Text

Insp Repts 50-498/87-75 & 50-499/87-75 on 871201-31.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to Personnel Error,Tmi & Generic Ltr 83-28 Action Item Followup & IE Circulars
	ML20147C768
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/22/1988
From:	Bess J, Bundy H, Carpenter D, Constable G, Haag R, Hildebrand E, Murphy M; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20147C748	List: ML20147C743; ML20147C759; ML20147C768;
References
	TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-3.D.1.1, TASK-TM 50-498-87-75, 50-499-87-75, GL-83-28, IEC-80-09, IEC-80-9, NUDOCS 8803030152
	Download: ML20147C768 (18)
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APPENDIX B

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U.S.' NUCLEAR; REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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NRC' Inspection: Report: = 50-498/87-75 Operating License: 'NPF-71

' 50-499/87-75 . Construction Permit (CP): CPPR-129

Dockets: 50-498 CP Expiration Date:

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December 1989 '

50-499

Licensee: Houston Lighting &-Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77001-

Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

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Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas

. Inspection Conducted: Decembr141,1987

Inspectors: v w -

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jr'R. CarpenW Senior Resident Inspector

)roject Section D, Division of Reactor

Projeets

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. E. Bess 7 Resident Inspector, Project

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Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

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'E P. fiildebYand, Resident Inspector, Project 06te /

Section D, Division of Reactor Projects

M. ~ E. Murphy 7PlanF SysWms Section, Division

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Sate '

of Reactor Safety

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1803030152 880223

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ADOCK 05000498

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.R. Haag, Materid and. Quality Programs Date.-

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.Section D, Division of Reactor Projects-

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Other

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Personnel: J. P. Claus'ner, French Commissariar A L'Energie

Atomique, Institute De: Protection Et De Surete

Nucleaire

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G. L."Constable, Chief, Project Section;D.

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Inspection Summary

Inspection' Conducted December'l-31~, 1987'(Report 50-498/87-75;

' 50-499/87-75)

' Areas-Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection , including licensee action'on

previous inspection findings, licensee action on previously reported items,

slave relay surveillance- deficiency due' to personne11 error, THI and GL 83-28

.act ion item followup,' IE Circulars, Class 1E batteries inoperable, cold; weather-

preparations, chemical-detection system inoperability, safety injection. pumps

recirculation flow, Unit 2 preoperational test program,- incore thimble tube.-

inspections, Unit 1 significant events, status of incomplete preoperational

tests.(Unit 1)' status of auxiliary feedwater system failures (Unit 1), and

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siteLtours.

Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation (paragraph 10) and no

deviations' were identified.

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. DETAILS

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. 1. ' Persons Contacted .

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J. E. Geiger, Genera 1LManager, Nuclear Assurance

M. R. Wisenburg, Unit 1 Superintendent

W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager

S.LM.' Dew, Operations Support' Manager.

G.'L. Jarvela, Manager, NP00 Technical Support

J. A.'Brady, Division Manager, Emergency Preparedness

T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager

G; L. Parkey, Manager, Plant Engineering'

H. A. McBurnett, Manager, Site Licensing

'*S. - M. ' Head, Supervisory Licensing Engineer

P..L.: Walker, Staff Engineer

J. A. Constantin, Simulator Training Supervisor

In addition-.to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with

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various other licensee, architect engineer (AE),_ constructor, and

contractor personnel during this inspection.

Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on

January 6, 1988. _

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2. Unresolved Items -

An unresolved item is a matter'about'wh'ich more information is' required to

ascertain whether it is an acceptable 1 item, a deviation, or'a violation.

Unresolved items are'identilied in paragraphs,5 and 11 of this report.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Violation 498/8739-02

This violation concerns'the failure to follow the procedures for

installing temporary modifications. The NRC inspector ~ reviewed the

response given by the licensee (Letter ST-HL-AE-2354), the Procedure

OPGP03-Z0-0003, "Temporary Modifications and Alterations" Revision 7,

effective September 12, 1987, and the records which indicate training in

temporary modifications has been conducted for responsible startup

personnel.

Corrective action and steps taken to prevent recurrence are considered

acceptable.

This violation is considered closed.

