ML20237L453
ML20237L453 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Comanche Peak ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/23/1987 |
From: | Martin B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
To: | Jennifer Davis NRC |
Shared Package | |
ML20237K807 | List:
|
References | |
NUDOCS 8708200225 | |
Download: ML20237L453 (58) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1985007
Text
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' 4 v "' . cPRAG., J i - 2/ UNITED STATES ,.' i % I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ,. REGION IV a I 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 1000 / ARUNGTON, TEXAS 76011 & Cfsf'kG *Janu K ry 23, 1987LW 4 NOTE T0: ' John Davis: . Enclosed is an amendment t6 the material I sent to you on January 22, 1987 ~ Bob Martin i . (I , , $$ Y $ Y f t, & L& Y $ \ i3 pos , vc f4 m a r , & c. . uJ sk.ali k< ,. . d e p r o La d -a, <<gna % m e s.s J _ ' "~ vu d os . h\ss scousl y* ys of Cd Wi 2I haada :,614 Le a do J. l , p . s. ha t.p . e c+en%ek , c Pari G - G ) . b ' ' ~'s * *b 5""> T %g(gf p P/ p,g- gsg b, jg - . '4 8700200225 070123 PDR ADOCK 05000445 G PDR _ _ _ _ _ -
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~ . 4FnRG-18 C PttRG '% Insoection Recert 50-445/85-07 50-446/95-05 (85-07/05r m Concern No. 1 / ] and PHILLIPS were concerned that Region IV (RIV) management cowngraded the violation, concerning failure to translate design criterta into specifications and drawings, to an unresolved item in the inspection report issued without giving sound NRC regulatory and technical casts and unresolved stems require no action. In the inspection report (signed on October 2, 1986,- by the onsite NRC supervisor and inspectorsi the violation reads as follows: "6. Failure to Translate Deston Criteria into Installation Scectit cati on s, Proceduras, and Drawinos; and Failure tc Centrci Deviations from These Standards "10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterten III, as implemented oy TUGC0 CAP, Section 3, Revision 0, dated July 31, 1994, requires tnat measures shall De established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, are correctly translated toto spectitcations, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These seasure,s shall include provisions to , assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in ( design documents and that deviaticns from sucn standards are contr311ec. i " Contrary to the above, Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel installation l crateria such as centering tolerances, levelness tolerances (sic], ,and shoe l to brackat clearances were: (a) specifiec on Constru: tion Operation Traveler ME-79-248-5500 based on NSSS vendor recommenced criteria which had ) not been translated into CFSES specifications, drawtngs, proceoures, or j instructions; and it) changed on traveler withcut appropriately dccu. tenting 1 sucn engineering changes. "This is a Severity Level IV Violaticns (Supplament.II.E) ( 4 4 d S 5 0 5- 0 5 ; . The downgraded item in the final inspection repcrt reads as fellcws: "12. Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals instailatics - Unit 2 ( "ints inspection was perfccmed by an NRC Inspector to .'arify final placement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and internals by exacining tne templeted installation and inspection racceds. v ,. . "a. Requirements fer Placement of RPV l " Requirements for placement of the RPV to ensura proper fit-up of all other major NSSS equipment are in Westinghouse Nuclear Services Divisten (WNSD) 'Procecure for Setting of Majcr NSSS Ccapenents,' Revision 2. dated February 13. 1979, and ' General Rea.t.r Vessel Setting Procedure,' Revision 2, dated August ;0. 1974 The HR- l Inspector reviewed the f ollowing drawings, sht:n were ref erencac in l
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . __ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ 4 , 4 .. 6 . 2 , . the RPV operation traveler, to verify implementation at WNSD --- recommendations: j 1 . *NSD drawing 1210E59 ' Standard - Loop Plant RV Support Hardware - Details and Assembly' ' . "NSD drawing 1457F27 ' Comanche Peak SES RCS Equipment Supports - Reactor Vessel Supports' i . "E drawing 10773-171-004 ' General Arrangement Elevation'~ i . "E drawing 10773-171-005 ' General Arrangement Plan' ' "Neitner site prepared installation drawings nor spectitcations (which implemented the WNSD recommended procedures) were available and the drawings examined did not show certain specific installation criterton q such as centering tolerances, levelness tolerances and clearance ' between support brackets and support shoes. * "The inspector considers this matter unresolved. (446/S505-051" PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No. 1 Requirements: The requirements (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) include the appropriate 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria; Final Safety Analysis Report (FSARi; and Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) requirements. , ! These requirements require: (1) design control interfaces between design organization, (2) the translation of design criteria into specifications and drawings, and (3) the organt:ational responsibilities must be described in the organi:ation and program sections of the FSAR and Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). Noncomoliances With Requirements: The NRC inspection of the reactor vessel inst'allation activities identified a violation that appeared to be more closely related to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion'!II (Exnibit 1); however, the :1RC inspectors reali:ed that violations of other criteria procaoly caused this violation. Instead of writing violations of several criteria, the NRC inspector selected what he considered the most significant violation and documented Lt. This approach would allcw TUSCC to address this specific violation and perhaps i wnat. appeared to be violations of otner criteria when addressing the corrective )
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action necessary, cause of the violation, and steps necessary to prevent repetition. As TUGC0 was not required to take such action because the vtclation , was downgraded as an unresolved ites, PHILLIPS identified additional v2clations during the review of Attachment MM and development of these comments. They are discussed below. Introduction: The NRC inspector found that Westinghouse Nuclear service Division (WNSD), " Procedure For Setting of Major NSSS Components." (a j Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania procedure and not site specific) hao no signatures ! wnich would indicate that tne document had been reviewed and/or autnori:eo. There was no evidence that this procecure was revieweo and approvao cy 3 foes k Hill (3&H) and integrated into a specification, procedure, or drawing. This e
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also applies to TUGC0 engineering. It was not included in the site document ---l
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:entrol system as it is probably not appropriate to do so as at is a proprietary {' procedure with general application. Westinghouse IW1 recommended that the customer generate a detailed site specific procedure for WNSD site personnel to review; however, the next sentence disclaimed responsibility for this activity with respect to W if the procedure, specialist, or consultants were used. As no G&H specification, procedure, or drawing was developed and placed in che document control system, it was impossible to meet Criterion III which requires the same organi:ation that specified the design criteria to review changes. This happened because the installation criteria were simply taken from an I uncontrolled procedure and placed in an instruction (the traveler); therefore, subsequent changes were not approved by the original design organt:ation. This is contrary to Criterion III which states, in part, " Design Changes, inclucing field changes, shall be subje:t to design control measures commensurate with those applied to tne original design and be approved by the organt:ations that ' performed this original design unless the applicant oesignates anotner responsible organi:ation." . ! . Failure of G&H to Perform Desian Interface / Coordination Responsibilities The TUGC0 FSAR, Section 17.1.3 (Exhibit 2), and TUGC0 QAP, Section 3.0, state that G&H is the architect engineer (AE) and that G&H is required to control design interfaces and coordinate responsiollities and activities of j participating design organi:ations. The reactor vessel installation is dependent on the configuration of the reactor containment building for which W has no responsibility. The W procedure describes prerequisites which must be met prior to reactor vessel installation and it appears that G&H was responsible for controlling such interfaces and ccoroinating such interface activities. j l The NRC Inspector found no such involvement oY GLH. as evidenced oy a lack j Of guidance in any specification, draw.ing or procedure reviewed and approved by the AE. This violates Centerton III and F5AR 17.1.; c:ncerning design :nterface responsibility. . Failure to Desertbe Westinohcuse 3ite Orcartration Responstallities PHILLIPS found tnat W site organt:ation participate in revising design :rt:eria; however, the FSAR, QAP, and implementing procedares do not ! describe any such design responsibilities. In a January !!. 1?S7, l conversation, the W site manager said they have no site design I responsibility or engineering responsibility. WESTERMAN states in his testimony (page 73, July 10, 1996) that W is a super Quality Assurance s0Ai organt:ation that is there to make sure tne utility is not inval: cat;ng the warranty. Notet also. WESTERMAN 540 scuot if TUGC0 was casacle of aa:itino tnem. :HILLIPS areees in Concern No. ! below. WESTERMAN c:ntradicted tnis ________ _ _______ _____ _ _ _ - _ -
, . . . d . statement later by stating that W approved changes to design criteria on ---- construction operation traveler (traveler) ME79-248-5500, did not identify the above failure to describe W responsibility on-site; however, this failure to describe the W site organtcation also violates Criterion I and II. . Failure to Include Westinghouse Recommended Desian Criteria Into 'Soect(ications. Procedures, and Drawinos PHILLIP5andIEEIIIIl~foundnoevidencethat9d'asigncriteriahabeen formally. translated into the specifications, drawings and procedures; i.e., wara not reviewed and apprived by G&H, W, or by TUGC0 engineering. Instead, PHILLIPS fr.und traveler ME79-2489-5500, which had been initiated i., accordance with Brown & Root (B&R) construction Precedure CP-CPM-6.3 : Exhibit 4) but which makes no provisions for design responsibilities as required in Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 or the TUGC0 FSAR and QAP. This construction document provides great latitude for expediting construction. It can be initiated and prepared by the construction superintendent or discipline engineers. It allows approval by the appropriate GA personnal who have no design responsibility. Procedure CP-CPM-6.3 (Revision 5) requires W to review the construction traveler but there is no DA program description or procedu're that describes the W organization or responsibilities; therefore, neither W or B&R is autnort:ed to make design changes. The B&R Quality Control (CC) inspectors are authorized to make minor changes; however, other changes must be authart:ed by B&R QA. The y procedure (Exhibit 5) states that W nas no responsibility for interfacing the Nuclear Steac System Supplies (NSSS) with the plant structures. The procedure does recommend tolerances out takes no cther respons:bility. Criterion III requires field changes to me reviewed and approved by the original organi:ation. The NRC inspector found tnat the design tolerances on the traveler were not treated as engineering cesign criteria. No engineering design change authert:ation (DCat was processed and the traveler tolerance was cnanged by B&R construction, CA, and W representatives who had no such design responsibilities specifically delegated to tnem in writing. Tha s f ailure to translate design requirements into specifications and
I drawings is a violation of Criterion III and FSAR, Section 17.1.0.
. Failure to Follow Traveler Procedurg lEEEEEEI~revtewed traveler ME79-248-5500 (Exhibit 6) for compliance to tolerances and was either unaware of traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.3 or apparently did not choose to revtew the traveler against CP-CPM-6.3. PHILLIPS, during the CIA investigation revaewed TU6CC's and RIV management's claim that this traveler is squal to detaileo pecceduras which are signed and authert:ed by persons navtng the proper autnority. FHILLIPS' detailed review revealad tne following deficianc:es or _ _ .
