi1ent Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, AL 35609 General Counsel
. Tennessee Valley Authority ET 10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 Nicholas C. Kazanas, General Manager ,
Nuclear Assurance I Tennessee Valley Authority SM Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Robert G. Jones, Plant Manager Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, AL 35609
, cc w/ enc! continued: See page 5
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TVA 5 cc w/ encl: Continued Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge
- 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Timothy E. Abney, Manager -
Licensing and Industry Affairs Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, AL 35609 Chairman
. Limestone County Commission 310 West Washington Street Athens, AL 35611 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street Montgomery, AL 36130-1701 Distribution w/encis:
S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR H. N.~ Berkow, NRR L. Raghaven, NRR A. DeAgazio, NRR W. M. Dean, NRR T. H. Boyce, NRR J. Lieberman, OE G. M. Tracy, OED A. P. Hodgdon, OGC B. J. Keeling, GPA/CA W. Bearden, Ril C. F. Smith, Ril D. W. Jones, Ril D. H. Thompson, Rll L. S. Mellen, Ril PUBLIC Distribution w/encls continued: See page 6
4 TVA 6 Distribution w/enCis: Continued NRC Senior Resident inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10833 Shaw Road Athens, AL 35611 s
OFFICE Ril:DRP Ril:DM / Ril:DRs Ril:DRs Ril;@s /
SIGNATURE M% 4 hy ,A *)y) C /, _ h b yg6f NAME R Carrion alt K. law 3lg i K B4rr H. Christensen 8'Be'listi DATE 3/ /t/199 ,1/M 199 3/ 9$ 199 3/;9 /99 f.31,/1199 3/ 19 9 3/ 19 9 COPY? 6/Ed NO /(ES I NO VES) NO YES NO hES 'l NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD M DOCUMENT NAME: G:\BF\PPR\ SPRING 99\PPkCOV.'LTR
f% United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(%)
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area BROWNS FERRY 16-Mar-99 DATE TYPE (s) SEC. SFA SOURCE (s) !D'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES PgM (]
7/11/98 NCV NCV 296/ 98-04-01 LICENSEE The licensee's failure to implement the procedure for retuming a loop i Residual 1 234 5 Heat Removal (RHR) pump and heat exchanger to service in an operable loop resulted in an unrecognized entry into a more restrictive Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation. The licensee's corrective actions were adequate.
A OOOOO Core Spray and RHR procedures were enhanced to address a vulnerability while B OOOOO opening normally closed containment isolation valves.
O OOO 7/11/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The control room operators responded correctly to the tnpped 3B recirculation pump 1 234 5 and utilized a conservative approach regarding consideration of the power / flow conditions. The licensee's use of thermography to assess damage to switchyard ceramic insulators was good.
A OOOOO B ROOOO cO 000 6/16/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC During observation of routine operational activities, the inspectors observed good 1 234 5 proceduralwnv6n . Self checidng and commurucations were conducted in accordance with licensee management expectations. A deficiency involving nitrogen gas bottle storage in the reactor building .vas corrected promptfy by the rl' ensee.
A OOOOO Good supervision of a reactor operator trainee was noted during operation of a B OOOOO dieset generator.
O OOO 6/16/98 NCV NCV 98-03-01 LICENSEE Personnel errors during development and review of a clearance for maintenance 1 234 5 work on a reactor protection system power supply resulted in an inadvertent engineered safety features actuation. A OOOOO sO0000 cO 000 6/16/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC The Unit 1 operator and AUOs demonstrated good coordination, commurucations 1 234 5 and self checking during the Unit 1 residual heat removal system surveillance for Unit 2 operability. The contaminated area inside the Unit 1 drywell access contained an excessive amount of miscellaneous materials.