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(Closed) Deviation 498/8741-01; 499/8741-01

This deviation involved failure to treat' components.in certain systems as

quality related per STP Final Safety Analysis Report'(FSAR) requirements

-in the preventive maintenance (PM) program and maintenance work

request (MWR) program. The NRC inspector reviewed-records indicating that

PMs which might not have had'the proper quality control (QC) inspections,

have been reviewed and evaluated by the, licensee.- Out of 11 MWRs/PMs

which would have required QC inspection, no discrepancies were found in

the work packages. The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures OPGP03-AM-0002,

"PM Program," effective September 2, 1987, and OPGP03-AM-0003,'"MWR

Program," effective November 6, 1987, and they contained adequate.

clarifications for determining proper quality classifications. The NRC-

inspector also reviewed records for training conducted during the period

- of June 29 to July 24, 1987, which indicated training in determining ,

quality classifications had been conducted for key maintenance personnel.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-01

This item concerned the completion of emergency lighting installation and

testing as well as the development of procedures to periodically check the

operability of the lighting units. Tne installation and initial testing

of emergency lighting has been completed. The NRC inspector reviewed the

last preventive maintenance check procedure and completed data form ,

EM-1-LB-87013194 and found them acceptable.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item 498/8717-02

This item concerned the completion of installation of all fire barriers,

seals, wraps, detection devices, and fireproofing. The constructor has

turned over to the licensee all systems and items related to these areas.

The licensee's fire protection engineers have completed a review of all

documentation and have conducted a satisfactory walkdown of all items.

The NRC inspector completed a tour of selected plant areas that provided

an adequate campling of the items of concern. Discrepancies noted were

minor in nature and found to be already identified in the licensee's work

item tracking system.

This item is considered closed. ,

(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-05

This item concerned smoke stratification effect on smoke detectors in

rooms with tall ceilings, large volumes, and low ventilation air flow

rates. The licensee responded to this concern in Letter ST-HL-AE-2053,

dated April 17, 1987. The response determined that these areas were not a

concern based on the location of combustible materials and detectors. The

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NRC inspector. toured each.of-the: rooms. identified' in <the above letter and

agrees with the licensee's assessment based on' detector location and

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quantity of~ installed combustible material. -

'This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-06

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-This item concerned installed noncollapsible fire hoses which were not

Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed. In a' letter dated April 17, 1987,.

-the licensee committed to-hydrostatically test all.of these hoses, and to'

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replace them with UL listed hoses at--the first hose maintenance _'changeout.

The hydrostatic testing has been: satisfactorily completed. The NRC

inspector has reviewed the~ documentation-on,this. item and finds it

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This item is considered closed. ,

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(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-07'

This item concerned the installation of portab'le fire extinguishers in the.

essential codling water intake structure in accordance with National Fire

. Protection Association (NFPA) Standard No. 10. The NRC inspector verified

that the fire extinguishers.were. permanently mounted in the intake

structure as required.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item 498/8727-08

This item concerned the development of procedures to maintain the

emergency communication systems. The NRC inspector reviewed Station

Procedures OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Communication," Revision 0, dated

June 16, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0,

dated June 9, 1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm

System," Revision 0, dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication

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Systems Testing Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987. These

procedures appear to satisfy the commitments.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item 498/8726-08 -

This open item concerns the classification of the Interim Storage

Facility (ISF) as a records storage facility per American National

Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.9-1974. HL&P Technical Support conducted

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an evaluation of the ISF and questioned whether the ISF can be classified

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as a records storage facility. This uncertainty involves

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paragraphs 5.6.7, 5.6.8, and 5.6.9 of ANSI N45.2.9-1974 which addresses:

(a) use of halon as the suppression agent, (b) conduit penetrations, and

(c) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetrations.

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The' existing halon suppression system appears to provide "adequate. fire

protection" as required by ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The licensee verified that

conduit penetrations are properly sealed and.the. supply and return HVAC

ducts contain dampers which exceed the required fire rating. This.

verification also meets the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9-1974. The NRC

inspector has reviewed this evaluation and agrees with the conclusions

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reached by the licensee on these issues.

This item is considered closed.

4. Licensee Action on Previously-Reported Items

The NRC inspectors reviewed the following incident review committee (IRC)

reports and determined that the licensee has taken adequate action on the

subject items, except as noted.

