ML20247A107

Emergency Planning.* Provides Info Re Problem of Summer Beach Population in Plant Area Resorts Not Being Protected During Radiological Emergency.Related Correspondence

ML20247A107
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/06/1989
From:	Curran D HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
CON-#389-9141 OL, NUDOCS 8909120043
Download: ML20247A107 (8)

Text

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ggtMEMSSlMTfMD InYoYuNr th HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSI.EY ,

2001 S STREET, N.W. > '(,pE T(P SUITE 430 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-?l25 GAIL McGREEW HARMON *gg g{p .8 hO Zh MEPHONE DIANE CURRM (202) 328 3500 DEAN R. ToUSLEY m

ANNE $PIELBERG

'I, (202) 328 6CIH 5ANDRA K %U* t JANNE G GALLAGHER. of counsel

• Not Admitted in D C.

September 6, 1989 Advisor) Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Seabrook Emercencv Plannino

Dear ACRS Members:

Thank you for the opportunity to address the ACRS on the issue of emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear reactor.

The following comments are submitted on behalf of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP"), which has been an intervenor in the Seabrook licensing proceeding since the incep-tion of the construction permit case.

In a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Emergency Planning on August 17, 1989, representatives of the operating license applicants, the NRC Staff,-and.the Federal Emergency Management Agency, depicted Seabrook as a typical nuclear power plant site with few, if any, emergency planning problems. As the record of the Seabrook licensing case amply demonstrates, nothing could be farther from the truth. The stark reality of emergency planning at Seabrook is that during a radiological release on a hot summer day, there would be no form of protection available to the thou-sands of people would be trapped in their cars for hours, without access to adequate shelter. This reality is not meaningfully abated by Applicants' plans for early notification of the beach population, nor can it be excused on the basis of probabilistic risk assessment. The purpose of this letter is to provide you ,

with important record information regarding this difficult, if not intractable issue.

1) The summer beach populatin. in Seabrook area resorts would be unprotected during a radiological emergency at Seabrook. 4 The critical is ae with respect to emergency planning at Seabrook is whether the summer population in the congested beach resorts within a few miles of the Seabrook site can be protected ,

during a radiological emergency at Seabrook.1 only a few narrow I 8909120043 890906 PDR ADOCK 05000443 'hSO3 G PDR l

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. HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY ACRS Members September 6, 1989 Page 2 - .

evacuation routes serve the barrier beach communities, anG the major routes are within direct view of the plant. Sheltering consists mainly of unweatherized summer buildings, and is not even provided for in the New Hampshire RERP. The Licensing Board has termed the Seabrook site " unique" with respect to "the size of the transient (" day tripper") beach population, the number of unwinterized housing /commerical buildings; volume of corridor type road traffic; complexity of road network; number of local governments involved in the emergency planning process; and the large geographic size of the EPZ." LBP-88-32, 28 NRC 667, 762-63.

Given the Seabrook site's unusual features, the risks to the public during an accident on a summer day at feabrook are uniquely high. As documented in testimony sucmitted by the Com-monwealth of Massachusetts in hearings on th< New Hampshire RERP, "The proximity of the reactor to an unshielded summer beach popu-lation makes the Seabrook case a special and difficult one for emergency planning. The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, with emergency plans in effect, are higher than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of emergency planning."2 The Commonwealth's experts caculated that these unshielded beach-goers, caught in the open, could be expected to receive. doses as much as five times higher than generally considered in nuclear emergency planning. They concluded that "certain recident releases, .not normally projected to cause early fatalities, are projected to do so in the Seabrook case," an4 that "For the acci-dents studied in our testimony,; many thousand; of people could receive life-threatening doses." Id. As discussed in the Com-monwealth's testimony, for some types of accidents, the Applicants' proposal to provide early warning to the beach popu-lation would probably gain evacuees very little time.3 It should 1 Sor Town of Hampton's Brief in Support of Appeal of Partial Initial Decision on the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated February 10, 1989. Attachment 1.

