IR 05000338/1997002

Insp Repts 50-338/97-02 & 50-339/97-02 on 970223-0405.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20148B660
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	05/05/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148B635	List: IR 05000338/1997002 ML20148B632 ML20148B654
References
50-338-97-02, 50-338-97-2, 50-339-97-02, 50-339-97-2, NUDOCS 9705130233
Download: ML20148B660 (14)

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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50 338, 50 339 License Nos: NPF 4, NPF 7 Report Nos: 50 338/97 02, 50 339/97 02 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPC0)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: February 23 through April 5, 1997 Inspectors: R. McWhorter, Senior Resident Inspector (February 23 until '

March 6, 1997)

K. Poertner, Acting Senior Resident Inspector R. A. Gibbs, Resident Ins xctor R. Aiello, Acting Senior Resident Inspector (Sections 01.2, 01.3, 01.4, 02.1, M1.1, and M1.2)

L. Garner, Project Engineer (Sections 02.2 and F5.1)

R. D. Gibbs, Reactor Inspector (Section M8.1)

Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects j

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ENCLOSURE 2

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9705130233 97Q505 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G PDR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/97-02, 50 339/97-02 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six week period of resident inspection: in addition, it includes the results of inspections by two regional specialists and a project engineer.

. Operations

. 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, were satisfied prior to the receipt of new fuel (Section 01.2).

. The ins)ectors concluded that the nuclear oversight meetings were of some su) stance. As the organization continues to mature and gain credibility, the organization's ability to identify issues prior to those issues becoming significant regulatory issues should improve (Section 01.3).

. One Unresolved Item (URI) concerning Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNS0C) program reviews was identified (Section 01.4).

. An Inspection Follow u) Item (IFI) was identified to review the evaluation concerning )oron concentration in the accumulator discharge lines (Section 01.4).

. A Violation (VIO) concerning the failure of the licensee to assure that the Control Room (CR) chart recorders were functioning properly was identified (Section 02.1).

. An unusual oil leak from the 2H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) exhaust manifold was identified and discussed with plant management (Section 02.2).

Maintenance

. Maintenance work activities observed were performed in a professional and thorough manner. An NCV concerning the failure to perform a required Appendix R fire watch was identified (Section M1.1).

. Surveillance activities observed were generally performed in a professional and thorough manner. However, the inspectors noted a lack of attention to detail in completing the required documentation for 2-PT-80, AC Sources Operability Verification. Housekeeping in the Service Water Building was not as orderly as more frequently traveled areas in the plant (Section M1.2).

. Technical Specification (TS) requirements were satisfied for the quarterly turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and valve test. The _ -.

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! Training Department was not effective in preparing the licensed operator for the overspeed trip tappet exercise portion of the test

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[ * The testing of the Auxiliary Shutdown facility clearly exceeded the i

requirements of TS and is identified as a strength (Section M8.1). '

• Many of the switches on the Auxiliary Shutdown panel were not tested to

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verify operability, and the inside of the panel was found to be extremely dirty. An IFI was issued to followup licensee actions concerning this weakness (Section M8.1).

. Enaineerina j . The safety evaluation associated with Unit 1 Temporary Modification

. (TM) 96 1635 adequately justified implementation of the TM (Section E1.1).

Plant Sucoort

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Radiation protection practices observed were conducted properly (Section R1.1).

i e The protected area perimeter barrier was properly manned and maintained (Section S1.1).

i . Several deficiencies were noted during a fire drill which resulted in i

the fire drill being classified as a failure (Section F5.1).

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J Report Details Summary of Plant Status Units 1 and 2 operated the entire inspection period at or near full powe I. Operations

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01 Conduct of Operations

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01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500)

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The inspectors conducted frequent CR tours to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures. The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to verify operational safety and compliance with TSs. Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically reviewed from CR indications to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status and housekeepin Deviations Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that )otential safety concerns were properly reported and resolved. T1e inspectors found that daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures. Good equipment material conditions were also evident by extended problem free plant operations.