. . b i . . 5 . noncompliance with the procedure, whicn means it cannot ce considered a "-- complete procedure. As a result, TUGC0 initiated the work with a faulty procedure. 1. Procedure CP-CPM-6.3 is geared to construction and does not describe design responsibilities. As indicated in paragraph 3.6.2 of the procedure, it assumes that specifications, procedures, and drawings had been reviewed and approved by design organi:ations and such documents have been collected or referenced in a traveler package which shows how each construction step is to be accomplished to achieve the design shown in drawings, specifications, etc. No 4here in this procedure did it delegate the autnority to change design documents or criteria. W responsibility was not described other than to acknowledge their review for :ommercial considerations. 2. Traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.3, required the traveler package either conta:n or reference appropriate drawtngs, procedures, instructions, manufacturer's manuals / guidelines, or other information necessary to accomplish the the activity. Traveler ME-79-248-5500 did not reference the @ procedure for setting major NSSS :omponents and did not incorporate all of this uncontrolled procedure into the traveler; i.e., the traveler did not show that all prerequisites or conoitions were met prior to installing the vessel which would be Step i in a controlled procedure. ' 3. CP-CPM-6.3 required that drawings and procedures ce referenced ano the revision level be provided. No revision level was provided for drawings 81210E59, W1457F27, C-E 10773-171-004, C-E 10773-!71-005 and mechanical installation Procedure MCP-1. Thus, there is no assurance that the correct drawing was used. 4. Step 6 of the traveler did not specift: ally state "not less than 1 inch," as stated in Step J of the W vessel setting procedure. l 5. Revision 4 (Step 11 cf the traveler) changeo the 75% =cntact recuireo l by the W procedure to . contact area a::aptable to 'd. In this :ase, tne uncontrolled H procedure was ignorea without an engineering change ceing processed. M responsibilities onsite were not describeo in the TUGC0 FSAR, Section 17.1.3, or QAP; however. nese documents 4: 0 assign this responstbtitty to 3&H and TUGC0 :ecause W nac no castgn responsibility onsita. Without a cascriptian :f W in enese occuments, the W representative may ce anyone; 1.e., requires no tecnrt:si expertise. o. Revision 3 documentee the violation at Step 1 for minimum engagement for guide pins. The same : cements apply as far Revision 4 '. Revisi:n 2 deleted tne machining requirements witneut engineering review and justift:ation. The same ::mments a 01 y ice Rev;ston 4
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. . . . ' 6 . ' - - 8. Revision 5 changed the requirement to 0.020' for each side of the vessel supporting to a range ci 0.015 to 0.025" for each sica. The same consents as for Revision 4. l 9. The ! representative accepting revisions / deviations of the i construction traveler (although inappropriate) does not appear to be the same as the person who approved the original traveler. CP-CPM-3.3 required those who reviewed and approved the traveler during l preparation must review and approve major changes to the precedure. - Since ! responsibilities were not described, there is no way to identify who in the M on-site organization or other M organizations -- was authorized to change tha uncontrolled procedure to the . construction traveler. 10. Considering that the construction traveler was used instead of a procedure (reviewed and approved by the appropriate design engineering and QA/QC organizations) nonconformance reports (NCRS) should have been written when the required tolerances were violated. As a sinimum, appropriate site engineering and QA/QC organizations should have dispositioned such deficiencies. In September 1985 and presently, PHILLIPS understands the initial violation. He also realized, then and now, that there are several other potential violations in addition to M proposed violation which was dropped; i.e., additional ' violations of Criterion I and Criterion Il--TUSCO failed to describe ! in their CA program; violation of Criterion V--failure to fo!!aw procedure CP-CPM-6.3; Criterion VI--failure to control'the ! docusants; and Criterion XV--failure.to wette NCRs. Neither B&R construction, QA or M even justified changes to informal M documents and in some cases gave arbitrary tolerances. There was more than enough information to cite the originally proposed a violation. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Handlino/ Mishandling Concern 1 Backoround irected PHILLIPS to review the NRC MC 2512 inspection progras in 0, ober 1984 and during this review of the NRC Fore 766 program covering 10 years, it was f ouno that the storage and handling was caserved by the senior resident inspector but the installation of the vessel was not j inspected in accordance with inspection Procedure (IP) 50053. Procedure 50053B showed completion by a RIV inspector in the Inspection Report 80-26; however, vessel installation was really not observed as reported in the NRC Fore 766. j li PHILLIPS subsequently learned that CASE, the intervenor, had suositteo - l Contention 5 (Exhibit 7) to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) which stated that TUGC0 failed to adhere to quality assurance / control provisions, ; ' Appendix'B of 10 CFR 50, and the construction practices for various work and specifically the placement of the reactor vessel for Unit 2. In late 1984 and early 1995, M and PHILLIPS cecided that the installation of Unit 2 shoul'7eo inspected to the degree possible (since installation was completed July 26, 1979) because NRC inspection of the actual installation was not apparent and this issue would likely be covered during the ., hearings. When WESTERMAN replaced @ nd assuaec responsibility for the RIV l l l * \
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. _ ~ . . , Comanche Peak Task Group, PHILLIPS discussed these issues with has and the ' importance uf the inspection. - ! In addition to this information, PHILLIFS and WESTERMAN were aware of* findings in " Miscellaneous Item 2, Reactor Pressure Vessel," of NURES-0797, Supplement 8 (Exhibit 6), which describes problems found with regard to installing the Unit i vessel. In this case, a design change was not properly coordinated between W, 6&H, and TUSCO to assure that design , requirements were incorporated into project specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions / travelers. This failure to interf ace resulted in deficiencies; i.e., reactor vessel and insulation to - the reactor vessel cavity fit, caused unacceptable conditians which were . identified during hot functional testing. PHILLIPS was also aware of another deficiency (Exhibit 9) which should have been reported as a 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiency. On February 20, 197o, TUGC0 reported that a major error had been detected in the as-built configuration of Unit 2 reactor vessel support structure; i.e., the reactor vessel support shoes, their ventilation duct work, and surrounding reinforcing steel had been rotated.45 degrees from the correct positions. Apparently, just prior to installing the vessel, TUGC0 learned that the reactor vessel would neither catch the vessel support feet nor would the piping system fit the other reactor loop cooponents. This appears to have been caused by another design.interf ace problem; 1.e'., G&H not assuring that prerequisites for vessel setting were acceptable as construction proceeded. Proper Handlino: PHILLIPS provided this background information tolllllll(prior to helping his prepare for his inspection and explained vessel installation Procedures IP 50051, 50053, and 50055 (Exhibits 10.a, 10.b, and 10.c) which . require review of procedures, observation of work in progress or completed work, and review of records. HUNNICUTT,RIVsupervisoron-site,directedEEElll[to inspect the area and report his inspection findings. These findings were submitted to HUNNICUTT, the reviewing supervisor, who was stationed on-site from early 1984 through Jul .or August 1995. On June 10, 1996, tnis violation was revtewad by , Branch Chief, and HUNNICUTT, prior to the management exit interview. t was revtewed during the exit interview with MERRITT, TUGC0 Construction Manager; HALSTEAD, TUSCO Site QA Manager; and WELCH, Site QC Supervisor; and they all acknowledged the violation. TUGC0 representatives were also well aware of this violation in advance of the exit meeting. CUMMINGS, a second Senior Resioent Inspector, took the lead with respect to writing the report. The draft report (Exhibit 11) was completed. HUNNICUTT asked PHILLIPS to review only the paragraphs of the report which he had written because PHILLIPS had several special projects assigned, including involvement with South Texas hearings and the Houston Lighting & Power vs. Brown k Root lawsuit. findings atPHILLIPS this pointhadotheralmost no involvement than routinely withinspection discussing @ nsfection and with results
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PHILLIPS assumed responsibility for reviewing the final draft report for I accuracy when CUMMINGS left the site in August 1985. Acout Septancer 1989 WESTERMAN askeo FHILLIPS to become technically involved and to reva aw _ t findings because,HUNNICUTT and CUMMINGS were no longer en-site. Also, in late l l
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. * V . . 8 . ~ August 1985, TUGC0 had complatned that they did not agree with all of - findings. In late August or early September 1985, PHILLIPS and set with TUGC0 representatives who presented information concerning ftndings. The information presented at this ttee should have been readily available to TUGC0 during the inspection and well before the exit. In any event, TUGC0 should have responded within at least a day or two after the extt meeting to show compliance. Regardless, @ agreed to limited changes based on information presented in these seatin s. PHILLIPS also arranged for discussier.s between BOSNICK, NRC headquarters, Acui PHILLIPS. The final report was _ revised to reflect these changes anc on this basis PHILLIPS signed and concurred * with it. HUNNICL'TT also signed on October 2, 1985 (Exhibit 12). Mishandlinot WESTERMAN replaced % n August-September 1985; JOHNSON replaced M ANd WUNNICUTT was removed fraa site. ~ The mishandling occurred shortly after WESTERMAN and BARNES were assigned to the RIV Comanche Peak Task Group and case on-site. According to WESTERMAN's July 20, 1986, statement, it appears that WESTERMAN sought out TUSCO personnel who were following up on i,e report because in his sind, he questioned the violation concerning Item 10 in Exhibit 11; i.e., where the NRC inspector was unable to retrieve records. WESTERMAN further stated that he knew TUSCO's system was not fast but they have , always been able to come up with documentation. As a. result of TUSCO's ability to retrieve one single piece of paper two months after the exit, WESTERMAN launched into a reinspection of virt ully all findings. WEETERMAN directed PHILLIPS to review findings and meet'with TUGC0 to listen to their disagreement with fin'ings. d PHILLIPS does not recall TUGCO's ever disagreeing with Concern No. 1 in those meettngs but they did disagree with some findings on the ASME Section III Code. The final inspection report (Exhibit 12.a) was forwarded for N00 NAN's review and apparently HAUGHNEY's consents were taken as an opportunity to make additional changes. In this case, a consultant, who had reviewed and inspected nothing, was used to counter the inspector's detailed review and inspection. WESTERMAN subsequently set with and/or had long and loud conversations with PHILLIPS and M several times between September 1885, and January 1996. was badgered and harassed, for no good reason, to change his findings. disagreed with WESTERMAN tach time he tried to persuade him that Co'ncern No. I was not a violation. WESTERMAN attempted to solicit PHILLIPS support to PHILLIPS convince @ this did not suppert was neither but WESTERMAN a violation or an agreed with unresolved M and ites. stated that this was clearly a violation. WESTERMAN's attitude toward PHILLIPS changed at this point and pressure and harassment to wear PHILLIPS down has continued until the present. It was WESTERMAN's responsibility to escalate the differences but instead WESTERMAN ignored the differing professional opinions of both @ }nd PHILLIPS and directed that the vtolation be downgraded to an unresolved iteo without basis (Exhibit 13). This also appears to be snappropetate as it appears that M and CUMMINGS were not contacted to get their understanding, advice, or concurrence on such changes to the report. It is not clear as to whether HUNNICUTT was informed of the difference and changes. { ' __ _ _ - _ _ - 9
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e . 9 PHILLIPS signed the re,2 't in October and thought that WESTEJAN had in some way - - resolved 1986. PHILLIPS the issue later wibe Q'c[ame aware that M h d refused to sign the reportM iefo and never had agreed with downgrading the violation. E and , [tatedtheirdifferenceoftechnicalopinionconcerning changes in the final inspection report. JOHNSON, HALL, WESTERMAN, and BARNES had a meeting with M and M 'on February 25, 1986, but PHILLIPS was not , invited to this meeting. RIV management simply ignored PHILLIPS, CUMMINGS, and perhaps HUNNICUTT as thay were not allowed to attend. If RIV management had required all to attend, differing professional opinions would have resulted. PH!LLIPS Understands A pi Safety Significance This concern is significant.from several standpoints such ass (1) Contention 5 licensing issue, (2) failure of NRC management to regulate instead of proacte the licenstng of Comanche Peak Steae Electric Station (CFSES), (3) TUGCO's GA program and plan deficiencies, (4) technical deficiencies, and (5) differing professional opinions. - 1. The significance of Contention 5 is that it claims that quality assurance / control provtstons required by t!fa construction permits and Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 were not adhered to concerning the placement of the reactor vessel for Unit 2. It appears that the TUGC0 quality program was not properly controlling all aspects of this activity; however, NRC management refused to issue a violation which would have assured TUGC0 would take appropriate corrective steps. 2. * WESTERMAN, supported by BARNES and JOHNSON, made it clear to d PHILLIFS that they were expected to promote the licensing process and to do the work for TUGC0 by going to extremes to help them show comoltance. The two NRC inspectors were held to unrealistic performance stancaros concerning how far one must inspect after a violation is identified, in this instance, while expecting little or no performance from TUGC0 to snow compliance in a reasonable period of time. 3. The TUGC0 FSAR and QAP describe the design responsibilities; however, at
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appears that GtH did not discharge their respensteilities regarding tne coordination of design responsibilities pertaining to civil structural, and NSSS component interfaces as evidenced by their failure to develop specifications or drawings wnich would incorporate W installation criteria. Stallar problems were experiences concerning the vessel supports for Unit 2, which should have been reported as a construction deficiency, and if identified may have identified this problem as part of the corrective action. The onsite W group responsibilities were not descriceo in the FSAR, QA Plan, or other procedures; therefore, y activities are not under
l the control of the TUGC0 program and this is significant as, acccraing to j WESTERMAN, they were apparently performing engineering design functions.
Traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.0 was supposed to be equivalent to a detailed procedure; however, the failure tc follow this procedure defeated this prentse. It is unrealistic to expect the traveler system to include all design criteria and be a design cortrol document.
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_ _ _ _ _ ---- - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , . - 10 ) ! 4. and PHILLIPS do not agree with tne statement that DIA - concludes no hardware problem exists. Only the AE, NSSS, and TUGC0 can jointly determine this. NFJ anspectors perform ge'eraln inspections of design, procurement, and construction on-site, but usually have little or no der,tgn engineering expertence. Therefore, few NRC inspectors are j qualified to evaluate the complex design of the plant. Instead, NRC l tnspectors assume that design criteria is specified by the AE or other j design organizations and inspect for compliance to such criteria. Hhen noncompliance are' identified, a violation is issued concerntng failure to meet this criteria,and then, TUGC0 and the design engineering organization { are required to evaluate this deficiency ano take appropriate action. Since no violation was issued relative to this concern, the overall. - technical significance is unknown until either TU0C0 or NRC engineers, with ) design expertise, fully evaluate all aspects of these deficiencies. It is also unclear as to whether the prerequisites for vessel setting (Steps 1-19 of W procedure) were met as they were neither referenced nor checked off an the traveler. Failure to meet the prerequisites could cause design interface problems with other components because all they depend on acceptable installation of the reactor vessel. 5. d PHILLIPS have all been estraci:ed, downgraded, defamed, disfranchised, and penalized for having differing professional opinions with JOHNSON, WESTERMAN, and BARNES. They have been ridiculed to their peers, who have carried away these attitudes and in some cases, false rumors. WESTERMAN, acting as an agent of JOHNSON, harassed and pressured 4 [o change his findings to the point that he probably would have given up if PHILLIPS had joined forces with WESTERMAN and JOHNSON. Despite % ]nd PHILLIPS' differing opinions, this violation was downgraded without sound regulatory or technical support. Subsequent meetings on these differences have shown inspectors the futility and dangers of expressing differing opinions. This message has a chilling effect on inspectors and leads inspectors to take the easy way and that way is to staply avoid differences by never documenting violations. The safety significance of this effect is unmeasureacle because ci ths great influanca that the NRC has on licensees and applicants. The changing of reports after the inspectors have signed and concurred 11 unprofessional. Again, the message is so strong concerning otftering opinion, that the health and safety of the puolic is not well servec. This appears to be a persuastve RIV samagement attttude. It is so strongly promulgated that RIV inspectors soon learn to conform to the " party line" and sit back, relax, and draw their pay. M says it quite well in quotes shown in Exhibit 12.b. Concern No. 2 PHILLIPS was concerned that RIV management downgraded _ stolation (described below) to an unresolved item and because sound ragulatory and technical basis were not provided to support their action. Also unresolved items are a concern because they co not require TUGCO.to respon: to the NRC to explain the corrective action, cause and future prevention of the violation.
