ML20246H853
| ML20246H853 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1989 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246H847 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905160210 | |
| Download: ML20246H853 (21) | |
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p 9-V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
- l. STATUS OF CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW, HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES AND SIMILARITY REVIEW REMAINING ISSUES NAY 1. 1989 t
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY Status Of Control Room Design Review, Human Engineering Discrepancies -i And Similarity Review l Remaining Issues 1.0 Control Room Surveys 1.1 Ambient Noise Survey 1.2 HVAC Surveys 1.3- Indicator Light Bulb Survey 1.4 Cumulative Effects HED Operator Survey Evaluation Status
' 1 2.0 Unit 1/2 Control Room Similarity Review 2.1 Control Room. Layout 2.2 Similarity Review 3.0 Status Of Unit One Control Room Design Review As Applied To ,
Unit Two 3.1 Human Engineering Discrepancies Completed 3.2 Human Engineering Discrepancies In Process of Being Completed 3.3 Cummulative Effects HEDs
.3.4 New Category 4A HED - No~ Action '
4.0 Control Room Modifications b
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,1. 0 Control Room Surveys 1.1 Ambient Noise Survey This survey was completed on Unit 1 and 2 after Unit 2 fuel load. Results were as follows:
Ambient Noise Unit 1 Unit 2 Ambient Sound Level: 59 db 58 db :
Annunciator Alann Reset Bell: 80 db 80 db t s QMCB Section A Annunciator Tone: 64 db 62 db QMCB Section B Annunciator Tone: 62 db 63 db QMCB Section C Annunciator Tone: 64 db 63 db QEAB Annunciator Tone: 64 db 67 db QHVC Annunciator Tone: 59 db - 64 db Three previous Human Engineering Discrepancies were resolved:
HED 1321 - Background noise (60 db) may impair verbal communication between two points in the primary operating area.
Removal of a temporary wall and ventilation modifications decreased the ambient noise level below 60 db. No further action is planned.
r HED 1322 - The annunciator alarm tones may not permit operators to reliably discern them above the ambient control !
room noise. The main control board alarms are less than + 10 db above ambient noise levels.
Alarms are 3 to 9 db above background, except for the Unit 1 QHVC panel (a back panel). The QHVC alarm ,
will be raised to the same range by May 30, 1989.
Although the other alarms are below the + 10 db guideline, they are clearly audible. Operators complained of the Ligh noise level interfering with communications when alarms were at the + 10 db level. We intend to maintain sound levels in this range + 3 to + 9 f
db to avoid degrading operator performance.
HED 1323 - The annunciator reset bell sound level ( 85 db) exceeds l
the guideline nominal value of + 10 db above ambient.
l HED 1323 was categorized as a level 3 (easy to correct) and the bell was muffled to 80 db. No operator complaints have been received.
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1.2 HVAC Surveys l'. 2.1 Temperature and humidity surveys were performed in March 1989 after the Unit 1/2 control room ventilation was in a normal configuration. The results were:
TEMPERATURE *F(dry bulb) HUMIDITY %
CONTROL RANGE MAX MIN RANGE Unit 1 72 - 74 79 72 45 - 66 Unit 2 74 - 76 81 69 46 - 70 The max and min values were due to transient conditions during equipment testing; the control range indicates the normal temperature range. These data are for consecutive 7 day recordings in each control room.
These results are slightly below the NUREG 0700 temperature guidelines; however, the two control room areas have separate thermostats which are used by the operators to adjust temperature at their discretion within the Technical Specification limits.
In a spot survey of eight operators, two wanted the rooms cooler, two wanted warmer, and four were satisfied. Given the individual <
variation in this comfort assessment, and the temperature control option the operators have, no further action is planned on temperature control.
1.2.2 Survey of control room personnel revealed a ventilation problem at the fire alarm computer station, which is normally continuously manned by a Fire Protection Technician. A large supply duct at the Process Control Panel (QPCP) behind the Main Control Board (QMCB) creates a floor level draft at that workstation.
Five of five technicians cited the draft as a major discomfort.
The workstation will be reconfigure by August 1989. If that does not correct the condition, an engineering modification ;
I to the duct work will be it.itiated.
