ML17265A676

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Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis
ML17265A676
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/1999
From: MECREDY R C
EATON CORP., ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
REF-PT21-99 NUDOCS 9906220033
Download: ML17265A676 (8)


Text

REGULARLY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTICOSYSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:990622'0033 DOC.DATE:

99/06/16NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETIFACIL:>0-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATION VISSING,G.S.

RecordsManagement Branch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Part21reptredefectsSnoncomplicanse,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii),

whichrecpxires "Writtennotification toNRConidentification ofdefectorfailuretocomply."RelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluation 6rootcauseanalysis.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE19TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:Part21Rept(50DKT)NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

E05000244GRECIPXENT IDCODE/NAME LPD1-INTNAL:FILECENTER01DRNARD,RGN1'GN3COPIESLTTRENCL.'11-1111111.1RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G.

NRR/DRIP/REXB RES/DET/EIB RGN2RGN4COPIESLTTRENCL1111111111EXTERNAL:

INPORECORDCTRNRCPDR1111NOACSILVER,ENUDOCSFULLTXT1111DM'EUINIgIIIhim NOTETOALLMRIDSMRECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR14ENCL14 4NDROCHESTER GASAh/DEIECTRICCORPORATION

~89FASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y1dbf90001 ARFACODE716Sf6-27D0ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresident Nuciearoperations June16,1999U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

10CFRPart2130DayReportR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

Theattached10CFR21reportissubmitted inaccordance with10CFRPart21,Reporting ofDefectsandNoncompliance, Section21(d)(3)(ii),whichrequires"Writtennotification totheNRContheidentification ofadefectorafailuretocomply".Veryrulyyours,Attachment RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStopSC2)ProjectDirectorate I-1DivisionofReactorProjects-I/IIOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20S5SRegionalAdministrator, RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector 990622003$

9906ibPDRADQCK05000244sPDR

10CFR2130DAYWRITTENREPORTNAMEANDADDRESSOFTHEINDIVIDUAL INFORMING THECOMMISSION:

NAME:ADDRESS:RobertC.MecredyVicePresident NuclearOperations GroupRochester Gas6.ElectricCorporation 89EastAvenueRochester, NewYork14649IDENTXFICATXON OFTHEFACILXTY, THEACTIVITY, ORTHEBASICCOMPONENT SUPPLXEDFORSUCHFACILITYWHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTA1'NS ADEFECT:Thebasiccomponent istheNBFD65NRControlRelay,suppliedbyEatonCorporation, Inc.Thiscomponent waspurchased safety-related foruseinvariouslocations atGinnaStation,andisinstalled inreactorprotection andsafeguards systemsforuseascontrollogicrelays.III.IDENTIFICATION OFTHEFXRMCONSTRUCTING THEFACILITYORSUPPLYING THEBASICCOMPONENT WHICHFAILSTOCOMPLYORCONTAINSADEFECT!TherelaysweresuppliedtoRochester GasandElectricCorporation (RG&E)by:EatonCorporation Znc.21SouthStreetDanbury,CT06810XV.NATUREOFTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYANDTHESAFETYHAZARDWHICHISCREATEDORCOULDBECREATEDBYSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLY:PerRGGETechnical Evaluation 90-145,NBFD65NRrelayswereevaluated assuitablereplacements forNBFDXXSrelays.GinnaStationTechnical Specifications allowsaminimumvoltageof108.6VDCatthebatteryterminals.

According toaletterfromWestinghouse toRG&E,"MaximumandMinimumDCVoltageandOperating CurrentsforRelays",datedSeptember 13,1993,theNBFD65NRrelaywouldoperateatvoltagesaslowas100volts.Fifteen(15)NBFD6SNRrelaysfailedtoperformpertherequirements ofthepurchasespecifications duringpre-installation benchtestingatGinnaStation.Astherelaysweregradually energized, thecontactswouldstarttochatteratapproximately 70VDC,andeventually fullypickupat125VDC~Theenergized relayswouldchatterbelow125VDC,andcompletely dropoutbelow70VDC.PurchasePage2 specifications were:125VDCNominaloperating voltageandaCertificate ofCompliance thattherelaysmetallperformance specifications.