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.. - . - - _ _ . * '- 11 . --- In the signed inspection report the violation reads as follows: "7. Failure to Maintain Tolerances Recuired and failure to Recort Tolerance Deviations.on a Honconformance Recort "10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV as implemented by the TUSCO QAP, Section 15.0, Revision 2, dated May 21, 1981, requires that seasures shall be established to control saterials, parts or components which do not confors to requirements; and nonconforming items shall be reviewed and _ ac:spted, rejected, repaired; or reworked in accordance with documented ~ ~ procedures. " Brown and Root Quality Assurance Manual, Section 16, dated March 27, 1985, requires that unsatisf actory conditionr i~dentrTTa3 on process control documents shall be identified on a nonconforming report. " Contrary to the aDove, clearances between the reactor vessel support bracket and support shoes were not within the original or revised permissible tolerance stated in Construction Operation Traveler ME79-248-55 and the deviation was not reported on a nonconformance report. "This is a Severity Level IV Violation. (Supplement II.El (446-8505-56) ' Violations which were droppw.d or downgraded to unresolved itses do not receive the following treatment: , " Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Texas Utilities Electric Company is hereby required to submit to this office, within 30 days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including (1) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further . violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown." The final inspection report issued February 3, 1986, dropped these findings. The items just disappeared. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No. 2 Recutreeents: The requirements are described in Exhibits 1, 14, 15, and 16 and include the appropriate Criterion (XV) of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, TUGCC FSAR and QAP, and B&R QA Manual (QAM). These documents require the identification and correction of deviations, deficiencies, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances. . Noncompliance with recuirementst PHILLIPS reviewed f' d'ng and i violation which had been approved by previous supervision and HUNNICUTT). In September discussions withlEEEEEEE'related to Concern No. 1, it wasapparenttoPHILLIPSthatjllllll understood the issues and had identified a failure to occusent out-of-tolerance conditions and have _ second violation; i.e., appropriate engineering organizations evaluate the nonconforming condition.
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. . ,, , . PHILLIPS subsequently inspected the vessel installation and identified other -- instances where a NCR and/or DCA would have been appropriate. See discussten in Concern No. 1. (PHILLIPS' Understanding Of The Concern) which discusses revisions to the traveler to disposition several failures to meet W tolerances. PHILLIPS' Understanding of How Ccncern No. 2 was Mishandled Same as Concern No. 1.
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PHILLIPS' Understanding of Safety Significance - . - ' This concern is an extension of Concern No. I and the safety significance is virtually the same. Concern No. 3 and PHILLIPS were concerned violation that RIV sanagement downgraded (described below) to an unresolvec item and because sound ' regulatory and technical basis were not provided to support their action Also, . unresolved cause, correction, items do not require TUGC0 to respond to the NRC to explain the and future prevention of this violation. . " The following violation was originally proposed in Exhibit 11. 4 "8. Failure to Audit RPV Specifications / Procedures. Records Installation and As-built "10 CFR 50, Assurance (QAlAppendix Plan, 8, Criterion XVIII as implemented by the TUSLO Guality Section 18.0, Revision 2, dated July 31, 1984, requires that a comprehensive systes of planned and periodic audits be carried out to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance progras. " Contrary to the a'bove, there was no evidence that TUGC0 had auditro either l Unit 2hardware actual reactor vessel installation spectfacations, placesc.-d proceoures, placement, or as-built records. "This is a Severity Level '!V Viol ation. (Supplement II.E) (446/8505-08)." The downgraded ites in the final report (Exhibit 13) reads as felicws: "d. Records of CA Audits er Surveillance The NRC inspector requested by TUGC0 of the Untt 2 RPV installation.TUGC0 QA audits or surveillance performed TUGC0 did not make available any documentation spectfted placeaant of an audit or surveillance which evaluated criteria, placement procedures, hardware placement, or as-built records. This ites is unresc!ved pending a more comprehensive review of these activities (446/8505-07)." NOTE: See Exhibst 11 and 12 for report details that explain the basis for these violations which were described in the Notice of Violation. I 1 l ! - _ _ _ _
_ _ ______ ___ -__ _ __ _ _____ -__ _ _ - . . * * 13 PHILLIPS' Understandtna of Concern No. 3 ' ~~' Requirements! The requirements for auditing'(Exhibit 1, 17, 18 and 19) include Criterion XVll! of Accendix B to 10 CFR 50 and TUGC0 FSAR, Section 17.1.18; and QAP, Section 18. jlllllfiidnotincludeareferencetoB&RGAN, Section 19.0, and implementing procedure QAP-19.1; however, B&R also had responsibility to audit the installation of major NSSS components but no evidence of such audits have been found. Also, both TUGC0 and B&R were required to implement ANB! N45.2.12, " Quality Assurance Program Auditing Requirements for Nuclear Power . Plants." Criterion XV!!1 requires a comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits be implemented to verify compliance" with all asoects of the quality assurance program and to determine the effectiveness of tne program. ANSI N45.2.l'2 (Exhibit 18) describes, in detail, the sinimum requirements to meet Criterion XVIII of Appendix B and specifically addresses tne need to plan the audit program which includes auditing complex activities. The W installation procedure (a complex activity) states that the reactor vessel must be set correctly as it is key to installing all other major components. In this case, there was not only a requirement to audit complex vessel installation activities, but also a requirement (Exhibit 18, paragraph C.4.3) to perform supplemental audits because of previous qualitg and design problems; i.e., the reactor vessel supports were installed some 44 out-of-talerence and relates to failed design interfaces between G&H, y, and TUGCO. Noncompliance with Requirements: lllllll[requestedauditsofthereactorvessel installation because of Concern No. I and'2, and previous installation problems. jEEEEEEl3nspectedtodeterminewhy TUGC0 had not identified failure to control design t'n Concern No..I and to issue a nonconformance on out-af-talerence conditions as described in Concern No. 2. He contacted WELCH, TUSCO Site QC Supervisor, to determine if audits had been performed concerning :he installation of the Unit 2 vessel. TUGC0 found no audits of these activities andlllllll}'asalsoinformedthatnosurveillanceswereperformed. This failure to audit this complex and critical NSSS activity is a violation of Criterion XVIll of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. PHILLIPS' Understanding of How Conceen No. 3 Was Handled /Mishandlec The basis of the mishandling starts with the philosophy described in Exhibit 12b. In order to understand the handling and mishandling at this specific concern, it is important to understand the background concerning TUSCO's audit program. Also, this failure to audit cannot be considered an isolated case where the audit program did not work and this is supported by comments in the next paragraph. Backoround: TUSCO obtained their construction permit December 19, 1974. The CA program delegated certain audit responsibility to the AE, NSSS, and the constructor. Because of their dissatisfaction with G&H, AE, and tne contractor, B&R, TUGC0 took away certain responsibilities from tnese organt:ations and one specific function was portions of the audit function. TUSCO unwisely assumed audit responsibilities that a highly experienced 11censee usually does not assume and as a result, the IUGC0 audit prograa has been continuously oeticient. A 1984 NRC inspection of TUGCO's audits of W site and TUGC0 sita activittas
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revealed violations whicn were documented in the Inspection Report 8462/11 - (Exhibit 20). It also appeared that SLR eite work activities nad not been properly audited. Specifically, the sCcond part of the 64-32/11 Inspection was to similarly review the BLR audit program; however, PHILLIPS was unable to complete the inspection due to limited resources and other assignments. As the i B&R audit program was also suspect, this inspection was to be continued by C. l HALE's group on-site. { In addition, one must also consider that three consultant's reports, by LOBBIN ! and Management Analysts Corporation (MAC) indicsted that in 1976, 1977, 1976, I and 1982, serious problems, existed in the TUSCO and B&R QA program; nowever, 1t appears that TUGC0 took ltttle or no corrective action to correct these deficiencies. One of the significant itndings that was common to TUGCC and 3&R ~~~j In these consultant's reports was ineffective audit programs. Since the auctt programs validate the other 17 criteria of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, tnis 2s signaticant because of the impact on many other areas wnicn may ce deficient and go undeti:cted. PHILLIPS also found that the NRC had not perforaeo'an in-depth review of the
- TUSCO corporate office from 1974-1984 Because of this, previous violations ano
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fa21ure to perform required IE inspection, PHILLIPS has emphasiced the inspection of onsite audits by TUGCC and B&R to deteretne what activittns have or have not been audited by TUGC0 and B&R. In cases where audits have not been performed, RIV management takes the position that there is nothing that can be done as the opporutnity to audit has been lost. This is not entirely accurate as those activities can still be audited through the review of completed work records and accessible attributes for equipment or components may still be observed as a part of tne audit. In 1978, MAC (Exhibit 21) conducted an audit of TUSCO which was highly cr2tical of many TUGC0 QA program areas such as organtcation, design, procurement, complicated procedures, inadequate inspection criter2a, in-service inspection ma-ktngs, exclusion of proper engineering of nonconformances, records storage j facility, and an inadequate audit program. These areas impactec techn: cal work. Although Concern No. O relates to audits, tne audit program is responsi:le for assuring these other deficiencies do not exist. Subsequent NRC Inspections nave snown that corrective action was not taken on these deficiencies until 1994 and in some cases certain of these corrective actsans were not effective. In May 1985, PHILLIPS received the ASLB Notif; cation fres TUSCO attorneys, WORSHAM, . FORSYTHE, SAMPLES & WOOLRIDGE memorandum (Exn2 bit 22), dated May 29, 1995. According to this memorandum, it appeared tnat TUGC0 made a material false statement to PHILLIPS during the NRC S4-32/11 inspection of corporate aanagement as they said they had no other consultant reports but they nad this report that was criti and the r,esulting cal of the areas thatNotifteation PHILLIPS was inspecting. The NRC investigation NRC Board 35-067 and 55-076 (Enhisit 2D confirmed this material false statement; however, 0! failed to confirm an additional material f alse statement about TUGCO's knowlecge of tne MAC auct; of ( BLR. In January 1996, PHILLIPS ident:ited defic:encies in :ne B&R audst program and followec uo en :nese NAC auctts. In 1956, it became evident tnat TUSCC ano skR had still not taken complete ano effective corrective act2on :oncerning tne:r 1 _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
__ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - . __ , --. . gg audit programs, in May 1986, PHILLIPS wrote violations for fatlure to take "-- corrective action but in September 1986, was directed by IE headquarters and RIV management to drop these violations out of NRC Inspection Report 96-08/06 (Exhtbit 30) as they claimed C. HALE, NRC inspector, would take care of the violations. To date, these violations have not Deen issued and in a recent conversation with HALE (on January e, 1986) he said he had no intention of following up on the MAC reports. If violations are not written, PHILLIPS has informed RIV sanagement that a differing professional opinion will be written. In February 1982, pages 1, 2, 3, and 14 of the P. S. LDBBIN audit (Exhibit 24) , again advised TUSCO manageeent of serious deficiencies in the QA program which , included inadequate expertence, deftetent audit program, and an ineffective surveillance program. On June 1, 1982, a TUSCO letter (Exhibit 25) sent a copy of this audit to RIV. Contrary to what WESTERMAN says in his statements, this should have caused an in depth audit in accordance with IE Procedure 35060, " Audit of Licensee Management of QA." This alone made Procedure ;5060 priertty and it should have been performed in 1980 under MC 2512, priority 2, and special audits in 1981, 1992, 1983, and 1984 until these problems were resolved. RIV took no such action and in fact TUGC0 management of the QA fun: tion was not audited in depth from 1974 until PHILLIPS audited TUGC0 in August 1984. WESTERMAN became very def ensive about this; i.e., RIV failed to perform QA inspections and this was in November-December 1, 1984, before he was reassigned to Comanche Peak. He later made veiled threats to PHILLIPS about these matters it in' December 1985 while assigned to Comanche Peak. j l NRC Construction Assessment Team (CAT) Report (Exhibit 26), dated April 190s, i (conducted January 24 through Maren 3, 1983) identified sertous QA and hardware violations. The audit program (Exhibit'26, pages 1, B-1 through B-3,. and VIII-1 j through VII-3) was again singled out and this time it was tied to causing HVAC. ' and electrical separation deficiencies. RIV vtgerously opposed the CAT team while onsite and later their inspection report findings. The qualifications of the team were, questioned. Again RIV ignored the QA program deftetenctes at TUSCO corporate office and failed to perform required QA inspection per . Procedure 35060. Even today, it is clear that RIV management and inspectors I still believe Comanche Peak ts the best plant in the country and the fault was l with CAT members and Technical Review Team, et al. l NRC Inspection Report 84-32/11 (Exhibit 20) NRC Division Director, directing PHILLIPS and two NRC consultantswas o aucat the result of lllllll T management of this QA program. In preparing for this inspection per Procedure 35060, PHILLIPS reviewed old inspection reports and interviewed inspectors. PHILLIPS contacted CAT inspectors to avetd dupitcation of effort. HANSEN, NRC CAT inspector, told PHILLIPS he inspected the progras at the TUGC0 Dallas office but really had not had enough time to completely analy:e their progras; however, he considered their audit program to be somewhat deficient from 1974 through 1982. HANSEN sent his field notes to PHILLIPS prior to the inspecticr. As a result, this inspection was also a follow-up on has findings. PHILLIPS elected to audit TUGCD's program for 198; to avoid dupitcation. PHILLIPS found serious violations tnat indicated they had not corrected the deficiencies (Exhibit 24 and :6); however, in August 1984, PHILLIPS was unaware
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16 of the MAC audit of TUSCO (Exhibit 21) as TUGC0 purposely dented NRC this - information. Pages P-31 through P-33 (Exhibit 27) o RC ER No. 11 of NURES 0797 referenced PHILLIPS' 84-32/11 inspection report. elected to have TUGC0 respond in the Action Plan and final TU6CO Result Report; however, this was done with the thought that TUSCO would take prompt corrective steps and advise NRC of the results in a satter of 3-4 sonths. This did not happen because the TUSCO Results Report on audits was not issued until April 1986. PHILLIPS became uncomfortable with TUSCO's delay in Septesber through Octater 1985, and wrote - senos to both WESTERMAN and HALE (RIV CPTB) to folles-up on 84-32/11. This did not happen until about March 1986. However, PHILLIPS disagreed with HALE and ' the Results Report because it appeared that TUGC0 has still not corrected the probles, determined the cause, and took steps to preclude repetition. This was based on PHILLIPS findings in February 1986, which showed tnat in 1980 B&R had not audited 12 sections of their ASME QA sanual and 11 sections of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. This was teentified in February 1986, but WESTERMAN downgraded this violation to an unresolved ites. This was subsequently documented in PHILLIPS' Inspection Report 86-08/06 with two other violations (concerning TUGC0 and B&R failure to take corrective action) which were dropped. PHILLIPS was told he could not follow up on his own findings in 84-32/11 as this responsibility had been given to HALE. This is most unusual. Little.or no coordination with PHILLIPS has occurred on the closure of his findings. Inspection Specific Action Plan VII.a.4 (Exhibit 28, pages 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) and Results Report VII,.a.4 (Exhibit 29) are TUSCO's answers to audit progras deficiencies; however, they do not specifically address the MAC audit deficiencies ar.d B&R audit progras deficiencies. That is the reason that TUGC0 should be cited f or f ailure to take corrective action. TUGC.0 has never specifically responded to these violations and PHILLIPS is concerned that Unit 2 will be almost complete before they respond and by that time there will be nothing to correct. PHILLIPS contends that corrective action has not been taken by TUSCO and B&R concerning deficiencies in the site audit prograss. The RIV GPTS management has not required prompt corrective steps of TUSCO, especially with respect to the finding in 84-32/11 and previous NRC inspection / consultant findings. Although the above events happened outside the specific inspection period of Concern No. 3, such information shows the continued pattern of dropping violations and disregard for QA. Procer Handlino The inspection and documentation was properly handled while directed by M ~HUNNICUTT, and CUMMINGS. PHILLIPS' involvement was _ - secondary as he only provided EEEEEE(with background inf ormation relative to inspection Report 85-07/05 and guidance on the requirements of IE IP 50051, 50053, 50055, (Exhibit 10) which cover inspection of reactor vessel procedures, work installation, and records of all activities. Exhibit 10 (50055 page 11-1; shows the IE requirement to inspect audits (quality control inspections) performed during various reactor vessel activities. I5lllll(under HUNNICUTT's supervision, proceeded to inspect in accordance witn Exhibit to and documented his findings. ]Elllll[Tound that reactor vessel installation (and no other audit of any NSSS component was offered) had not been . _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