1.3 INDICATOR LIGHT BULB SURVEY A survey of the control p?nels was conducted to identify any )
safety related indicators which have a single light bulb indication, such that a burned out bulb could be misinterpreted as a false indication of equipment status. The following items were identified:
Refueling k'ater Storage Tank Safety Injection Test light ZL-40135 ;
Centrifugal Charging Pump Lube Oil Pump 'ON' light ZL-40136 Lockout Handswitches for 8 valves, nonna11y off lights Diesel Generator Sync Permissive lights (2)
Diesel Generator ' Droop' Mode light ESF Buss Voltage Indicator Lights Containment Hydrogen Monitor status lights Control Room Isolation Reset Handswitch indicator light HS-12195b/12196b l
.1. 3.1 'The refueling water storage tank safety injection test light indicates the status of a safety injection signal allowing semiautomatic swapover of the emergency cooling pump suctions to the containment .
sump following a design basis loss of coolant accident. This l
-signal status.is also available on another light box indication )
and the function is backed up by a specific annunciator.to trigger operator actions in the emergency operating procedures. Since this. indicator is designed to support testing rather than operation, and given the redundant indications and triggers for operator actions, no action is planned on this item.
1.3.2' The aux 111ary lube oil pumps for the centrifugal charging pumps are not required for emergency operation. The oil pumps prelube the bearings to reduce wear in normal operation. Since the oil pumps have no safety function and normal operation is supported by an operator locally inspecting the pumps and starting the oil pumps, no' action is planned on this item. .
1.3.3 Eight emergency cooling valves have lockout switches which are nomally off to prevent erroneous valve operations. The lockout is turned 'on' to pemit valve operation. Since the lockout light is redundant with the adjacent handswitch position and the loss of indicator bulb would not affect valve operation, no action is planned.
1.2 4 The diesel generator synchronizing permissive lights indicate matched phase angles allowing closure of the emergency diesel generator output breaker to the emergency electrical bus when offsite power is available. The sync permissive light has no function during nomal or emergency automatic operation of the diesel, and manual operation is supported by an adjacent syncroscope meter. Based on these features, no action is planned on this .
item.
1.3.5 The 'DR00P' mode light indicates that the emergency diesel generator
- frequency regulator is set up to operate the diesel in parallel with offsite power for testing. In :tandby status and in emergency operation the reguletor operates in a ' UNIT mode without offsite power. The indication does not affect automatic diesel Operation in the event of a loss of offsite power or a safety injection.
In either case the diesel will start and automatically shift to the ' UNIT' mode. The oporator monitors diesel operation using the voltage and frequency meters on the panel, not this light. No action is planned on this item.
.I 1.3.6 Bus potential lights indicate the presence of phase voltage and control power for emergency power supplies. Although each bulb is a single indicator there are two or three for each buss, continuously lit when the buss is energized. Bus voltage is also available using a panel voltmeter. Since these lights are normally lit, are redundant, and have no active function, no action is planned.
1.3.7 The containment. hydrogen monitor status lights are operating mode lights which show the operating state of these monitors.
The indicators follow control switch positions on the same panel and have no operating function. No further action is planned.
1.3.8 The control room isolation (CRI) reset handswitches are used to override and reset a control room isolation signal. The light comes on when a control room isolation signal is present and the handswitch is moved to reset. If no actuation signal is still present, the light then goes out. This indication is only used for testing and during restoration to a normal lineup after a control room isolation has occurred. If the lamp burned out, the operator should notice the malfunction when the switch was reset (i.e. the light would not come on).
If the operator missed that, an alarm condition would continue on the main control board to alert the operator to the uncleared CRI signal. Based on lack of operational impact for bulb failure, opportunity for operator detection of burnout, and alarm status )
to detect a reset failure, no action is planned on this item.
1.4 CUMULATIVE EFFECTS HED OPERATOR SURVEY _ EVALUATION STATUS 1.4.1 HED's With Additional Corrective Action Indicated 1038 The left hand corner of panel 181 is too crowded, and there is no direct indication for the SG blowdown valves (HS-7603 A, B, C, D). This indicator is on the QPCP.
Problems with steam generator blowdown operation were reported by 36% of the operators. The problems were with the control valves being on a back panel with the isolation valves in front. The procedures address this and good perfonnance has been achieved. Verification of blowdown isolation was not a problem since those valves are on the main board. No action is planned to modify the Control Room; however, the survey indicated a problem in communication when transferring control from a field panel. A change to the communications system is being processed to add communications at the blowndown panel. This change will be installed oefore or during the 1990 refueling outage for each unit.
1103 Blue light on RCP lift oil pump does not have a legend describing blue light function.
' 21% of the operators felt a label for this light would I be useful. We have added a light legend to the handswitch engraving.
1222 In the event of a reactor trip, the tile associated with the event illuminates. Other tiles illuminate, counter to 0700.