(0 pen) IRC 400, Inadequate Cooling of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) High

Voltage Cubicle Panels

This item concerned inadequate cooling of the Unit 1 SDG high voltage

cubicle panels which was discovered when a high temperature alarm actuated

during a 100 hour0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months test run of SDG 13. It was reported to the NRC under

10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21. HL&P completed a design modification which

involved installing a second fan and removing drip shields over the vents

to provide additional cooling to the Unit 1 panels. Completion of a

second 100 hour0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months test run for SDG 13 without experiencing abnormally high

panel temperatures verified the adequacy of this modification. The N9C

inspectors have reviewed both the field installations and the

documentation of this modification and consider it acceptable. This item

is considered closed for Unit 1. A similar modification is planned for

Unit 2 panels. This item will remain open for Unit 2 pending installation

of this modification.

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(Closed) IRC 399, Failure of Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) Fuel l

Injector Nozzle

This item concerns a SDG fuel injector nozzle failure during a 100 hour0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months

SDG 13 endurance run. A previous failure had occurred on February 25,

1987, during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months preoperational test run of SDG 11. During an IRC

meeting on July 27, 1987, the licensee determined that this item was

reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).

Based on failure analysis results performed by Southwest Research

Institute and on site testing of all spray nozzle tips (169) there were 20

tips with internal cracks identified, all from the same manufacturers Lot

No. 001124. The licensee concluded that the most probable cause of

cracking appeared to be due to manufacturing deficiencies associated with ,

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this lot. All spray nozzle tips from Lot No. 001124 were considered to be

potentially susceptible to cracking and have been replaced.

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ThisitemaisoconcernsSDGfuellineleakswhichwerefoundduringa24

hour preoperational- test performed on SDG No.11. The root'cause has.been

identified as being improper machining _ of the fuel line ferrule nuts.

Corrective actions have been taken, fuel line repairs are complete and

have been satisfactorily tested.

The NRC inspectors have. observed portions ofithe field testing and

maintenance activities, and have reviewed the associated documentation.

The licensee's corrective actions appear to be acceptable.

This item is considered closed.

5. Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to Personnel Error (LER 87-019)

The NRC inspectcr reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER)87-019 which

identified imprope. slave relay testing deficiencies due to personnel

error. The licensee. also discovered that the required slave relay testing

for "degraded undervoltage coincident with safety injection" had not been

properly performed. The licensee has committed to review the criteria for

slave relay testing. This review will be addressed in a LER which the

licensee plans to submit to NRC. This item will remain an unresolved item

(498/8775-02) until the LEt has been issued and corrective action has been

implemented by the licensre and verified by the NRC inspector.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Three Mile Island (THI) and Generic Letter Action Followup (GL) 83-28

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(Closed) TMI Item I.G.1.3 and (0 pen) Open Item 498/8708-19, Training

Requirements During Low Power Testing

Open Item 498/8707-19 tracked completion of the training required by THI

Item I.G.1.3 in the STP FSAR, Appendix 7A. The licensee committed to

satisfying this requirement by training operators on Procedure

1 PEP 4-ZX-10, "Natural Circulation Verification," Revision 0, utilizing the

plant simulator. The NRC inspector examined training records verifying

that training on this procedure had been completed for appropriate

personnel at the simulator during the period of June 1 to July 3,1987.

However, it was established that this training did not involve

accomplishing and verifying natural circulation from the remote shutdown

panel. TMI Item I.G.1.3 is considered closed. Completion of appropriate

training on the remote shutdown panel will be tracked by Open

Item 498/8708-19 and must be completed prior to exceeding 50% of full

power.

(Closed) GL 83-28, Item 2.2 and (Closed) Open Item 498/8739-04, Equipment

Classifications and Vendor Interface

The open item tracked licensee response to questions contained in NRC

letter of May 4,1987, which related to the Nuclear Utility Task Action

Comittee/ Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (NUTAC/VETIP) as

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it is implemented at the STP Electric Generating Station and the quality

assurance controls over vendor supplied service on safety-related

equipment. The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's letter of January 5,

.1988 (ST-HL-AE-2470), which appeared to be responsive to the NRR

questions. Therefore, GL-83-28, Item 2.2 and Open I+,em 8739-04 are

considered closed. However, these closures do.not preclude further NRR

questions on these subjects.

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(Closed) TMI Item II.B.4 and (Closed) Open' Item 498/8723-09, Training for

Mitigating Core Damage

TMI Item II.B.4 was.open pending closure of Open Item 498/8723-09

regarding completion of training of health physics personnel on mitigation

of core damage. The NRC inspector reviewed records which indicate

appropriate personnel completed course RPT905, during the period of May 8

to August 4,1987, which covered the radiological aspects of a core damage

accident.