A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 6/16/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC During a Unit 3 rrudcycle outage, the licensee successfully identified leaking fuel 1 234 5 assemblies. Strong reactivity controls were administered for control rod manipulations during the subsequent startup A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 4/19/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page 1 of 7 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/11/94 Ehclosure 1
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BROWNS FERRY 16-Mar-99 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) , SMM CODES 5/5/98 Negative OPS IFl 98-02-05 NRC Overalt, conduct of Fix-It-Now team work was well controlled. The inspectors 1 234 5 questioned the procedural guidance and implementation regarding the use of personnel, in some cases, to ensure that a component was maintained % the safe posrtion instead of usmg a clearance. Licensee management is reviewing the A OOOOO practice to determino if procedural guidance is appropriate and management B DGOOO expectiations were met. Additional NRC review of the licensee
- evaluation is necessary. (IFl 98-02-05)
O OOO E!5/98 VIO ENG VIO 98-0243 NRC Additional NRC review identified that the procedure for testing the SBGT 1 234 5 downstream HEPA filter did not meet the requirements of American National Standard institute (ANSI) N510-1975 as required by TS, DOP dispersion testing was not incorporated into the test procedures. (TS 3.7.B.2.a Violation)
A OOOOO OOOOO cO 000 5/S98 VIO ENG VIO 98-02-02 NRC The licensee did not initially perform an aggressive review of the inspector's concem 1 234 5 that SBGT testing relied upon the skill of the maintenance craft to work around procedural obstacles. The NRC subsequently identified that the model of DOP generator used for testing of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) and Contol Room A OOOOO Emergency Ventilation (CREV) systems was not equivalent to that model required B OOOOO by the procedure. A violation was identifed for failure to follow testing procedures.
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wwN , rg g 7/11/98 NCV NCV 260,296/98-04-04 LICENSEE The correction coefficient (TAU) used to adjust the Operatirig Limit Minimum Critical 1 234 5 Power Ratio (OLMCPR) for slow control rod scram insertion times was incorrect for several Unit 2 and 3 operating cycles. However, the corrected OLMCPR was never exceeded. Weak design controls were in place between the licensee and the A OOOOO contractor performing core reload analysis. The licensee corrective actions were B OOOOO prompt and complete.
O OOO 6/16/98 Negative NRC ltr dtd 6/6/98 NRC incomplete and poor quality submittal and nontimely responses to staffs requests 1 234 5 for additional information relating to license amendment request for power uprate.
Quality of submittals and planning for Fcensing activities needs to be improved. A OOOOO sD0000 CO 000 6/16/98 Negative MAINT IR 98-03 NRC Implementation of GL 89-10 remained partfy incomplete, as the licensee had not 1 234 5 satisfactorily obtained and/or analyzed motor-operated valve (MOV) test data to support cee assumptions. A OOOOO B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 4/19/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page 4 of 7 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/11/98
BROWNS FERRY 16-Mar-99 DATE TYPE (s) SEC. SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES 6/16/98 NOV MAINT , NCV 98-03-06 LICENSEE The licensee identified that testing of a control room emergency ventilation system 1 234 5 damper did not fully implement Techrucal Specification (TS) requirements. The problem was identified during reviews for Generic Letter 96-01 Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits.
A OOOOO OOOOO c0 000 6/16/98 URI URI 98-03-02 LICENSEE Testing of the Standby Gas Treatment relative humidity heater flow switches was 1234 5 wen controlid ad conducted in awv dcu.w with procedures. Second party checking and communication practices were good. Some inconsistencies were noted involving the testing methodology and measurement of air flowrates. An A OOOOO apparent discrepancy between TS requirements and the test procedure was B OOOOO identified by the Ecensee. An unresolved item was opened to address additional review.
O OOO 5/5/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The inspector concluded that the licensee's Qualified 50.59 Preparer Training met 1234 5 ANSI-3.1-1981. Six 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations chosen for review, five were determined to be techrucally adequate. One safety evaluation contained a mimr A OOOOO
- ' " Y B OOOOO cO 000 5/5/98 VIO MAtiT VIO 98-02-04 NRC Periodic replacement of the High Pressure Coolant injection System turbine exhaust 1 234 5 rupture disc assembly was performed satisfactorily except that the as-found inspection process was not adequate to identify that the disc material was degraded. The licensee did not identify the degradation until the inspectors A OOOOO questioned the inspection. (Criterion XVI Violation) B OOOOO cO 000 F @ " h > ~~5l 7/11/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC Facility radiological conditions in radioactive waste storage areas, health physics 1 234 5 facilities, and Turbine and Reactor Buildings wera found to be appropriate and the areas were properly posted and material appropriately labeled. Personnel dosimetry devices were appropriately worn. Radiation work activites were appropriately A OOOOO planned. Radiation worker doses were being rreined well below regulatory limits B DOOOO and the licensee was maintaining exposures ALARA. A special team was planning an aggressive U3 drywell cleanup. The Whole E% counting program was O OOO performed as procedurally required.