Ten percent of operator surveys indicated a problem with this annunciator. Engineering work is in progress to provide a separate acknowledge / reset control for this annunciator, since some comments concerned the loss of first out data when the other annunciators sharing a control were reset. This change should largely alleviate the problem. Since this annunciator provides the primary J operator information on the occurrence of a Safety Injection j after reactor trip, in support of the Emergency Operating )
Procedures, no further action is planned, beyond the individual l control. The modified control will be installed before l or during the 1990 refueling outage for Unit 2 and 1991 for Unit 1.
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1223 ~ There .is no . turbine trip first out. Turbine trips.on
' ALB19 and ALB20 are not first out annunciators, as. recommended in 0700.
Fifty percent thought a turbine. trip first-out annunciator would be a benefit but.some pointed out that the ' turbine
. Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) panel in the control room
.c also provides this information on' a back panel. . Since the cause of a turbine trip-is not' needed immediately to 4 establish stable control of the reactor plant, the back' j panel location is sufficient. However, this infomation .
is not used' effectively. The reactor trip review procedure was' revised to collect turbine first-out' trip data from the back.EHC panel if a turbine trip causes a reactor trip.
1226 There is.no silence feature in the annunciator- system, as distinct from acknowledge.
The lack of an alarm silence feature was cited in 50%
of survey results as a problem. The high noise level set to achieve the NUREG-0700 guidelines coupled with the large number of alarms after a plant trip makes this a significant distraction to the operators. However, many feel that' the ability to silence back panel alarms would increase the probability of not following up on an alam condition. A silence feature-is being considered.
A prototype is installed in the. simulator to silence all
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alarms for 45 seconds each time the silence button is pushed. After 45 seconds the audible alarms return.
This trial will be evaluated by operator survey-and an implementation decision made by August 1989. If implemented, completion will be during 1990 refueling outage for Unit 2 and 1991 for Unit 1.
.1237 The ERF computer does not provide a sequential history file of operator entries available upon request.
This feature was desired by 21% in the operator survey, !
but evaluation of amplifying remarks showed that they were actually wanting more saved or pre-fomated ERF trend displays for operator callup. A software change was made to provide an expanded menu of preformated trends, and to sale a display for later recall.
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1240 The proteus operating procedure 13504-1, Rev. O does not
' describe the overall computer system, and the computer l
system components with which the operator can interface.
Twenty-one percent of operators reported problem' s with the Proteus computer operating procedure. The problems stem from the brief treatment of normal operations in the procedure, and the relatively difficult operator interface software. The procedure has been revised to address these problems.
' 1250 Multiple ERF page considerations,.when pages are organized in a hierarchical fashion, containing different paths through a series, a visual audit trail of the choices made are not available upon operator request.
This feature was desired by 21% in the operator survey, but evaluation of amplifying remarks showed that they were actually wanting more saved or pre-fomated ERF trend displays for operator callup. A software change was made to provide an expanded menu of preformated trends and to 'save' a display for later recall.
1259 The impulse pressure indicators PI-505/506 on 181 are difficult to locate. They are in an area of many similar
- instruments.
Fifty percent expressed difficulty in locating the turbine impulse pressure indicators. This meter pair was marked with a white (black letter) label to highlight it from the surrounding black labels. Since this is the only such white label on the panel it serves to help visually locate the instruments.
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1.4.2 HEDs With Additional Evaluation Indicated 1040 HS-5208, HS-5209 & FIC/FI-4499 are not in close proximity '
to the main feed pumps.
Problems were reported by 28% of operators, specifically with main feed pump speed controls, the transfer from manual to automatic control, and the slight difference in A and B instrument arrangement. The speed control / transfer problems are actually related to' operating procedures which were revised to clarify speed control / transfer.
The arrangement of instruments cannot be modified since
'the board is full. No further action is scheduled.
1047 The set-point knobs for the controllers do not have directional markings.
The problems operators expressed with controller potentiometer settings (42%) were not related to the lack of a directional arrow but to a broader problem of controller conventions.
A " process" convention was chosen in the CRDR; the "UP" button and a higher potentiometer setting should increase the process parameter (level, temperature, etc.) being controlled. Since' this characteristic is not visible v at the board, the DCRDR procest was not able to verify conversion / correction. Based on the survey results, there may be multiple problems in this area. An engineering study is underway to verify and correct the implementation of a " process" controller convention. All corrections will be complete during the 1990 refueling outages.
1114 One CCW & NSCW pump light is normally off (MLB) in a block of "0N" lights for SI. R0's prefer this as it gives status of ESF for all pumps on MLB. The alternative is to delete the 3rd pump light (2 normally start).
