IR 05000456/1989015

Insp Repts 50-456/89-15 & 50-457/89-15 on 890430-0617.No Violations Noted.Unresolved Item Noted Re Operator Logs. Major Areas Inspected:Ler Review,Regional Request,Followup on TMI Action Items & Operational Safety Verification

ML20245H925
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	06/23/1989
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245H917	List: IR 05000456/1989015 ML20245H914
References
TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.7, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-TM 50-456-89-15, 50-457-89-15, IEIN-89-044, IEIN-89-44, NUDOCS 8906300144
Download: ML20245H925 (15)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-p -

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ReportNos.L50-456/89015(DRP);50-457/89015(DRP)?

. Docket Nos.- 50 456'; 50-45 License Nos. NPF-72; NPF-77-

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. Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 y Facility Name: :Braidwood Station,-Units 1 and'2 Inspection At: , Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois

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Inspection Conducted: April 30 through. June 17, 1989 -

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Inspectors: T..M.. Tongue

'T. E.-Taylor

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G. A.-VanSickle Approved By

&tW W J.M.Hiffds,Jr., Chief f/b399'

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'. Reactor.. Projects Section 1A D#te '

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Inspection Summar i

, Inspection from April 30 through June 17, 1989 (Report Nos. 50-456/89015(DRP);

50-457/8901T(DRP)) .

X'reas Inspected: . Routine, unannounced' safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee- action on previously identified items; licensee event .

treport review;- regional ' request; follow-up on TMI action items; operational .

safety. verification; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance:

observation; contractor employee with positive drug screen' test; licensee medical drill; evaluation of licensee self-assessment capability; OSHA related

activities; training effectiveness; report review; and meetings and other activitie Results: One unresolved item was identified regarding operator logs  ;

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'8906300144 PDR 890623 o-O ADOCK 05000456 i

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DETAILS ]

i 1. - Persons Contacted

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Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

, i T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations

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• R. E. Querio, Station . Manager .

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• D. E. O'Brien, Technical: Superintendent K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent

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• S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

• G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations

• G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Department R. J. Legner, Services Director

• M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1

• R.' J. Ungeran, Operating Engineer

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R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2

• W. B. McCue, Operating Engineer - Uni *R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• D. E. Cooper, Regulatory Assurance' Supervisor

• R.-C. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor J. Gosnell, Quality Control Supervisor 1 R. E. Aker, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor F. Willaford, Security Administrator

• L. W. Raney, Nuclear. Safety Supervisor

• R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup

• G. Vanderheyden, Operations Training Supervisor

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W. McGee, Training Supervisor

!' *N. Kretschmer, MIS Supervisor

• E.;W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

• P. G. Holland, Regulatory. Assurance S. Hedden, Master, Instrument Maintenance R. Hoffman, Master, Mechanical Maintenance i- J. Smithc Master, Electrical Maintenance I *R. A. Flessner, Engineer

• H. D. Pontious, Operations Staff

• C. L. Bearden, Operations Staff

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• R. Trusheim, Operations Staff

• T. Mr Bandura, Quality Assurance L * Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on June 15, 1989,- :

L and at other times throughout the inspection perio l The inspectors also talk'ed with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, i reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personne . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items i i Open Item l

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(Closed) 456/87007-03(DRP); 457/87006-02(DRP): Potential delay between review and hanging of out-of-services (00Ss) and {

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documentation of shift control room engineer (SCRE) review and  !

granting'of 00S approval for implementation. Through discussions j with operations personnel and review of the current 00S process, '

the inspector has determined that 00S's are processed in an timely manner, relative to delays between reviewing and hanging i of the 00S. Additionally, the inspector's review of the May 25,  !

1989 00S procedure identified that adequate documentation for SCRE and shift engineer review, prior to granting approval for 00S implementation, does exist. This item is considered close b. Violations (Closed) 456/87035-01(DRP): Inadequate sh_ ort-term corrective action resulting in repeat violation This violation resulted from at least two situations in which the licensee had provisions ,

for adequate long-term corrective actions for events; however, no '

provisions were made for short-term corrections that resulted in repeat events before the long-term corrective actions were implemente The licensee took appropriate corrective actions with the specific events as described in their Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and/or Deviation Investigation Reports (DIRs). For the violation, the j licensee placed a step in the DVR package routing form stating, i

