ML20248E040

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Emergency Planning Appeal.* Clarifies Understanding Re History of Contentions on Reception Ctrs & Board Rulings on Litigability of Size of EPZ Population Attending Reception,Per 890727 Oral Argument.Supporting Info Encl
ML20248E040
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/1989
From: Curran D
HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To: Bollwerk J, Rosenthal A, Wilber H
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#389-8996 LBP-88-32, OL, NUDOCS 8908110217
Download: ML20248E040 (20)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-- h. HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY ;g ; a -

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         . Gall McGREEVY llARMON                                                                          ELEPIlONE DIANE (.'.URRAN                                                                              (202) 328 3500 DEAN R. TOUSIIY                                                     r .,,                          FAX ANNE SPIELBERG '                                                          -

M SANDRA K. PTAU' *. ' I M(202) 3284918 JANNE G. GALLAGilER, of counsel August 2, INN -

          'Not Admitted in D C.

J Paul'Bollwerk, Chairman Alan S. Rosenthal Howard A. Wilber ~ Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Seabrook emeroency plannina appeal, 50-443 OL g-@b

Dear Appeal Board Members:

At the oral argument on July 27, 1987, regarding Inter-venors' appeal of.LBP-88-32, a question arose regarding the Licensing Board's treatment of Interveners' contentions on the adequacy of reception centers. I stated my recollection that NECNP had filed a contention challenging the adequacy of the reception centers to accomodate all evacuees who might go there, and that this contention had been rejected on the basis of FEMA's assumption that only 20% of the evacuees would go to the recep-tion centers. I also volunteered to provide citations to the Appeal Board. In reviewing the history of the contentions on receptions centers, I found that my recollection was only partially correct. I also found that the Board's rulings on the litigability of the size of the EPZ population attending reception centers were inconsistent and unclear. On November 26, 1986, NECNP filed Contention HP-1, which challenged, inter alia, the capacity of reception centers to accomodate the potentially large numbers of evacuees who might go there. For each reception center, NECNP calculated the maximum size.of the EPZ population assigned to that reception center, and asserted the possibilit would go to'the center.{ that In asan many as all Memorandum unpublished of those people and Order dated May 18, 1987, the Licensing Board rejected the contention

                .on-the basis that there is "no regulatory requirement that 8908110217 890002 PDR     ADOCK 05000443 g                      PDR 1

See basis (a) of contention HP-1, pp. 17-20. A copy of the contention is attached. 4 - _ - - - --. A

um ' I.? ' ? w /HARMON, CURRAN & TOUSLEY l

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Appeal' Board Members p* , August 2, 1989 Page 2 f l relocation centers be able to provide for all evacuees who leave the EPZ..."2 Slip op, at 61. In rejecting,the contention, the Licensing Board found that l the number of people." arriving at" relocation centers is neces-sarily a " lesser number" than the entire population of the EPZ, but did not.say what that number was. In a footnote, the Board observed that in Lona Island Lichtina Co. .(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),.ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792 (December 12, 1986), the Appeal Board "left'open the question of what percentage of the EPZ population should be expected to seek radiological monitoring and decontamination assistance, as a matter appropriate for evidentiary proof in the proceeding." ASLB Memorandum and Order, slip op. at 59, note 11. The Licensing Board also noted that FEMA had submitted testimony in the Shoreham proceeding which

                                   " supported a reception center utilization factor of 20% "                  Id.

Thus, while the. Licensing Board reached no conclusion as to the percentage of the EPZ population that reception centers should be prepared to accomodate, it refused to admit NECNP's contention' asserting the possibility that the entire EPZ popula-tion would go to the reception centers. 3. 2 This was consistent with a previous decision by the Licens-ing Board rejecting SAPL's Contention 3, whose basis asserted i that the. New llampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan lacked any estimates of evacuees who'can be registered and monitored within any given time frame at reception facilities, and thereby precluded a finding that there is reasonable assurance that all evacuees who should be registered and monitored within 12 hours will in fact be thus protected. Con-tention 3, filed February 21, 1986. A copy of the contention is attached. In an unpublished Memorandum and Order dated April 29, 1986, the Licensing Board ruled: The Board finds no regulatory requirement for relocation centers to be able to provide for all evacuees who 10 ave the EPZ. Indeed, there is no requirement that one go to a cen-ter. What positive results could be expected in providing for; estimates of how many may go to these centers is wholly without merit. The requirement is that the centers will be established, staffed, and equipped whether one or all evacuees choose to use them. Slip op. at 82.