2 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Corrected Testimony of Steven C. Shelly on the Technical Basis for the NRC Emergency Planning Rules, Dr. Jan Beyea on Potential Radiation Dose Consequences of the Accidents that Form the Basis for the NRC Emergency Planning Rules, Dr. Gordon Thompson on Potential Radiation Release Sequences, and Dr. Jennifer Leaning on the Health Effects of Those Doses, dated November 17, 1987, at 14. Attachment 2.

3 Sholly/Beyea/ Thompson / Leaning Testimony at 48-49. Attach-

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'ACRS Members September 6, 1989 Page 3 . .

be noted in this regard that as a general matter, the NRC requ!.res the capability to respond to fast-breaking accidents.

ggg NUREG-0654 at 13.

In its original testimony on the New Hampshire RERP, FEMA also concluded that "using the standard guidance for the initia-tion and duration of radiologicalitreleases 4, and the current New Hampshire RERP. including ETE , appears that thousands of

. people could be unable to leave during an accident at Seabrook involving a major release of radioactivity without adequate shelter for as much as the entire duration of the release."6 None of this evidence is considered by the Licensing Board to be relevant to the adequacy of emergency planning for Seabrook. The Licensing Board adopted a "best efforts" standards for emergency planning and rejected the Commonwealth's evidence on the basis that it was " irrelevant."7 Bowing to threats by the NRC Staff of waging " war" against FEMA if it held to its position that emergency planning for Seabrook was inadequate, FEMA also (continued) ment 2.

4 As FEMA noted in its testimony, NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev, 1, indicates that "the range of times between the onset of acci-dent conditions and the start,of a major release is of the order or one-half hcur to several hours." Further, "a major portion of a release may occur in a time period ranging from as little as one-half hour to one day after the release begins and (b) that the travel time of the release to exposure point can range from one-half hour to two hours at five miles, and one hour to four hours at ten miles." FEMA Prefiled Testimony, dated September 11, 1987, at 39. Attachment 3.

5 As FEMA noted, the State of New Hampshire's Evacuation Time Estimates indicated that in good weather when the beaches are at 60 to 100 percent of capacity it will take three and one-half

-hours to clear the beaches, and a total of from four hours and fifty minut9,s to five hours and fifty minutes to evacuate all the population on the beaches from the EPZ. During bad weather fol-lowing a peak summer day, total ETEs could be as high as seven j hours and fifty minutes for some portions of the EPZ. Id.

6 yg, 7 gee Attachment 1, Town of Hampton's Brief, at 16-21.

i "l HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY .

ACRS Members September 6, 1989

'Page 4 adopted NRC's "best efforts" interpretation of the adequate pro-tection standard.8 However, it is notable that FEMA has.never abandoned the factual underpinning for its original conclusion that the public health and safety could not be protected.during a radiological emergency at Seabrook.

As discussed thoroughly.in the Town of Hampton's and Com-monwealth of Massachusetts' appellate briefs on the New Hampshire RERP,9 the Licensing Board's interpretation of the adequate pro-tection standard flies in the face of the Atomic Energy Act's mandate that safety standards must establish a level of accept-able risk without regard to the cost to a utility. Under the Licensing Board's interpretation of the emergency planning stan-dard, the public is given enly as'much protection as the utility is reasonably able to provide under the circumstances. As is clear from the record of this case, that level of protection for the-summer beach population at Seabrook is nil.10 Applicants',

trm.NRC Staff's, and IEMA's blithe assurances to the ACRS Sub-committee that-the Seabrook emergency plans fully comply with the NRC's regulatory standards, are based on a mindless and meaning-less reading of the regulations.

2) Compensatory Measures are Inadequate.

Given the prospect that their citizens would be left unprotected during a radiological emergency at Seabrook, a number of the New Hampshire communities ^in the EPZ refused to lend credibility to what they considered to be a sham emergency plan-ning process, and refused to participate in emergency planning for Seabrook. As a result, Applicants and the State of New Hamp-shire instituted " compensatory" measures for these communities.

