ML20154G401

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Discusses Insp Repts 50-254/97-23,50-265/97-23,50-254/98-11 & 50-265/98-11 on 971014-980522 & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty of $88,000 Re Inadequacies in Comed Capability to Shutdown Facility Following Fire
ML20154G401
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/1998
From: Caldwell J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Kingsley O
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20154G404 List:
References
50-254-97-23, 50-254-98-11, 50-265-97-23, 50-265-98-11, EA-98-175, EA-98-231, NUDOCS 9810130162
Download: ML20154G401 (5)


See also: IR 05000254/1997023

Text

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(*****,/ September 11, 1998

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Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley

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President, Nuclear Generation Group g

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Commonwealth Edison Company x  ?

ATTN: Regulatory Services

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1400 Opus Place, Suite 500

Downers Grove, IL 60515

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SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - l

$88,000 (NRC inspection Report Numbers 50-254(265)/97023(DRS) and l

50-254(265)/98011(DRS))

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Dear Mr. Kingsley:

This refers to two inspections conducted from October 14,1997 to May 22,1998, at the

Commonwealth Edison Company's (Comed) Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). l

The inspections identified several apparent violations associated with Comed's (1)

implementing procedures for the post-fire safe shutdown analysis and, (2) changes to safe

shutdown procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The NRC discussed

significant inspection findings with members of the Comed staff at a public management

meeting conducted in the Region ll1 office on December 19,1997, The results of the

inspections were discussed at exit interviews conducted on April 15 and May 22,1998. On

June 18,1998, an open predecisional enforcement conference was held in the Region til office

to discuss the apparent violations.

Based on the information developed during the inspection and the informati'o n provided by

Comed representatives during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has

determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the

enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice), and the

circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection reports.

The violations in the Notice represent inadequacies in Comed's capability to shutdown the

Quad Cities facility following a postulated design basis fire. When it identified in

September 1997 that it may not be able to shutdown the Quad Cities facility following a

postulated design basis fire, Comed implemented compensatory measures including shutting

down Unit 2. However, during a December 19,1997, public meeting that occurred after several

months of NRC inspections, Comed acknowledged NRC inspection findings that concluded that

despite the compensatory measures, Comed had not demonstrated and could not demonstrate

that the Quad Cities design basis fire safe shutdown analysis and implementing procedures

were adequate. Subsequently, Comed shutdown Unit 1 and kept Unit 2 shut down while the

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analysis and procedures were revised and validated. These violations indicated a broad lack

of understanding on the part of the Quad Cities' staff for the importance of having analyzed,

proceduralized, and validated means for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown following a

design basis fire. During the enforcement conference, Comed acknowledged that inadequate

knowledge and ownership of the fire protection program, along with inadequate management

involvement and support for correcting identified deficiencies in the safe shutdown program

were several of the root causes for these violations. Comed stated that it expected that

operators would have been able to achieve and maintain safe shutdown based on their training

and various procedures including abnormal and emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and

equipment not described in the Quad Cities safe shutdown analysis. However, the NRC

concluded that some equipment necessary to achieve safe shutdown may not be available or

accessible and that reliance on unanalyzed impromptu measures such as combining sections

of EOPs during the fire would not provide reasonable assurance that operators could achieve

post-fire safe shutdown conditions.

Additionally, in response to the safe shutdown issue, Comed char. gad its safe shutdown

procedures to permit the use of the station blackout diesel generator in lieu of the emergency

diesel generators without first performing a safety evaluation to confirm that the departure from

the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) did not constitute an unreviewed safety

question. The required safety evaluation was performed after substantialintervention by the

NRC staff. When performed, the NRC staff identified that the safety evaluation was deficient

because it did not consider all necessary manual actions required to operate the station

blackout diesel generator. These actions included manual unloading and reloading of electrical

buses and diesel engine refueling sooner than previously anticipated. Comed subsequently

determined that the additional manual actions needed to utilize the station blackout diesel

involved an unreviewed safety question that required Commission approval prior to

implementation of the change. The failure to perform a safety evaluation for a change to the

facility as described in the USFAR that was subsequently determined to be an unreviewed

safety question constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, Tests, and Experiments."