i l HARMCRJ, CURRAN & TOUSLEY l Appeal Board Members August 2, 1989 Page 3 l The Board's rulings on NECNP Contention HP-1 and SAPL Con-tention 3 appear to be inconsistent with the Board's admission, in the May 18, 1987, order, of SAPL Contention 33 (filed on November 26,'1986), which challenged the reduction in the number of host communities serving the EPZ and asserted that there is no

       " reasonable assurance that any significant fraction of the summer mid-week population of 142,929 estimat?d in these plans for the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ could be assured the requisite assistance in the specified time frame [of twelve hours.]" The Board found that the contention " overlaps" with SAPL Contention 7 (filed February 21, 1986), which challenged, inter alia, the ade-quacy of personnel and equipment at reception centers.J Memorandum and Order dated May 18, 1987, slip op. at 45.

In conclusion, while the Board did not reject any conten-tions on the basis of FEMA's 20% assumption, its various inconsistent rulings left unclear the question of whether and to what extent it intended to allow the litigation of the size of the EPZ population that should be accommodated by reception cen-ters. In any event, the Licensing Board has since made clear its belief that the issue of the size of the population that must be accommodated by reception centers was properly raised and addressed in the hearings on the New Hampshire plans, and has ruled accordingly that FEMA's planning basis is res iudicata for purposes of the litigation of the adequacy of the Seabrook Plan for the Massachusetts Communities.4 Sincerely,

                                                          \

Diane Curran cc: Seabrook service list 3 Copies of SAPL Contentions 33 and 7 are attached. 4 See Transcript of Prehearing conference on SPMC litigation, dated January 18, 1989, at 15333-36. A copy of the relevant transcript pages is attached.

NECNP Contention HP-1, basis-(a) 17 - Thut, there may be a fac e n um er of the normal school buses and drivers who will not be ailab es during a radiological emer-gencr. B. Contention HP-1: The host plans for Manchester,' Dover, Salem, and Pochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 C FR Se c-tions 50.47(a), 50.47(b)(8), (10) , (11), and (13) , or NUREG- 06 95, Se c t i ons ' J .12 a nd K. 5. b. Basis:

a. NUREG-0695 r equir es tha t the personnel and equip-ment at relocation centers should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. Section J.12.

MANCHt: STER:

1. The tia nchester relocation center does not contain enough equipment to assure that all individuals can be administered the quick one minute check for contamination before entertng the reception facility for registration (the check would take over 40 hours if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only for this checkpoint) , nor enough to do a more thorough check on those evacuees who are contaminated to find out l where the contamination is. Only 3,060 of the 20,000 expected evacuees could be scanned in 12 hours in the decontamination fa-cility if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only.at this checkpoint. This is only for the first scan in each .

m-,_ __ s I 18 - $ However the plans call for several scans in the ase. 6

         - decontamination facility per person.

Moreover, it is absurd to asswne that evacuees would stand in line for this long before being able to register and begin the r endezvous process. It is very likely that the host facility es when the inefficiency becomes will te abandoned by most evacue \ l \ l l \ stored at the 6 There will be 17 survey the inst ruments (CDV-700) Manchester relocation center. i Fire Department for use in Monitoring will apparently occur in 5 Vol um e 3 6 a t I I- 11. f i places: ,

1. Vehicles will be monitored before entering the parking 1

lots. No time estimate per vehicle is is one provided, minute,but since the, it seems un-f shortest scan possible for a person Volume 36 likely that a whole car could be scanned in less time. at B-3.