Only 14% felt that this was confusing or caused misinterpretation.
However, since these are used to facilitate rapid eva k ation of a safety injection, a review was conducted to determine the technical feasibility and cost cf replacing the three light dit. play with a 2 of 3 logic for a system status light. Tnis was feasible for less than $10,000 per unit.
This change will be completed by the end of the 1990 refueling outage for Unit 2 and 1991 for Unit 1.
. '1244 System status' feedback,.the proteus does.not provide feedback to the operator as to computer system status (i.e. run, stop, failed,online).
Sixty-Four percent _of the survey indicated a problem with this. The Proteus fails with the' current display; data is not updated and the clock on screen stops changing..
The failure is not obvious until the clock error is noticed or some operator input is attempted. By contrast the ERF computer screen blanks out after a 15 second interruption of computer data. An Engineering review to develop a
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computer failure indication found no easy way to implement this function with programming. This computer system will be replaced eventually to correct this HED and upgrade-control room computer capabilities.
1282 All annunciators should be' recorded on hard copy and where multi-input annunciators.are used an alarm printout should identify the individual alam inputs in the alarm condition.
Only 39% felt such a feature would be beneficial. Others cited problems with noise, printer reliability, and review time against.such a feature.
An engineering review detemined that hard copy capability:
- would require almost complete system replacement for approximately-
$1.1 million. Since this function is already provided for reactor protection alarms by the Proteus computer typer, no further action is planned.
1318 The following parameters, as identified in the ICCR, are not indicated in the control room: 1) RCP seal INJ temp,
- 4) Spent fuel pool level, 5) Spent fuel cooling water flow. ,
Ten percent of operator surveys indicated a desire for control room indication of spent fuel pool level. However no spent fuel was present and the pool was drained, so the desire was strictly . hypothetical', not based ~on actual operations. An engineering review was perfomed to determine the technical feasibility of providing a control room display of this level. This addition would require extensive plant modification'to add sensors and wiring, totaling
$140,000. Since a spent fuel pool level alarm'is already located in the ccatrol room, there is no operational need for a level indication. No further action is planned.
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'2.0 UNIT 1/2 CONTROL ROOM SIMILARITY REVIEW
, 2.1 CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT Vogtle Units 1 and 2 share a common Control Room. The controls in both units are essentially identical with minor differences as described in the following:
The Unit 2 Main Control Board (QMCB) is a rotated image of the Unit 1 Main Control Board. On sections A, B, and C of the Main Control Board the left-right relationship for all the controls ,
and displays is identical. This identical relationship for !
the A, B, and C section includes the board layout and labeling.
The one exception to identical layout on the Main Control Board is the D section. The D section was a backfit after the control room design was completed and floor space did not allow an identical arrangement. Section D contains the same equipment on both units (RVLIS, PSMS, and Main Steam Bypass Isolation Valves).
Section D is on the left end of section A on Unit 1 and to the right of section B on Unit 2. This requires looking left on Unit 1 and right on Unit 2 to verify that the Main Steam Bypass Isolation Valves are shut on a Main Steam Isolation. There should be no impact on routine unit operation.
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The rest of the Unit 2 Control Boards appear as if the Unit 1 Boards were moved west. Their appearance on Unit 2 are the same as on Unit 1 if your are standing in front of them. The Electrical Auxiliary board (QEAB) appears somewhat different from the center of the Control Room. In Unit 1 it is over the right shoulder and in Unit 2 it is over the left shoulder.
This requires a slightly different scanning pattern during immediate operator action in the E0Ps but should have no impact on unit operation. The high voltage section of the QEAB is different to reflect the differences in the switchyards but the Unit 2 inplant. distribution systems appear identical to Unit 1. The common distribution system is on the Unit 1 QEAB.
The QPCP (Process Control Pawel) and QHYC (Ventilation Panel) in Unit 2 do not have the shared system controls located on Unit 1. These systems (fire pumps, river make-up, auxiliary boiler, etc.) are controlled by the Unit 1 crew in support of both units, 1
- d security wall was erected through the center of the common control room to separate Unit 1 from Unit 2 when Unit 1 Security went into effect. Original plans were for this wall to be removed when Unit 2 Security went into effect. Much of the wall was left to provide Unit separation and reduce inter-unit noise.
The wall has been opened on the Shift Supervisors station, near the south door, and behind the QPCP.
