ML20217D145

Rev 1 to Cse License Annex Final Assembly

ML20217D145
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	09/30/1999
From:	WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20217D114	List: ML20217D131 ML20217D142 ML20217D145
References
NUDOCS 9910150024
Download: ML20217D145 (26)

Text

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.. 4 4_,

5 CSE LICENSE ANNEX FINAL ASSEMBLY 4

9910150024 990930 PDR ADOCK 07001151 C

pm

y CSE LICENSE ANNEX:

I FINAL ASSEM.BLY

' Process Summary.......

I

. STORAGE OF FUEL RODS...........

....... 1 TRANSPORTATION CARTS.....

..... 1

- ROD LOADING MAGAZINES..................................................

..........2

. FUEL ASSEMBLY LOADER......................

-2

............... =

' ASSEMBLY OVERHEAD TROLLEY CRANE SYSTEM..._.

....... 2 FUEL ASSEMBLY WASH AND VACUUM PITS.................

3 CHANNEL SPACING PIT.....

3 FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE.......-....

=3

. FINAL INSPECTION PIT.

..... 3

. ~..........

Procedures and Drawings........

.... 4

' MANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES.

4 REFERENCE DRAWINGS...........~........

........5 FINAL ASSEMBLY EQUIPME.4T...........

.6 Environmental Protection and Radiation Safety Controls..

.7 Nuc) car Citicality Safety (NCS) Controls and Fault Trees..............

.... 8

' STORAGE OF FUEL RODS....

8-TRANSPORTATION CARTS..........................

-. 9

.................. = =

~ ROD LOADING MAGAZINES........... -

10 FUEL ASSEMBLY LOADER.

-12 ASSEMBLY OVERHEAD TROLLEY CRANE SYSTEM.....=

13

' FUEL ASSEMBLY WASH AND VACUUM PITS.

14 CHANNEL SPACING PIT.-

-- 20

. FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE.

=21

. FINAL INSPECTION PIT.................

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I-j Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

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~ Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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FINAL ASSEMBLY ANNEX REVISION RECORD REVISION DATE OF PAGES NUMBER REVISION REVISED REVISION REASON 1

7 SEP 99 All Complete Re-write I

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Initial Evaluation Date: 30 JUN 97 Page No. ii l

Revision Date:

7 SEP 99 Revision No. I r

p Process Sur3 mary i

Final Assembly includes the following process operations; a brief description of each operation is provided.

- 1. Storage of Fuel Rods >

2.: Transportation Carts -

3. Rod Loading Magazines

4. Fuel Assembly Loader

5. Overhead Trolley Crane System

6. Fuel Assembly. Wash and Vacuum Pits

- 7. Channel Spacing Pit

. 8. Fuel Assembly Storage

9. FinalInspection Pit STORAGE OFFUEL RODS The finished fuel cads range in length from approximately 136 to 178 inches. The nominal outer diameter of the fuel rods varies from.361 to.440 inches. These rods are stored in aluminum fuel rod storage channels. The channels are either 156 or 180 inches in length,9.75 inches in width and 4.50 inches in depth. The storage channels, which are open at both ends, are fitted with aluminum end covers prior to transport to the Frazier racks, where they are stored unless they are transported directly to final assembly.

Welded to the bottom of the channels are fork lift sleeves which extend 3.25 inches j

beneath the bottom of the channel. The Frazier racks allow the horizontal storage of four

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channels in each storage position. The arms of the racks have a 17.75 inch vertical j

separation which maintains > 12 inches vertical edge-to-edge separation between the storage channels stacked in each storage position. There are ten shelves on the racks, j

allowing ten vertical storage positions, j

TRANSPORTATION CARTS i

After fuel rods pass final inspection, they are loaded into fuel rod storage channels.

When the channel is filled, it is either taken on a transportation cart directly to Final Assembly, or, more commonly, temporarily stored in the Frazier racks. The channels are either 156 or 180 inches in length,9.75 inches in width and 4.50 inches in depth. The storage channels, which are open at both ends, are fitted with aluminum end covers.

Welded to the bottom of the channels are fork lift sleeves which extend 3.25 inches beneath the bottom of the channel. Only one channel is allowed per transfer cart. A pair of triangular " dimples" on each end of the cart define the position of the channel on the cart and serve to prevent stacking two channels I orizontally in the same cart. The transportation carts are designed to maintain a minimum 12-inch spacing side-to-side between adjacent channels. End-to-end spacing is maintained by administrative control.

I Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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The carts have a flip-up/ flip-down feature which allows chmging the rod storage channel l

clevation from the QC inspecti:n block h:ight (0 inches) to that needed for loading rods

. into magazines (+4 inches).

ROD LOADING MAGAZINES Fuel rods transported to the Final Assembly Area on transportation carts are manually loaded into horizontal storage magazines.. In the magazines, the rods are loaded into stainless steel tubes. These tubes are arranged to match the geometry of the fuel assembly I

into which the rods will be inserted. A second variety of magazine contains nylon block rod guides instead of stainless steel tubes. Each magazine is surrounded by a stainless steel shell approximately 0.25 inches thick which is open on the sides in a region 3.5 inches above.the base and 3.5 inches below the top. Extending from the base of each magazine are 4 U-shaped weldments which have holes in them to align the magar.ine with the assembly loader by mating with pins. A pair of triangular " dimples" (or brackets, depending on type) at each end of the magazine carts prescribe the mcgazine's position and prevent two magazines from being stacked horizontally on the same cart.

The magazine carts are designed to maintain a minimum 12-inches spacing side-to-side between adjacent magazines.' End-to-end spacing is maintained by administrative control.

FUEL ASSEMBLYLOADER After performing computer transactions to verify that the rods are placed in the correct

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pattern based on the Bill of Material, the magazine is affixed adjacent to a fuel assembly 3

loader. From the loaded rod magazine, the rods are pulled into a fixtured skeleton assembly to form a fuel assembly. The fuel assembly is completed by installing the top nozzle, lock tubes, bottom nozzle, and thimble screws.

ASSEMBLY OVERHEAD TROLLEY CRANE SYSTEM -

Following inspection in the fuel assembly loader, the assembly is raised to the vertical position and moved by a system of overhead trolley cranes on monorails. The overhead trolley crane system is a passive engineered control for all processes prior to fuel assembly storage. The design of the trolley crane system allows two assemblies to get no closer than 30 inches centerline-to-centerline. At any point where the assembly must wait while attached to the overhead trolley crane system, it is lowered to rest vertically on a -

stainless steel floor pad. The trolley cranes are able to transport assemblies to the fuel assembly envelope inspection fixture, the wash and vacuum pits, the inspection station, 4

' Note: dimensions addressed in this section refer to distances between fissile material.

Initial Evaluation Date:

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Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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end the channel spacing pit. This section covers generic trolley crane opr. tio.., the fuel assembly envelope inspection fixture, and the inspection station.

FUEL A JSEMBLY WASH AND VACUUM PITS Following envelope inspection,' the fuel assemblies in the overhead trolley crane system are queued for submersion into a series of 3 tanks: wash, center rinse, and final rinse.

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This process removes debris which may contribute to fuel failure at the reactor site and l

improves their cosmetic appearance before shipping. After final rinse, the assemblies are moved to the vacuum pits for further cleaning and water removal. In the wash tanks, the l

' assemblies are submerged in water, resulting in full interstitial moderation and full external moderation.

CHANNEL SPACING PIT After washing, cleaning a1d inspection, certain assemblics may be moved on the overhead trolley crane system to the channel spacing pit for further inspections, or l

to have alignment pins welded to the top nozzle. The channel spacing pit has four l

openings in which assemblies may be inserted. Each opening is > 12 inches from any other. Assemblies are lowered until they contact an elevated base pad in the l

pit and then raised 2 inches. No more than one assembly is allowed in the pit if there is visible moisture beneath the base pads. The assemblies are dry inside the pit.

I FUEL ASSEMBLYSTORAGE After QC inspection, assemblies are wrapped in fire-retardant bags and stored in j

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" trees" to await loading into shipping containers. The begs are waterproof and open at the bottom of the assembly such that any water in the assembly would drain out through the bottom nozzle. The storage " trees" consist of a central pole and 4 storage locations with bottom base plates and top clamps to secure each assembly in a prescribed location. These structures maintain a minimum of 12 inches edge-to-edge spacing between assemblies.