2. The plan calls for a quick (one minute) scanning the reception of each area. Vol.

individual evacuee before This one can enteris both for the safety of the evacuee, 36 at B-3, 24-3. ity, and whose decontamination needs should be made first priorin the recept for the " clean" people tected from contamination by evacutep who would be contaminatedAll 20,00 and wandering around the reception a.ea. That will j I come to Manchester will require this one minute scan.the monitor running constantly require 333 CDV-700 hours, with In Ma ncheste r, all seventeen and no space between evacuees. in use at once could do this in 41 hours. monitors Contaminated 3 individuals will then go to the Control Vol. 36 Point manager just outside the decontamination center. a thorough scan that will take be-at B3-4. There they will get Vol. 3 6 a t B4-5. At 4 minutes a tween 3 and 5 minutes cach. l survey,4. each CLV-700 can read Vol. 1803people in 12 hours, Conta 6 at B4-6. The same ' taminated clothing, and be rescanned. time factors will apply. the evacuees will go in- .

5. If they are still contaminated, Vol. 3 6 at l~

side the decontamination center and be remonitored.Then they will be B4-7. They will then be scrubbed or bathed. final reading. People who come up monitored c1can will another time and be released for apeople who are still contaminated will l Those who are still undergo scrubbing and remonitoring again.two scrubbings will be referred to contaminated after Supervisor. Vol. 36 at B4 - 7. l -

                       /

19 - 7 apparent, leaving people without access to the organized method of finding one another within the reception area. Those dis-cour aged individuals may seek shelter in other parts of the State or outside the State, thus spreading radioactive contamination as

              -   they travel.
2. After twelve hours, the Manchester facility I

is scheduled to become the cnly facility that will handle the decontamination of emergency workers. Vol. 36 at B-2. Obvious-l ly, monitoring and decontamination of the general public will I still be underway at that time. Thus, ther.e is no reasonable as-surance that the Manchester relocation c' enter can meet the needs of emergency workers. I ROCHESTER: I

3. There will not be enough equipment in the l

Rochestet relocation center to assure that everyone can be ad-l ministered even the quick one minute check for contamination be-f The plans fore entering the reception facility for registration. do not clearly state how many CDV-700 surveying instruments will be available for use in Rochester. However, there will be four l l f radiological monitoring kits, and therefore no more than four CDV-700's can be counted on. Vol. 3 5 a t 11- 11. It is possible that 35,000 evacuees will go to the Rochester host facility for decontamination. Vol. 3 5 a t I-10. If there are four CDV-700's for the initial scanning, it will take the last . This evacuee 143 hours to get inside the reception facility. clearly will not provide adequate protection to the evacuees. _ _ - - _ _ -- a

s i

                                                                                                                      . .- - ma FB'
4. .There will not be enough equipment at the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be adtt,inistered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration. There will be 4 3 CDV- i 700's available for use in Dover during a radiological emergency.

Vol. 3 3 a t 11-11. There could be 57,000 evacuees coming to Dover for decontamination. Vol. 3 3 a t I-10. Just to get everyone into the reception facility after one scan will take 22 hours. SALEM: -

5. There will not be enough equipment in the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering  !

the reception facility for registration. There will be 3 CDV-700's available for use in Salem during a radiological emergency. Vol 3 8 a t I I- 11 . There could be as many as 29,000 evacuees com-ing to Salem for decontamination. Vol 38 at I-8 . Just to get everyone into the reception area after one scan will take 161 hours.

b. The human resources available according to the plans are inadequate to protect the public health and safety.

All of the host plans - regardless of the size of the populations they are expected to serve - provide for 94 staf f members to per-form the many diverse tasks associated with the facility. Vols. 33, 35, 36, 3 8 a t B3-1, - 2. Not only are these numbers inade-

   .quate on their face, but the State clearly has applied a general-
   '+O                                                     SAPL Contention 3 Contention 2:                      .

Contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.II. 50.47(a)(1),10 C.F.II. Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV. .8. and IV. 'D.3., and NUltEG-0054 II. A.2.a and t II. A.3 and II.E.1 and 3., the responsibil es, authorities and concept of operations etween the State of New llampshire and the St. e of Massachusetts in ordering y protective action have not been sufficiently defined ior set forth in a writter agreement. Basis: According to the N.fl. .E.II.P the ultim e authority to order protective actions resides in the Governor or his osignee. cause there are two states with territory within Scabrook's EPZ , in order to su . that there is a timely accord on the protective actions ordered by the two govert rs r their designees) there should be, as NUitEG-

         ' 0654 ll.A.3. require, a written igreement               tting out the steps by which the governors could resolve any differ ces of opinion as o the appropriate protective action or actions to order. Oth.rwise, there remains the r k or undue delay in deelsion-making or the risk that de sions may not be the same and con sion of the public and inequitable protection of- ic public could result. 10 C.F.it. Part 50, Appendix E., IV.D.3. sets out that "the scensee. shall demonstrate that the State / local o lelals have the capability to ma e a public notification decision promptly on being infort ed by the licensee of at emergency condition" (emphasis added). This necessitates tha there be a prompt means of resolving differences of opinion between the two governors.

Contention 3: The New flampshire State.and host community plans do not provide for sufficient capacity in the New llampshire community reception centers for registration and monitoring within about 12 hours all residents and transients arriving at the relocation centers. Therefore, the New llampshire State, local and host plans do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.it. 650.47 (a)(1), 650.47 (b)(8), 650.47 (b)(9), 650.47 (b)(10), 650.47 (b)(12) and NUllEG-0654 II.J.12. I I j j

j #' 6-D 4 13 asis: .NUllEG-0654 II.J.12. specifically requires that personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring, within about a 12 hour period, al(emphasis added)

                                  . residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. If substantial numbers of evacuees are exposed to contaminants from the plume, then it is to be expected that substantial numbers would report to relocation centers for monitoring and decontamination. To assume otherwise would call into question the efficacy of the public notification and education procedures required by 10 C.F.It. 650.47 (b)(5),10 C.F.II. 650.47 (b)(7), NUllEG-0654 II. E.5., 6 and 7. and N9i!EG-0654 11.0.1. and 2.

Table 1, located in each of the 17 New llampshire local plans, provides 1985 peak population figures for each of the local communities, which sum to a total of 191,849 for all 17 towns. The assumption that people will not go to reception centers does not meet the NilC's mandate that there be " reasonable assurance that adequate protective meast;tes can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" for those circumstances in which the population has been exposed to contamination from a radiation plume if people who have been thus contaminated proceed directly to the homes of friends and relatives without being first monitored and decontaminated, they may, over time, receive significant doses from the unremoved contaminants as well as needlessly expose others to ionizing radiation. The total capacity for mass care shelters in the five communities to which maps in the local plans direct evacuees is 45,087. The capacity of the reception centers are only a small fraction of this number. No estimates are given of the numbers of evacuees who can be registered and monitored within any given time frame at these facilities. Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance that all evacuees who should be registered and monitored within 12 hours will in fact be thus protected. Contention 4: The New llampshire, Stiite oca nd host community plans fail to meet in adequate fashion the requirements that pr visions Jegade for medical treatment of contaminated _3

r

  • I 4

SAPL Contention 7 level radiation. -There are insufficient trained State personnel to allow this talement

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j to be trye on a continual 24 hour basis for a protracted period of time. \. Contention \G: N The New linmpshire State and local plans do not meet the re irement that there

                                                                     \

be mnps sliowh g population distribution around the nuclear fr ility as required at

l. \

NUitEG-0654 J.10.te liasis: \ The population figures it Table I and Figure 2 of the lo 1 plans and at Appendix E in the New llampshire State plans are not consistent witif one another and therefore are not meaningful estimates of population distribution #within the EpZ. Figure 2 la the local plans show tiie cumulative EI'7, resident p >ulation at 10!,968 as compared to the 140,857 total obtained by adding the' resider t population figures for each Town listed in Table 1 of the local plans. osents a discrepancy of 34,889, which is not That re'pp\ y an insignificant number. Further, p. /E.9 ;ig the State plan shows a cumulative EPZ resident population of 103,645.