Plant Computers The plant computer (PROTEUS and ERF) terminals are in mirror image locations. The PROTEUS computer function is different in that no common inputs go to Unit 2. The ERF computer is identical except that the common radiation monitors and weather data are displayed only on Unit 1.
2.2 SIMILARITY REVIEk A detailed similarity review was conducted visually by comparing slides of Unit 1 with Unit 2. The review included but was not limited to the following:
a) Labels b) Size of labels c) Hierarchial vs. non-hierarchial labels d) Infomation and abbreviations used on labels e) Infomation presented by ALB's, ZLB's Group Monitor Lights, etc.
f) Physical layout of meters, recorders, controllers, ALB's, alarms, etc.
g) Meter scales and markings h) Comparison of handswitch types
- 1) Comparison of operator aids j) Color coding as pertains to escutcheon plates Nire minor differences were fodnd involving labels,16. Press vs. pressure, HDR vs Header. These were determined to be minor in nature and no action is planned. In addition, twenty-eight differences in alarm panels (ALB) were observed. After checking procedures and P & ID's it was determined that the differet:ces were due to field hardware differences, no action is planned.
Some differences were identified due to Unit 1 HED implementation not complete on Unit 2 at that time. For a list of differences that were not an HED or a minor label or ALB difference, refer to Appendix 1.
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,3. 0 STATUS OF UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW AS APPLIED TO UNIT 2 3.1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES COMPLETE A Control Room walkdown was conducted to verify that previously identified Unit 1 HED's were applied to Unit 2. All but 35 !
Unit 1 HED corrections had been incorporated on Unit 2. Twenty two HEDs are in the process of correction (Appendix 2). Ten category 4 HEDs have no committed schedule for action, and may be worked in the future (Appendix 3). HED 1120, for additional phones at field panels, will be corrected in conjunction with HED 1038 (Section 1.4.1). Two HEDs 1196 and 1265 have no action planned (See section 3.4).
1 3.2 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES IN PROCESS OF BEING COMPLETED The remaining 22 Unit 1 HED's will be applied to Unit 2 by the following schedule:
14 Maintenance Work Order Items By August 1989 2 Procedure Items By August 1989(1233,1234) 1 Software Revision By December 1989 (1236) 5 Maintenance And Engineering Items By The End Of The First Unit 2 Refueling (or before), (1048, 1148, 1221, 1236, 1320) 3.3 CUMMULATIVE EFFECTS HEDs Additional review of HEDs with no previously planned corrective action identified additional action planned for five HEDs (1038, 1222, 1226, 1047, 1114). See Section 1.4 for details.
i 3.4 NEW CATEGORY 4A HED - NO ACTION Two HEDs were reviewed and determined to be insignificant; no action is planned.
1196 This HED was to add an auto start of boric acid transfer pumps when emergency boration valves are opened. The i two step process to (pan the valve and start the pump ;
is covered in training and no operator prcblems have been i noted in the simulator. Modification to the control system i would be complex and expensive. No action is warranted.
i 1265 Anti glare screens will not be installed on CRTs in the main control panel. No seismic glare screen vendor was located, and glare on the two screens has not been a problem l due to the lighting design. No action is planned.
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, 4.0 CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATIONS I l
L Plant procedures and practices are in place to' ensure that future control modifications preserve human factors considerations in the current design and avoid the introduction of new Human Engineering Discrepancies.
Modifications !
Control room modifications are controlled by Plant Administrative Procedure 00400-C " Plant Design Control" and Engineering implementing Procedure 50007-C " Engineering Review of Design Change Packages".
Procedure 50007-C requires all design changes which may affect human factors considerations to be evaluated using the checklist provided as Data Sheet 15 of procedure 50007-C. This check is perfonned by responsible plant engineers to ensure the guidelines of NUREG-0700 are maintained. The checklist is used to screen for changes in the operator interface and to compare the change to the appropriate section of NUREG-0700.
The human factors review of changes extends beyond the Control Room. All changes to operator interfaces are reviewed against NUREG-0700. Since many field and some Control Room situations are not covered by NUREG-0700, other human factors guidelines published by the Electric Power Research Institute are used as seconaary standards.
Unit Differences Georgia Power's policy is to maintain the Unit I and 2 plants in the same configuration. Design changes developed for either Unit will generally be implemented on both Units.
. . l GEORGIA POWER COMPANY APPENDIX 1 UNIT DIFFERENCES FOUND DURING SIMILARITY REVIEW UNIT 1 UNIT 2 D RECOMMEN~ATION/ STATUS Group 4 Monitor Lights Blacked Out OK, Equipmer.t not Train A & B, Cubes monitored on Unit 2.
