IR 05000409/1987009

Insp Rept 50-409/87-09 on 870601-0717.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings, Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Maint Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation & LERs

ML20236D766
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	07/24/1987
From:	Jackiw I, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236D749	List: IR 05000409/1987009 ML20236D747
References
50-409-87-09, 50-409-87-9, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8707310055
Download: ML20236D766 (6)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION >

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/87009(DRP)

Docket No. 50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South i La Crosse, WI 54601 '

Facility h0me: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At: La Crosse Site, Genoa, Wisconsin i

Inspection Conducted: June 1, 1987 through July 17, 1987 lCHilNk Inspector: K.R.Ridgdwchay i

l i (Z Approved By: w, Chief Reactor rojects Section 2C 7M!N Date Inspection Summary Inspection on June 1, 1987 through July 17, 1987 (Report No. 50-409/87009(DRP)) l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of l Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings: Operational Safety i Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Licensee Event Reports Followup; Special Reports; Training; and Organization and Administratio Results: No violations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent

• G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor L. Kelley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor L. Nelson, Health and Safety Supervisor

• R. Wery, Quality Assurance Supervisor L. Goodman, Operations Engineer D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those attending exit interviews during the inspection period.

2. General On April 24, 1987, the Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC) Board authorized the permanent shutdown of LACBWR due to economic reasons. The licensee completed defueling the reactor on June 11, 1987, replaced the core spray bundle and vessel lid and stored the primary coolant system filled with wate Plans are being made to reduce radiation dose rates in accessible locations and to ship resins and solid waste accumulation On May 22, 1987, DPC submitted a proposed amendment to change License No. DPR-45 from an operating license to a license to possess - only and on June 17, 1987, the licensee submitted a cancellation of all open licensing actions. On June 19, 1978, an application for a license amendment was submitted to remove Inservice Inspection requirements for high pressure primary system piping and equipment, to delete the requirements for nuclear instrumentation, and to make Technical Specification changes to agree with the possession only license that the reactor will not be operate The licensee plans to submit amendment applications in the near future to remove all TS references to Operating Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5; to change staffing and training requirements in TS Section 6, Administrative Controls; and to revise the Security-Safeguards and Emergency Plans for the shutdown condition.

3. License Action on Previous Inspections Findings In light of the facility shutdown, open or unresolved items and bulletins have been reviewed to determine whether additional inspection effort is justified or whether they should be administrative 1y closed. Based on the review, the following open items are administratively closed: /85001-BB: IE Bulletin 85-01 - Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps b: 409/86017-01: Open Item - Feedwater Line Break

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4. Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of the crib house, reactor building, and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and fluid leaks, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. By observation and direct interview the inspector verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Service Water System, and Fire Protection System to verify operabilit No violations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry

, codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting ,

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

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inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were I

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

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control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to the maintenance of safety-related equipment which could affect system performanc No violations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector reviewed the licensees surveillance program to assure that TS required surveillance were in their pr0 gram, that the surveillance had been performed, and test records were available. The Type B and C Containment Leak Rate Tests for the Personnel Air Lock, the Containment Isolation Dampers, and electrical penetration were reviewed for content and that the systems were returned to normal operating conditions following tests.

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The licensee has reviewed the surveillance program in light of their current SAFSTOR status and has proposed removing those tests not needed in Operating Condition 4, i.e., for systems such as the Control Rods and Safety System, the Emergency Service Water Supply System, Reactor Pressure and Power Instrumentation, High Pressure Core Spray and Baron Systems, Alternate Core Spray (not including the backup fire protection portion). These changes will be reviewed and approved by the Operations Review Committe No violations were identified.

7. Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective actions were accomplished, and corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 87-04: Core Spray Bundle Flange Leak. On June 1, 1986 with the vessel head removed in preparation for defueling the reactor, the scheduled pressure drop and leak test was performed on the Emergency Core Spray Bundle in accordance with Administrative Control Procedure ACP 11.2, Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection, which in turn is required by the approved Inservice Testing Progra During the test, water was observed spraying from the bundle flange out over the top of the core spray bundle in a fan shaped pattern. The leak test is performed prior to the bundle removal as well as following the bundle installation to assure proper makeup of the flange and to visually examine all the core spray fittings for leaks or other abnormalities. The leak test is performed with both HPCS Pumps operating. Technical Specifications require both pumps to be operable. When only one pump is operable, reactor shutdown must be started in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and be in cold shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Both pumps were operable during the operating period following the last test made on August 2, 198 From the visual examination of the leakage, the licensee concluded tha:

the leakage would have affected the coolant distribution to the top of the fuel assemblies but not the total flow to the vessel; therefore, adequate cooling to each bundle could not be assured if the HPCS had been needed with only one HPCS Pump operable, but with both pumps operating, adequate coolant would have been distributed to each fuel elemen Examination of the leaking flange indicated the gasket was less compressed on one side, thus permitting the leakage. An examination of the previously used gasket also indicated uneven compression of the material, but to a lesser extent and no leakage had been observed when it was tested. Following the previous refueling outage in early 1986, the core spray bundle was damaged during installation and subsequently repaired, see LER 409/86-11 and Inspection Report No. 50-409/86005. This damage may have misaligned the flange on either the vessel or bundle

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causing the uneven gasket compression. The licensee decided that since )

the plant was permanently shutdown and the issue was not of a generic nature that further testing and investigation was not prudent because of the significant personnel radiation exposures that would be require The inspector has reviewed this LER and concludes that the licensees actions following the discovery of the flange leak was proper, since the plant is permanently shutdown. At some point during the last operation period the HPCS may have become degraded in that it would not have performed its designed function if only one HPCS Pump was operabl The design of the HPCS directs the water flow to 72 spray nozzles each located directly above a fuel assembl With the flange leak, part of the flow would have by passed the fuel nozzles. Although all of the water would go into the reactor vessel, it might not have gotten to the fuel assemblies in the designed distribution pattern. However, both HPCS Pumps were operable during this period and if called upon could have !

supplied adequate coolin It should be pointed out that the Alternate Core Spray System, a low ;

pressure system used in conjunction with the Manual Depression System, is i a complete back up safety system for the HPCS. Therefore, if the HPCS could not provide sufficient flow to maintain core coverage, these systems could provide the eniergency core cooling. Special Reports j On June 29, 1987, the licensee submitted a special report on the failure of the IB Emergency Diesel Generator to supply the required voltage of 450 during a scheduled surveillance test. The cause was attributed to a loose anchor nut in the voltage regulator rheostat which was later secure Since the reactor is permanently shutdown and defueled and the facility is conservatively considered to be in Operation Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, only one emergency generator is required to be operable. Training The licensee is revising the LACBWR Training Programs to reflect the permanent shutdown status. The initial Reactor Operator Program (TPP-1)

will be revised to train new personnel to replace licensed Reactor Operators. The program will stress systems training, control room operations, radiological, and emergency training. The SS/SR0 Training Program (TPP-2) will be changed to include only presently used systems and expected emergency situations. The Continuous Training Program (TPP-3) will be changed to reflect presently used plant systems and expected emergency situations and will be repeated every two years with an annual walk through exam and biennial written exam.

10. Organization and Administration The licensee expects to reduce the manpower requirements at LACBWR about fifty percent (40 persons) by November 1987. About twenty-five percent have already been reassigned to other DPC sites or have been offered

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positions with other utilities or contractors. A proposed license i amendment will be submitted to reduce TS manpower requirements but for now the licensee maintains or exceeds the manpower requirements for Operational Condition 4, Cold Shutdown, having one shift supervisor, one licensed operator and one auxiliary operator per shift. Shiftwise, health physics coverage is also being maintained. Shift Technical advisor coverage is not required in the Cold Shutdown Condition and was terminated at shutdown. Security forces meet Security Plan requirement . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representative (noted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar i

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