                                                                                                      \

N Additionally, further Figur 2 in the local 1ans shows the cumulative peak EPZ population at 241,983.

                                                                                                            \

Addh , the figures given in ' Table 1 for peak population, one N obtains a total of 287,964. This discrepancy is even larhe,r than that for the resident population, i.e. 45,981. gain, examination of the State pin \nsyleids a different number.

                                                                                                                       \

The addition of the et iulative resident population from p.E.9 andst e cumulative summer weekend transient population from p.E-14, yields a total of 246,701. Ilecaus ere is no internal consistency in the numbers in the planning documents, s there is np possible way for those using these plans in an emergency 1esponse to determine' which are the real numbers. Contention 7: The New ilampshire State and local plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.fl. 650.47 (b)(II) and NUltEG-0G54 K.5.b. because there has been no showing that

the means of radiological decontamination of emergency personnel, wounds, supplies and

      . equipment have been established.      Further, there has not been a clear showing that adequate means for waste ' disposal exist.

Basis: The decontamination facilities for emergency personnel are inadequately described in the emergency plans and therefore do not provide reasonable assurance that proper

l. decontamination can be effected. page 2.7-9 of the State plan says that a contaminated person and his possessions will be sent to a " state decontamination facility".

l The State plan at 2.4-4 describes such decontamination centers as follows:

                "llemoving radioactive material from individuals and/or equipment that may have been contaminated will occur in these facilities. Most decontamination involves relatively simple washing procedures. If special equipment is required, individuals will be transferred to facilities equipped to treat l-radiologically exposed individuals (see Section 2.8 of this !!Ellp for a list

! of facilities). That concludes the entire description of decontamination centers in the State plan. The local plans note that the decontamination centers will be co-located with reception centers, but neither the local plans nor host community plans describe the adequacy of the facilities to provide sufficient showering capacity for the numbers of people to be dealt with, sufficient car washing facilities for the numbers of vehicles to be expected or any provisions for decontamination of equipment or supplies. No provisions are made for isolating the contaminated water resulting from the showering and car washing activities. As noted in Contention 4 above, the available medical facilities described in the plans are likely to be overburdened in a radiological emergency if there are larage numbers of evacuees. This would obviate the possibility of emergency workers obtaining l treatment for their contaminated wounds. provisions for waste disposal are grossly inadequate. The State plan states that each decontamination center is capable of storing a minimum of I cubic meter of  ! l contaminated waste and two cubic meters of contaminated personal articles for ~ quarantine. The very next sentence states that "this is sufficient for the worst expected

                                                     -B-l

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       ,9      .            .
                                                                                                                                                                 }
                                                                                                                                                                'I y, , n.1                                   ,

j k .t l decontamination required".. There is no stated " maximum"' capacity, so its sufficiency remains' in doubt. .l

                              .The provisions for. waste . disposal are exceedingly vague and consequently there                                                  l X
           . is no sufficient basis for concluding. their adequacy.                                   Page 2.7-10 of the State plan simply states that the Division of Public Ilealth Services will dispose of waste materials                                                        l

< through a " local brokerage". There is no reference to any specific entity or its licensed j status to accept such materials or its capacity to accept them. Without specific l J i information as to the name, location, capabilities, and licensed status of such entity,  ! its utility in this matter remains in doubt.  ! Contention 8: The New ilampshire State and local plans fall to meet the requirements that , i there be adequate manpower and 24-hour per day emergency response, including 24- j p hour per day manning of communications links, as required by 10 C.F.It. 650.47 (a)(1), 650.47 (b)(I) 650.47 (b)(2),' and NUllEG-0654 ll. A'.1.e, !!. A.4. and ll.F.I.e. . i Unsis: There are not enough personnel at both the' state level and local level to ensure an effective and continuous emergency response effort sufficient to ensure the health and safety of the public. For example, there is only one full-time police officer and i i four part-time police officers for the Town of llampton Falls. The initial notification to the Town from the State Police Communication Center and llockingham County Dispatch is to the " Police Office on Duty or On Call" according to page 11-9 of the l 1