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01.2 Preoaration for Refuelina (New Fuel Receiot Insoection)

a. Insoection Scope (60705)

On March 19, the inspectors observed the facility conduct an inadvertent criticality evacuation drill. On March 20, the inspectors reviewed plant systems and licensee procedures for the receipt of new fue b. Observations and Findinas

. On March 19, the facility conducted two drills in order to ensure

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compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, prior to receiving a new fuel shipment. The inspectors identified to the licensee during the first post drill critique that the

, first drill did not simulate the anticipated conditions during an accidental criticality. Specifically, all of the participants were huddled in a group and the drill coordinator said, "The criticality alarm is alarming." Everyone at that point exited the Fuel Handling Building. The facility elected to conduct a second drill. This time the drill coordinator had everyone assume normal fuel receipt inspection positions. The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation (97 SE-Ti 08)

that discussed the placement and o>eration of the temporary criticality

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, alarm system in the Fuel Handling 3uilding. No problems were identifie Procedure 0 0P-4.2, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel, Revision 10, was revised to incorporate the addition of the new temporary criticality monitor _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . ._ ..___.m- .

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Conclusions ,

i The inspectors verified that the requirements for 10 CFR 70.24,

Criticality Accident Requirements, were satisfied prior to the receipt of new fuel.

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01.3 Nuclear Oversiaht Deoartment Quarterly Meetina  !

i Insoection Scooe (71707)

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! On March 25, the inspectors attended the licensee's Nuclear Oversight !

! Department (N0D) quarterly meeting. The N0D ensured that nuclear -

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activities were conducted with focus on nuclear safety, regulatory 1 compliance and performance.

f j Observations and Findinas

The N00 quarterly report inputs included department interfaces, safety

evaluations, maintenance rule implementation, personnel safety, safety >

l related ventilation maintenance, conduct of operations during transient i events, reduction in engineering _ effectiveness and control of the ionics 1 i syste Issues that required increased management attention were ;

j identified as " Red Issues." These " Red Issues" were categorized based

on evaluation of nuclear safety significance, regulatory com j l -personnel safety, the ability to self identify the concern, pliance, and the timeliness and effectiveness of the corrective action. The N00 t identified several areas that required increased management attention.

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Two examples were: l

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the lack of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment representative at

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untimely and ineffective corrective actions for identified

deficiencie The N00 consisted of four nuclear specialists, one for each SALP discipline. Two of the specialists were relatively ne Conclusions  !

The ins)ectors concluded that the nuclear oversight meetings were of some su) stance. As the organization continues to mature and gain credibility, the organization's ability to identify issues prior to those issues becoming significant regulatory issues should improv .4 DR Review l Inspection Scope (71707. 40500)_

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The inspectors reviewed numerous DRs during the report perio ,

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b. Observations and Findinas Additional reviews were necessary for the following DRs:

- DR N 97 577: TS 6.5.1.6.a requires that SNSOC review the programs and all changes thereto described by TS 6.8.4. TS 6.8.4.a states, in part, that there will be a program to reduce leakage from primary coolant sources outside containment. The technical procedures that implemented the requirement did not require SNSOC approval. This condition is being corrected by the license The insoectors are reviewing other programs to verify that SNS0C reviews are being performed. Pending completion of this review, this item is identified as URI 50 338, 339/97002 0 <

- DR N 97 494: On February 24, the licensee identified that '

3rocedure 1/2 OP-14.1 Residual Heat Removal, Revision 41/31, Jnits 1 and 2 respectively, Step 5.19 did not take into account that the space between the accumulator discharge check valves on B and C accumulators could be at a much lower boron concentration than either the Reactor Coolant System or the accumulator discharge line due to cold shutdown requirements. Until the inspectors review the evaluation concerning boron concentration in '

the accumulator discharge lines, this item is identified as IFI 50 338, 339/97002 0 r c. Conclusions >

One URI concerning SNSOC program reviews was identified. An IFI was identified to review the evaluation concerning boron concentration in the accumulator discharge line Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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02.1 Review of Shift Loos a. Inspection Scooe (71707)

On March 18, the inspectors checked the CR chart recorders to assure that pens were marking properly and the recorders were timing correctl The inspectors also verified that each chart had been checked by each shift and annotated as required by procedure '

b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified where the licensen failed to properly check the CR chart recorders as required by the fc! lowing procedures:  ;