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. . 17 . audited by TUGC0 and no surveillance were effered to snow that something was
l done. At the exit interview, M with Mnd HUNNICUTT's concurrence,
identified this failure to audit as a violation. Three senior TUGC0 managers (MERRITT, HALSTEAD, and WELCH) were at the exit and acknowledged this finding. They offered no discussion or disagreement. As previously discussed in Concern No. 1, the report (Exhibit 11) was processed for inspectors final signature. The handling was proper to this point. Mishandlinal As discussed in Concern No. 1, the sashandling, again, occurreo because of attitudes described in Exhibit 12.0. The handling was proper until WESTERMAN and BARNES became involved and stated that this was no violation because Criterion XVIII of Appendix B, 10 CFR 50; FSAR, Section 17.1; and ANSI N45.2.12 requirements do not specifically require that the audit activities concerning the reactor vessel activities. PHILLIPS disagreed with this narrow interpretation of the regulations because NRC regulations require the audit of many things that are not specifically called by name in (Exhibit 1, 17, 18, and 19) regulations and requirements. This illogical reasoning cannot be appited to auditing as it would allow TUSCO the option of choosing to audit the residual heat removal system but not the safety injection system, or worse, if carried to further extremes as the audit requirements do not specifically name the NSSS systems. PHILLIPS further contended, with no success, that the narrow logic that TUGC0 does not have to audit the reactor vessel activities is unsound because it ignoress (1) previous NRC findings and problems experienced with Unit 1 and ~ Unit 2 reactor vessel, (2) Contention 5, and (3) NRC and ANSI standard requirements. The logic was also unsound because it also reasons that a component does not have to be audited because NRC regulations and ANSI standards do not specifically name components to be audited. Appendix B, Criterson XVl! (Exhioit 1) states that s!1 aspects of the GA program shall be audited to determine compliance and effectiveness. PHILLIPS concludeo that all aspects also includes important components such as the reacter vessel. The FSAR list of quality items (Exhibit 31) lists four major NSSS components that have always been high priority items for the Applicant and NRC relative to observation of work. The reactor vessel has always been given the highest priority and order of protection. It is reasonable to expect TUGC0 to audit all four NSSS components listed in the Q table. FSAR, Subsection 17.1.18, and the TUGC0 QAP, Section 18.0, repeated the werds of Criterion XVIll of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and has placeo this requirement on the AE, NSSS, and site contractors (Exhibits 17 and 18). The FSAR and QAP are cited as examples of requirements; however, while making
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the comparison during the preparation of Comments on Attachment MM, it also
i became evident to PHILLIPS that natther of these documents references ' ) paragraph 3.4.3 of ANSI N45.2.12 nor incorporates all of the specific { requirements of this standard; i.e., supplemental audits which are to be l performed at specific times in the contract life wnen significant i reorgant:ations or proceoure revisions occur and when safety-relateo stems are
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- _ . * * . 18 1 in jeopardy, etc. The same is true of QAP 18.0 (Exhibit 191. This is an example of a deficiency in the QA program a'fter all of TUGCO's reviews. This is another potential deviation that has not been addressed and this deviation has caused TUSCO to fail to perfors reactive audits and it say be a violation. Again, this probles can be traced to probless with procedures discussed an the MAC Report (Exhibit 21). BARNES, HALE and WESTERMAN in O!A statements (D, J, and N) reiterate that .to audit of the reactor vessel is required but offer no evidence other than that is . their belief. Individuals saking statements J and.4 have no construction * experience, that I as aware of; i.e., until reassigned from the NRC Vendor Program Branch in late 1984. Experienced construction inspectors know procedures and the requirements and how the requirements have teen applied during construction. The individual in statement D has scae construction expertence; however, he argues against any violation in tne Appitcant's f avor. With this combination, faulty reasoning has prevailed and findings were downgraded regardless of the requirements. These individuals ignored the fact that previous probless in this area should have caused suppl.esental audits in additten to routine audits to restore confidence in quality control, engineering, and construction work over the years. A violation should have been issued. , The saga of this failure to audit cannot yet be concluded. In May 1985, the TUGC0 QC supervisor followed-up on this item and concluded, as WESTERMAN did, that no audits were, required on the reactor vessel. PHILLIPS believes that this is whers WESTERMAN's position originated on this issue; i.e., from TUGC3. Mand PHILLIPS set with TUSCO, at WESTERMAhls insistence, sonths af ter the exit meeting, and M and PHILLIPS asked at this meeting for any surveillance or audits by TUGC0 or BLR. Between September 1985, and , I Feoruary 3, 1986, when the Inspection Report 86-07/05 was issued, the TUGC0 QC supervisor offered nothing to the K or PHILLIPS concerning the unresolved ites in Exhibit 13, as he had what the wanted--the violation dropped. In Nevesbar 1986, the Senior Resioent Inspector insisted on having information and J the QC supervisor finally provided a few surveillance but found that no audits j of sajor NSSS equipment installation. This information was proeuced only ~ because the NRC inspector inf os ted him that he would go to the next level of supervision to get the information if he did not cooperate. Safsty Stanifteances The significance of this concern is similar to Ccncern No. 1. In addition, this ites has been unresolved over one year without any
real correctivs action by TUGC0 (i.e., TUGCD did not aucit the installation records or if they did, they were not required to advise NRC of this corrective actieni. In December 1986, it was learned that neither TUGCD nor B&R audited the installation of sajor NSSS equipment; however, limited turveillances were l performed. These surveillancas provide a little assurance that the work (not I I the vessell was checked; however, ANSI N45.2.12 does not allow substituting I surveillance for audits. It appears that they nave been in violation for over a year. There is no way for the NRC to determine the full significance of the quality assurance and technical implications as only TUGC0 is in a posttton to determine this. If they had answereo the proposed violaticn, ?HILLIPS or _ might be in a position at this time to determine the significance. l l l 1 - - - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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~ In addition to this specific issue, many more audit program deficiencies go unanswered after years and the significance is again great because many of the {; hardwar e issues in the plant do relate to inadequate audits which allowed QA program breakdowns and', in turn, design and construction deficiencies to { accumulate for years. It is also a current concern as massive amounts of work on Unit 1, "Get Well Prograa," and Unit 2 construction have been and keep proceeding. At the present rate, all work will be completed before the NRC has all the answers and corrective action to whicn they are entitled. Concern No. 4 and PHILLIPS were concerned because about three months after TUGC0 was formally informed of the spool pieca violation, WESTERMAN directed jochangetheviolationtoaccomodateTUGCO. The following is the violation that TUGC0 acknowledged at the e::s t meeting and that was described in the first final draft inspection report (Exhibit 111. "9. Failure to Properly Identify a Scool Piece "10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII, as implemented by the TUGC0 QA Plan, Section 8.0, Revision 0, dated July 1, 1973, requires that measures be established for the identification and control of materials, parts, and components, including partially fabricated assembites. These measures snall assure that identification of the item is maintained by heat number, part number or other appropriate means. " Article NA3766.6 of ASME, Section III, 1974 Edition, requires t*at the identification of material consist of marking the material with the applicable matersal specification and grade of material, heat number or heat code of the material, and any additional marking required by this section to facilitate traceability of the reports of the results of all tests and examinations performed on the matertal. "' Contrary to the above, spool piece ;01 (DWG No ERP-CS-2-RS-76) nad netther been marked with the material spectitcaticn and grade, heat nuacer or neat code of the material. "This is a Severtty Level IV Violation (Supplement II.E) (44c/8505-09)." The following 15 the report paragraph wntch shows up in the second signed draft (Exhibit 12) and the final report (Exhibit 13): "C.o. CVCS Scool Piece 301 - Requirements for this item are stated in ASME, Section Ill, 1974 Edition through Summer 1974 Addenoa, which 15 the comettaent from the FSAR, Table 5.2-1. The item was field fabricated from bulk piping and purchased elbows and installed in tne CVCS with field welds number I and 6 (ref. BRP-CS-2-RB-07es. Tne following records were reviewedt . "BtR Code Data Report _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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. . * * 20 . " Field Weld Data Card - . 'NDE Reports . "QA Receiving Reports for piping and elbows . . "CMTRs "The installed spool piece was inspected for weld quality and to vertly that marking and traceability requirements had been set. The item had been marked with the spool piece" number (3Q1) and the B&R drawing number which providad traceability to the material certificat'ons." Notes Exhibit 32 is two pages of text taken from the details of the original and final tnspection reports. . PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No. 4, In this case, the issue is straight forward. llllllllfieldInspectedSpool Piece 301 which is a part of the Chemical Volume and Control System. As previously described in the original violation (Enhibit 11), the spool piece was not identified as required by the Code. Requirements: The requirements for identification of this spool piece are discribed in Exhibits 1 and 33-07 which include Criterion VIII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50; FSAR, Subsection 17.1.8; and TUSCO QAP, Section 8.0; require material traceability. ASME, Section III, 1974 Edition through Summer 1974 Addenda, requires material traceability and identification as does the BLR implementing procedure. The spool piece was field fabricated by S&R from bulk matertal. Asllllllll' HUNNICUTT and CUMMINGS (Branch and Section Chiefs) nad acceptec tnis fancing, PHILLIPS only reviewed the write-up (Exhibit 11) to assure prcper references were in the report. During the preparation of Comments on Attachment MM. PHILLIFS reviewed the requirements more closely, considering this review anc the olffertnc tecnn1-$ _ opinion that surfaced during a February 25, 1966, meeting between versus JOHNSON et al. Pages 6, 7, and 5 of B&R Procedure 01-QAP-ll.1-2o require three daiferent levels of identification tExhibit 37). Noncompliance? with recutrements: llllllllfppropriatelyident1ftsdSpcolPiece 301 as not having the appropriate material traceability and scentification markings apolled. " During a subsequent detailed review, PHILLIFS found tnat the cult pipe for i fabricating piping was not marked tr. accordance with BLR Frececure GI-0AP-11.1-26 which requires bulk pipe to be scentifieo Oy heat nusber,
l ASTM /ASME type and grade, schedule wall thickness, scool nuncer, drawing nummer, j and piece number. This failure to idents.iv the spool piece is a violation ci
the Coce and the BLR procedure. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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a . 2I PHILLIPS' Understanding of the Handlino/Mtshanditna of Concern No. 4 Proper handlinoi PHILLIPS provided MTith the background ano status of inspections relative'to IE Procedures 49051, 49053, 49054, 49055, and 4905e i (Exhibit 39) which are the sinisus IE inspection requirements for the reactor coolant pressure boundary piping. [ completed the inspection of the pip %~ ing in under HUNNICUTT's accordance supervision, with Exhibit 39 which identifed the violation; conducted the exit meeting with T,UGC0 management; and documented the inspection. . - . Hishandlino: This finding was properly handled until WESTERMAN; BARNES and - ELLERSHAW (page 148 of Attachae'nt D to OIA Reports reviewed the fina r e c ar,t which had been signed by all involved and was about to be signed by NR; Division Director. WESTERMAN stoppet the report from being signed-off on the basis that M3as in error relative to his interpretation of the ASME !!! Coce. This is inappropriate for a numcer of reasons; i.e., RIV management and TUSCO had known about M interpretation at the exit meetings. Also, j W _and the TUGC0 representative (who accompanied him) were unable to find ' the TUSCO required numbers on the spool piece during the inspection. TUSCO had not found them for more than two months afterwar.ds or at least they did not bring it to or PHILLIPS' attention and this is an inordinate amount of time for TUGC0 to find the identification on one spool piece. This concerned K b_ecause neither he nor the TUSCO representative could find it during the inspection. Regardless, M and PHILLIPS looked again during this second inspection and found the spool piece number was there with no explanation as to' how it got there. At this point in time (September 1985), it was inappropriate to change findings in a report that had been presented at the exit meeting; i.e., without at least discussing in the NRC transmittal letter that this follow-up inspection was done in the August through September 1985 inspection period. In WESTERMAN's statement, he stated that he consulted SARNES on ASME III, Division 1, who is a Code expert, page 150 of Exnibit 40.a. , EARNES stated on pages 10-13 of OIA, Attachment "J", that M Tas an error (Exhibic 40.b, page 11). WESTERMAN advised PHILLIPS of 3ARNES conclusion. It is not clear but based on WESTERMAN's statements, it appears that NRC management first challenged M ding and discussed it with TUSCO prior to discussing at with .p_r PHILLIPS. Accordingly, PHILLIPS, who does not consider himself a Code expert, relied on BARNES expertise. In addition, PHILLIPS did not perform c more detailed review of this matter (September 19851 because 'under pressure, agreed that the material could probably be traced and droppeo t<e violation. He did not agree with BARNES' interpretation because BARNES was considering the issue from the standpoint of a spool piece manufactured at a vendor when in fact, it was fabrtcated from bulk material on-stte. In preparing Consents on Attachment MM and Concern No. 4, PHILLIPS perforaeo a more detailec review and it aopears that B&R failed tc follow their marktng and identification instructions on pages 6-8 of B&R Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-26, - __________
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Reviston IB, and earlier revisions (Exhibit 37). The subject spool piece was - cut from bulk and this requires the app!tcation of the heat numoer, ASTH /ASNE type and grade, schedule / wall thickness, spool numner, drawing number, and piece number. This ASME procedural requirement is identical to lllllllll'or2ginal finding; however, it appearc that because llllll[3a's pressured, he ' erroneously agreed to downgrade the violation as the final report states that only the spool piece number and drawing number were applied.