              . plan that has been prepared by the New Ilampshire Civil Defense Agency for the Town                                                               j 1

of llampton Falls. llampton Falls Police Chief Andrew Christie, Jr. says that if that -{ I

               . police officer on duty or call is out of town on an investigation or in Boston for court, for example, then there is no back-up for receipt of notification. Police Chief Christie further states that he is unable to fulfill the duties designated to him in the plan due to lack of manpower and equipment. There is no llADEF Officer for llampton Falls and also no Transportation Coordinator.

1

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                                           'sAPL Cor,;ention 33                                                I y

1 The NilR' P Rev. 2 does now contain letters of agreement with ) 14' ambulance serv es (Vol . 5 ), though one lis d, O'Brien Ambulance , of Beverly, Massachuse s, has stated th 'the company will not be able to participate in any pc of esponse in the Seabrook area. j l SAPL will need additional time i check with the others.

                                                                                                               ]

Though the State has r w devise sys t em f or ident i f ying those with special needs, a the Board has fou the system a sufficient basis for summari. disposing of the issue of he adequacy of means of identific ion of these individuals,3 SAPL wi . ies to preserve once ag 'n for the record its objection to the Board's finding.

                                                                                                   --t ;

SAPL Contention No. 33. g4 j_ t Contrary to the requirements of 10 CPR 5 5 0. 4 7 ( .4 ) ( 1 ) , 050.47(b)(8), 6 5 0. 41 ( b ) (9 ) , 650.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 ll.J.12, ./ there is no showing that NilPERP Rev. 2 provides adequately for the regis t rat ion and monitoring of evacuees at reception centerr within about a 12-hour perlod. Basis: The NHRER- v. 2 has reduced the number of host communit ies from six communities down to four communities in eliminating Nashua and Durham. This has had the resultant effect o; lessening the base of municipal resources that can be drawn upon to assist the evacuat ing popultd ion and has reduced the likelihood, which was not great bef ore, ) that all evacuees seeking assistance would indeed by assisted within the t ime f rame set forth in NUREG-0654 as reasonable, i.e., about a l l 12-hou r per iod. The rate at which evacuees can be processed through

3. Memorandum and Order of November 4, 1986 at p . p. 10-17.
;~ - - ~ - ~ - ' ~

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the:' remaining reception and decontamination'. facilities'has not:in i a any fashion been established in'.the plans. .Therefore,. reasonable assurance has not been demonstrated _that any significant fraction; o f : t he'summe r mi.dweek- popul a 1 ion o f 14 2,9 29 est imated in _these t lans for the New flampshire pcrtion of the EPZ could be assured the requisite assistance-in the specifled time frame.
    ,                     .SAPL Contention No. 34.

The New ^ llampsh i r e State and local plans do not . meet' the

                          -requirement.that there be rr.aps showing the po                                                                                                                                   latlon: distribution around the facility as. required at NUREG-0                                                                                                                    4 J.10.b. and Appendix 4..                Therefor ,                                t here ' is no reasonable assurance that                                                                                                     adequate protect Ive mens res can and will                                                                                                       b           taken pursuant                                to             10 CFR 950.,47(a)(1) and 6                                                                                 . 4 7 ( b ) ( 10.) .                                                           .

r Basis: . A s imi' a r. con t e t i i to this was originally submitted _as SAPL Conien t ion 'No. 6, wh I h < PI, withdrew. Subsequent 1y, however, t he NilRERP ' Rev. 2 has ppeared .nd it has very significantly end erroneously reduced he peak popula ons in the EPZ from those that t appeared ~in the ovember 1985 NilRERP on whIch contentions were