The TMI item and associated open item are considered closed.

(Closed) TMI Item III.D.1.1,/ rimary P Coolant Outside Containment

This item concerns the review of the TMI followup actions and the

implementation of a program to reduce leakage from systems outside

containment, that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during

a serious transient or tecident, to as-low-as practical levels as required

by NUREG-0737.

To comply with this requirement, the licensee has established a program

covering the systems (or portions) outside containment defined in FSAR

Appendix 7A (7A.III.D.1.2, Amendment 53) and Technical Specification

(TS) 6 i.3a.

This program is described in the contaminated system leakage test program

Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0028, Revision 0, effective date October 24, 1986.

The inspector reviewed this program and the procedures for Contaminated

System Leakage Test as follows:

, 1 PSP 11-SI-0018, "Safety Injection System Train IC," Revision 0

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1 PSP 11-CM-0005, "Containment Monitoring System," Revision 0

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IPSP11-AP-0005, "Post Accident Sampling System," Revision 0

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1 PSP 11-CS-0008, "Containment Spray System Train IC," Revision 0

The NRC inspector considers these documents acceptable. However, the

Safety Evaluation Report (SER) NUREG-0737, Supplement 2 (13.5.2.6,

Item III.D.I.1) recomends that the applicant should also apply the

leakage reduction program to the Chemical Volume and Control System

(CVCS). STP TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the CVCS to be included in the

program for systems to be tested.

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The.NRC inspector discussed the above subject with licensee's

representatives who stated that the CVCS was excluded because it is part

of the inservice leakage test

of. Mechanical Engineers (ASME) program

. Section in accordance

XI. This position waswith American

stated by Society

the licensee in the Letter ST-HL-AE-2001 on May 1, 1987. The NRC

inspector observed that the licensee scheduled some tests on the CVCS

prior to initial criticality.

Although the TS, Section 6.8.3a requires the licensec to include the CVCS

in their program, NUREG-0737 allows delaying compliance until receipt of a

full power license. Inclusion of the CVCS in the leak reduction program

and review by the NRC prior to issuance of the full power license will be

an open item (498/8775-03).

7. IE Circulars (IEC)

(Closed) IEC 80-09, Internal Plant Comunications

This IEC had been closed with the exception of followup on training for

plant personnel. The NRC inspector has reviewed plant procedures

OPGP03-CN-001, "Radio Comunications," Revision 0, dated June 6,1987;

OPGP03-CN-0002, "Telephone Communications," Revision 0, dated June 9,

1987; OPGP03-CN-0003, "Plant Public Address and Alarm System," Revision 0,

dated June 9, 1987; and OPGP3-CN-0006, "Communication Systems Testing

Program," Revision 0, dated April 24, 1987; and the revised General

Employee Training I plan to ensure incorporation of the IEC concerns.

They have been addressed in an acceptable manner.

This IEC is considered closed.

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8. Class 1E Batteries Inoperable LER 87-27

During this inspection period, the licensee declared all four trains of

Unit 1 Class 1E 125 volt batteries inoperable because previous

surveillance testing per Station Procedure 1 PSP 06-DJ-0004 had Leen

performed using incorrect amperage values for the 120 minute discharge

service test.

The plant was subsequently placed in a Mode 5 (depressurized) status to

satisfy the TS 3.8.2.2 Action Statement requirements. ;

The cause of the inadequate testing appears to be due to an anomaly which

exists in the numbering system used to identify the four trains.

Specifically, Channels I, II, III, and IV are identified as Trains A, D,

B, and C, respectively (a nonlogical letter sequence). Also contributing

to the potential for error is the fact that Channels I, II, III, and IV

have plant equipment designation numbers of 3E231EBT045A, 3E231EBT0458,

3E231EBT045C, and 3E231EBT045D, respectively (a logical letter sequence).

The amperage values for the 120 minute discharge service test were

provided by Bechtel Engineering Calculation EC-5008, Revision 5. The

amperage values were incorrectly. entered into the surveillance test

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procedure for 'oattery Trains B, C, and D. This _ error caused these battery

trains to be tested using incorrect values. The new amperage values of

Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008 had not been entered into the

surveillance test in a- timely manner (approximately six months). The

licensee has completed retesting of all four Class IE battery trains using

the correct amperage values provided by Revision 7 of calculation EC-5008.