l FHILLIPS, although not a " Code Expert," pursued this matter f urther when the l
procedureagreedwith_jlllllll[[echnicalopinton. A B&R staff engineer was contacted and was presented with M ]without naming persons) interpretation that NA0766.6 of ASNE, Section III, 1974 Edition,. Summer addenda versus BARNES' interpretation. The B&R construction engineer independent)y researched the Code and stated that NA37ct.6 acclied. It appears that BARNES' interpretation is not only different fromjEEElll[[butalsoc2fferentfrom PHILLIPS and a B&R staff engineer with Coca responsibility. BARNES' statements on pages 2 and 3, CIA Attachment J (Exhibit 40.b), indicates that hts experience has been almost solely manufacturing prior to coming to the NRC 4nd his expertence as a vendor inspector did not incluce nuclear power plant construction expertence. This may be the reason he interpreted the Code from tnat perspective. . Exhibit 40.a, page 112 and 113 gives the tapression that WESTERMAN may have lost his objectivity because of hearsay and, in turn, doubted PhILLIPS objectivity concerning this report for which he was not ortganally responsible. It appears that tne follow-up on M Code items and tnis specific tssue may nave become suspect for the same reason, discussed on pages 148-158. He also states, that M iss an enormous hard head." Next, TUGC0 accepts findings son pages 154 and 155) but on pages 155 and 1:a WESTERMAN states he felt 2t necessary to defend TUGCO, speak for them, and reinspect to shou compliance. Safety Siontiscance The safety significance acoears to be tnat for about tnree months TUGC0 does not have the ability to snow g ~that a single spool piece is marked. It also appears that they think thsy are in compliances however, tne marking on the spool piece does not conform with their own procedural requirement 6. It is also very significant that an inspector was pressured into dropping what appears to be a valid violation. The OIA report documents tnat there is a pervastve RIV philosophy of handling viciations informally or as unresolved items (pages 29, 30, 02, 25, 3e and 37 of the OIA reports. When inspectors feel pressured and harassed and stop reporting conditsons adverse te quality, the safety significance is great but cannot be measured because it is an unknown. That is the reason NRC sust have the same freeoom (". . . organizational freedom to identify quality problems; to inittate, recommend or provide solutions; and to versfy implementation of solutions . . . . ") as cescr:Ded for Util2ty personnel in Criterion I of "Organtratton" of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. A regulator should understand thas concept better than anyone. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -_ , _ u . . * . . ST Concern No. 5 ~~~ PHILLIPS was concerned that RIV management did not require TUSCO to respond in writing tc the vtalation concerning concrete mixer blades. The following is Item 2.c. of the Notice of Violation in the final report: " c ., Brown & Root Procedure 35-1195-CCP-10, Revision 5, dated December 4, 1973, requires that central and truck mixer blades be enecked quarterly to assure that mixer blade wear does not exceed a loss of 10% of original blade height. " Contrary to the aoove, on May 31, 1985, the NRC inspector determined tlat there was no objective evloence (records) that the mixing Olades nac oren inspected quarterly since the trucks were placed in service in if77. (445/0507-04; 446/35-02)" The following is the required response in the ortginal drait report: "During this inspection, it was found that certain of your activities were in vtolation of NRC requirements. Consequently, you are required to respond to this violation, in writing, in accordance with the provision of Section 0.001 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Feceral Regulations. Your response should be based on the specifics contained in the Notice of Violation enclosed with this letter." The following (paragraphs 3 and 4 from NRC letter of transmittal, dated February 3, 1985) show that the requirement to respond to the violation was dropped. "During this inspection, it was found that certain of your activities were in violation of NRC requirements. Consequently, you are reautred to respond to this violation, in writing, in accordance with the provision of Section 2.201 of the NRC's " Rules of Practtce," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Your response should be based on the spec fics contained in the Nott:e of Violatton enclosed with this letter. Since B&R Procedure 35-1175-CCF-10 has been revised to provide documented inspection of truck mixer blaces, there was no abnormal blade wear identified as a result of blade inspection, and tnere have been consistent concrete strength and untforalty tests, no reply to vtalation 0.c is required. " Pursuant to the provisions of 10 C"FR 2.201, Texas Utilities Electric Company is hereby required to suosit to this office within 30 days ci the cate of -he letter transmitting this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including f or each vt alations (1) the reason for the violations ti admitted, (2) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (;) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid furtner violations, and (41 the cate wnen full compliance will be acnieveo. Where good cause is shown. :enstderat1Jn will be given to extending the response time." The details of this inspection are descr2:ec 2n Enni:it 11-10.
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j PHILLIPS' understanding of Concern No. 5 Reovirements: The requirements are described in the Notice of Violation quoted above and in Exhibits 11-13. Noncompliance: The noncompliance is also adequately described in ; Exhibits 11-13. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Handlino/ Mishandling of Concern No. 5 Proper handlino: Similar to Concern No. 1 and four other concerns, tn. 4!ncings were being properly handled by M and HUNNICUTT. @ letter ar,u Notice of Violation required a respons? to this violation. PHILLIPS probably should have made thip violation a Level IV violation; however, TUGC0 was given the l benefit of this doubt. M'I s h a n d l i n o The mishandling occurred when ,BARNES and WESTERMAN came to site and got involved. WESTERMAN informed PHILLIPS that TUGC0 would not be required to respond. PHILLIPS disagreed and never subsequently agreed with this position because.of the following: . PHILLIPS only inspected the blades of one of three trucks for wear. Since no response was required, TUGC0 does not have to look at the other two trucks and inform the NRC of their condition or if safety-related concrete placements were affected. l . PHILLIPS found that an inspection requirement existed for quarterly l inspection of the blades for 10 years but tnere was no evidence the l' inspections had been conducted. This alone merits a response, as no apparent technical problem (an unapparent technical proolem may e::1st) does not justify dropping QA corrective action. j . PHILLIPS also stated that a required response often causas the utility to i look deeper to find the cause. Sometimes it applies to other inspection l areas or procedures. Therefore, a response may have caused the quality assurance organization to review other inspection procedures to determine if inspections were being accomplished as required and documented. In this case, it is also important to note that the blade inspection frequency should have been less frequent as it was a waste of inspection time that could nave been applied to other higher inspection priorities. . WESTERMAN again gave the impression that he was protecting TUGC0 from . unreasonable demands by inspectors. Safetv Significance: The technical significance of this violation as it l specifically relates to concrete mixer blades of one truck and adequate concrete , l is quite low technically; however, PHILLIPS states that the safety significance may be higher with respect to the two trucks not inspected oy NRC. To saf it ; has low significance would require the NRC inspector to tnspect all trucks. l Obviously, a single NRC inspector cannot, and should not be expected to inspect I three trucks under the circumstances; 1.e., once the violation is established, ) it is TUSCo's responsibility. l . _ _ _ -
_ _ - _ - __ - _ - - - _ - - - . . c ..o . * .- . ' 25 Insaection Report 50-445/05-14: 50-446/95-11 (95-14/11) '-~? Concern No. 1, 2. and 1 PHILLIPS and YOUNG were concerned that RIV management not only downgraded i violations concerning the shipment of sole copies of design records to
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, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation.(SWEC) in New York and several other , branch offices in different states but also dropped these fi'ndings from the report. i OIA Report, Attachment MM, (Exhibit 41.a, page 9) adequately describes che issues.