FINAL INSPECTION PIT Fuel assemblies are inser ed into the final inspection pit for inspection t

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immediately prior to loading into shipping containers. In the final inspection pit, the flame retardant bag is removed and a protective yellow translucent bag is put l

on. The protective bag is open at the bottom to allow any moisture to drain out the bottom nozzle. The final inspection pit contains a storage " tree" which consists of I

a central pole and 4 storage locations with a bottom base plate and top clamps to hiitial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

3 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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p secure each assembly in a prescribed location. These structures maintain a mimmum of 12 inches edge-to-edge spacing between assemblics.

L Procedures and Drawings Key procedures and drawings for the Final Assembly Area are identified in the tables below:

AfANUFACTURING OPERATING PROCEDURES Document Number Document Title.

MOP-500201 Fuel Assembly Wash Tank MOP-730102 Load Fuel Rods into Skeleton Assembly - Pull Loaded Assemblies MOP-730103 Fixture Skeleton Assembly MOP-730104 Fixture Magazine -

MOP-730105 Remove Assembly from Fixture MOP-730106 Fixture Skeleton Assembly and Magazine - Pull Loaded Assemblies MOP-730108 Fixture Bottom Nozzle to Assembly MOP-730109 Fixture Top Nozzle - Welded Top Nozzle Assemblies MOP-730110 Weld Top No.rzte to Assembly MOP-730112 Prep Top Nozzle to Grid Sleeve / Thimble Weld Sample MOP-730152 Crimp Thimble Screws - Reconstitutable Fuel Assembly MOP-730209 Install Guide Pins into Top Nozzle MOP-730502 Fuel Assembly Cleaning - General MOP-730503 Fuel Assembly Vacuuming and Clean Check MOP-730501 Load Rods in Magazine MOP-730708 Moving Fuel Assembly In and Out of Storage Racks MOP-730712 Wrap Fuel Assembly or Skeleton for Storage or Shipment MOP-730752 Final Cosmetic Check MOP-730808 Remove Guide Pins from Top Nozzle - XL MOP-730809 Insert lack Pins into Top Nozzle & Weld - XL l

l MOP-730905 Stamp Weight on Dummy Fuel Assembly MOP-732401 Fuel Assembly Tilt Aligr. ment MOP-732501 TIG Manual Welding - General MOP-735202 Replace Bottom Grid / Bottom Nozzle or Adjust Nozzle Parallelism MOP-735301 General Handling Instructions for Skeleton Assemblies MOP-735303 General Operating Procedure - Fuel Assembly Area MOP-735472 RAMS Terminal Operation - Final Assembly 1

Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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Document Number Document Title MOP-735473 Rework Grid Deviations - General MOP-735475 Rework / Adjust Top Nozzle Guide Pins - XL MOP-735502 Handling Fixture Procedure MOP-735504 Position F/A into Final Assembly Fixture - Final Assembly MOP-735505 Criticality Control MOP-735507 Check / Inspect and-Adjust Nozzle "S" Holes - Chamfer and/or Straight Section MOP-735701 Rework Scratches MOP-735903 Remove Damaged Dimple from Fuel Assembly MOP-735906 Remove Top Nozzle - 16X16 WTN Design MOP-735908 Removal of Small Visual Defects from Zircaloy Components MOP-735910 Removal & Reinsertion of Fuel Rods in a Fuel Assembly MOP-735911 Removing Rust on Stainless Steel, In:onel, & Zirc Components MOP-735919 Ream Top Nozzle Thimble Location MOP-735926 Blend Nicks & Gouges on Machined Components and Cleaned Assemblies MOP-735939 Reset Lock Tube Position MOP-735940 Rework Bent or Distorted Top Nozzle Inserts MOP-735941 Lnading Fuel Rods with Strippen End Plugs - Rework MOP-736505 Process Materials - Fuel and Skeleton Assembly

_ MOP-737001 Remove Bottom Nozzle - Welded Design & Reconstitutable IWOP-737008 Remove (RTN) Top Nozzle Assembly MOP-737009 Install (RTN) Top Nozzle Assembly MOP-737010 Assemble Pin / Center Screw and Locking Cup MOP-737015 Crimp Thimble Screws - VVER-1000 MOP-737016 Fixture Bottom Nozzle to Assembly - VVER-1000 MOP-737017 Fixture Skeleton Assembly and Magazine - VVER-1000 MOP-737018 Load Fuel Rods into Skeleton Assembly - VVER-1000 MOP-737019 Remove Assembly from Fixture - VVER-1000 MOP-737020 Install Top Nozzle Assembly - VVER-1000 MOP-737021 Operation of VVER-1000 Top Nozzle Manipulator REFERENCE DRAWINGS Drawing Number (s)