All four battery trains are now considered operable by the licensee.

The licensee's long term corrective action to prevent recurrence is

unclear at this time. It should include, as a minimum, steps to ensure

that revised calculations are correctly entered into the appropriate

procedure immediately upon approval and the anomaly which exists in

the identification of the battery trains is corrected. The

corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be tracked as open item

(498/8775-04).

No violations are deviations were identified.

9. Cold Weather Preparations

An inspection was conducted on both units to ensure that adequate

protective' measures have been taken by the licensee to assure that

safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines will not freeze

during cold weather.

'The freeze protection systems at STP have not yet been turned dver from

construction to HL&P for operational control. This is expected to occur

in January 1988. The system is currently under the control of startup

engineering.

The NRC inspector met with the cognizant startup engineer and the future

HL&P plant engineer. Existing records of system status were found to be

thorough and complete.

Verification was made that licensee inspections are being conducted oa

systems susceptible to freezing-to ensure the presence of heat tracing and

space heaters, insulation is in place where required, proper thermostat

settings are utilized, and the required circuits are energized.

Field inspections were conducted in selected plant areas and no

discrepancies were identified by the NRC which had not already been

identified and tracked by startup engineering. Cold weather protective

measures were verified to be reestablished af ter system maintenance. The

NRC inspector was satisfied with the attention that the STP cold weather

protection program has received and found no deficient conditions within

the existing program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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10. Chemical Detection System Inoperability (LER 87-22)

During this inspection period, it was identified by the licensee that the

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Chemical Detection System toxic gas monitors were in the'"Not in the -

Analyze Mode" while in Mode 4 of plant operations..

The STP TS, Section 3.3.3.7 requires a minimum of two chemical detection

system channels for all modes of plant operation..

From December 4-6, 1987, while the plant was in Mode 4, both toxic gas

monitors for the Control Room HVAC were found in the "Not in-Analyze Mode"

condition. The toxic gas monitors had been in this condition for

approximately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months . .There were qualified technicians on shift taking

data and reviewing sample = checks during this period. After identifying

the problem, the licensee immediately.took corrective action by placing

the toxic gas monitors in the "Analyze Mode " and then placing the Control

Room HVAC.in recirculation as required by the TS. . Subsequently the toxic

gas monitors nare functionally checked with satisfactory results and

control room ventilation was returned to a normal status.

The improper status of the toxic gas monitors and resulting inoperability

of the Control Room HVAC system to automatically isolate the Control Room-

in case of an accident is an apparent violation of NRC requirements.

(498/8775-01)

11. Safety Injection (SI) Pumps Recirculation Flow

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During this inspection period, the licensee discovered that all six SI

pumps recirculation flow measuring orifices were not the required size.

The installed orifices were not compatible with the installed

instrumentation.

An improper condition was suspected during the preoperational test program

due to the recorded pump recirculation flow data not being within expected

val t.es. The indicated flow was higher than expected and a nonconformance

report (NCR) was issued. This was dispositioned "acceptable as is" due to

the fact-that the indicated recirculation flow values were conservative

and the SI pumps delivered the required flow to the reactor coolant

system (RCS) meeting their test acceptance criteria. The NCR disposition

did not recognize that the wrong size orifices could be the cause of the

indicated high recirculation flow condition.

The cause of the incorrect orifice / indicator combinations was due to

Westinghouse design errors on the "Shop Order 325" forms. The system

construction was in accordance with the above documents.

The licensee took corrective action as follows:

. New orifices of the correct size were installed.

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Nsw reference val'ue measurements were.obtained on all-six'SI' pump

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. The: low head SI _ pump minimum allowed recirculation flow is 186 GPM.-

The post-corrective flows are:

Pump A - 190 GPM

Pump B - 185 GPM

Pump C - 184 GPM

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. The high head SI pump minimum, allowed recirculation flow is 100 GPM.

The post-corrective flows are:

Pump A - 100 GPM

Pump B - 101 GPM

Pump C - 92 GPM ,

Two low head pumps .and one high head pump are below the allowed minimum

flow value. Westinghouse, the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, ,

has accepted this data as satisfactory for operation at this time but not

permanently acceptable for long term operation.

HL&P pla'nt engineering has recommended that the SI pump (s) recirculation

line pressure breakdown orifices be replaced with larger elements to

increase flow for long tenn acceptability.