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The violations in Exhibit 42.a were to be written as one violation of Crite-ion XVII vio'ation with multiple exampies. The one exception was . Criterion V violations; i.e., TUGCO's failure to have procacures in place to control the shipment of design records. Pages 1-4 of Exhibit 42.4 toriginal draft report, paragraphs 5.a-b, in the Details Section) cover these issues; . however, one concern was not addressad in Attachment MM; i.9., the failure to I incorporate 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requirements and commitments into the highest- QA manuals by reference cr.by describing sucn requirements in the various QA sections.. Exhibit 42.b, pages 67 and 68 of the second draft, dated Decemoer 3, .1986, shows that violations were downgraded and much of the text was also dropped from the final report. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern rios, t. 2. and 7. Requirements: The requirements are described in Exhibit i, 43, 44, and 45, which include appropriate portions of 10 CFR 50 (Criterion XVII) Appendix B;. FSAR Section 17.1; ANSI N45.2.9l and TUSCO QAP. Noncocaliances with Recutrements/ Commitments: The following discusses the original noncompliance which YOUNG identified and are described in Exhibit 42.a. . "TUSCO failed to have/use procedures to control shipment of original records to SWEC." This finding was dropped from the report. ~ ' - ' innding is very important as it may be the cause of all of the noncomplian. acerning records cescribid in the Inspection Report 85-14/11. Accordingly, tne most important aspect of the ; proposed violation was lost and, of course, TUGC0 does not nave to address tne correction or cause if it is not in the fina! Notice of Violation. Criterton XVll, Exhibit 4, states that the Applicant shall establish requirements for record retention. FSAR 17.1.17, Exhibit 43, requires pracedures which will estaclish a QA records system to include all of the elements to control, account for, and protect against deterioration and damage. I
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- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . * . . * * 26 FSAR LA(b)-3o (Exhibit 44.bl commits to implement the requirements in accordance with ANSI N452.9. Paragraphs 5, 5.3, and 7 (Exhibit 44.a) require procedures to include a description of the storage area (or areas). This would include permanent and nonpermanent storage areas. Special processed records; such as, ' radiographs, photographs, negatives, and microfilm are relutred to ce stored in an area to preserve them. Section 6, Retrieval, states that the system snall provide f or the accurate retrieval of information without undue calay. . .Section 7 describes the requirement to assure the accumulation and transfer of records. " Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station QA Plan," (Exhibit 45) does not fully comply with Exhibit 1, 43, and 44. as it does not spectftcally include ano address all the requirements of the higher tier document as they apply tJ tne site as follows: . The definition of a 04 record (Exhibit 44.a, page 11). . Location of all permanent and temporary storage areas or reference to suo tier procedures which give location (Exhibits 43 and 44.a). . Specific on-site organi:ations responsible for permanent and temporary records storage; e.g., TUGC0 vs Chicago Bridge & Iron, Bahnson, Westinghouse Service Division IWl, etc. and interface req ~utrements and agreements when records are to be transferred between organt:ations (Exhibit 43 and 44.a). . . The definition of Lif etime/ Nonpermanent QA records to classify records as required (Exhibit 43 and 44.c). . Requirement .to index (Exhibit 43 and 44.al. . . Retention requirements (Exhibit 43 and 44.al. . Receipt of records (Exhibit 43 ano 44.4). . Retrieval (Exhtbit 43 and 44.a). . Accumulation and transfer of records (Exhibit 43 and 44.a). . Instead of the CPSES QA Plan, Section 17.2, estaclisning the requirements, it states, " Quality Control documents are initialed, collected, ano maintained in accordance with approved procedures,' and infers tnat the lower tier documents set the requirements. This procedure is also improper because it only addresses QC procedures and should be addresstag CA procedures, it defers responstbtlity for defining records to the organt:ation implementing procedures. The responsibility for record
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systems is also described in tne lower tier procedures. This . ! organi:ational approach to control of recor:s nas caused estreme problems. l . " Original design records shtsped in caraboard boxes althout making backup Copy." l
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____ ..---_._ _- . - . . . *- , , * * 27 . This findtng was drcpped from tne report; however, it is an important part of "- ' the originally proposed violation. Criterion XVII of Appenoix B requires a description of record retention and that includes assigned responsibility, location, and duration (Exhibit 1). Exhibit 43 gets more specific and states: (1) procedures shall descrice responsibility, (2) that records will be protected against damage ano deterioration, and (3) the method of transfer between organi:attons. Exhibit. 44.a describes in even greater detail how to meet tne 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII requirement. Although no document is ever totally prescriptive enough to cover absolutely everything, this ANSI document is sufficiently prescriptive and descriptive tc tell a new applicant (TUGCO) how records should be :entrolled. When construction tirst begins, each applicant is .. quired to protect and preserve the first piece of paper down to the last piece oi paper that is defined as a OA record of safety-related activities. AN31 defines unat a Qa record is. Paragraph 5.4(1) requires that records be kaot in a permanent f acility in standard steel cabinets or, if this is not practical, keep them tn fire resistant cabinets (1-hour rating) or an alternative is to keep duplicate records stored in a separate, tesote location. ' This logic does not change when all design activities are completed. The requirement to afford permanent.or temporary protection for design of piping racercs became more important at this point. The precedent for an NRC inspector has been to write violations on a few important records not given tai s minimum protection when construction begins and this is a well established fact. Therefore, it is illogical that a violation would not be written anen the bulk records were not protected. Regardless, paragraph 5.3(6) states tnat a method of control and accountability must be established by procecure. Control includes preserving bulk destgn records during movement from point a to point 3. This can be done two ways (1) transfer the records in fire rated cabinets, oaxes, or wrap with fire resistant matertal; or (2) retain a duplicate copy. TUGC0 neither accounted for the records (inventory) nor assureo that the methoe of transfer was appropriate. Instead, TUGC0 informed the NRO thats til it was too expensive and time consuming to cuplicate the recor s or seno them in fire resistant cabinet or otherwise, and (2) they had the rignt to proceso at their own risk. The last statement appears to disregard tne regulatory requirements in favor of cost ano schedule. . " Failure to :ontrol and account for QA/cesign records transterrec trom site to SWEC." This was a concern but not because the proposed violation was dropped. The concern nere was that the details were severely edited and this left out tne magnitude of the problem and the stated reason for the violation; 1.e.. TUGCO's policy was to proceed at rtsk because of senedule and cia not duplicate or snto the records in fire resistant cabinets because of :ost. This poilcy was also stated to NRC oy var tous corporate CA and site managers wnen tne C211 issue arose. .
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< l l . , 1 r . , J . . 28 L I PHILLIPS' Understanding of Mishandling: YOUNG identiftad the violations - i described in Exhibit 42.a. While the inspection was still in progress, WESTERMAN became aware of these violations and the inspector was unable to complete the inspection before pressure was being applied to not consider these as violations. WESTERMAN stated that TUGC0 could proceed at risk and co what they wanted to do with these old records because the records became in-process documents when removed from the QA records vault and no longer have to oc protected in accordance wi.th Criterion XVl! Records of Appendix 9 to 10 CFR 50 and ANSI N45.2.9. An additional reason was stated to be the fact that once the - engineering reanalysts is completed they will be no longer be needed and the new analysts is all that is important. PHILLIPS and YOUNG having many years of construction experience on-site did not agree these illogical arguments. Toward the end of the month, HESTERMAN stated he would agree that TUGCO's failure to have and implement accountability and inventory controls was a violation but, after much pressure and badgaring, directed that all the other items be dropped. WESTERMAN mishandled these issues because he dropped ta ortan _ details from the body of the report. Also, his technique desertbed in statement was to harass, pressure, and badger the NRC consultant and sentor resident into surmission. He spent so such time doing this he actually disrupted several inspections. So euch of PHILLIPS' ttee was used between Septemoer and December 31, 1985, that he experienced difficulty in getting his other work done and in providing guidance to three personnel who worked for him at that time. Safety Significance: The safety significance is that TUGC0 has completed Unit I but has not fully described QA record requirements in TUSCO QAP, Section 17.0. Exhibit 21, MAC Report, page 5, describes a complex array of procedures which are difficult to maintain current and consistent. Exhibit 21, MAC Report, page 15, shows that this consultant also recogni:ea that neither TUSCO permanent nor temporary storage met ANSI N45.0.9 requirements in 1978. TUGC0 never corrected the records problem as they said they would in their response to MAC. \ The significance of shipping all of the paping design records to SWEC, New rork, and various offices is that TUGC0 risked the loss of all tnese design recer:s because of cost and schedule. This attitude has causeo them to fall inte the q big hole tney are trying to climb out of; however, this attttude still Itngers, ] j
l The significance of shipping all records without a spec 2fic inventory ano a !
method of accountability (i.e., how many records were sent from site and now many records did SWEC receive and the reverse process to return to site) results in not knowing if all records were received by SWEC and all were returned to site. The significance of dropping the issues from the NRC report is that TUGC0 was not formally required to address these issues that appear to be generte. The significance of WESTERMAN's application of pressure and badgering inspectors caused tospectors to drop tmportant findings. Perhaps the NRC will never know l l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
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, . 3@ - how many issues were never brought up by other RIV inspectors on this and other - projects. Differing professional opinions do not come about in this type anytronment. Concern No. 4 and No. 5 - PHI P a.ndllllllll ere concerned that RIV management downgraded two of violations concerning TUGCO's failure to assure that CB&I records (generated on-site) were'not af' forded temporary storage protection in transit to Houston, Texas, and these records were not inventer.ied and accounted for prior ' f to leaving site which made a seaningful inventory after their return to the site unlikely. 1 I Exhibit 46, pages 11 and 12 of Attachment MM to OIA Report, describes this concern in more detail. Exhibit 42.a. pages 2, 3, and 4, of the original draft report descri nes llEEEEEEE violations as originally written in the body of the report. One was downgraded in the body of the next draft report (Exhibit 42.b, pages 68-70) and the other was subsequently downgraded before the final report was issued. j I The final inspection report-(Exhibit 42.c) was iss,ued March 6, 1986, and was j watered down to the point that it has little resemblance to tae origtnal l findings. l I P H I L L I P'S ' Understanding of ' Concerns No. 4 and No. 5 ) i Requirements: Exhibits 1, 43, 44, and 45 which applied to Concern No. 1, 2, and ] 3, also apply to Concern No. 4 and 5. Noncomoltance with Requirements / Commitments: lllllllidentifiedaviolation , which would have been a further example of one violation of Criterion XVl! , 1 examples; 1.e., failure to assure proper control, inventory, and transfer of records between organizations as required by the above exhibits. Specifically, the requirements of Criterion XVll of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 as described in Subsection 17.1.17 were violated as follows: . "This f ailure to transmit records in accor3ance with a procedure and afford protection in transit equal to temporary storage reguirem4Ats are additional examples of violation identified in paragraph a b 'o v e . " Exhibit i requires that the applicant establish requirements concerntag record retention. The other words in Criterion XVII (assigned responsibtitty and locations mean a description f rom top to bottom of the handling of records. Location, not only means static, but also means dynamic or movement. UEEEEEEE~ found no such controlling procedure in place and TUSCO did not state that thev had not assured the implementation of such controls. CBLI had left site,$EEEElIE$_ was forced to accept TUSCO's statement regarding what happened. An alternative would have been for CB&l, Houston, tb come tc tne site but it appcared that TUGC0 provided sufficient information to show it was a violation. Also, it is doubtful that all personnel involved were at CB&I,. Houston, Texas, and could have shed more light.
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.' . , . . , . . 30 . Itshouldbenotedthatllllll[[aswellcwarethataCB&lprocedureexisted; however, his review of their procedure showed that the CB&I procedure was inadequate; i.e., they had the option to send records in cardboard boxes or otherwise sail them. None of these measures assured protection in route commensurate with FSAR 17.1.17 requirements (t.e., protect from damage or ' deterioration). The final NRC report erroneously shifts the emphasis from a TUGC0 responsibility to a CB&1 procedure; however, TUGC0 at no time showed that they had in any way assured that CBLI gave required protection wnile shipping- - thase irreplaceable records. . "The failure to maintain control and provide accountability of records removed from storage is another example of the deviation identified in paragraph above." This should have been a violation as tt also violates the Criterton XVII concerning responsibility and location. CPSES QAP 17.0 (Exhibit 45), is a shallow procedure and requirements such as method of transfer between remote locations ano inventory are not specifically addressed. This allows lower tier organt:ations on-site to establish arbitrary requirements and this is not proper as lower tier procedures are to implement the requirements. - PHILLIPS' Understanding of the Mishendlina of Concern No. 4 and No. 5 PHILLIPS incorporated M [tndings into the report. In this case, WESTERMAN concentrated tne pressure on PHILLIPS to remove the violation from the report and finally directed that it be removed when PHILLIPS would not agree with WESTERMAN's logic that site generated containment liner and other records belonged to CB&I instead of TUGCO. TUGCO, in WESTERMAN's presence, also maintained that important and irreplaceable site records; such as, containment liner, structural steel restraints, tanks, etc., belonged to CB&I and they were free to control them as they pleased. In reply to PHILLIFS' question of such records being destroyed in transit, sentor TUSCO management stated that tt was a TUGC0 policy and they could proceed at their own risk. PHILLIPS contends that if nd requirements existed, it would not ce prudent for WESTERMAN to endorse such a policy. When WESTERMAN found that PHILLIPS would not agree, he directed that the violation be dropped from tne report and gave PHILLIPS the option to wrtte a letter to Headquarters to resolve the ditference in technical opinion. PHILLIPS wrote this letter which discussed the differences and forwarded it to WESTERMAN. According to the 014 report, this letter " languished" in ERIC JOHNSON's office. WESTERMAN made no further effort to follow Concerns No. 4 ano 5 until after the ' 0!A investigation started. In desperation, WESTERMAN apparently had a number of people working on the concerns and other matters in report 85-07/05 and other reports to and his during the CIA interview process. PHILLIPS was never acvised of this additional work; however, in tne various 01A statements tt is apparent that such work was done. It was probably done netween WESTERMAN's first interviews on July 11 and July CO. 1986, the day before the last interview. For e/ ample. WESTERMAN states that CB&I transferred the records to Houston, Texas, l l . ______ _
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. . 31 ' . in fire resistant cabinets. This information is not even in TUGCO's file. "-- PHitLIPS has followed up on this information with TUGC0 but tney nave never stated this to be the case even as late as December 198o. Safety Significance It is safety significant tnat TUGC0 has not shown to date (and will probably be unaole to) that every record that left site was returned. This is significant from a quality assurance and a hardware standpoint because records prove the quality of the reactor liner and other hardware. This-does not even consider the tnit I records transfer and how it was nandled. NRC follow-up inspection is incomplete and the full significance is not yet known. TUGC0 has stated that the records have been returned; nowever, it is safety significant that sucn irreplaceable records were transferred in accordance with a CB&I procedure that does not require that a duplicate copies be retained at site or shipment in fire resistant containers or wrapping. TUGCO's stated policy allows them to continue the practice as TUGC0 says it is at their own risk. The fact that NRC managers downgrade or drop safety concerns and do not forware letters containing differing technical opinions is very significant because it is downgrading the NRC regulations that nelp protect the healtn and safety of the public. Pressure and harassment of inspectors also add a dark cloud instead of professionally resolving the issues. This is highly significant because of the need for freedon to identify problems and see that soluttons sc1ve conditions adverse to qualit / including the control of records of harcware acceptability. Concern flo, 6
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PHILLIPS and YOUNG were concerned that management dropped 10UNG's /tclation concerning the failure to affarc protection to records removed from the Q4 vault and placed in nonfire-rated cabinets located in trailers at multiple iteld locations. Exhibit 47, pages 10 and 14 of Attachment MM to the OIA Report, descrises Concern No. 6. Exhibit 42.a, pages 4-5 of the original draft inspection report, descrites tne violation wnich was ortginally written. In accordance with IE guidance IMC 0610), this was to be an example of the one Criterion XVII violatten proposed. Exhibit 42.b, pages 76-77 of the second draft inspection report, dated Deceober 12, 1985, was rewritten to provide more information to convince RIV management that this was a violation. Exhibit 42.c, page 1; of the final inspection, downgraded the vtalation. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No. 6 Requirements (Exhibit ' , Criterton 4VII: Ennioit 43, 44, and 453 watch also apply to Concerns No. 1, 2, and 3, also apply to tnis concern.