- 1-G0P-1.0, Unit 1 CR0 Turnover Checklist, Revision 12

- 2 GOP-1.0, Unit 2 CR0 Turnover Checklist, Revision 11

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0 0 PAP 0004 Logs and Operating Records, Revision 5

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, 4 Chart recorders 1 RC-FR 1154B, Unit 1 number 1 Setl Leakoff: 2 RC FR-2154B Unit 2 number 1 Seal Leakoff: and 2 NI-NR 46, Unit 2 Nuclear Instrument (NI) 43 iverpower were not inking and hao not been for several days. Furthermore, the operators on each shift had initialed

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and dated the recorders without verifying that the recorders were functioning properly for several days. When the ins)ectors identified that the above recorders were not inking properly, tu CR licensed o)erator immediately re primed the pens to allow a trace to be rea T1e facility wrote a DR (DR 97 671) and the shift supervisor briefed the on coming shifts in order to re emphasize the requirements of the above procedures. The failure to assure that the CR chart recorders tere working properly is identified as VIO 50 338, 339/97002 0 c. Conclusions The inspectors identified one violation concerning the failure of the I licensee to assure that the CR chart recorders were functioning 1 properl .2 2H EDG Walkdown (71707)

On March 14, while performing a routine tour of the '4i EP.G room, the inspectors observed oil dripping off the diesel's sm. It seemed to originate around the exhaust manifold header flanger. An operator performing rounds was notified of the condition and the oil was cleaned up. Approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later, the inspectors observed that approximately two tablespoons of oil had accumulated in this same are The 2H EDG had last been operated on March 10. After operation, the diesel generator is barred over with air to clear tha cylinders of oi This oil is blown into the exhaust manifolds and may later leak out the flanged connection. The inspectors considered that the observed flow rate five days after the diesel's last o)eration was unusual. This was discussed with the system engineer and t1e Station Manager who indicated that the observed condition would be evaluated and action taken as appropriat II. Mainteinance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed and reviewed maintenance activities to verify that activities were conducted in accordance with TS, arocedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards. T1e inspectors observed all or portions of the following Work Order (W0) activities:

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0-MCM 0101 01, Main Feedwater Pump and Motor Alignment, Revision 2

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0 MPM 0103 01. Preventive Maintenance on Charging /High Head Safety

Injection (SI) Pumps, Revision 7

j . W0 00358792-01, Change Oil In Pump Speed Increaser

. W0 00355939-01, Clean Lube Oil Coolers

. W0 00354318-01, Clean Filters / Inspect Seal Coolers

. W0 00344087-01. Charging Pump Casing Replacement and j DCP 95127, Remove Seal Coolers

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0 MPM 0710 01, Quarterly Preventive Maintenance on the Caterpillar 1

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Station Blackout Diesel, Revision 1.

Observations and Findinas

! The inspectors found the work performed under these activities was professional and thorough. All of the work observed was performed with

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the work package present and in use. The blocks of the fire and missile barrier for the Unit 1 A charging pump cubicle were removed for the

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planned maintenance under the W0s mentioned above. Therefore, an hourly fire watch was required per VPAP-2401, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5. for 10 CFR 50 Ap)endix R non compliance. The ins)ectors identified

on March 25, that t1is fire watch was not performed )etween 6:00 l 4 and 9:00 a.m. on March 25, as required by VPAP 2401, Paragraph 6.5.3 l A dedicated welding and cutting fire watch was present in the charging

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pump cubicle during this time as required by VPAP-2401, Paragra)h j

6.5.4a. The welding and cutting fire watch was not observing t1e

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general area outside the charging pump cubicle that was to be observed i

by the hourly fire watch. The licensee has taken correct actions to address this failure to follow procedures. This failure constitutes a

violation of minor significance and is being treated as an NCV,

consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is

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identified as NCV 50 338/97002 04.