Moreover, even for those communities participating in emergency planning, the lack of adequate staffing necessitates compensatory measures by state personnel.

As. discussed in NECNP's and the Seacoast Anti-Pollution 8 gee F*acoast Anti-Pollution's Brief on Appeal of the Partial Initial Decision on the NHRERP LBP-88-32, dated March 21, 1989, at 12. Attachment 4.

9 Heg Attachments 1 and 5,-respectively.

10 fee, appellate briefs on New Hampshire RERP filed by Town of Hampton, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, and Commonwealth of Mas-sachusetts, Attachments 1, 4, and 5, respectively.

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HARM'ON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY . ,

ACRS Members September 6, 1989 Page 5 League's briefs to the Appeal Board,11' Applicants have failed t

utterly to demonstrate that there are sufficient, personnel that can and will respond to an accident at Seabrook. For major emer-gency. response functions, including transportation of school children, Applicants have identified only " pools" of possible emergency responders who may be located anywhere'in the state of New Hampshire, and who may be unaware that they a e slated to participate in an emergency response at Seabrook.{2 Moreover,

~ Applicants purportedly " systematic" approach to surveying the need for and availability of emergency response personnel was disorganized, inconsistent, and'did not meet.the minimum stan-dards for obtaining reliable data.13

3) The failure of emergency planning for Seabrook cannot be excused on the basis of probabilistic risk assess-ment.

During the meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on August 17, a number of questions were raised regarding the probability of an accident that would require the activation of emergency plans for Seabrook. While such considerations may be of academic interest to the ACRS, they cannot be used to excuse Seabrook from com-pliance with the Commission's emergency planning requirements.

As the Commission stated in 1980 when it proposed the emergency planning rule, the Commission's former attitude that emergency planning was " secondary" to safe siting and the defense-in-depth approach to engineered safety systems, was " severely altered" by the accidant at Three Mile Island.14 As a result, the Commission 11 See Attachments 6 and 4, respectively.

12 The absurdity of this approach to compensatory emergency response staffing was illustrated graphically in the licensing hearings. At the outset, Applicants listed 1,500 Teamsters as being available to drive buses during an evacuation at Seabrook.

After the responsible Teamster official was deposed and disclosed that his drivers did not fully understand or accept their responsibilities, Applicants reduced the number of purportedly "available" bus drivers to 48. One bus company owner who was listed in the letters of agreement as committing 300 buses to the emergency response said he had no idea how many bus drivers would show up for an evacuation. See SAPL Brief at 29, Attachment 4.

13 Sea NECNP's Brief In Support of Interveners' Appeal of LBP-L8-32, dated March 24, 1989, at 1-24.

14 44 Fed. Reg. 75,169 (December 19, 1979).

j ILUO10N, CURRAN & TOUSLEY ACRS Members September 6, 1989 Page 6 -

now considers emergency planning to be ecuivalent to siting and design in public protection. In promulgating the rule and underlying guidance documents, the Commission explicitly refused to consider accident risk on a plant-specific basis, opting instead for a generic approach that would provide preparedness for a wide range of accidents, including unexpected, low-probability events.15 In fact, the Licensing Board has already rebuffed an attempt by Applicants to essentially eliminate emergency planning for Seabrook by reducing the size of the Seabrook EPZ from ten miles to one mile in radius.16 The Applicants' petition for a waiver of the emergency planning regulations was based on probabilistic risk assessments prepared for Applicants by their consultants.

In addition to arguing against the use of PRA to justify waiver af the emergency planning regulations, interveners also pointed to se ment.{gousflawsintheApplicants'probabilisticriskassess-The Licensing Board conc to make a crima facie case that the rule should be waived.

4) The NRC has abdicated its responsibility to protect the public health and safety.