Equipment N/A Rod Channel Storage Rack l

SKF-90040 Rod Channel Cart Modification SKC-86005 Fuel Rod Storage Channd (XL) 1%2F21 Fuel Rod Magazine Assembly l

Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

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v 448F03EQ11 VVER-1000 Fuel Rod Magazine 448F09FX04 Generic Fuel Rod Magazine C639F987 16x16 Fuel Rod Magazine Assembly SKF-%299 XL Fuel Rod Magazine SKF-%280 Fuel Rod Magazine (w/ nylon spacers)

SKF-91117 Fuel Rod Magazine Cart (TVA) 3TN-3051-F

" Coffing" Hoist Crane (1 Ton Capacity)

FINAL ASSEMBLYEQUIPMENT Drawing Number (s)

Equipment 448F03EQ14 Fuel Assembly Loader (s)/Strongback(s) 448F03EQ05 448F03EQ10 SKF-94014 SKF-94020 SKF-94139 SKF-94142 SKF-90008 i

SKF-91075 i

SKF-92056 SKF-96206 SKF-88053 C639F936 l

TDMJ46228F-3 Fuel Assembly Envelope Inspection Fixture (SKE95TB-1) 1 SKB-587 Round Fuel Assetnbly Wash Tank for Columbia (20-inch diameter,228-inch depth) l l

SKB-854 Rectangular Fuel Assembly Wash Tank - Columbia (20-inch x l

35-inch x 228-inch)

SKA-583 Fuel Assembly Wash Pit Layout for Columbia 448F17EQ03 Fuel Assembly Storage Rack 448F03EQ04 F/A Storage Rack Interface Ft. Calhoun and B&W l

C883D607 Fuel Assembly Storage Rack SKF-94147 F/A Storage Rack Drive l

I Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

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Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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Environmental Protecti:n and Radi'.tlan S:f;ty Centrals t

. To be provided in a future Integrated Safety Assessment.

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1 Mitial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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. Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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y Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) C:nt' rcb cnd Fcult Trees STORAGE OFFUEL RODS Control Parameters and Safety Limits Control Parameters Moderation j

Geometry.

e Spacing e

Safety Limits j

See Margin of Safety j

e Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2 i

FullInterstitial Moderation e

Partial Reflection e

Controls Safety Sinnificant Controls None Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the rod storage system is evaluated to be very strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication in the rod storage system are geometry, spacing and moderation. Criticality would be possibly in the rod storage system if there was a failure of multiple passive engineered controls on spacing and geometry combined with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined criticality in the rod storage system to be not credible.

The design of the Frazier racks is described in Regulatory Affairs Review Request #104-1-591. The rack arrangement furnishes 17.75 inches of vertical separation between storage positions which provides > 12 inches edge-to-edge vertical separation between channels, with a maximum of four channels loaded horizontally in each storage location.

2 Calculations performed on the Frazier rack demonstrated a 95/95 kar of 0.91614 for the most reactive case under the following conditions:

Close-packed rods in a square lattice Rods completely filling a channel measuring 9.933 inches by 4.515 inches, failing conservatively to whole rods outside actual channel dimensions Full interstitial moderation with water 8 CN-CRI 99-018 Frazier Racks Analyis Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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Full extemil reflection (12 inches of water)

Rods ccntaining the most reactive pellet diameter (0.40 inch) -

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o-Four channels in each storage location with a fifth channel " double stacked" in e

the center Channels infinite in length Frazier rack infinite in height.

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These conditions a e extremely conservative. The rods, as found in the storage channels, are in a close-packed triangular or hexagonal pitch, which is a less reactive arrangement than the assumed square pitch.~ Full interstitial moderation is very unlikely due to the construction of the storage channels. The channels are open at each end and the end covers are not water tight. Full external reflection is not credible. In order to surround the lowest storage location on the Frazier rack with 12 inches of water, the depth of water in the entire facility would need to be 32 inches. Further, the " double' stacking" of a single channel in a single storage location requires extreme skill and precision by the operator.

The fork lift sleeves are the same width as the channel and would have to serve as " feet" for a double stacked channel, it is unlikely that a channel could be balanced on its " feet" in such a scenario. Additionally, the fork lift sleeves make the effective height of the channel 7.75 inches, which is a tight fit in an 8.0 to 8.5 inch space with a fork lift. It is-not credible to expect double stacking, much less, repetitive double stacking.