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) The inspectors also noted that a contract Quality Control (QC) inspector

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had written a note, approximately 30 minutes earlier, on the fire watch ;

log indicating that hourly fire watches had r,ot been performed. The 1

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inspectors spoke with the QC inspector who stated that he had not yet '

i reported the problem. The inspectors informed CR personnel of the

! missed hourly fire watch and discussed with management the failure of ;

i the QC inspector to immediately report the conditio Conclusions I

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The inspectors concluded that maintenance was aerformed satisfactoril The inspectors identified one NCV concerning t1e failure to perform a required Appendix R fire watc __ __ __ _ _

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M1.2 Surveillance Observations InsDection ScoDe (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed surveillance testing activities to verify that testing was >erformed in accordance with procedures, test instrumentation was cali) rated, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, and any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolved. The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:

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2 PT 17.1, Control Rod Operability Test, Revision 17

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2-PT-36.9.1.J. Degraded Voltage / Loss of Voltage Functional Test:

2J Bus, Revision 26

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1 PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test, Revision 10

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2 PT 75.2A. Service Water Pump (2 SW P 1A) Quarterly Test, Revision 27

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2-PT 80. AC Sources Operability Verification, Revision 9

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2 PT-32.3.1, Loop 1 Steam Flow and Feedwater Flow Protection Channel III (2 FW F-2477) Functional Test, Revision 26

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1-PT-30.2.4. Nuclear Instrument System Power Channel IV (N 44)

Channel Functional Test, Revision 2 Observations and Findinas The inspectors f ound that the work performed under these activities was professional anti thorough. All of the surveillances observed were performed with the procedure present and in us During the performance of 2 PT 80, the inspectors observed that the Reactor Operator (RO) failed to initial Step 6.1, which checked the closed position of 4160V J Bus Normal Feed, Breaker 25J11. Furthermore, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) had reviewed the test documentation and failed to discover the error. The inspectors cuestioned the SR0 and the R0 to determine if the breaker had been checkec closed. Both operators confirmed that the breaker was closed as require Additionally, the inspectors had earlier checked the breaker to be close The inspectors noted while observing 2 PT 75.2A that housekeeping in the Service Water Building was not as orderly as other more frequently traveled areas in the plan .

7 Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the surveillance tests had been performed ,

satisfactorily, but noted a lack of attention to detail in completing j the required documentation for 2 PT-80. The inspectors also concluded that housekeeping in the Service Water Building was not as orderly as more frequently traveled areas in the plan ;

M1.3 Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Doerability Test i Inspection Scope (61726)  !

On April 1, the inspectors observed portions of 2 PT 71.0, 2-FW P 2, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and Valve Test, Revision 18, to ensure TS surveillance requirements 4.7.1.2.b.1 and 4.0.5 were l satisfied. The inspectors observed the test locally at the turbine and l in the C Observations and Findinas During the test, the inspectors noted that the instruments used for pump speed and vibration were in calibration. The inspectors observed that !

procedure usage and supervisory oversight were appropriate. The j inspectors reviewed the completed test results to ensure TS requirements l were suisfied for pump differential pressure, vibration and miscellaneous valve operations including stroke times. No discrepancies were identified. The inspectors concluded that TS requirements were me The inspectors observed the performance of step 6.6.45 to ensure the operator was familiar with resetting the overspeed trip device for Overspeed Trip Valve, 2 MS-TV 215. The inspectors observed that the reset function was performed properly; however, the operator experienced some difficulty performing the previous step (step 6.6.44) that exercised the overspeed trip tappet and verified that it fell back to its original position. The operator, who was licensed, did not recall any specific training for this evolution, and did not remember doing it before. A representative from the Training Department later informed the ins)ectors that specific training for exercising the overspeed trip tappet 1ad been provided for non licensed operators, but not for licensed operators. The inspectors concluded that training had not adequately prepared the licensed operator to perform the overs)eed trip tappet evolution and the evolution had not been discussed in t1e pre job brief. This observation was discussed with the Training Superintenden Conclusions The inspectors concluded that TS requirements were satisfied for the quarterly turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and valve test. The Training Department was not effective in preparing the licensed operator for the overspeed trip tappet exercise portion of the tes _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues

M8.1 Auxiliary Shutdown Facilities Maintenance / Surveillance

a. Inspection Scope (62700)

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This portion of the inspection was conducted to review the licensee's practices concerning maintenance and surveillance of the plant's ,

Auxiliary Shutdown facilities. The aurpose of the inspection was to l

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determine what actions were being tacen by the licensee to assure that i the facilities would perform their safety function if called upon during a plant event.

