ML20078Q305

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3 Ses EOF Tabletop 3,941010
ML20078Q305
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1994
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20078Q270 List:
References
NUDOCS 9412220061
Download: ML20078Q305 (7)


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l WATERFORD-3 STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EOF TABLETOP #3 OCTOBER 10,1994 Approval: /  !

Approval:

[E Planning Manager N/A General Manager Plant Operations l

Approval: N/A  ;

Vice President Operations  !

l

WATERFORD 3 SES EOF TABLETOP #3 4

OCTOBER 10,1994 W3 SES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILL CUE CARD DRILL TYPE /NO. EOF TABLETOP #3 CUE CARD NO. 2 TO: All Participants TIME: N/A I FROM: Lead Controller T= N/A l

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT initiate actions affecting normal plant operations '

l ANNUAL EXERCISE LESSONS LEARNED:

NRC WEAKNESSES: (Refer to Weakness Response Letter W3F1-93-0374) l

1. The issuance of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS), the failure to follow appiscable procedures for completing notification messages containing PARS, and the failure to receive the Emergency Coordinator's approval to modify previously approved PARS were identified

, as an exercise weakness.

2. The inability to timely assess the source of the release and implement mitigation strategies was identified as a weakness.

4 EOF IMPROVEMENT ITEMS: (Refer to W3 exercise report and NRC report.)

1. Although plant page announcements were frequently made to update plant personnel on the status of the emergency, plant personnel were not informed of the identity of the person making the announcement, their emergency position or their emergency facility. This is also a good practice during "round table" status briefings, especially if personnel from the NRC or other agencies are present.
2. Transfer of responsibilities from the TSC to the EOF could have been performed more efficiently, especially transfer of communications.
3. The TSC did not always keep the EOF informed of their actMties in a timely manner. For example, the EOF asked at least three times for the status of Containment isolation. The EOF personnel could have been more aggressive in pursuing information and the EOF Director did not ensure that the EOF staff was pursuing completion of high prionty assessment and mitigation activities.
4. Status boards were not maintained after the declaration of General Emergency. The NRC noted the PARS were not kept current on the dose assessment status boards.
5. EOF access was not maintained during the exercise.
6. Several EOF personnel did not follow posted instructions for frisking (tuming up the frisker volume, etc.).
7. Discuss the importance of the EOF Director cm,M4 the duty Emergency Planner. (Refer to Event Report 94-01.)
8. There was some confusion relating to computertred dose assessment results from irs,hing teams outside of the plume.

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WATERFORD 3 SES EOF TABLETOP #3 OCTOBER 10,1994 W3 SES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILL CUE CARD DRILL TYPE /NO. EOF TABLETOP #3 CUE CARD NO. 2 TO: All Participants TIME: N/A FROM: Lead Controller T= N/A l l

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT initiate actione effecting normal plant operatione l l

ANTICIPATED RESPONSE COMMENTS  !

l Participants should be encouraged to ask questions or comment on the issues discussed. 1 INSTRUCTIONS 1

1. The Lead Controller will use the Response to the NRC to discuss the NRC i

Weaknesses in detail.

2. The Lead Controller will use the W3 exercise report and the NRC report to discuss the improvement items in detail.
3. The Lead Controller will use Event Report 94 01 to discuss the problem in contacting the duty Emergency Planner.
4. The Lead Controller should also discuss the changes being made to EP-001-001 as a result of the recent NRC inspection. Additional indicators are being added to the three barrier General Emergency EALs to clarify how to determine if the cladding barrier has been breached.
5. The Lead Controller may discuss additional improvement items at his discretion.

l l

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' WATERFORD 3 SES EOF TABLETOP #3 OCTOBER 10,1994 W3 SES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILL CUE CARD DRILL TYPE /NO. EOF TABLETOP #3 CUE CARD NO. 3 -

3; TO: All Participants TIME: N/A FROM: Lead Controller T= N/A

= _ = ____ = _ _____= =_________ ____ _____ ____________________

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOTinitiate actio

===- > ec==_=-__= -__ns affecting normal plant operations

__=_-_____

_--___=--________=__-__-

The following three practice scenarios will be provided to the participants to discuss Protective Action Recommendations:

1. Scenario #1 l

l You have just declared a General Emergency due to a LOCA with cladding damage and Containment per hour. pressure of 36 psi and increasing. The wind is from 202 degrees at 3 miles

2. Scenario #2 l

A General Emergency was declared due to a dose projection calculation as follows:

l TDE CDE EAB 7334 MR 8692 MR 2 miles 611 MR 724 MR 5 miles 105 MR

! 105 MR 10 miles 56 MR 67 MR Wind direction is from 18 degrees at 2 miles per hour.

l .

3. Scenario #3 A General Emergency had been declared 45 minutes ago and the minimum PARS provided to the offsite egencies. New dose projection information is received as follows:

TDE CDE EAB 14,325 MR _ 170,402 MR 2 miles 3,519 MR 42,099 MR S miles 1,112 MR 13,231 MR 10 miles 471 MR 5613 MR 4

Wind dirsebon is from 180 degrees at 6.3 miles per hour.

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WATERFORD 3 SES EOF TABLETOP #3 OCTOBER 10,1994

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W3 SES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILL CUE CARD DRILL TYPE /NO. EOF TABLETOP #3 CUE CARD NO. 3 TO: All Participants TIME: N/A FROM: Lead Controller T= N/A

_- _ -- DO NOT initiate actions affecting normal plant operations ANTICIPATED RESPCNSE

1. Scenario #1 Participants should recommend: Evacuation for A1, B1, C1, D1, A2 & B2 and; Shelter for the rest of the sectors (A3, A4, B3, B4, C2, C3, C4, D2, D3, & D4)
2. Scenario #2 Participants should recommend: Evamation for A1, B1, C1, D1, C2, & D2 and; Shelter for the rest of the sectors (A2, A3, A4, B2, 83, 84, C3, C4, D3 & D4)
3. Scenario #3 Participants should recomment Evacuation for A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, C2, A3 & A4 and; Shelter for the rest of the sectors (B2, 83, B4, C3, C4, D2, D3, & D4)

COMMENTS The scenarios are not related to each other. They are individual sets of conditions.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Provide the conditions for each scenario and instruct the participants to determine the correct PARS.
2. Encourage the participants to use EP 002 052 for these practice scenarios.

l

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS TRANWiG DEPARTMENT

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ATTEPGANCE RECORD

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