6/16/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC The inspector detemuned that the licensee had procedurally established a process 1 234 5 to ensure that personnel who were granted unescorted access were trustworthy, reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the A OOOOO P"D"'
s000OO cO 000 FROM: 4/19/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page 5 of 7 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last updated: 7/11/9s
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BROWNS FERRY 16-Mar-99 DATE TYPE (s) SEC.SFA SOURCE (s) ID'd ISSUE (s) SMM CODES SMMTemplate Codes: SALP Functional Areas: ID Code:
1A- l OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations LICENSEE LICENSEE 18 OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients ENG ENGINEERING NRC lNRC g
1C ; OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes MA!NT MAINTENANCE SELF iSELF-REVEALED 2A ! MATERIAL CONDITION - Equipment Condition OPS iOPERATIONS 2B l MATERIAL CONDITION - Programs and Processes PLT SU PLANT SUPPORT 3A l HUMAN PERFORMANCE - Work Performance SAQV 3AFETY ASSESSMENT & QV 3B HUMAN PERFORMANCE - KSA 3C il HUMAN PERFORMANCE- Work Environment 4A jENGINEERING/ DESIGN - Design 48 iENGINEERING/ DESIGN - Engineering Support I
4C ENGINEERING / DESIGN - Programs and Processes SA PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification 58 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis SC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Resolution Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action * (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URis are unresolved items about which more information rs required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 4/19S8 TO: 1/31/99 Page 7 of 7 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 7/11/98
..-. . ._. .- ...-. -. . . ~. _ . - .. - - .-
Page: .1 of 8 %ee: 03/18/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission w a .oi 4, aegion si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BROWNS FERRY By Primary Functional Aroo Functional Temploie Date Source Area ID Type Codes llem Description 12/26/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC MISC Prt 1A The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations evaluation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear facility was consistent with g g the most recent NRC assessment of the licensee's performance.
Ter:
12/26/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC' MV Prt IA On September 11,1997, the licensee failed to meet the TS requirement to fully isolate a pressure boundary 3,e.
leak from all operable systems; however, the actions taken were reasonable and there were no safety consequences.
t Tec 12/26/1998 1998008 Pet OPS NRC NEG Prt 1 A The licensee continued to have difficulties with the implementation of the improved Technicd Specifications
- g. g (TS). Specifical!y. the licensee erroneously determined that on inapprorwicte TS Umsting Conditton for Operation (LCO) was app!! cable during rod worth minimizer testing. The testing procedure was subsequently Tec changed to ensure that the LCO actions were folowed.
12/26/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt1A Good housekeeping was noted in the accessible portions of the plant. Cold weather protection was well-maintdned.
Tec i
12/26/1998 1998008 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt IB A Unit Board 3B lockout caused a plant transient on November 17.1998. Overall, the operators' response to the transient was good.
Sec- M ;
Tec 11/14/1998 1998007 Prh OPS NRC POS Prt lA Fuel movement activities were property implemented during the Unit 3 refueling outage. Refueling bridge pe g che W WM fuel mowment wMe h a ment See: See: IC manner.
Tec 11/14/1998 1998007 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt 1A The operators performed in a professiond and conservative manner. A strength was noted in the high g quality of the control room logs.
Tec ,
11/14/1998 1998007 Prt OPS NRC STR Prt 3A Subsequent to the completion of the Unit 3 Cycle 8 refueling outage. drywel housekeeping was excellent ,
with a few minor exceptions which were promptly corrected. <
Tec 11/14/1998 1998007-01 Prt OPS NRC VIO IV Prt 3B Ucensed operators demonstrated a knowledge deficiency when they failed to implement the requirements g.- g of Technical Specification (TS) Umiting Condition for Operation 3.0.4. The operators incorrectly continued RPV heatup through 150 psig while HPCI was inoperable for maintenance.