" Verify adequacy of short term and long term corrective action as ;

appropriate." This appears to have corrected the problem. This j violation is considered close (Closed) 456/88011-01; 457/88013-01: Inoperability of two non-accessible area exhaust fiIter plenums. The action requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.7 were not initiated within the required one-hour time limit. The root ceuses for the two cited occasions were the failure of operating personnel to adequately  ;

verify system status prior to authorizing an out-of-service, and an !

administrative and management deficiency in that the personnel assigned the task of determining cut-of-service boundaries lacked the expertise and adeq'uate reference material required to perform i the function. To preclude recurrence of these events, the licensee i has conducted training of operators through the " Licensed Operator Requalification Program" relative to lessons learned from the two events, and developed a 120-volt control power system guidance document to identify what equipment is affected if a specific breaker / relay / fuse is removed from service. Also, a computerized )

program called " Outage Editor" has been implemented to assist in the !

determination for isolation points for equipment out-of-service The inspector has reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and 1 found them to be acceptabl This item is considered closed, i

(Closed) 457/88019-01 and 457/88019-02: Failure to make a timely I unusual event declaration and failure to make a timely Emergency l Notification Sy. stem (ENS) notification. Each of these violations '

resulted from a June 7, 1988 event in which a reactor shutdown was

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required by Technical Specifications after identification of an 0 inoperable containment isolation valve. . The applicable Technical Specification requires that the inoperable valve be restored to operable status within four hours; otherwise, that a plant shutdown '

to hot standby be completed within the next six hours. Station

management decided that the entry condition for the. unusual event declaration and ENS notification was the completion of the shutdown (entryintohotstandby),notthepowerreductiontoinitiatethe

shutdown almost two hours earlie The licensee has revised its emergency action level (EAL) procedure to clarify that- an unusual event for a Technical Specification required shutdown is declared when the power reduction for.a reactor shutdown has commenced. Also, a January 3, 1989 letter from corporate management to all nuclear station managers has provided additional. conservative guidance concerning the timing of unusual event declarations and ENS notifications. Extensive training in the clarified requirements was provided for all licensed operators and appropriate station management personnel in January 1989, prior to . implementation of the revised EAL procedure. The resident inspectors have since noted an increase in conservatism on the part of management'and operators when the potential for invoking these requirements arises during plant operation. These violations are-considered close (Closed) 456/88029-02: Repeat violation concerning an untimely ENS notification and an untimely unusual event declaration. This violation resulted from an October 31, 1988 sequence of event involving an inoperable main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and a shutdown. required by Technical Specifications. The licensee's governing procedure, BwAP 1250-6, " Reportable /Potentially Significant Event Screening and Notification," did not explicitly identify MSIV inoperability as a condition requiring ENS notification. Also, once the licensee belatedly determined the ,

deportability requirement, the shift control room engineer did I not have time to gather all pertinent information for a complete I notification within the one-hour interval. These two factors contributed to the late ENS notification. The licensee's consideration of the unusual event declaration was complicated by the Technical Specification for MSIV inoperability, which requires a shutdown from Mode 1 with one MSIV inoperable, but which allows unlimited operation in Mode 2 or 3 with one MSIV inoperabl Although the licensee reduced power to comply with the Mode 1 action statement, they intended only to proceed to Mode 2 and hold there for valve repair. Therefore, the licensee initially felt that a shutdown was not in progress, and the late unusual event declaration resulte BwAP 1250-6 has been revised.to clarify conditions, including MSIV inoperability, which require ENS notification, and to emphasize that ENS notifications be made prior to the end of the reporting interval, regardless of the completeness of information gathered at that time. As noted above, the licensee has revised its EAL procedure to clarify unusual event declaration requirements

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associated with shutdowns required by Technical Specifications, and has conducted training for appropriate station personnel in the revised requirements. Shutdowns / power reductions resulting ;

from MSIV inoperability were addressed in training, portions of j which were observed by the resident inspectors. This violation l is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92702)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS):

IClosed) 457/89002-LL: Reactor Trip Due to a 345KV Switchyard '

Breaker Defective Trip Coil. On May 11, 1989, at 4:47 a.m., a generator trip / turbine trip / reactor trip occurred. The initiating event was a trip signal from transmission substation (TSS) 17 The TSS 177 trip signal caused bus tie circuit breakers (BTCBs) 7-11, 10-11, and 11-14 to trip open as designed. Due to the A phase of BTCB 10-11 taking longer than 5 cycles to open, because of a stuck A phase trip coil assembly, a local breaker backup (LBB) signal was initiated and opened the 9-10 BTCB. This BTCB was the Unit 2 main generator output breaker; its opening resulted in a reactor tri All reactor protection and support systems functioned as designe Corrective action included: repair of the A phase trip coil on BTCB 10-11, raising the LBB relay initiation delay setting for t'