The difficulty of protecting the thousands of people who flock to the Seabrook area beaches dur(ng the summer has been recognized since the inception of the construction permit case.

Tather than facing the problem at the outset, the Commi'ssion has postponed a reckoning with this intractable situation for over fifteen years. In 1977, the Commissioners rejected NECNP's appeal of the lower boards' refusal to require emergency planning for outside the two-mile Low Population Zone at Seabrook. The 15 Ene NECNP's opposition to Applicants' Petition Under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758 and 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c) for Waiver of Ten-Mile Emergency Planning Zone at 7-16. Attachment 7.

16 LBP-87-12, 25 NRC 324 (1987) 17 See Attorney General James M. Shannon's Memorandum In Oppo-sition to Applicants' Petition Under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758 and 10 C.F.R. 5 40.47 (c) With Respect to the Regulations Requiring Plan-ning for a Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone in Excess of a One-Mile Radius, dated January 26, 1987, and support-ing affidavits (Attachment 8) ; NECNP Opposition to Applicants' Waiver Petition (Attachment 7) at 25-30.

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HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSI.EY I-ACRS Members l September 6, 1989

.Page 7 Commission noted its "very real concern about the issue and directed our staff to carry forward a study as a ' priority mat-ter.'" CLI-77-22, 6 NRC 451, 453 (1977). The Commission also announced its intention to initiate a rulemaking for the purpose ofLpromulgating emergenc, planning rules.

A final rule on emerge.'cy planning was issued in 1980. In part, the rule responded to the chaotic aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, in whi :h the lack of emergency planning was a big problem. In the rule,.the Commission for the first time established detailed planning standards for th,e ten-mile "cmer-gency planning zone" around each plant, and provided further that operating licenses could not.be issued unless and until the Com-mission found-that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47. The Commission refused, however, to entertain a petition by the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to apply the rule to Seabrook before any further investments were made in construction of the plant. The Court of Appeals upheld the NRC's decision to postpone that evaluation until the operating license stage, based on the NRC's vow that it would not allow the util-ity's investment to influence its decision regarding the safety of operating Seabrook. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leacue v.

HEg, 690 F.2d 1025, 1033 (D.C. Cir.,1982).

The Commission can no longer postpone its reckoning with the issue of emergency planning at Seabrook. Predictably, now that over $5 billion has been sunk into the plant, the NRC is succumb-ing to the pressure to license the Seabrook nuclear power plant in spite the lack of adequate emergency planning. In order to achieve that result, the Licensing Board has applied a weakened interpretation of the. emergency planning standards that sanctions a "best effort" by Applicants, even when that effort provides no measurable protection to the public during an accident.

Hiding behind this warped interpretation of the emergency planning rule, Applicants, the NRC Staff, and FEMA, have attempted to persuade the ACRS Subcommittee that all is well at Seabrook. We urge the ACRS not to accept taese representations at face value, and to closely examine the entire record of the Seabrook emergency planning case. You will find that no party i

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HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY ACRS Members September 6, 1989

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has challenged the fundamental fact that during a radiological emergency at Seabrook on a hot summer day, thcusands of people could be trapped in evacuation traffic for hours, without access to thy nffective shelter.

Fifteen years ago, noting the proximity of the Seabrook plant to the coastal beaches and the nature of the road network, the ACRS recommended that "furthe r attention" be given to the evacuation of residents and transients in the Seabrook vicin-ity.18 As is demonstrated by the record of the Seabrook licens-ing case, the NRC continues to ignore the lack of any adequate protective measures for the summer beach population at Seabrook.

We urge you to recommend aaainst the licensing of Seabrook unless and until the NRC resolves this fundamental safety problem.

Sincerely, Diane Curran Counsel for .17tervenor New England Cc]lition on Nuclear Pollution cc (w/o attachme:*ts) : Seabrook service list 1

18 Letter from W.R. Stratton, Chairmaa, ACRS, to Dixie Lee Ray, Chairman, AEC, dated December 10, 1984.

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