Init ially file . The' November 1985 NilRERP s ted the peak population f o r New flamp h i r e a t 191,849. Rev. 2 has red ed this peak number
                          .to 142,529 for a summer weekend and 142,929 for sum er midweek. The f

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15182 w UNITED STATES UUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN k J' ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of: )

                                                                           )
                                                                           )

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY CF ) Docket Non 50-443 OL NEW RAMPSHIRE, at al. ) 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Off-site Emergency

                                                                          )      Planning Issues                         .
                                                                          )
                                                                          )

PREHEARING CONFERENCE ) Wednesday January 18, 1989 Room No. 1013 Federal Office. Building 10 Causeway Street Boston, Ma s c achu s et., The above-entitled matter J:ame on for hearing,. pursuant to notice, at 9:01 a.m. BEFORE: JUDGE IVAN W. SMITH, CHAIIU1AN Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear hegulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 JUDGE RICHARD F. COLE, MEMDBR Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 2055$ JUDGE JERRY R. KLINE, MEMBER Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

    }                                          Heritage   Reporting   Corporation 1

(202) 620-48P9 A l &

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                                                            . v e , -   s. c. i_ c. , c. . . .                                                                  c., 2 15331' 1                        AEIEEMQRH                    aEaaIQH 2-                                                                 (1: 35.p.m.)

3 JUDGE SMITH: We are going to rule on the 4 arguments and mot. ion for reconsideration of Contention 18, 5 with-respect to. Basis B. u 6 We do recognize the language of the introductory 7 paragraph as referring to facilities. Reading the. 8 contontion, reading the basis as a whole, we believe pretty

9. much as I stated earlier, that if you had intended to say 10- additional reception centers, that is an important enough 11 matter that you would not have overlooked it.

12 However, that is not the only basis-for our 13 ruling. The first half of it, clearly the emphasis is the

         .14      Izumber of personnel and equipment whi,ch we believe was a 15       readily correctable problem.

16 The second half, where it begins: "Moreover, the 17 . exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the SPHC and the 18 NHRERP, in that the event of the kind of radioactive release 19 that occurred during.the exercise re'sulting in a clockwise, 20 sweeping plume that hit virtually every town in the EPZ..." 21 et cetera, with respect to that, we recognize that that is a 22 contention raising the 9verall capacity of reception 23- centers, including facilities, personnel, equipment and 24 everything, to monitor the expected population. 25 However, the Board has decided, in its December Heritage Repo rting Corporation (202) 628-4888 .

c .. , . . . l~ .A > k, - L, , . 153

1. would obviously' attempt in this proceeding.to rebut it.

c , 2 JUDGE SMIT 11: The-issue of the planning basis for-3 the.Seabrook EPZ eas put squarely in issue by SAPL, and it 4 may be, but nevert heless, our decision -- L 5 MR. 'LAFICONTE: I s e e -. I understand. 4 JUDGE SMITH: It may be that we decided more than i.. But our de'cisidn does find, and-it is I 7 we were invited to. 8 t@2 JM41.c_ata for this proc.eding, that~the correct planning' i 9 b6 sis is the FEMA planning basis and it will have to-operate 10 in this aspect of the proceeding. If we're wrong, I am sure 11 we will. hear about it. 12 MR. TRAFICONTE: Just as a general -- well, I . 13' withdraw that. 14 MR. DIGNAN: Your Honor, may I have a point of 15 clarification on the ruling? 16 JUDGE SMITH: Yes.

                               -17                           MR. DIGNAN:    Do I undarstand that the ruling is 18    solely on the basis of tea dudicata or is in addition also
19. on the basis of the first reason you gave? I want.to find 20 out how many strings I have in my bow.

21 JUDGE SMITH: We do not reach that. It is 22 altogether possible that with the benefit of the arguments 23 we received today that the second part of the contention, . f 24 raising the overall capability to monitor all the people who 25 would be reeking monitoring is raised. But we don't reach neritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .i.