A14. B14 & C14 are er.g raved.
No covers Plastic covers on U-1 will install the following: covers following 2HS-12111A Engineering review.
2HS-12111B 2HS-12113A 2HS-12113B 2HS-12126 2HS-12127 2HS-12114
, 2HS-12115 1-ZLB2 Blank OK, U-2 has a different Monitor lights model turning gear without 5.1 and 5.2 main these lights. No action feed pump turning unless U-1 gear requires gear status replacement.
Panel Al has two Switches These switches will be spare handswitches removed. Holes removed on Unit 1.
abandoned in place. blanked.
Boron injection Blanied OK This equipment not Tank pressure installed in Unit 2 indicator on A2 panel
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY APPENDIX 2 UNIT 1 HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES
,, IN PROCESS OF BEING COMPLETED ON UNIT 2 HED- CATE-HED DESCRIPTION GORY PROPOSED RESOLUTION STATUS NUMBER ORIGIN 1020 1982 PRELIMINARY THE ALARMS ON THE QEAB 02 ADJUST TO DIFFERElli NEW HORNS IN.
AND QMCB PANELS SOUND TONES. ADD HORNS TO ONE NEEDS
'CRDR (HED 237).
0FF WITH THE SAME TONE. MCB A AND B FOR THEIR READJUSTED.
PR 70. 0700 (6.3.2.1) AND THERE ARE NO ANNUNCIATORS.
DIRECTIONAL CUES FOR THE ALARMS ON THE QMCB.
1048 1982 PRELIMINARY COLOR CODING HAS NOT 03 ADD GREEN BAND TO MWO - FIRST BEEN UTILIZED TO DE- METER FACE. REFUELING CRDR (HED 406)
FINE NORMAL LIMITS FOR OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS.
1070' ANTHROP 0 METRIC ANNUNCIATORS ARE AB0VE 03 MILL ANNUNCIATOR HOODS QEAB MISSED.
THE RECOMMENDED HEIGHT ON QPCP. QHVC AND THE MWO SUBMITTED.
SURVEY (AS-12)
FOR VERTICAL BOARDS, QEAB TO EXPOSE THE LOWER LINE OF ENGRAVING. NOT NEEDED ON QMCB DUE THE TILT OF THE ANNUNCIATORS FRAMES.
GENERAL PANEL NO LEGEND EXIST AS TO 03 LABEL LIGHTS TO INDl'- DONE. NEEDS 1105 CHECKLIST FUNCTION OF LIGHT ON CATE FUNCTION REVISION IN HANDSWITCH(3 WHITE SPACING LIGHTS).
TA SCENARIO 5A PCP A?_ ARM HORN IS NOT 03 ADJUST PITCH TO DIF- DONE. NEEDS 11El NOTICED UNTIL FRONT FERENTIATE READJUSTMENT.
(NUREG0700 MWO SUBMITTED 6.3.2.2.) MCB ALARMS ARE SILENCED.
NEEDS MORE DISTINCTIVE SOL 9D.
TA E 0 STEF METER APPEARS TO BE LOG 03 NARK METER FACE TO TO ENGINEERING.
1148 14 RNO SCALE. 80 GPM IS NOT SHOW 80 GPM. [1-FI-0930) 1990 OUTAGE CLEARLY' INDICATED.
03 PAIN 1 BLUE PEN RED AND MWO SUBMIT 1CD 1149 TA 27A STEP 6 BLUE PEN ON BACK OF FRC.1 RECORDER IS INVISIBLE. RED PEN BLUE CHANGE INK PUT RED PEN IN BACK. BLUE COLORS AND RECORDER IN FRONT. R0 MISTOOK WIDE LEGEND Plate.
RANGE FOR UPPER HEAD SCALES. CONSIDER NAME CHANGE.
4 HED CATE-NUMBER ORIGIN HED DESCRIPTION GORY PROPOSED RESOLUTION STATUS 1156 TA SCENARIO 25A FULL. DYNAMIC, AND 03 POST MIMIC AND NORMAL IN PLACE.
TST FRC.1 STP6 UPPER SCALE LEVELS DYNAMIC VALVES. MIMIC OPS TO ADD ARE CONFUSING. SUP- IS ON PSMS. STARTUP DATA PLEMENT RECORDER LABEL BY AUG. 1989 WITH RX VESSEL DIAGRAM.
CONSIDER 0 BASE REFERENCE FOR FULL & UPPER SCALE.
THIS IS ALSO A TRAINING ITEM. POST NORMALS FOR
<4RCP.