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* * 32 * ) \ l Nancompliar;L: The failure to protvet GA records removed from tne CA vault to - - -- l facilitate work in process is a violaticn of Criterion XVII; newever, it may alternatively be considerad a deviation from Exhibit 44.a. All of the references require the protection of GA records from damage and deterioration. PHilLIPS' Understanding of the Handlina/ Mishandling of Concern No. 6 Proper Handlinc: YOUNS found that TUSCO had removed large quantities of QA records from the OA vault in order for construction personnel to be able to revtew previously completed work and facilitate new work. The records were moved to several different locations on-site that would be convenient for construction. Both PHILLIPS and f0VNG considered this move to expedite work a good work practice; however, both cecame concerned when it was learned that the completea original OA records removed from the QA vault were stored, in some I cases, in regular file cabinetc in tra11ers without maintaining a backup copy. f0VNG and PHILL-IPS challenged this practice and asked wny this pas done. The first answer was that it was too expensive to purchase fire-rated cabinets. Further, review of this matter revealed that the definition of a raccrd in their commitment (Exhibit 44.a, page 11) had been ignored by TUGC0 and they replaced thic definition with their own definition (Exhibit 48). TUSCO created a definition to fit the practice instead of fitting the practice to the ANSI N45.2-9 definition which states, in part, *0ualitv 4ssurance Recores. Those records which furnish documentary evidence of the quality of items and of activities affecting quality. For the purposes of this standard a document :s considered a quallty assurance record wnen the document has been comolet?d." The practice was to take a multitude of completed documents that had alreacy been classified as QA records and were in the vault, mix them with incomplete documents where work was still in-progress, place a work traveler on top of the package, and call this mixture "in-process" documents. These cocuinents were not in fire-rated cabinets and no duplicate existed. YOUNG's finding was presented at the extt as a violation by PHILLIPS. MERRITT, Senior TUGC0 Manager, asked for clarification and discussion. PHILLIPS explatned again and a BLR manager at the meeting stated that it would be too costly to store these OA records in fire resistant cabinets. Mishandling: At the exit, WESTERMAN apparently agreed with the cost statement. He later told PHILLIPS there was no requirement to protect GA records (completed documents) removal from the vault because they oecame in-crocess dccuments. PHILLIPS and YOUNG agreed that GA records could be removea from the file to facilttate work but that TUGC0 ts required to give the QA records atxed witn the in-process document temporary protection at the- end of the work day as requireo by ANSI N45.2.9. WESTERMAN spplied pressure to drop this finding altogether tecause he said tne NRC Technical Revtew Team (TRT) had found iie practice acceptable and so documented it in SSER 11; however, the CIA report also pointed out that SEER 11 also inoicated they were in fire resistent cactnets. _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
' . ' .. . . * * 33 4 O HALE concurred with WESTERMAN's definition of in process documents; newever, ___ HALE only gave his opinion and no supporting documentation. HALE gave no precedent because he has little construction expertence as ne worked in NRC Vendor Branch until 1984. P.HILLIPS and YOUNG have years of construction expertence and have observed many licensee's and appitcant's practices across the United State 3. This is the first time they encountered a utility that so grossly does not understand this requirement to protect records. It is also the first time to encounter NRC inspectors who do not understand this reoutrement. PHILLIPS was directed to drop this violatton. WESTERMAN met with TUGC0 management, without PHILLIPS being present, and later tnformed FHILLIPS they did not consider it a requirement to protect these records but would buy the fire-rated cabinets to protect these records. Subsequent to this, other TUGC0 QA managers stated, at different times during the last year, that they would not~be"plice~d into the appropriate cactnets. PHILLIPS has oeen unable to followup on this iten as TUGC0 has been delaytng in hopes that the finding would go away. PHILLIPS last conversation with the TUGC0 QA Director on December 15, 1986, revealed that they would not revise their procedure to require any such practice but they will do it only because it is prudent. PHILLIPS replied that this is not acceptable because they will not admit it is a requirement.and/or a . commitment and if they store for prudency only the NRC has no reason to inspect the QA records so stored. Safety Significance: The significance of this concern has diminished somennat because TUGC0 says the QA records are now stored in fire-rated caoinets; however, the NRC cannot be assured that the records will continue to be stored in this manner because TUGC0 refuses to consider this a requirement. It is significant that on January 8, 1987, PHILLIPS requested the TUGC0 QA Director to provide the locattons of all QA records storage areas, coth temporary and permanent, and the procedures which describe such locations. As of January 1c, 1997, the TUGC0 QC supervisor had provided procedures but could not state wnere all temporary record storage areas are. *nscection Reoort 50-345/95-16: 50-446/95-17 (95-16/13) Concerns No. 1. 2. and 3 FHILLIPS was concerned that RIV downgraded a series of potential violations to unresolved items involving TUGCO's system for controlling construction deficiency reporting or 50.55(e) documentation. fccording to the deaft inspection report, these potential violations included the following: . "TUGC0 failed to developrie:<lement a procedure to show or reference objective evidence that deficiencies were corrected,
i
. "TUGC0 failed to revtse implementing procedures before corporate NE] Procedure CS-1 was implemented, resulting in a confitet utth itve otner
- procedures.
, i I - i _ _ _ _ _- -__ _
. A s . . * ' 34 . "TUGC0 failed to maintain 50.55(e) files (QA records) that were --- retrievalbe, i.e., could not produce record in almost a conth." Exhibit 49, page 14-16 of 01A Report, Attachment Mit, adequately describes these s specific issues. ' Ex'hibit 50, original rough draft report completed about December 20, 1985, pages 3-1 through 3-6, shows these violations as originally written. This rough draft was handed to WESTERMAN before typing and editing to allow JOHNSON and WESTERMAN to prepare for a meeting on the subject. PHILLIPS had told WESTERMAN about difficulties experienced si.nce October 1985 and, proposed violations would have resulted in the following: (1) a violation of Criterion V, " Procedures," with two examples; (2) a violation of Critericn XVII, "0A Rec rds"; and (3) a 10 CFR 50.55(e) violation, " Failure to Report Corrective Action." The final report issued August 16, 1986 (Exhibit 51), dropped all the proposeo violations and inserted an unresolved item based on otscussions between WESTERMAN and TUGC0 in which PHILLIPS was not involved. WESTERMAN later Informed PHILLIPS of commitments made by TUGC0 to form a Task Force. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No, t. 2. and 3 Recutrements: The requirements are desertbed in E::hibi ts 1, 14, 15, ! 6, 44.a, 52 and 53 which include 10 CFR 50.55(e); 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and XVII; ar.d the TUGC0 FSAR, TUGC0 DA Plan.- Guidance: The NRC had provided TUSCO with 10 CFR 50.55(e) guidance which is in the back of the IE Manual Chapters (Exhibit 54) as RIV routinely did this ta 1979-1981. This is guidance to the NRC inspectors concerning the applicact!ity of Appendix B Criteria.' Contrary to statements made by WESTERMAN, the IE Interpretation is that construction deficiency reporting comes under appl.caole Criteria of Appendix 3 to 10 CFR 50; t.e., as a minimum Criterton V ann XVII. Noncompliance with Requirements: The'iollowing disc'.sses tne logic f or each violation ortgtnally proposed. "TUGCD failed to develop / implement a procedure to show or reference ( J objective evit'ence that deficiencies were corrected." This proposed violation is the most important aspect of this :oncern as it ias caused TlfGCO's 50.55(e) reporting system to be deficienct. MCOLESKY, NRC consultant, started inspecting the TUGC0 30.55(e) systeo sn October 1985 and had made little progress by February 1996. A large number of man hours were expended before giving up the efiart as useless at the time. PHILLIFS and MCCLESKY (experienced in 50.55te] reporting) asked for information to close out the 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiencies and TUGC0 was unaole to provide it. MCCLESKI was to review the individual 50.55(e) files and then fteld ve tfv
i
the correction of these deficiencies. TUGCC could not reactly tcenttiy the NCR,
! DCA. or test deftciency report (TDR) which originally identifted or descrtbed ( tne deficiency. The reason they could not readily ident:ty tnese reports was j i
that their 50.55(ei reports to NRC were so poorij written tnat they dij not _ --___- _____________ -
- - . , 6 . . . . 33 reference the documents which identified tne deftetency in the field or Identify ~~~ the resultant corrective action document. Either document, if referenced in, the l report to the NRC, would have allowed tne inspector to pull the report from the file and identify the proper document. This would allow the inspector to go to j the QA records vault and obtain.the document from a file clerk snd, after reviewing this document, he could go directly to tne field and observe the deftcient systems component or part. If the records were in the " paper flow group," they should be indexed and retrievable. The document would also provtde identification numbers whereby the inspector could obtain specifications and drawings from the document control office. ] 1 TUGC0 could only respond to such a request dy directing the inspector to a manager, an engineer, B&R inspector, or some other person who may have been 1 involved at one time. In many cases, this method led to gotng from person to person over a several day period to learn what they knew. The information tney provided was sometimes from memory or notes in their desk drawers. After a knowledgeable person was found, the search started for the appropriate documents. It took varying amounts of time to identify one appropriate document ! out of thousands in the GA records vault. The person's ability to retrieve I documents is also impacted by other priorities and memory. Instead of ; retrievab!e GA records system, TUSCO has a retrievable persons system to get ! many of their records. L i Cnce faced with this serious retrievability problem, TUSCO finally admitted they i l had a problem with 50.55(e) records and asked the NRC inspectors to terminate ! their inspection untti they could get a handle on things. l TUGC0 stated that they were writing a new Procedure (NEO CS-ll whicn would help correct these problems. They asked PHILLIPS and MCCLESKY to review the final draft and make comments, and MCCLESKY made comments to TUGC0 which spect f t cally ccacerned the fact that the procedure did not adequately describe what identification and corrective action documents should be otther referoncac in { the 50.55(e) report to the NRC, or referenced in a letter to t'ile, or otr.erwise j cross indexed to or from the nonconformance or design change log. Gescate these !
l
comments, TUGC0 issued the procedure without aadressing how the 50.55(et report j referenced the NCR, DCA, cr TDR, or cross indexed logs to tne 50.55(e# l deisciency report. ) NOTE: One must not lose sight of the fact that this 4pplicant is not just starting to construct a nuclear plant but has completed Unit 1 anc is close to
! completing Unit C. PHILLIPS and MCCLESKY had never encountered such ineptness
and they have inspected a large number of other nuclear plants. This failure to have adequate procedures as required by Exhibits 1, is a violation of Cetterton V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. (
, "TUSCO failed to revise implementing procecures before corporate NEO
Procedure CS-1 was implemented, resulting in conflict dith five other procedures." l l MCCLESKY directea the acove violation to FHILLIPS attertion. FHI L1ri, antle I writing the violation, checkeo to vertfy tnat TUGCC nad revised tne sucorcinate .
_- , c . .
. . .