Additional corrective action taken by the licensee included inspecting

other orifice / flow indicator combinations in the plant which could be

affected by similar errors of Westinghouse on design documents.

One additional problem was found during this inspection in which the

orific2 and indicator were not matt.hed properly by the Westinghouse design

document. This orifice is located in the refueling water purification ,

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pump discharge (a nonsafety system). The orifice will be changed and

retesting performed. This error was not discovered during the

preoperational test program.

The cause for the errors on the Westinghouse design installation documents ,

(Shop Order 325 Forms) is considered an unresolved item (498/8775-05).

Assurance that these flow indication discrepancies do not exist in other ;

areas of the plant is considered an open item (498/8775-06),

i

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program

Preoperational testing is continuing on plant support systems. The

resident inspectors have allocated some time to monitoring prerequisite ,

testing. The conduct of testing was satisfactory.

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Startup engineering is making preparations for primary and secondary

hydrostatic testing. Also, preparations are being made for initial SOG

engine runs.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Incore Thimble Tube Inspections

Due to the recent thimble tube leakage problems on the European

Westinghouse (14 foot core) reactors, the licensee has performed a

baseline eddy current inspection of all incore thimble tubes. The

inspection results were satisfactory and a report has been sent to NRR for

review. Two low pressure seals were observed to be leakint and were

replaced. One high pressure' seal was leaking due to galling of the

seating surface at the reducer and was repaired. For detailed information

see NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-498;499/87-74.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Unit 1 Significant Events

The following events resulted in licensee notifications to the NRC during

this inspection period. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed these events

and initial corrective actions to determine if any immediate safety

concern was apparent.

a. High head SI and low head SI recirculation line flow elements and

indicators were not compatible. Indicated flows were not accurate.

. Discovered December 15, 1987 (No LER)

. Reported to NRC December 15, 1987

. LER Number - Not Reportable

See Section 11 for additional information,

b. Toxic gas monitors discovered "Not in Analyze Mode"

. Discovered December 6, 1987

. Reported to NRC December 6, 1987

. LER No.- 87-022

See Section 10 for additional information.

c. Key was found out of keyway on two motor operated valves; M0V CC542

and MOV CC297.

. Discovered on October 10, 1987

. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987

. LER No.- 87-023

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lLicenseeinvestigationrevealedthatthekeyswerethewrongsize.-

~All potentially affected M0V's have been checked for this condition.

The' resident inspectors monitored the 11censee's~ actions and consider

them acceptable..

d. . Actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) during trouble shooting

of ESF sequencer.

. Occurred on November 30, 1987-

. Reported to NRC December 1, 1987-

. LER No.- 87-021

During trouble shooting of the ESF sequencer,.an unanticipated bus

strip and "B" ESF SD6. start upon being deenergized was experienced.

The sequencer was reenergized to release the bus strip. Upon

repowering, it correctly started a loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

sequence,

e. Inadvertent actuation of control room / auxiliary building ventilation

by personnel pressing the wrong flow button on the Rii-23A_ module

during surveillance testing.

. Occurred on December 8, 1987

. Reported to NRC December 8, 1987

. LER No.- 87-024

This is another example of toxic gas monitor problems which are of

concern to the resident inspectors. An apparent violation due to

toxic gas monitors not being in the "Analyze Mode" when required is

discussed in Section 10.

f. "A" Train LOOP instantaneous undervoltage caused an "A" ESF bus

strip, "A" ESF SDG start, and sequencing "A" ESF component loads onto

the "A" 50G.

. Occurred on December 9, 1987

Reported to HRC December 9, 1987

. LER Nc.- 87-025

This occurrence was due to personnel error during surveillance

testing. The licensees actions are considered acceptable to resolve

this occurrence,

g. Failure to meet the required testing for "undervoltage condition

coincident with a SI signal."

. Discovered December 12, 1987

. Reported to NRC December 12, 1987

. LER No.- 87-026

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See Unresolved Item 498/8775-02 in' paragraph 5 for- additional

informationi.

h .- Surveillance-procedure-for Class 1E batteries contained incorrect

-amperage values.

. Discovered' December _30, 1987

. Reported to NRC December 30,1987

. LER'No. - 87-027~

.

See Section 8 for. additional information.

These events may be addressed in more detail in the future as the required <

corrective action is. completed by the licensee.