TRANSPORTATION CARTS Control Parameters and Safety Limits Control Parameters Mc eration e

Geometry e

Spacing e

Safety Limits See Margin of Safety Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2 e

FullInterstitial Moderation e

Partial Reflection Controls Safety Sienificant Controls

-l None Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the transportation carts is evaluated to be very strc,ng. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry, spacing

' Initial Evaluation Date: : 30 Jun 97 Page No.

9 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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p and moderation. A nuclear criticality lwould be possible in the case of multiple failures of passive engineered controls on geometry and configuration combined with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality to be not credible for this

. system.

3 Calculations on the transportation carts demonstrated a maximum 95/95 kerr of 0.89834 -

under the following conditions:

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Close-packed rods in a square kttice Full interstitial moderation with water e-e Full external reflection Most reactive pellet diameter (0.40 inch).

An infinite ' slab,17 ods high

'These conditions are extremely conservative. The rods, as found in the storage channels, are in a close-packed triangular or hexagonal pitch, which is a less reactive arrangement than the assumed square pitch. Full interstitial moderation is unlikely due to the construction of the storage channels. The channels are open ended and the end covers are.

not water tight. Full external reflection is even less likely. In order to surround the storage location on the transportation cart with 12 inches of water, the depth of water in the entire facility would reed to be 52-56 inches. The elevation difference possible for channels on the storage carts is 4 inches. If two channels were overlapped end-to-end, the resulting total channel height for the two would be eight inches. The design of the carts does not permit the channels to overlap in a single vertical plane; therefore, this is NOT a slab'8 inches high, but two finite 4.5-inch slabs next to one another, overlapping in a

- horizontal plane by the thickness of approximately one rod. Additionally, the maximum L

end-to-end overlap is 24 inches. Therefore, this finite slab with a single rod overlap in L

the horizontal plane is extremely conservatively bounded by ar. infinite slab 17 rods high.

ROD LOADING MAGAZINES Control Parameters and Safety Limits o

Control Parameters j

e-Moderation -

e' Geometry L

l e.

. Spacing Safety Limits e'

See Margin of Safety L

Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2

'e FullInterstitial Moderation 3 CRI-90-002, Fuel Rod Caannel Criticality Ei aluation Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97' Page No.

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g,<

o-Partial Reflection :

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L IControls Safety Sinnificant Controls None

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1 Margin of Safety The nuclear ' riticality margin of safety for the storage magazines is evaluated to be very c

strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry, spacing and moderation. A nuclear criticality would be possible in the case of multiple failures of passive engineered controls on geometry and spacing combined with sufficient

- moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality to be not credible for this system.

i l Calculations *on an assembly magazine' demonstrated a maximum 95/95 kerr of 0.97970 under the following conditions:

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L A finite array of 6 magazines overlapping end-to-end 84 inches Magazines 3.5 inches apart in the overlapping region e

5 w/o UO fuel 2

Full interstitial moderation with water i

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e-One inch extemal reflection Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA) e

- No IFBA rods Longest fuel manufactured at CNFD (XL,14 feet) e These conditions are extremely conservative. The placement of six carts overlapping end-to-end in a finite array is not credible. The nature of the work space where magazines are h

loaded and moved to fuel assembly loaders does not encourage operators to bring j

magazine carts near one another. The assembly loaders are more than 8 feet apart and j

magazine carts tend to be staged near the end of the fixture into which the rods will be loaded. Carts placed close to one another would congest the work area. The magazines are centered on their carts. Alignment markings are provided to assist operators in

= centering the magazines. When the longest assembly magazine is centered on shortest cart, the maximum overlap at each end would be 41 inches. 47 inches is chosen as a credible process upset to indicate a six-inch displacement from a centered position. An 84-inch overlap is not credible because a displacement of the magazine from the center of a cart to a point which would allow an 84-inch overlap would upset the cart. The 3.5-inch separation is also conservative. The closest the weldments will allow two magazines to come together is 3.75 inches.-' Full-interstitial moderation is not credible for the L

magazines. The top of the magazines are not open. The sides of the magazines are open L

and would drain any water which might be introduced to a maximum level of 3.5 inches inside the magazine. External reflection is also not credible. There would have to be at least 56 inches of water in the facility before a loaded magazine could be surrounded by e

, ' CN-CRI-99-017 Final Assembly Magazine Overlap Analysis Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 ~

Page No.