345KV oil circuit breaker BTCBs from 5 to 9.5 cycles, and raising the setting for all air circuit breakers *n the Braidwood 345KV switchyard from 5 cycles to 7.5 cycles. The NRC inspectors have reviewed this m ent with licensee personnel and consider this item to be close JClosed) 456/89005-LL: Reactor Shutdown Due to Failed Instrument Inverter. On April 23, 1989, Unit I was shut down because of the inoperability of instrument inverter 11 The inverter had become inoperable the day before; the shutdown complied with Technical

Specification action requirements associated with instrument bus i

operability. Following extensive troubleshooting efferts, the problem was traced to a failed capacitor. The capacitor nas replaced, the inverter was restored to operability, and the unit was restarted. As permanent corrective action, the licensee will implement preventive maintenance requirements for inverters at more ;

frequent intervals. Based on this action, this LER is considered l close '

In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed to

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l ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedures and the QA manua No violations or deviations were identifie l 4. Regional Request

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By memoranda, dated May 1, 1989, "Recent Operational Events," and May 3, 1989, " Followup on Recent Events, Inadequate Hydrogen Tank Storage  !

Onsite," Region III, Division of Reactor Projects requested specific ];

informatio With regard to the " Followup to Recent Events, Inadequate Hydrogen Tank Storage Onsite," the following is a summary of the findings relevant to j the identification of a hydrogen storage tank on the roof of the control room as described in NRC Information Notice 89-44. It also provides answers to the questions in the T. Murley memo to all Regional Directors, dated May 2,1989, " Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room,"

enclosed with the May 3, 1989 mem The hydrogen storage facility at Braidwood is located outside of the power block, about 80 feet west of the northwest corner of the Unit 1 turbine building. The nearest safety-related structure is the auxiliary building, which is about 260 feet away, and the turbine building is between the two facilitie It is about 150 feet east of the condensate storage tanks and about 150 feet west of the Technical Support Center (TSC) building, which are required by Technical Specifications or other requirements, but not treated as

" safety-related."

The nearest air intakes are in the west wall of the turbine building, which are louvered panels allowing air to enter the main turbine building feed / condensate heater bays (non safety-related).

The maxiraum volume of gaseous hydrogen permitted onsite at any time i is 260,000 SCF per FSAR Secticn 10.2.2.2.1. This includes 60,000 SCF in the storage facility and no more than two trucks with 100,000 SCF eac The foregoing information was submitted to Region III via memo on May 8, 198 r F_reele Seals With respect to the event where a freeze plug failed during maintenance I at the River Bend Unit 1 facility., Braidwood maintenance procedure BwMP 3300-018, Revision 1 " Applications of Liquid Nitrogen Freeze Seal to All Pipiag," has the provisions to protect against the problem identifie The Braidwood procedure requires the installation of temperature bulbs 3/4 inch to 1 inch from the freeze chamber and it also requires temperature recording every 10 minutes. A data sheet is provided with the procedur _ _ _

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In addition, the procedure'has provisions for when to employ the services of an outside supplier on pipe freeze seals, for the location of where a freeze seal can be used which is determined by a required distance from the maintenance activity in terms of the pipe's diameter, for the

' temperatures and pressures of fluids allowed, and for the assignment of a specific foreman with no other duties than the freeze seal. In addition, the licensee.. practices show a preference for isolation before freeze sealing. The licensee is considering an emergency kit for a freeze seal failure based on a recommendation from an NRC audi The foregoing information on both subjects was provided by licensee j personnel and verified by the inspector '

Tem 3orary Instruction 2515/100 - Pro)er Receipt, Storage, and Handling -i of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) :uel Oil l

TI 2515/100 defined inspection and reporting responsibilities with regard J to verification of the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program.for the EDG fuel oil storage and delivery system. Appendix A of the subject TI contained a survey of the results of selected EDG fuel oil issue Through discussion with licensee personnel and review of TI 2515/100 +

issues the inspector has evaluated the licensee's fuel oil . storage  ;

program. . The results of that review were documented using Appendix A of  !