Tec item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), To 01/31/1999
Page: 2 of 8 m Dole: 03/18/1999 Unnao States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Tim.: 06ci:4, Region si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BROWNS FERRY By Pnmory Functional Aroo Functional Template Dole Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 11/02/1998 1998006 01 Prt OPS Licensee NCV Prt I A A control rod was inadvertentty withdrawn several notches post its previous position and prompfty inserted g '. back to its intended position. The Ecensee's investigotion determined that the cause of the mispositioned control rod was burnon error and the cause of the re-insertion of the control rod without direction was Tec human error, 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt1A Operations personnel inoppropriately entered into TS LCO 3.0.3 when togging out the Unit 3 CAD system
- g. prior to reactor shutdown for the refueling outoge. Although the octual conditions for entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 did not exist, operators involved were not oppropriately sensrtive to intentional entry into TS LCO 3.0.3.
Tec 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt OPS NRC NEG Prt I A Licensee monogement expectations for signing the working copies of clearances in the field were not diligently implemented. os identified by two examples. The Dcensee clearly communicated expectations to Sec-
- See: IC Operations personnel foHowing identificotton of the issue Tec 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt IB Plant systems responded as designed when on automatic turbine trip and ~ tor scram occurred on Unit 2.
U * * ' *U See: MAINT Sec: SA Ecensee's incident investigotion Team performed a thorough investigotion or l10 event.
Tec SB 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt 2A General material U oditions of the Unit 2 Core Spray system and of the Unit 3 torus were considered to be good.
Sec: MAINT Sec:
Tec 08/22/1998 1998005 02 Prt OPS Licensee NCV Prt 1A The Ecensee identified that a high steam dome pressure indicotton was not effectively evoluoted to mm ssary men mems, m WW pees, h Meom h pae was Sec-* Sec: 3B recorded and determined to be outside of the TS-required acceptance criterio.
Ter:
08/22/1998 1998005 Prt OPS NRC POS Prt I A Fuel receipt inspections were performed effectively and demonstrated good attention to detail, Sec: PLTSUP Sec:
Tec 01/25/1999 1998008-02 Prt MAINT NRC VIOIV Prt 2B The surveillance procedure for functional testing of the Stanoby Gas Treatment System relative humidity flow switch channels was previously identified as inadequate to test the flow switch contacts in the relative humidity heater circuit. The planned corrective actions were reviewed and determined to be acceptoble.
Ter:
12/26/1998 1998008 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Work actMties were welR:ontroRed. The prejob briefing for the inspection /colibration of a Reactor Core M' Sec: 38 m oo N wm m w ms M p N detailed post problems, and emphasized the importance of good communications with operations Tec personnel item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), To 01/31/1999
Page: 3 of 8 Dole: 03/18/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time: 0e0i:4, Region in PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BROWNS FERRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Temploie Dole Source Areo ID Type Codes item Description 12/26/1998 1998008 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Surveillance testing actMties were performed in o professiond rnanner with good attention to self<:hecking.
Sec: Sec: 38 Ter:
12/09/1908 1998007-03 Pit MAINT Licensee NCV Prt 2B Improper use of a volt-ohm meter (VOM) during Common Accident Signal Logic testing resulted in the
- " U* 9 '"" ~
- Sec'~ See: 3B associated with the recommended use of the VOM were noted ofter testing was restarted fonowing the Ter: octuation.
11/14/1998 1998007 Prt MAINT NRC NEG Prt 2B The surveillance procedure for functiond testing of the Standby Gas Treatment System relative humidity flow switch channels was inadequate to test tte flow switch contacts in the relative humidity heater circuit.
Tor.
11/14/1998 1998007 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B The licensee's periodic assessment report provided sufficient detail to demonstrate that the licensee fx3d
- g. g. odequately evoluoted performance, condition monitoring. ossociated gools, and preventive maintenance octivities for systems, structures, and components within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. The licensee ~s Ter ossessment met the requirements of NUMARC 9341 and parograph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65.