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- Revision Date-7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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p u6 moderator. The most reactive lattice and the longest fuel are modeled with no IFBA rods.

i The assembly magazines are dry and greater than 12 inches from one another in normal operations. For reference, the 95/95 brr of a dry 170FA/XL assembly in the nylon

magazine is calculated at 0.30886.5 FUEL ASSEMBLYLOADER Control Parameters and Safety Limits.

Control Parameters Moderation Geometry e

Spacing e

-Safety Limits See Margin of Safety.

e 5.3.4.7 Bounding Assumptions.

. Heterogeneous UO2 FullInterstitial Moderation e

Partial Reflection e

5.3.4.8 Controls Safety Sinnificant Controls e

None.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the fuel assembly loader is evaluated to be very strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry, spacing and moderation. A nuclear criticality would be possible in the case of multiple failures of passive engineered controls on geometry and spacing combined with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality to be not credible for this system.

Calculations' on an assembly demonstrated a maximum 95/95 brr of 0.93022 'under the following conditions:

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e' 5 w/o UO fuel 2

Full interstitial moderation with water e

One inch external reflection

. Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA)

No IFBA rods Longest fuel manufactured at CNFD (XL,14 feet)

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l CRI-97-019, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine

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• CRI-97-019, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine

Initial Evaluation Date

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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Cladding gap flooded o

These conditions are extremely conservative. Full interstitial moderation is not credible for assemblies in the fuel assembly loaders. The assembly is open and free to drain out any moderator. External reflection is also not credible. There would have to be 56 inches of water in the facility before an assembly in a loader could be surrounded by moderator.

The most reactive lattice and the longest fuel are modeled with no IFBA rods.

Additionally, there is no credible mechanism for achieving flooding in the cladding gap of the fuel in the magazine. For reference, the 95/95 kerr of a dry 170FA/XL assembly in the nylon magazir is calculated at 0.30886.

ASSEMBLY OVERhAAD TROLLEY CRANE SYSTEM Control Parameters and Safety Limits Control Parameters e

Moderation Geometry e

Spacing Safety Limits See Margin of Safety e

Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2 FullInterstitial Moderation Partial Reflection Controls Safety Sienificant Controls e

None l

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the overhead trolley crane system is evaluated to be very strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry, spacing and moderation. A nuclear criticality would be possible in the case of failure of passive engineered controls on geometry and spacing combined with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality to be not credible for this system.

l Calculations on an assembly demonstrated a maximum 95/95 kerr f 0.93022 under the 7

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following conditions:

5 w/o UO fuel e

2 CRI-97-019, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine 7

t Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

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o Full interstitial moderation with water o

One inch external reflection

' Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA) e e

No IFBA rods Longest fuel manufactured at CNFD (XL,14 feet) j.

Cladding gap flooded e

These conditions are extremely conservative. Full interstitial moderation is not credible

-for the vertical' fuel assemblies in the trolley crane system. The assembly is fully open and any moderator introduced would drain through the bottom nozzle. After the assembly is wrapped in the protective bag, the bag is open at the bottom to allow drainage of moderator out of the bottom nozzle. External reflection is also not credible. There would have to be 12 to 14 feet of water in the facility before a vertical fuel assembly could be surrounded by moderator. The most reactive lattice and the longest fuel are modeled with no IFBA rods. Additionally, there is no credible mechanism for achieving flooding in the cladding gap of a fuel assembly in the trolley crane system. For reference, the 95/95 kar of a dry 170FA/XL assembly in the nylon magazine is calculated at 0.30886.

FUEL ASSEMBLY WASH AND VACUUM PITS Control Parameters and Safety Limits Control Parameters Geometry e

Spacing e

Safety Limits e

See Table 1 Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2 FullInterstitial Moderation Full Reflection Controls Safety Sinnificant Controls Passive engineered controls (PEC)

Passive engineered controls are described in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

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Procedurch Funct. Verif.

Initiating.

Control.._, :

ControlFunction/;

[

a ID] ' - ;,7 Failure Condition /1 ' +.

Number z Required Event'(IE) No.;

s g,

',N^

3 'E Action ; <

P-WT-1 Overhead trolley crane design N/A No IE #la,b,c,d,e -

prevents <30 inches centerline-to-centerline (<20.7 inches edge-to-edge) spacing between assemblies /

Assembly spacing <l2 inches edge-to-edge (Failure not credible)/

Overhead trolley crane design prevents <30 inches centerline-to-centerline spacing between assemblies.