1165 TA SCENARIO 11A VALVES WITH LOCKOUTS 03 ADD " LOCK OUT" OR OPS WORKING E-1 STEP 17 CAN NOT BE READILY SYMBOL CODE TO HS BY AUG. 19B9 IDENTIFIED. PLATE ADD " LOCK DUT" MANIPULATIONS TO PRDCEDURES.
1210 COMMUNICATION INADVERTENT PUSHING OF 03 GUARD TEST BUTTON PARTS ARRIVED.
SURVEY BY DAN TEST BUTTON DURING WITH FLIP UP COVER. MWO SUBMITTED NIELSON CASUALTY DISRUPTS OPERATIONS AND DISTRACTS ALL OPERATORS MOMENTARILY.
1221 ENG, QUEST 10NAIRE. MANUAL CONTROL ACTIONS 03 REVISE CONTROLLER TO MOST DONE.
HED 1141 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH LET "UP" BUTTON RAISE ENGINEERING REVIEW POPULATIONAL STERE 0 TYPES. THE PROCESS PARAMETER IN PROGRESS TO TRAINING, AND INDUSTRY IN PROCESS CONTROLS AND VERIFY & CORRECT CONVENTIONS. SOME CONTROL- OPEN VLY IN VLV CONTRLS. ERRORS ,
LERS RAISE THE PARAMETER LABEL CLEARLY INDICATE ON PUSHING THE "UP" ARROWS, PROCESS OR VLV CONTROL.
SOME DECREASE. LABELING 15 SPLYNT DEMAND INDICATION SOMETIMES MISLEADING. WITH"0 PEN" OR OTHER INDI-CATION. MANUAL CONTROL OVERRIDE OR AUT0/
NUREG 0700 ANNUNCIATOR CONTROLS ON 03 COLOR CODE THE ANNUN- PARTS ARRIVED 1227 CIATOR CONTROLS WITH MWO WRITTEN.
(6.3.4.2.) THE QPCP & QHVC ARE NOT COLOR CODED DISTINCTIVELY. AN ORANGE THAT IS OF A QMCB USE WHITE. DIFFERENT SHADE NOT TO BE CONFUSED FROM SWITCHES, BUT PCP & WITH SAFETY INJECTION HVC HAVE ALL CONTROLS WHITE. SYSTEM COLOR.
AND QEAB 15 MOSTLY BLACK.
NUREG 0700 QHVC METER BEZEL THICK- 03 SPACE UPPER LABELS OUT OPS WORKING -
1229 (6.6.2.1.) NESS FOR UPPER R0W OF WITH " PLASTIC STOCK MWO WRITTEN.
METERS.
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l HED CATE-STATUS j NUMBER ORIGIN HED DESCRIPTION GORY PROPOSED RESOLUTION i
1233 OPERATING EXPER- DURING E0P VALIDATION 02 ADD THE S.G. DISCRE - OPS WORKING.
IENCE REVIEW #33 AT SUMMER #1 A DIS- PANCY TO THE OPERATOR CREPANCY WAS OBSERVED TRAINING PROGRAM AND j LER-395-84037 BETWEEN THE S.G. WIDE PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR l RANGE AND NARROW RANGE CORRECTING ' COLD' CALI-
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LEVEL INDICATIONS AT BRATED TO CORRESPONDING q i
1001 S.G. LEVEL. THIS HOT PLANT STEAM GENERATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN EX- LEVELS. IN THE PLANT DATA PECTED RESPONSE. BUT WAS BOOK.
NOT COVERED IN OPR TRN.
DATA BOOK HAS NO CON-VERSIONS.
SER 78-B3 COMMENT #3 02 ESTABLISH ADMINIS- DONE. NEEDS 1234 OPERATING EXPERIENCE REMOVING ALARM INPUTS TRATIVE CONTROLS FOR IMPROVEMENT.
REVIEW #14 FROM PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVAL OF COMPUTER PERMITTED THE PLANT TO ALARMS BY THE OPERATOR.
OPERATE OUTSIDE ESTAB- ADD TO ANNUNCIATOR STATUS LISHED UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURE.
WARNING THE OPERATOR.
NO ADMIN CONTROLS EXIST FOR REMOVAL ALARM POINTS. l g
OPERATOR / COMPUTER 03 ERF COMPUTER AND ERF DONE.
1236 CONTROL ROOM DIALOGUE COMPUTER OUTPUT PROTEUS COMPUTER USE CORRECT PROTEUS COMPUTER SURVEY N.R. 0700 6.7.1.2. TEXT USES ABBREVIATIONS ABBREVIATIONS TO MATCH BY DEC. 1989.