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In order to complete the inspection, the licensee was

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requested to provide the following information: a list of all surveillances PMs and calibrations performed; a list of all deficiency

reports and work orders written on the Unit 1 facility in the last year,

and a list of any design changes implemented on the facility in the last 3 years. This information was provided and reviewed during the course of the inspection. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Sections 7.7.1.12, 7.7.1.13.1, 4 7.7.1.13.2, and 7.4, TS Section 3.3.3.5, and the licensee's abnormal procedure AP 20, Operation from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel,

. Revision 14. A walkdown of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Reactor Coolant Monitoring Panel, and the Auxiliary Monitoring Panel was 4 l conducted. This walkdown compared installed equipment to the applicable drawing, verified system lineup to the ap)licable site )rocedure, and i included an inspection of the inside of t1e Auxiliary Slutdown Panel for

material condition. In addition, a sample of TS required surveillances and non TS required surveillances were reviewed for technical adequacy.

l TS surveillance frequency was also confirme b. Observations and Findinas The inspection resulted in the following observations and findings:

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The licensee determined that there were no work orders or deficiency reports written on the Unit 1 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel in the last year, and no design changes had been made to this

, panel within the last three year The inspector determined that the installed equipment and the

documentation reviewed during this portion of the inspection were

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in agreement with the UFSA The licensee's actions with regard to the Auxiliary Monitoring Panel and the Reactor Coolant Monitoring Panel in the Fuel Handling Building were commendable. The licensee performs

, surveillance testing for all instruments on these panels which includes both a channel check and a functional test (instrument loop calibration) similar to the TS testing required on the

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Auxiliary Shutdown panel.

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The licensee's actions concerning the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel met l and exceeded the requirements of TSs. TSs require a channel check I and a functional test (instrument loop calibration) of all instruments on the panel. The inspectors * sampling of this testing determined that the testing was technically sound and was being performed at the required frequency. In addition, the licensee also conducts periodic testing of the switches that control the Charging Pumps and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, which is not required by TSs. One weakness was identified regarding this panel. There are approximately forty other switches on this panel in each unit which are not subject to any periodic testing or preventative maintenance. These switches control the Boric Acid Pumps and key system valves, which are needed for safe shutdown of the plant in case of a control room evacuation. Once this weakness was identified, the licensee took immediate corrective actions to evaluate the condition by issuance of DR N 97 56 Walkdcwn of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Reactor Coolant l Monitoring Panel, and the Auxiliary Monitoring Panel determined !

that the installed equipment was in accordance with the applicable drawing. The equipment was clearly labeled, and a verification of the switch position lineup determined that the lineup was in accordance with the licensee's procedure (1 PT 41.3, Safe Shutdown l Equipment Control Verification, Revision 8). Equipment appeared I to be in good condition: however, the inside of all four of the i Auxiliary Shutdown Panels was extremely dirty. Once the licensee l was advised of this condition, immediate action was taken by the !

Maintenance Superintendent to establish a preventative maintenance l procedure to periodically clean these panel As a result of the observations and findings noted above an IFI u identified IFI 50 338, 339/97002 0 l c. Conclusions The licensee's actions with regard to testing of the Auxiliary Monitoring Panel and the Reactor Coolant Monitoring Panel were commendable. Actions concerning the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel met and exceeded the requirements of TSs. However, one weakness was identified concerning the lack of testing, inspection, or preventative maintenance concerning many of the switches on this panel. Equipment on all panels appeared to be in good condition; however, the inside of all four of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels was extremely dirty. An IFI was identified to followup licensee actions concerning testing and cleaning of the Auxiliary Shutdown Pane .