Active emtineered controls (AEC)

Active engineered controls are defined in License SNM-1107 and in Regulatory Affairs Procedure RA-108. They are also called safety-significant interlocks. The requirements for functional verification are defined in Procedure RA-108 and/or area operating j

procedures.

None Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist (AC)

Administrative controls with computer or alarm assist typically consist of operator actions which are prompted or assisted by computer output. The requirements for functional verification are determined by this evaluation.

None Administrative controls Safety-significant administrative controls are required operator actions which usually occur without prompting from a computer / control panel alarm or indication. These controls may require documentation via Control Form or some other record. Functional verification is not normally required.

Control Control Function /

Procedure Funct. Verif.

Initiating ID Failure Condition /

Number Required Event (IE)No.

Action A-WT-1 Procedum directs operator to not MOP-730502 No IE#2 move a failed trolley crane /

Operator moves a failed trolley crane afbr an assemblyis dropped /

Procedure directs operato' to not move a failed trolley crane.

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A-WT-2 Procedure directs operator to not MOP-730502 No IE#3 1

position a second assembly over the center rinse tank /

t Operator moves a failed trolley crane and positions second assembly over the center rinse tank /

3 Procedure directs operator to not position a second assembly over the center rinse tank.

A W T-3 Procedure directs operator to not MOP-730501 No IE#4 lower a second assembly into the center rinse tank /

Operator moves a failed trolley crane, positions a second assembly over the center rinse tank and lowers a second assembly into the center rinse tank /

Procedure directs operator to not lower a second assembly into the center rinse tank.

Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for the wash tanks is evaluated to be strong. The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication are geometry, spacing and j

moderation. A nuclear criticality would be possible in the case of failure of passive engineered controls on spacing combined with violation of administrative controls.

The only credible location where nuclear criticality could be achieved in the wash tanks area is in the center rinse tank. The possibility of two assemblies being placed in the i

center rinse tank is highly unlikely, but cannot be regarded as not credible.

For the wash tank and final rinse tank, it was determined that nuclear criticality was not credible. Nuclear criticality is only possible if two assemblies are able to be submerged less than 4 inches from one another in the tank. It is not credible for 2 assemblies to be placed in these tanks for the following reasons:

The overhead trolley cranes provide 30 inches centerline-to-centerline spacing.

The diameter of these cylindrical pits is 20 inches.

The top of each tank has a square sparger for water and/or air which measures 13.5 inches x 13.5 inches. The smallest base dimension of a fuel assembly manufactured at CNFD is 7.756 x 7.756 inches. Two assemblies will not fit through the sparger.

Summary OfInitiating Events Which Lead To Credible Process Upsets Failure of trolley crane allowing an assembly to fall into the center rinse tank:

IE #1a Failure oflatch plate.

LE #1b Failure ofclasp.

(

IE #1c Failure ofchain.

LE #1dFailure ofcrane motor.

)

Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

16 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

1 l

g..

aJ JE #1e Failure ofmonorail.

FaHure to prevent's second assembly from being inserted in the center rinse tank:

C IE #2 Operator movesfailed trolley crane.

LE #3 Operatorpositions second trolley crane over center rinse tank.

LE #4 Operator lowers second assembly into center rinse tank.'

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Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

17 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

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,; CHANNEL SPACING PIT Control Parameters and Safety Limits j

r Control Parameters j

4 o.

Moderation Geometry Spacing Safetv Limiij 5

See Margin of Safety Bounding Assumptions -

Heterogeneous UO2

' Full Interstitial Moderation e

Partial Reflection Controls:

Safety Siunificant Controls e

None Margin of Safety.

The nuclear cri icality margin of safety for the rod channel spacing pit is evaluated to be t

very strong. The ;.arameters which directly affect neutron multiplication in the chsanel -

spacing pit are geometry, spacing and moderation. Nuclear criticality would be possibly in the channel spacing pit if there was a failure of multiple passive engineer 6d controls on spacing and geometry combined with sufficient moderation.116s evaluation has

- determined nuclear criticality in the channel spacing pit to be not efedible.