These violations represent a very significant safety concern because they involve inadequacies

in Comed's capability to shutdown the Quad Cities facility following a postulated design basis

fire. Due to the design of the Quad Cities facility, the alternative shutdown capabilities relied

heavily on administrative controls to use opposite unit equipment and to implement a large

number of manual actions. If a design basis fire occurred in certain fire areas, the capability of

meeting shutdown performance goals, such as reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal,

process monitoring, and support functions, varied from area to area. Also of concern is

Comed's ability to evaluate fire protection issues as demonstrated by the weaknesses in its

preparation of the safety evaluation. In sum, because a postulated fire would so damage

equipment that reasonable assurance did not exist that safe shutdown could be achieved and

maintained using analyzed equipment and procedures, the violations were classified in the

aggregate, in accordance with NUREG-1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for

NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy)," as a Severity Level 11 problem.

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O. Kingsley -3-

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $88,000 is

considered for the Severity Level !! problem. Because the Quad Cities facility has been the

subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years', the NRC considered

whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the

civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 c," the Enforcement Policy. Identification

credit was warranted because the Quad Cities engineering staff identified all of the technical

concems regarding the inadequacies in the Quad Cities alternative shutdown capabilities.2

Corrective Action credit was not warranted due to the extensive involvement by the NRC,

including involvement in identifying the 10 CFR 50.59 violation, to focus Comed resources to

obtain comprehensive corrective actions. The NRC's involvement culminated in the

December 19,1997 management meeting, during which the NRC pointed out significant

deficiencies in Comed's corrective acticas. This meeting resulted in Comed shutting down the

remaining operating unit and maintaining both units shutdown until these safe shutdown

violation: were corrected. Since Identification credit was warranted and no Corrective Action

credit was warranted, the civil penalty assessment for the violations is $88,000.

Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining the post-fire safe shutdown capabilities

for all fire areas and the acknowledgment of Comed's recognition that the Quad Cities

10 CFR 50.59 program was in need of comprehensive corrective action, I have been authorized

after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director

for Regulatory Effectiveness, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition

of Civil Penalty in the amount of $88,000.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice when preparing your response. Notwithstanding the apparent

comprehensiveness of your corrective actions associated with the 10 CFR 50.59 violation, and

in light of the prior similar violations, you should describe why you believe your actions will be

effective in preventing additional violations of 10 CFR 50.59. The NRC will use your response,

in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to en,sure compliance

with regulatory requirements.

'

EA 97 591 issued two Severity Level til problems with a $330,000 civil penalty on March 12,1998, for

inadequate procedures for surveillance testing of the primary coolant system boundary and an inadequate

10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation associated with changes to the surveillance procedures.

'

While the NRC was involved in identifying the 10 CFR 50.59 issue, for purposes of assessment, this was

considered in determining Corrective Action credit.

__ _ . . _ . . . . . . . . _._ .._ _ . _ . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ .

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' O. Kingsley -4-

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in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

l enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

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Sincerely,

James L. Caldwell

, Acting Regional Administrator

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Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265

License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed

imposition of Civil Penalty

cc w/ encl: M. Wallace, Senior Vice President

D. Helwig, Senior Vice President

G. Stanley, PWR Vice President

J. Perry, BWR Vice President

R. Krich, Regulatory

Services Vice President

1. Johnson, Licensing Director

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DCD - Licensing

J. Dimmette, Jr., Site Vice President

W. Pearce, Quad Cities Station Manager )

C. Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager 1

R. Hubbard

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N. Schloss, Economist

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Office of the Attorney General

State Liaison Officer

Chairman, Illinois Commerce

Commission

W. Leech, Manager of Nuclear

MidAmerican Energy Company

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DISTRIBUTION /

PUBLIC IE,-Of

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JCallan, EDO

WTravers, DEDE

= LChandler, OGC

'JGoldberg, OGC

SCollins, NRR

RZimmerman, NRR

PSoger, NRR

Enforcement Coordinators

RI, Ril and RIV-

Resident inspector, Quad Cities

SRichards, NRR

APulsifer, NRR

JGilliland, OPA .

HBell, OlG

GCaputo, Ol

LTremper, OC

! TMartin, AEOD

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OCFO/LFARB w/o encl.

DRP

Docket File

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