the TI. The results have been submitted to the Technical Support Staff of Region III'for processing and forwarding to NRC Headquarters. .The inspector did not identify any adverse trends. This TI is considered closed for Braidwood Units 1 and No violations or deviations were identifie . Follow-up on TMI Action Items II.3.1.B Test / Install Auto Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Isolation The staff's review of this item, documented in NUREG-1002, Supplement 1, Page 702, states that this feature is not required at Braidwood statio Issue B(10) is considered closed. Therefore, this item is. considered closed for Braidwood Units 1 and II J.1.2.F Accident Monito_r_i_ng for Containment Hydrogen Concentration

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This item was previously addressed in NRC inspection report 456/86039; 457/8603 In that report, the number identifier II.F.1,2.F was omitte This report entry is to clarify that the containent hydrogen monitor  ;

was installed and that this item is considered closed for Units 1 and !

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III.A.1.2.1.AandBUpgradeEmergencySupportFacilities(TSC, EOF,OSC}

This item was closed in NRC inspection reports 456/86046; 457/86034, 456/87006; 457/87005, and 456/86021; 457/86019. Region based inspectors t performed the required inspections and found the facilities to be in  !

compliance with regulatory requirements. This item is considered closed for Braidwood Units 1 and i l

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. I.C.7.2 NSSS Vendor Review of Power Ascension and Emergency Procedures NUREG-0737, Paragraph I.C.7.2 requires that the-licensee's power ascension and emergency procedures are reviewed by the NSSS vendo The inspector's review of this item ' identified that Westinghouse Electric Corporation has reviewed the power ascension procedures and the revisions used at Braidwood station. Some of the procedures verified were BwSU RC-30, BwSU RH-50, BwSU AP-30, and BwSU CV-30. The inspector also verified that the licensee's emergency procedures were also written in I accordance with Westinghouse Electric Corporation guidelines. This was verified by-two separate region based inspections.of the emergency procedures. . This item is considered closed for Braidwood Units 1 and I.C.1.2.B and I.C.1.3.B Emergency Procedures and Training to Address 3 Short-term Accidents

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NUREG-0660, Task I.C., as clarified by NUREG-0737,Section I.C.1, includes requirements for operating licensees to develop procedures and conduct operator training to address the prevention of impending core '

uncovering, the recovery from inadequate core cooling, and responses to

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transients and accidents. Braidwood has developed emergency operating

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procedures (E0Ps) for all such conditions and has developed an E0P training program for operators. Braidwood comitments in this ' regard were found acceptable by the NRC in NUREG-1002, Supplement 2 (Safety Evaluation Report for Braidwood), dated October 1986. Implementation of E0Ps and operator E0P training in accordance with approved guidelines was verified in two region based inspections of E0Ps (Inspection Reports 456/87028 and 456/89011; 457/89011). These items are considered closed for Braidwood Units 1 and No violations or deviations were identifie . 0Jerational Safety Verification (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility 4 was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation. This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of j activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and .j discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of facility record l On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room ,

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staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant '

i activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator L adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);

including compliance with LC0ARs, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and ESF electrical alignment and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnonnalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understanding, off-normal condition, and corrective actions being taken;

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examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and other protection channels for proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operabilit Control Room Log Entries During the inspection period the inspectors noted four instances in the Unit 2 operator's log in which centrifugal charging pumps were " swapped" without a line entry of the change in the in-service pump. The pump swaps occurred between May 14 and 15, between May 15 and 17, on May 3, and between May 29 and 30. These instances could be determined because  !

some unit operators begin their shift entries with summaries of operating major equipment, and on those four occasions the summary included a different operating charging pump than that listed in the last previous summar In addition, the inspectors noted that a few operators frequently made illegible or difficult ~to-read log. entries. These deficiencies are examples of nonadherence to licensee procedure BwAP 350-1, " Operating Logs and Records," which requires in part clear, legible entries and entries for equipment status changes at the time of ,

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Missing, incomplete, and illegible control room log entries have been an inspector concern within the recent past at Braidwood. A violation for nonadherence to BwAP 350-1 (456/88008-02; 457/88009-02) was issued on April 26,.1988. Deficient logs were again noted in Inspection Report 456/88029; 457/88029, in which illegibility and failure to document reactivity changes were cited. Operator logs have since improved, and the violation was closed in Inspection Report 456/89005; 457/8900 The recent instances of deficient log keeping indicate a renewed area of concern, and the ongoing degree of adherence to BwAP 350-1 is corsidered ah Unresolved Item (456/89015-01(DRP); 457/89015-01(DRP)).