11/14/1998 1998007 Prt MAINT NRC DOS Prt3A Work practices were professiond and property controlled. Workers were knowledgeable of their assigned g *.
tasks. The leod performer demonstf sted exceptional knowledge of the construction and operation of the Sec:3B new Siemens vocuum type breaker during replacement octMties on the Unit 14-kilovolt Unit Board.
Tor.
11/14/1998 1998007 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A Surveillance test activities were conducted in a professiond manner, w!th good coordination demonstrated Sec-
' See: 3B monitor d.uring Residud.tHeat Removd Service Water pump testing.
7,,.
11/14/1998 1998007-02 Prt MAINT NRC eel Prt 28 The surveillance procedure for funchond testing of the Standte C m Trectment System Relative Humidity g g Fk- v Switch Channels was inodequate to test the flow switch contacts in the Relative Humidity Heater Circuit.
Ter:
10/03/1998 1998006 Prk MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B The licensee's inservice Testing (IST) program scope was satisfactory. The licensee's Program Manual for the ;
- g. g. second ten-year IST intervd was consistent with the ASME Section XI code requirements. The licensee developed and implemented procedures which met IST program requirements for reactor core isolation Ter cooling (RCIC) and residud heat removd systems (RHR) were described and tested in oppropriate procedures.
10/03/1998 1998006 Prt M2T NRC POS Prt 3A Thorough troubleshooting of equipment problems was observed during the inspection period. Workers were o w ch we &MM Sec: Sec: 3B Ter:
item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other). To 01/31/1999
Page: 4 of 8 Dole:03/18/1999 -
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission um.: 06m:4, nogion n PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BROWNS FERRY By Primary Funcilonal Aroo l
Functional Temploie Dole Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 2B Operators conservatively backed out of testing and consulted engtneering for support when problems were enc ce m @ @m WW teW @h W Wm west Sec: ENG Sec: 3B demonstrated on in-depth knowledge of the test and the cornequero=s of potential personnel errors.
Tec 08/22/1998 1998005 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 1A Maintenance work actMties were performed in o professional and thorough manner Sec: Soc:
Tec 08/22/1998 1998005 Prt MAINT Ucensee POS Prt 1A Effective troubleshooting by icensee engineers determined the cause of an oB foaming problem with the g, Unit 3 Reactor Core isolatim Cooling System. Troubleshooting octivities were weH-planned and executed with reiiobie maintenance support Tec 03/14/1998 1998007 Prt MAINT NRC POS Prt 3A The licensee's inservice inspection octMties, includng repairs and replace nents, were conducted in occordance with regulatory requirements and Ecensee commitments.
h c' M Tec 12/26/1998 1998008 Prt ENG NRC MISC Prt 4C The hcensee's program for maintenance, inspection and repairs to Service Level I coatings was odequate.
g, g *. However o weakness was identified in the licensee's site implementing procedure for omitting the requirements for repairs to cochng from the procedure and referencing documents which had been Tec superseded 12/17/1998 1903011 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 4A Although the mechanical /rbclear cdculations reflected the plant's current design and Icensing basis, vo-ious errors and/or methodology were identified in the majority of inem.
Tec 12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC NEG Prt 4C Requirements of FSAR Sections 8.6.2.2. 8.6.4.1, and 8.6.5 could not be mef beccuse of the 250-VDC system's inadequate battery capacity This was identified as on origind plant design deficiency Tec 12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC NEG PrtSB Cdculation MDC3999-970055. developed in support of the ECCS strainer plant modification provided a g weok andysis of the instoGotion by not oddressing the higi .er differentid pressure across the clean strainer.
Tec 12/17/1998 1998011 PrtENG NRC POS Prt 4A The Rcensee has implemented design changes wtuch fully satisfy its regulatory commitments for TS changes Sec: Sec:
384 W 386.
Tec Item Type (C-sis. Followup,Other), To 01/31/1999
Page: 5 of 8 Date:03/18/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. .ission Time:a6si.49 Region il PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BROWNS FEPRY By Primary Functional Area Functional Template Dole Source Arec ID Type Codes item Description 12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4A The electried equipment in the HPCI toom was qualified to meet the environmental chanQes resulting from 3,c. $,e.
the power uprote.