Thesespecifications includedtestingatdegradedvoltage,whichisdefinedas90volts.Thedeviation wasdetectedbyRG&Eduringtestingpriortoinstallation intoareactorprotection orsafeguards system.Noactualsafetyhazardexisted.Thenatureofthedefectconsisted ofamanufacturing deficiency.

Uponinvestigation, byEaton,itwasdetermined thattherelaycoilhadbeenincorrectly wired.Theinternalcoildesignincludestwocoils,apickupandaholdcoil,whicharedesignedtooperateinseries.Theholdcoilisshortedbyanormallyclosedcontactwhentherelayisde-energized, andinsertedinthecircuitinserieswiththepickupcoilwhentherelayenergizes andopensthecontact.Duetotheincorrect wiring,thecoilsopposedeachotherwhenthecontactopened.Atlowvoltages, thiscausedtherelaytodropoutassoonastheholdcoilwasenergized, resulting inrelaychatterandpreventing asolidpickup.AtGinnaStation,anNBFD65NRcanbeusedforasafety-relatedfunction, suchasContainment Spray.Forthisapplication, relaysarenormallyde-energized, andenergizetogeneratetheprotection logic.Therelayscouldhavecausedcontainment spraynottofunctionatallowedvoltagelevelsbelow125VDC.Therefore, theuseofthedeficient NBFD65NRrelays,inthethisapplication, couldhavecreatedasubstantial safetyhazard.THEDATEONWHICHTHEINFORMATION OPSUCHDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYWASOBTAINED:

Theinformation wasobtainedonApril2,1999,duringthepre-installation testingoftherelays.INTHECASEOPABASICCOMPONENT WHICHCONTAINSADEFECTORFAILSTOCOMPLY,THENUMBERANDLOCATIONOPALLSUCHCOMPONENTS INUSEAT,SUPPLIEDPOR,ORBEINGSUPPLIEDFORGINNASTATION:TherearenumerousNBFD65NRrelaysinsafety-related applications invariouslocations atGinnaStation.Eatonsupplied50ofthemodelNBFD65NRrelaystoRGSEforinstallation intheGinnaStationreactorprotection andsafeguards systemsduringthe1999outage.Noneofthedeficient relayshadeverbeeninstalled orusedatGinnaStation.Page3 VT~rIl THECORRECTIVEACTIONWHICHHASBEENIISBEINGgORWILLBETAKEN)THENAMEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL ORORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FORTHEACTION;ANDTHELENGTHOFTIMETHATHASBEENORWILLBETAKENTOCOMPLETETHEACTION:Afterthedeviation wasdiscovered byRG&E,therelayswerereturnedtoEatonforevaluation androotcauseanalysis.

AnRG&EQAEngineerwaspresentduringtherootcauseinvestigation.

Atthefactorytherelaysweretestedandpassedthebenchtest,butthesoundoftherelayschattering'as notdetectedbecausefactorynoisemaskedthechattering sound.Uponfurtherinvestigation, itwasdiscovered thatoneofthetworelaycoilswaswiredbackwards onalltherelaysinquestion.

According tothevendor,thecoilwindingproblemwasisolatedtotheRG&Eorderonly.Thedeficient relaycoilswerereplacedandtherelayswereretestedusingenhancedtestprocedures whichincludedcheckingforrelaychatter.Theincorrect wiringwasattributed toinsufficient trainingandsubsequent poorworkmanship ofanewemployee.

Inadequate factorytestingfailedtodetectthechattering relays.According toEaton,theirtrainingprogramhasbeenrevisedandtheworklocationhasbeenenhancedwithvisualaidstoensuretherelaysarecorrectly constructed andtested.RG&Ehascurrently imposedaSourceSurveillance requirement onEaton,andwillconsidertheneedtoincludeSourceSurveillance and/ortoperformreceipttestingofrelayspurchased fromEatonasacondition ofacceptance forfutureorders.ANYADVICERELATEDTOTHEDEFECTORFAILURETOCOMPLYABOUTTHEFACILITY,

ACTIVITY, ORBASICCOMPONENT THATHASBEEN,ISBEING,ORWILLBEGIVENTOPURCHASERS ORLICENSEES:

Performance ofreceiptinspection testingofrelaysand/orperformance ofasourcesurveillance ofthevendor'stestingpractices maybeappropriate.

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