Operatiens Issue _s On a tour of the control room, the senior resident inspector noted about seven er eight recorders that were not inking properly. This was raised for the purpose of identifying trends during operation and prompt evaluation of data fcilowing an event. The licensee responded by noting that there is a couputer trend monitor available, that a computer generated point hhtory can be called upon, and that they have made additional effort to assure the recorders continue to track appropriatel In addition, the licensee is evaluating a modification to the recorders =

in wh1ch the ink pen will !:e replaced with a more reliable marker devic While observing surveillance testing of the 18 auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

pump, the senior resident inspector noted at least four pages were missing from the alarm response manual in the pump room. Other AFW pump alarm books were found with the proper alarm response procedures in place. The licensee promptly responded by replacing the missing pages and was conducting a survey of other alarm response books throughout the

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plant at the close of this inspection. The inspector will review the L results and will report on any further discrepancies in the next routine inspection repor I During the inspection, .the inspector identified a numb'er of compressed gas cylinders temporarily tied to a grill on a wall in the auxiliary 1 building. This. issue was raised for proper safety restraints and additional loading on the wall. The licensee promptly removed the cylinders and provided instructions to appropriate personnel about proper storage of~ compressed gas cylinder The inspector raised a concern about wipes for oil / water absorption around rotating machinery and that they could be picked up into the air inlets and affect the cooling of the equipment. The licensee provided information that the equipment operators and attendants have been instructed to be aware of this concern as part of their monitoring of ,

.the machinery and to correct any abnormalities if necessar '

In addition, throughout the inspection period, the inspectors identified a number of minor items, such as: a radiation technician in a very relaxed non-professional position while monitoring a control point; some isolated graffiti in the auxiliary building; miscellaneous tools and ,

equipment stored in disarray; a B0P instrument cabinet left open; B0P  !

RTD. dust covers removed or loose; a damaged RTD cable conduit; and a .!

temporary instrument left from the startup testing in the Unit 1 essential service water pump room. Each of these items were promptly corrected by the license During tours of' accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of-shift turnovers, general. safety items, etc. The specific areas ot, served were:

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Engineered Safety FeatureL(ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF s,ystems and components were inspected to i verify: valve positicn for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or FSAR; and the operability of support systems essential to system actuation or performance through ' observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, et Radiation protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration. *

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l The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area-(PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital i areas were kept locF and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitorin *

Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protectio On a few occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors i identified areas where the quality of housekeeping had declined, such as the Unit 1 condensate pump room and the 1A emergency diesel generator room. These were acknowledged through prompt action by !

the license On June 1, 1989, the station Material Condition and Housekeeping Coordinator gave a presentation to the resident inspectors on the ,

station's new housekeeping program. This program makes use of a l computer tracking system, written correspondence with individuals responsible for specific areas, a tagging system, statistical summaries to the Station Manager and a controlling administrative procedure that was being developed. The new system requires committee tours, inspector training, and required reading, and it interfaces with walkdowns by managemen The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers.

I shiftily logs and surveillance, daily orders, maintenance items, varia.s l

chemistry and radiological samples and analyses, third party review l results, overtime records, QA and/c r QC audit rcsults and postings l

} requirec per 10 CFR 19.1 No violations or deviations were identifie . MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(627031 4 Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to asctrtain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification s The following items were considered during this review: the limiting l conditions for operation were met while components or systems were i

removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved l procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or ,

calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems -

to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is

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l assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed: i Unit 1 Troubleshooting and repair of loop 1A OP(Delta)T reactor trip bistabl Unit 2 Troubleshooting / repair of ground on 125V DC bus ^12 WV A3101 Repair of. fuel injector for 2B diesel generator cylinder 9 ,

i The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of tim No violations or deviations were identifie i 8. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical l Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing  ;

was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test i instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirererts and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified

! during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne ;

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities: !

Unit 1 18wVS 5.2.f.3-2, Monthly ASME Surveillance Run of RHR Pump 18.

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{ 18wVS 0.5-3.AF.1-2, Rev. 2, ASME Surveillance for Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and "B" Train Auxiliary Feedwater Valves.

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Unit 2 2Bw0S 7.3.1-1, Component Cooling Water System Valve Lineup to  !