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     .. [ - -.;   ,     ++     '

sV333. 157-l

1 30,.1988 partial initial decisio,n'that the planning basis 2 for the'Seabrook EPZ'is appropriately the FEMA planning L 3- ' basis, c

i 4 Therefore, this aspect of it, although I expect p 5' you will be complaining to the appellate authorities about. 6 that. decision, this aspect of it as far as'this case.is 7 -concerned is out of our jurisdiction as (11 fudi_CALA. 8 In other words, we'could not1adnit this contention 9 even were we inclined, because we have already made a 10- decision that the planning basis for the population in the 11 Seabrook EPZ is the FEMA basis of -- what is it -- the 12 Krimm, so-called Krimm memo basis? 13 MR. FLYUN: The Krinun memorandum --

                '14.                   JUDGE SMITH:    The Krimm memorandum. Jurisdiction 15-        over that aspect of it has passed before us.      It.is, as far 16         as this licensing hearing is concerned, the planning basis
17. that is decided, and jurisdiction has passed.

18 MR. TRAFICONTE: Your Honor, just one query on 19 that aspect of your ruling. I understand,-I.have read the 20 'New Hampshire decision. I have read the portions of-it 21 corecerning the presumption that wduld attach to the 20 22 percent figure. Fart of our concern in this regard is of 23 course the Board found in that proceeding that that 24 presumption was not rebutted., Just as a point of 25 clarification, if this were admitted, this contention, wo Beritage Ecporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 4

1 l- .- i <

                                                                                                                  \ % 31b l'   'I 1        that. As a matter of fact, we do dot even have the                               i 2        jurisdiction to rule on it now. So we did not exclude it.

3 MR. TRAF ICO!4TE : You did not exclude it? 4 JUDGE SMITH: No, we excluded it, based upon the 5 fatithat the planning basis of the'20 percent of the EPZ ) 6 population has already been adjudicated and is the subject' 7 of Our decision. 6 .This would be within thc rubric of that finding 9 which is now, the jurisdiction now rests in the -- not the 10 Bankruptcy Court -- 11 (Laughter) 12 ' JUDGE SMITH: It's the Appeal Board. 13 He did not exclude it on;the basis that it would 14 not otherwise have been a contention. 15 MR. TRAFICONTE: Okay. That's what I t, anted to 16 know. 17 JUDGE SMITH: We do not. We do not exclude it, or 18 admit it, or rule on it. We recognize that it does fairly 19 allege an overall capacity shortfall, that aspect of it. It 20 did fairly allege an overall capacity shortfall of 21 monitoring capacity, including facilities. 22 MR. TRATICONTE: B'uc that issue is rga iudicata

                                    . 23        >is-a-vis the EPZ.

24 JUDGE SMITil: Decause you've already decided what 25 the planning basis is for the population who would be 1 l I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 u_u- _m. _..-_m. ___._m.__ _ ._ _ .n AA.

Is33b 153 1 seeking monitor,ing and reception services. You've already 2 decided that. 3 MR. TRAFICO!!TE : Based on a presumption. The only 4 point of inquiry here is that, as I read the New Hampshire 5 decision, you decided that giving p'resatoptive weight to the 6 20 percent rigure -- i 7 JUDGE SMITH: That is correct. 8 MR. TRAYICONTE: -- and then holding, after 9 discussion of the record, that that presumption was not 10 rebutted -- 11 JUDGE SMITH: Tnat is right. 12 HR. TRAFICONTE: -- by thIe interveners on that I 33 record. The only reason why I am pressing here is that we 14 want to make sure, we would have of course attempted on this 15 record to have rebutted that. 16 JUDGE SMITH: That's right. 17 MR. TRAFICONTE: All right. As long as that is 18 clear. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Evidentiary argument. 20 MR. TRAP'ICOttTE : Right. l 21 JUDGE SMITH: However, we are not ruling on 22 evidence now. We are ruling on jur.isdiction. He have lost 23 jurisdiction. We do not have the authority, the 24 jurisdiction,1 authority to relitigate matters that were 25 heard and decided in the initial decision, nerit' age Reporting Corporation (202) 620-4880 _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _}}