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III. Enaineerina l El Conduct of Engineering (37551)

, El.1 Temocrary Modification Review 1

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a. Insoection Scooe (37551) '

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] The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 Temporary Modification (TM) 96 163 b. Observations and Findinas 3 Unit 1 TM 96-1635 was installed on July 10, 1996, to cut and cap the

drain line associated with pressurizer pressure transmitter 1 RC-PT-l 1456. The drain line isolation valve was leaking past the seat and the

leakage resulted in level transmitter 1-RC LT 1460 reading slightly

high. The insmet s e reviewed the TM package and associated safety

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evaluation. T1e saiety evaluation adequately justified implementation

! of the TM. The licensee plans to remove the TM during the upcoming i refueling outage.

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c. Conclusions

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} The safety evaluation associated with Unit 1 TM 961635 adequately l justified implementation of the T '

IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

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i R1.1 General Observations (71750)

F j On numerous occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors

! reviewed Radiation Protection (RP) practices including radiation control

area entry and exit, survey results, and radiological area material i conditions. No discrepancies were noted, and the inspectors determined

that RP practices were prope S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities l

S1.1 Physical Security Observations (71750)

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On April 4, the inspectors walked down the protected area barrier with a security officer. The officer was professional and knowledgeable of security systems throughout the facility. The inspectors checked the protected area barrier to ensure there were no openings or degraded

! conditions and none were found. The inspector also observed that the i isolation zones were clearly marked, free of obstructions, and of sufficient size to permit clear observation by security force members.

Vehicles in the protected area were inspected to ensure the doors were j either locked or the keys removed. The inspectors also observed that

personnel access to the protected area and the security towers were i

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properly manned. The inspectors concluded that the protected area perimeter barrier was properly manned and maintained.

F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification

} F5.1 Fire Drill InsDection Scope (71750)

On March 13, the inspectors observed the fire brigade's res>onse to a

, simulated fire in the Unit 2 switchgear room and attended t1e subsequent critiqu Observations and Findinos i

During the drill, a number of negative observations were made by the ,

ins)ectors and the drill evaluators. These included: one fire brigade l mem)er, also a security officer, took eleven minutes to arrive at the I fire scene: the fire plan for this area was not used since the Unit 2 fire plan book which was brought to the scene did not contain the fire plan for common areas which were contained in the Unit 1 fire plan book:

>ersonnel entered the fire area without being properly dressed out; a arigade member failed to monitor his air supply such that as he attempted a second entry into the fire area, the low air alarm sounded; and, personnel failed to clearly understand verbal instructions as to the location of a breaker to open so that the wrong breakers were opened. In addition, one fire brigade member reported that his dress out gear was sized improperly and another indicated that three of his snaps were broke The critique included the topics presented above, as well as, possible corrective actions. The critique also addressed positive observations to re enforce good practices. The licensee considered this fire drill as a failure, and indicated another fire drill would be conducted for !

this grou ! Conclusions Several deficiencies were noted during a fire drill which resulted in the fire drill being classified as a failur V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Sunniary

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The inspectors aresented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on April 15 and May 5,199 The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie . _ _ - _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee l

W. Anthes, Superintendent, Outage Planning B. Foster, Superintendent Station Engineering

, J. Hayes, Superintendent. Operations i

D. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing H. Kansler, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

. W. Matthews, Station Manager M. McCarthy, Director Nuclear Oversight H. Royal, Superintendent, Nuclear Training

D. Schappell, Superintendent, Site Services R. Shears Superintendent, Maintenance

A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection

! INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering i IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems i i IP 60705: Preparation for Refueling '

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations 1 i IP 62700: Maintenance Implementation  !

IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations l IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

! 50 338, 339/97002 01 URI Review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6 requirement for SNSOC review of programs (Section 01.4).

50 338, 339/97002 02 IFI Potential inadequate boron concentration in the j accumulator discharge line (Section 01.4).

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50 338, 339/97002 03 VIO Failure to assure that CR chart recorders were marking properly (Section 02.1).

50 338/97002 04 NCV Failure to perform a required Appendix R fire watch (Section M1.1).

~50 338, 339/97002 05 IFI Followup licensee actions concerning testing and cleaning of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (Section M8.1).

Closed 50-338/97002 04 NCV Failure to perform a required Appendix R fire watch (Section M1.1).

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