AND CONTRACTIONS AND OTHER PLANT NOMENCLATURE.
SHOULD BE AVOIDED. AND MAXIMIZE INFORMATION IN ONE PRINT LINE. BOTH WILL BE REVIEWED FOR CONSISTENCY WITH PLANT ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYM LIST. l COMPUTER KEY BOARDS 03 REMOVE EXTRANEOUS KEYS OPS WORKING BY 1239 COMPUTER SURVEY H.R. 0700 6.7.1,4. USE EXTRANEOUS KEYS AND AND BLANK OVER H0LES. AUG.1989 SYMBOLS. PROTEUS (UNUSED KEYS & SYMBOLS) ERF (VIDEOCOPY) 1288 OPERATOR QUESTION- SOME MAIN CONTROL BOARD 03 REPLACE INDICATOR LENS / MOST DONE WINDOW WITH NEW NON- MWO WRITTEN AIRE 0080-12 & I @ICATOR LENS WERE DAMAGED BY THE teSE OF A GLARE PART. FOR 10.
0028-26 CLEANING SOLVEh! AND ARE NOW DIFFICULT TO READ.
)
l HED CATE-NUK3ER ORIGIN HED DESCRIPTION GCgY, PROPOSED RESOLUTION STATUS 1313 QUESTIONNAIRE HS-90178. THE RWST 02 RELOCATE HAND SWITCH. THIS WILL BE
- 0068-02-01 SUPPLY TO CNMT SPRAY ONE SPACE 10 THE RIGHT. CORRECTED WITH PUMP-B IS ONE SPACE TO A MIMIC FLOW PATH THE LEFT COMPARED TO BY AUGUST 1989.
TRAIN A LAYOUT. MOVING THE HAND SWITCH DNE SPACE TO THE RIGHT WOULD IMPROVE THE TRAIN SEPARATION AND MAKE THE LLYOUT MORE CONSISTENT.
1320 CONTROL ROOM POSITION INDICATION 01 CHANGE LIGHT COLORS ON SAFETY RELATED EXPERIENCE COLORS ON CONTROLLERS ON VALVE CONTROLLERS $0 ITEMS DONE. REVIEWING ARE INCONSISTENT IN S0 THAT THE DOWN BUTTON TEMPERATURE CONTROL-MAINTAINING A DOWN, SHUT,
- SHUT r GREEN AND UP = LERS. CAT 2 ITEMS.
GREEN CONVENTION. OPEN = RED. DELETE THE BY END 1989 WITH COLOR ON NON VALVE HED 1221.
CONTROLLERS AND TIC PROCESS CONTROLLERS WITH POSITION IND. ON PR0 CESS CONTROLLERS WITH OUT IND MAINTAIN RED =0 PEN
- REGARDLESS 1322 NUREG 0700 ANNUNCIATOR SOUND 03 ADJUST. DNE FAILED LEVEL <+10 db AB0VE RETEST. MWO (3.1.1.a)
BACKGROUND WRITTEN. SEE SECTION 1.1 1326 NUREG 0700 PROCEDURES ARE NOT 03 PLACE VENDOR INSTRUCT INSTRUCTIONS IN SEC. 6.2.1.5.c ESTABLISHED OR POSTED IN CONTROL ROOM. MCR. LABEL ON ORDER.
FOR USE OF THE FIXED BASE TRANSCEIVER.
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1 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY APPENDIX 3 l CATEGORY 4 HEDs j NO ACTION SCHEDULED i
1039 Main feed pump oil pressure meter location - These may be relocated if engineering review approves the deletion of other instruments l- on the main control board (feedwater nozzle delta temperature).
1052 Multipoint recorder replacement - will be replaced at end of and service life.
1112 1055 Ink cartridge replacement - cartridge system is substituted on a case by case basis during maintenance.
1128 Nuisance alarms - Engineering review is in progress to correct.
1140 Proteus alarm computer CRT controls location. This display is not used. Alams now go to a printer. No action is planned
- < until computer replacement.
1152 Low air pressure to containment alam is not currently planned.
There is already a low pressure air header alam and an alam if a containment isclation occurs, cutting - off air to containment.
All equipment in containment fails safe on loss of air. No further action is scheduled.
1268 Proteus computer graphics rewrite will not be perfomed. This system will be replaced eventually.
1290 Air compressor handswitch replacement - none planned.
1311 PERMS radiation detection computer printer deletion is planned.
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