The design of the channel spacing pit allows four assemblies to be lowered into fixed

' locations which provide a minimum of 12 inches edge-to-edge spacing. The base pads

~

are elevated above the bottom of the pit. By procedure, the operator lowers an assembly until it contacts the base pad and then elevates it approximately two inches before fixing the assembly in a fixture.

Calculations on an assembly ' demonstrated a maximum 95/95 ker f 0.93022 under the 8

o following conditions:

5 w/o UO fuel e

2 Full interstitial moderation with water One-inch external reflection j

Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA) e No IFBA rods e

L

-- CRJ-97-019, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

20

, Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

I q

.)

y *.,

? Longest fuel manufactured 'at CNFD (XL,14 feet) :

Jo-K1 Lo

Cladding gap flooded SThese conditions are extremely conservative. Full interstitial moderation and reflection are nct credible in the channel spacing pit. The assembly is dry. For reference, the 95/95 l-k,n of a dry 170FA/XL assembly in the nylon magazine is calculated at 0.30886.

l

. FUEL ASSEntBLYSTORAGE

' Control Parameters and Safety Limits Control Parameters -

Moderation e

Geometry Spacing e

Safety Limits e'

' See Margin of Safety l-

Bounding Assumptions -

Heterogeneous UO2 FullInterstitial Moderation e

e

- Partial Reflection

Controlst Safety Significant Controls l

None Margin of Safety '

The nuclear criticality margin of safety for assembly storage is evaluated to be very l-strong.' The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication in the assembly storage area are geometry, spacing and moderation. Nuclear criticality would be possibly 1

in the event of failure of multiple passive engineered controls on spacing and geometry combined ~with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality in the assembly storage area to be not credible.

The. design of the assembly storage " trees" places four assemblies in fixed locations

. hich provide a minimum of 12 inches edge-to-edge spacing. The fire retardant bag L

w which wraps the assemblies is open at the bottom nozzle to allow drainage.

j L

Calculations' on an assembly demonstrated a maximum 95/95 ken of 0.93022 under the following conditions:

5 w/o UO2 uel j

l f

' CRI-97-Ol9, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine j

hiitial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

21 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

1

(

f

o Full interstitial moderation with water o

One inch external reflection Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA)

No IFBA rods Longest fuel manufactured at CNFD (XL,14 feet) e

(

Cladding gap flooded e

These conditions are extremely conservative. Full interstitial moderation and reflection are not credible in the assembly storage area. The assembly is dry. For reference, the 95/95 kerr f a dry 170FA/XL assembly in the nylon magazine is calculated at 0.30886.

o FINAL INSPECTION PIT Control Parameters and Safety Limits f_pntrol Parameters Moderation e

Geometry Spacing e

i Safety Limits See Margin of Safety Bounding Assumptions Heterogeneous UO2 e

Full Interstitial Moderation e

Partial Reflection Controls Safety Sienificant Controls e

None Margin of Safety The nuclear criticality margin of safety for final inspection pit is evaluated to be very strong..The parameters which directly affect neutron multiplication in the final inspection pit are geometry, spacing and moderation. Nuclear criticality would be possibly in the event of failure of multiple passive engineered controls on spacing and geometry combined with sufficient moderation. This evaluation has determined nuclear criticality in the final inspection pit to be not credible.

The design of the final inspection pit " trees" places four assemblies in fixed locations which provide a minimum of 12 inches edge-to-edge spacing. The protective bag which wraps the assemblies is open at the bottom nozzle to allow drainage.

l Initial Evaluation Date: 30 Jun 97 Page No.

22 Revision Date:

7 Sep 99 Revision No.

1 i

'~ N'o.T.

Calculations' on an assembly demonstrated a maximum 95/95 ken f 0.93022 under the o

following conditions:

5 w/o UO2 fuel e<

Full interstitial moderation with water e

One inch extemal reflection e-Most reactive fuel assembly lattice manufactured at CNFD (170FA) e No IFBA rods Longest fuel manufactured at CNFD (XL,14 feet)

Cladding gap flooded e

These conditions are extremely conservative. Full interstitial moderation and reflection are not credible in the final inspection pit. The assembly is dry. For reference, the 95/95 k,n of a dry 170FA/XL assembly in a nylon magazine is calculated at 0.30886.

l

CRI-97-019, Criticality Safety Analysis of the Assembly Magazine Initial Evaluation Date:

30 Jun 97 Page No.

23 Revision Datei 7 Sep 99 Revision No.

1 E