Safety-related Equipment Monthly Surveillanc Bwls 3.2.1-302, Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification / Calibration for Loops IF-0511,1F-513,1P-515 Steam

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l Generator IA Steam Flow / Feed Flow Mismatch Channel II Cabinet 2 (IPA 02J).

j No violations or deviations were identifie . Contractor Employee with Positive Drug Screen Test j On May 18, 1989, station management personnel informed the NRC personnel

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on site that a contractor employee had tested positive for cocaine during .

a routine physical exam. The individual's employment was promptly  !

terminated and his security badge was withdrawn from use, preventing his unescorted access to the site protected area. The individual was employed as a Work Analyst with Westinghouse Instrument Service Corporation (WISCO) where he prepared work request packages that required at least nine levels of review if they were safety-relate The individual was interviewed by the Quality First organization and the WISCO project manager; he stated that no one else was involved in his activitie Licensee personnel further added that there was no evidence of abnormal behavior by the individua Concurrent with the finding, on May 17, 1989, an anonymous female caller  !

contacted the station and reported that the individual was involved with drugs and that she was seeking hel i Licensee personnel are following up on any other possible leads such as i the possibility of other individuals involved, frequency of physical exams with respect to dates of the allegations, etc. Licensee management .

personnel committed to inform the NRC of any new information that may I become availabl !

This information was relayed to Region III security personnel on May 19, .i 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . Li_censee Medical Drill During the evening of May 25, 1989, the resident inspectors coserved an emergency preparedness drill irvolving site personnal and local firemen and paramedics. The drill involved the response to a simulated gasoline pump fire within the site protected area concurrent with tending to a worker with a contaminated injury. The onsite fire brigade and local fire departments responded quickly and effectively to the fir Radiological technicians and local paramedics promptly treated the irdured worker while taking appropriate measures to avoid spre6 ding contaminatio No violations or deviations were identifie !

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11. Eyaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)

Nglear Safety - Quarterly Review Meeting j On June 1, 1989, the senior resident inspector attended the Offsite 1

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Nuclear Safety Quarterly Review meeting. The inspector noted that !

the appropriate personnel were present and that the discussions were ,

relevant to nuclear safety. The inspector noted an effort'for j consistency between stations in reporting matter ;

l 1 No violations or deviations were identifie . OSHA Related-Activities l

On June 6, 1989, a contractor painter fell about 12 feet.from a platform in the overhead of the turbine building. The individual received a broken leg and a dislocated shoulder. He was promptly removed from the site via a Braidwood fire department ambulance to St. Joseph hospital in Joliet, Illinois. After the individual was removed, the inspectors observed the scene of the accident and interviewed the licensee safety '

personnel. The licensee verified that the contractor (Midway) would

investigate the accident with assistance from the licensee. The licensee ,

also stated that an OSHA 200 log would be completed by the contractor and !

submitted as required. The licensee will provide a copy of the report to the resident inspectors when it is completed. The. inspector discussed the accident in a telephone conversation with Mr. Jim Foster, NRC Region III OSHA Coordinator, and it was agreed.that no further action was required at this tim Ne violations or deviations were identifie . Training Effectiveness (41400, 41701)

The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed ,

personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the !

licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and !

. operational activities and during the review of the ' licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period. Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of trainin No violations or deviations were identifie . Report Review During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for May 1989. The inspector confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Report for April 198 No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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15.- Meetings an'd Other Activities (30702)

Management / Plant Status Meeting A routine management meeting was held at the Braidwood Station on May 19,

, 1989, .between NRC and Coninonwealth Edison representatives. The NRC-contingent was led by Mr. W. D. Shafer, Chief, Region III,. Division of -

Reactor Projects, Branch 1, and included Mr.' J. M. Hinds, Jr.,~ Chief, Region III Division of Reactor Projects, Section 1A, and the resident inspectors. The licensee contingent was headed by Mr. G. Masters, Assistant Superintendent for Operations and included a number of station ,

and corporate staff members. The subjects discussed were plant status, '

LERs, recent reactor trips, lifted leads on the. boron dilution prevention system,.the Augmented Inspection team which investigated apparent or perceived inattentiveness, and other matters of common interes !

No violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information'is required l in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or i deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 6 of this repor !

17. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in I paragraph i during the inspection period and at the. conclusion of the inspection on June 15, 1989. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed'the likely centent of this

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inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection {

could-be censidered proprietary in r.atur !

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