No deviations were identified. An apparent violation involving LER 87-022

is' identified in Section 10.

15. Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests (Unit 1) !

'

The following Unit 1 preoperational tests have not been completed due to~

being restrained by plant mode-conditions: ,

. 1-HB-P-01 99%

. 1-PS-P-01 99%

. 1-RC-P-06 99%

. 1-RC-P-07 99%

. 1-RC-P-08 99%

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. 1-RC-P-11 98% ,

. 1-SP-P-03 95%

16. Status Auxiliary Feedwater System Failures (Unit 1) "

.

'

During the November 1987 inspection period, there were several failures in

the auxiliary feedwater (AF) system resulting in the licensee declaring

the system inoperable. }

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The failures were attributed to water hammer events which resulted in

significant vibration and failures of AF piping and pipe supports. A. i

detailed description of the failures and subsequent licensee actions is ,

contained in NRC IR 50-498;499/87-71, i

During this inspection period (December 1987), the licensee's trouble

'

shooting and test program was successful in duplicating the vibration

event which caused the failures.

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The testing effort established that the vibration occurred only when the

Train A and D flow control valves (FCV) were in a highly throttled,

_ near-seat position.s The internal geometry of the FCVs created pressure

pulsations at a 24 HZ frequency that matched'one of the hydraulic

resonance frequencies of the piping system. This resonance provided the

cyclic driving force which caused the AF system failures. ,

HL&P engineering submitted a detailed. report to NRR and Region IV

inspectors. The report was complete and; demonstrates a professional,

successful effort on the part of the licensee to resolve the AF system

failures. .

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In their effort to establish' root cause for the failures, the licensee

examined previous system testing during preoperational testing, performed-

extensive testing to duplicate the damage causing event, obtained data

from other utilities, analyzed potential causes of hydraulic transient

events; e.g.,-fast valve operation, entrainment of noncondensable gases,

pump instabilities, check valve closure, and other potential contributing ?

possibilities.

"

Testing further revealed that no water hammer or initial "kick" was

required to trigger the event. It was initially thought that system cross t

connect header valve operation could be a contributor to the failures

since water hammer had been experienced during valve operation.

The pressure pulsations caused by the FCVs being in a highly throttled

position were observed to dissipate when the valves were opened to deliver

approximately 50 GPM or more flow. The following system modifications ,

'

have been or will be made to the AF system to ensure future system

operability.

. Five additional high point vents were added to the system to provide

additional air removal capability. ,

. Nine double valve connections had rejectable indications from

nondestructive examination (NDE). These connections were repaired by i

replacing the schedule 80 piping with schedule 160 material and

deleting the second valve.

.

New cross-connect valve actuators will be installed on the Train A,

B, and C valves. The actuators contain a higher spring force for

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closing and will provide a greater margin from the 24 HZ system

hydraulic natural frequency. ,

,

. The Train D cross-connect valve exhibited a fast stroke time in the

open direction. The valve actuator will be fitted with a needle

valve in the air supply line to allow increasing the stroke time.

. Additional pipe supports were added to the system mainly in the area

of the cross-connect valves and FCVs.

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. The FCVs have been fitted with travel stops to limit their closure to

a highly-throttled position. This was accomplished by use of a close

limit switch backed up by a mecnanical stop.

The licensee's efforts have been closely monitored by the resident

inspectors and were observed to be professional and thorough. .This

monitoring will be continued throughout the completion of repairs and

performance of proof testing in Modes 4 and 3 of plant operations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

17. Site Tours

During this inspection period, the NP.C inspectors continued to conduct

tours of all plant areas of both units. Observations have been discussed

with licensee management. Those observations requiring licensee attention

were resolved in a responsive and timely manner.

The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations

during this inspection period. Activities observed were the conduct of

operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS), Secondary Alarm

Station (SAS), and the badge issue area. The above activities witnessed

by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with licensee procedures and were

performed in a professional manner.

The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of the Health Physics (HP)

department activities during the inspection period. The NRC inspectors

witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant

workers, use of radiation work permits (RWPs), and general conduct of

shift HP activities. The HP activities appear to be acceptable and in

compliance with licensee procedures.

Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during

the repair process of the various plant system failures during the

inspection period.

No violations or deviations were identified.

18. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) on January 6,1988, and summarized the scope and findings of

the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee

management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss

identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of

the information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection.

ML20147C768

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