Tec 12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt 4A The review of Electried Cdculation ED-Q0256-880707 showed that the assumptions made were odequate .
g and a sound eng:neering approach was used.
Tec 12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt4C The licensee developed and implemented plantmodifications which evoluoted the HPCI system instrument
- g. g. loops and demonstrated their capacity to operate under power uprate conditions. The Instrument loops were demonstrated to be sufficiently occurate to perform their design function.
Ter:
12/17/1998 1998011 Prt ENG NRC POS Prt SA The self-assessment plan prepared to evduate the HPCI system was both thorough and cortplete.
- Sec: Sec:
Tec '
12/17/1998 1998011-01 Prt ENG NRC NCV Prt 4A Inodequate 250-VDC Battery Copacity. Although there were copocity limitations on the 250-Vdc system g, g *. design, monuoi realignment of attemote power sources from another bottery and repositioning of volves ollowed the 250-Vdc system to meet the FSAR licensing basis requirements. This condtion hos existed the Tec since original plant design.
12/17/1998 199801 M2 Prt ENG NRC IFl Prt 4A Corrective action followup for design basis calculations with six examples.
Sec: Sec: 4B Ter-12/09/1998 1998007-04 Pit ENG NRC VIOIV Pit 1A The Rcensee's engineering group fo5ed to diposition floppers !dentified as deficient prior to placing in on issue Sec: See: AC
- Tec i
11/02/1998 199800 % 3 Prt ENG Licensee NCV Prt 1 A The licensee toiled to identify inoperable RBM channels and take the actions specified by Technicd g g Specificoffon 3.32.1 Tec 10/03/1998 1998006 Prt ENG NRC MISC Prt1A The licensee's resolution that on Emergency Diesel Generator cooler leak was not a failure was considered to g ', gg be incorrect. However, the licensee performed on adequate review to determine the cause of the leak on the 1/2C diesel generator cooler.
Ter: 5B ltem Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), To 01/31/1999
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Pogo: 7 of 8 Date: 03/18/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm. ission nm.: ma:.,
Region si PLANT ISSUE MATRIX BilOWNS FERRY By Primary Functional Area Funcilonal Template Dole Source Area ID Type Codes llem Description 10/02/1998 1998012 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt: 1A The licensee *s security facilities and equipment were determined to be very wel maintoined and reliable.
- g. g.* The initichve to develop a map of the effective zones of detection and to return the zones to that status offer major maintenance was considered a strength The exceDent Engineering and I&C support was the Tec major contributing factor to continued operabiEty of the detection and ossessment equipmeni.
10/02/1998 1998012 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1 A The SFMs odequately demonstrated that they have the requisite knowledge necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with their day-to-day and contingency response positions.
Tec 08/22/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1 A The protected crea was well lit and temporary shuctures had sufficient temporary Eghting.
Sec: Sec:
Tec 08/22/1998 1998005 Prt PLTSUP NRC POS Prt 1A During new fuel receipt, the Rodation Protection techniaans performed thorough and consistent surveys
- g. and were knowledgeable of the new survey requirements.
Tec item Type (Compliance, Followup,Other), .') 01/31/1999
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.- l BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT !
INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION NO.OF INSPECTION l PROCEDURE TITLE INSPECTORS DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION 73753 ISI 1 4/99 Core I
83750 Radiation Protection 1 4/99 Core 82301 Emergency Preparedness 3 5/99 Core (Bi-annual Graded Exercise) 83750 Radiation Protection 2 6/99 Core (To TVA corpo ate offices to review j personnel dose records) l 37750 and Engineering Performance and SSEl 3 8/99 Regional Initiative - Evaluate engineering - l 92903 Followup performance and review issues identified in the i 1998 SSEl. l 84750 and Radiation Protection 1 9/99 Core 86750 l
81700 Physical Security 1 11/99 Core 83750 Radiation Protection 1 11/99 Core !
I i
ENCLOSURE 2 :
b i
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ ___.... _____.._ ___________ _ ___._ ___.__ _________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ ._. . . - . . . _ . _