* * 36 ~- ' implementing procedures before issuing the corporate procedure. Such revtstons were important because the corporate prockdure affected responsibilities, deportability critert a, notification policy, and reporting instructions. This failure to revise procedures as required by Exhibit 53 is a violation of Criterion VI, Document Control. i "TUGC0 failed to maintain 50.55(e) files (QA records) that were retrievable, i.e., could not produce record in almost a month." . TUSCO's inability to retrieve records is a violation or at least a deviation, depending on onw's enforcement outlook. Exhibit 43, page 17.1-41, states that the method of identification and indextn3 l of records for ease of retrievability will be assured oy procedures ~thIt-~ '~ j I tapiament this FSAR requirement. PHILLIPS interprets this as a requirement which was violated; however, at a etntmum a commitment was violated in f' Exhibit 44.a, paragraph 6.2 which states, in part, ". . . retrieval at information without undue delay." P H I Li, I P S ' understanding of How Handled / Mishandled Backoround Prtar to initiating the inspection of the TUGC0 10 CFR 50.55(es reporting system, PHILLIPS had performed a trend analysis of TU3CO's deficiency reporting as directed by Hunter. An adverse trend was identified basec cn reviewing RIV inspection reports lover 200 violations and unresolved itesse. Six violations had been issued and three unresol,ved items appeared to os violations instead of unresolved items. Including PHILLIPC' experience at plants in Region III and the South Texas Project, PHILLIPS concluded this was the worst enforcement history he had witnessed (Exhibit 55, Trend Analysis). 1 l Thisanalystswasfurnishedtolllllll}[hoplannedtofactorthisintotheRIV Comanche Peak Task Group.-(CPTG) follow-up inspection of TUSCO's third party } inspection, the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT). This was never done because ! j WESTERMAN replaced lEEEEEE[Ind he rejected the trend analysis and the idea of factoring this into the follow-up inspection which is consistent with his j rejection o3 adverse trends in the GIV inspection program for Unit ! where it appearad that RIV inspectors had performed inadequate inspections. He also j rejected reinspection of the various MC 2512 inspection procedures which aculd { have looked at 50.55(e) deficiencies in conjunction with reinspecting the deftcient areas concerning NRC inspection procedures of MC 2512. WESTERhAN also directed the subject of tren' ding be dropped from inspection report 65-07/0. j which is discussed in a different concern. In 1980 PHILLIPS alerted RIV management about BhR work anc problems when he was at South Texas but it was ignored (Exhibit 56, two memorande; S pages). l ' Considering Exhibit 56 and if these trends had been identified in 1980 or earlier, special NRC inspections could have averted what his napoened at Comanche Peak. Proper Handlino: PHILLIPS provided MCCLESLf with back;rounc saterial ano IE l Procedure 92700 which require the inscection of TUGCC's 50.55.es system. As l Indicated in his field notes (Exhibit 57.a and b), MCCLESKf e:pertenceo l .__ -
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . ~ . . . . . . 37 immediate problems wnile inspecting the 50.55(el procedures and files. The ~ ~ ~ ~ ' corrective action portion of the procedure was inadequate. Insufficient information was on file to determine if nonreportable items were properly evaluated or if reportable items had been corrected. In October 1985, 6 of B files reviewed were deficient regarding sufficient information to verify corrective action. Twelve additional files cantained nonreportacle deficiencies; however, of three of these files were deficient to the point that the inspector could not determine whether or not the deficiency was reportable. Thts data was presented to WESTERMAN by PHILLIPS and MCCLESKY. Misnandlino: PHILLIPS told WESTERMAN that he had not seen such a mess in all his time with the NRC. PHILLIPS had decided to shield MCCLESKy and keep him out of the line of fire regarding violations cecause WESTERMAN had already let YOUNG's contract expire becaust of his QA background and his tjentifying l problems; 1.e., writing violations. In this case, WESTERMAN concentrated all the wrath ne could to pressure, narass, and intimidate PHILLIPS to drop these violations. His statements suggested that PHILLIPS would be removed from the job because he was not a team player; 1.e., would not agree to drop the violations. Veiled threats about--did not PHILLIPS make good money and suggesting he would make less when removed from site--started to become serious from PHILLIPS standpoint. Such unprofessional behavior nad never been encountered oy PHILLIPS in nearly 29 years of working. MCCLESKY had about one year left on his contract but he was terminated to further isolate PHILLIPS. PHILLIPS returned from three weeks leave on January 13, 1996. PHILLIPS was confronted with the draft inspection report on which JOHNSON nad made unprofessional comments and rediculed PHILLIPS' draft Inspection Report 86-16/13, (Exhtbit SS). These comments are not only uncalled for out also erroneous. This is probably because of a lack of expertence as JOHNSON's statement, Attachment P to the OIA Report shows that he does not understand quality assurance and construction. His personal attacks in Attachment P and comments on this memo are improper conduct for a senior manager. In reading nts l OIA statement, it was evident he could not answer simple questions en IE MC 2512 and QA procedures. WESTERMAN said he had talked to JOHNSON about the proolems PHILLIFS was creating for him. WESTERMAN told PHILLIPS that something was going to nave to se cono. JOHNSON came to the site to browbeat PHILLIPS over the SISCO memorandum PHILLIFS had written. During this visit, JCHNSON and WESTERMAN met with TUGCC to discuss their 50.55(e) system and PHILLIPS was told he was not needed. As a result of PHILLIPS absence, TUGC0 made commitments and went overocard. They formeo a task force to develop huge folders on each item when a simple ref erence in :ne 50.55(e) report or list maintained in tne file or any method of indexing to tne
.
existing NCR, DCA, etc., logs would have been sufficient. This task force nas
l worked for a year and has had 5-10 people working on it. If PHILLIFS had been } at this meeting to explain, TUGC0 may nave elected to go tne stsple and more { inexpensive route; however, it ts PHILLIPS's Delief tnat their conitdence in {
j th:5 area was 50 shaken they elected to periorm a massiye review. j 1 l 1 i e'
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __- . _ _ - _ .__ _ _ - - _- . e . * . . , ' , , 38 Instead of being t this meeting, PHILLIPS~(with a broken rtb) was asked to give *--
[ GAGLIARDO an onsite tour. Initially the purpose was unclear as GAGLIARDO had
been on-site for months in 1984 and since he was already very familiar with the site, PHILLIPS gave GAGLIARDO a casual tour. WESTERMAN later told PHILLIPS that the purpose of the tour was to test his for site knowledge and that he dio not do well. JOHNSON telephoned PHILLIPS a couple of days later to repeat this and say that he questioned PHILLIPS' construction experience after reviewing his resume. All this was to make a point. The point was that 11 PHILLIPS insis,ted on writing violations he would stay in trouble. At this point, PHILLIPS told WESTERMAN that he recognt:ed these things as a " set up" and told WESTERMAN to tell "them" to back off; i.e., he would write this inspection report as RIV management desired, and ne would ask what they wanted written in the inspection reports in the future. PHILLIPS followed this policy until May 1986 when Inspection Report 86-08/06 was written. Again, this is precisely in line with the RIV policy described in ment (Exhibit 12bt. The mishandling of these items is abunduntly clear free reading WESTERMAN's statement (Attachment D, Volume II, dated July 11, 1986). His twisted logic and lack of understanding the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) are evidenced by the following references; however, pages 348-412 must.oe read for a full understanding. Pace 350: "Now it was my poisition and still is my position that there's no requirement in 50.55(e), or a procedure, that having a procedure to cover 50.55(e) is not an Appendix B requirement. 50.55(e) is a reporting requirement which is placed on the untility via the code of requaltions." Comment: This conflicts with I.E. Guidance in Exhtbit 54. Pace 351: "O Okay. Are there procedures for identification, documentation and notification of affected organizations -- "A Yes, str. "O -- for nonfonfirming items? 1 "A Yes, sir. "O Okay. Are we talking about that here? "A Not -- well, what we're talking about that Mr. Phillips wanted, was ' for the utility to have a status in a file for each 50.55(e) which he could go over to and look in that file and close out a 50.55(e). And I'm saying , ' I don't know of any requirement that would say the utility would have to have those in a file for the convenience of the Commission. Those records i _ ______-___-_________ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ - - - - _ _ .. . . , . 39 -i are there; they are maintained; they are part of the permanent. Now, if l's a prudent licensee, I Will have that kind of a system. " 12 Did they have a system, not for 50.55(e), it's -- ' "A Yes, sir." < Comment: This is a false statement as PHILLIPS never asked for such a system as he only asked that the 50.55(e) report (to NRC) to refarence tha nonconformance r e p o'r t , reference it in the file, or reference the 50.55(e) report on the NCR log. PHILLIPS and a witness can prove that this statement is false. ! Pace 360: "If you went to look at nonconformance reports, you woulo citaarly be l able to identify whether it was a 50.55(e) item." l i Comment: MCCLESKY claims just the opposite in Exhibit 57. Psoe 362: In response to how many 50.55(e) reports had been received: "Oh we haven't gotten very sany here of late." Comments PHILLIPS tracks 50.55(e) reports and this is a false statement. Exhibit 59 shows that CP-86-50, for example, had b,een received by July 17, 1936, and this means that a total of fifty 50.55(e) reports had been issued thus far 1 in 1986. WESTERNAN testified on July 11, 1986, and knew this to be a false answer.as PHILLIPS furnished these reports and status reports to make him aware of technical reports by number, in fact, the last report (November 26, 19861 shows that 76 reports had been received in 1986. PHILLIPS' experience has been ! that some projects have not received this many 50.55(el reports during all of j these 6-8 years of construction. i j .Paoe 3e3: "I'm telling you 50.55(el does not fall under Criterion 15." ) Comment: TUGC0 FSAR, Exhibit 14. page 17.1-38, and Exhibst 15, OAP, , Section 15.0, consider 50.55(s) to fall under Criterton 15.0. This is an j example of WESTERMAN's defending something that TUSCO could not even defend. It l s impossible to deal with his logic as it skt;:s f rom potnt to point without { rationale. His only logic is that is the way it is becaute he says it as that l way. PHILLIPS, M 'f0UNG and MCCLESKY were bombarded with this lack of I logic and unless they were willing to agree that dark is daylight, he started narassing, pressuring, and threatening. Pace ~61: "There's no time liett on 'retrievabil2ty'." Comment: TUSCO FSAR and ANSI N45.2.9 state that there is a limit (Exhibit 44.a, page 17.1-41 and Exhibit 43). These words do place a time limit; i.e., a 1 reasonable amount of time or the norm. PHILLIPS and MCCLESKY considereo a month
i excessive time to retrieve records. In addition, all WRC teams who have come to I the site have experienced this problem because at is a generar problem.
] l Similar comments could be made on many of WESTERMAN's statements. As WESTERMAN { was being advised by BARNES, HALE, anc ELLERSHAW (who nave almost no i construction but have NRC Vendor Program experientel, WESTERMAN and JOHNSON , 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ - - . - ., ' . . . ,
- . .
40 proceeded to downgrade all of PHILLIPS' and MCCLESKf's findings because of a "-- lack of canagement and construction expertence. In reading statements by JOHNSON and WESTERMAN related to these concerns, PHILLIPS detected unprofessional conduct to the manner that PHILLIPS was attacked and it appears they have lost objectivity. Safety Significance: These concerns are safety significant as thess violations show TUGCO's sytem for reporting 10 CFR 50.55{e) deficiencies has been deftcient during the entire construction of Unit I and 80% of Unit 2 construction. This statement is supported by PHILLIPS' trend analysis and by findings of the NRC TRT team in October 1984 (Exhibit 60, SSER No. 11 of MUREG-0707). Almost a year after TUGC0 learned of the weakness in their 10 CFR 50.55(e) system as described by the SSER, NRC inspection report S5-16/13 documented the fact that TUGC0 had not taken complete and effective corrective action. This was also after PHILLIPS' brief inspection in mid-1985 which showed basic probleas in their reporting (i.e., not including which unit a deftetenctey app!1ed to as evidenc?d in a few corrections in Exhibit 61, TUbCO's letter, itX-4508, dated July 9, 1985). A prudent utility would have performed an extenstye review after readtng the SSER, but they did not. In November 1985, PHILLIPS and YOUNG also found that TUGC0 did not report on potentially sertous deficiencies with BISCO fire seals and only did so in 198a after this became a subject of Inspection Report 85-16/13. The seriousness at l these violations, when past deficiencies in this system are considered, should have resulted in the 50.55(e) violations being made a part of the Notice of Violation from James M. Taylor to TUGCO, dated May 2, 1986. Sucn enforcement can hardly be constdered now as these violations were downgraded, droppeo, anc report details were gutted. As a result, TUGC0 has not been required to give , NRC written assurance that they have corrected the deficiency and deterstned the j cause to preclude repetition and the NRC continues to solve TUGC0 problems informally as described in Exhibit 21. During a recent November 1986 inspection, it was found that one of two files checked revealed that corrective action could not be field verified because of missing engineering documents and inacequate design change documents. TUGC0 issued corrective action request. The significance of RIV management's lack of experience and knowledge witn respect to 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting, is more safety significant as TUGCO's deficient management and knowledge of the system because RIV management's influence affects many utilities. Another strange practice in RIV is the fact they do not acknowedge receipt of the Applicant's 50.55(e) reports as do other regions. This may contribute to the inadequate reports made by TUGCO. It may also follow that if RIV management does not understand 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting, follow-up inspection, and accordingly RIV inspections of these areas have not been as good as they snould
j '
have been. If TUGC0 had been strictly required to implement an adequate 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting system, RIV or NRC headquarters most likely would have
i recogntced trends that are now snowtag up in the areas of design and
construction engineering. What can De more significant than this considering the poor position TUGC0 finds itself in today. l i . _ . .. ._ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- A _
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.. . . . . . . =. 41' . Concern No. 4 - PHILLIPS was concerned that RIV aanagement downgraded the following document control-related violation to an unresolved item: "TUSCO had replaced NAMCO switches per IEB 79-28,.but two of 14 that were field inspected were not properly identified on installation traveler.'" . Exhibit 62, pages 16 and 17 of OIA Report-, Attachment MM, adequately explat.ns the concern. Exhibit 50, pages 4 of the original draft inspection report, describes the violation which was dropped. Exhibit 51, pages 6 and 7, final inspection report issued, recorded the item as unresolved. PHILLIPS' Understanding of Concern No. 4 Requirements: The requirements are described in Exhibits 33 and 34 and include appropriate portions of 10 CFR 50, Criterion VI!!, Appendix B; FSAR. Section 17.1; and TUGC0 QAP.. Noncomoltance with Requirements: This noncompliance was identified as a violation of.the identification requirements in Exhibits 1, 33, and 34 as described in the original draft report (Exhibit 50). PHILLIPS' Understanding of Handlino/Mtshandlino of Concern No. 4 B a c k a r o u n _d_: Prior to performing this inspection, PHILLIPS reviewed RIV Inspection Reports dating back to 1983. This was done to prevent duplication of effort. The six RIV inspections reviewed did a fair job with respect to inspecting line IE IP90700 items; sucn as. TUGC0 actions or applicability
- distribution, assignment of responsibility, and corrective 7.ction documented.
These reports did not generally emphast:e field verification of hardware replaced, repaired, or modified. Therefore. MCCLESKY's task was to field vertiy selected IE Bulletins. Proper Handlino: MCCLESKY reviewed IE Manual Chapter requirements and tne ' l
l background material provided above.
The results of this inspection (Exhibit 50 and 63) show that before Novemoer 13, 1985, a potential violation had been identified to high level TUGC0 engineers who were involved in this review. These exhibits also document TUGCO's inability to.show in a reasonable time the correct switches on resicual heat removal valves that are installed. PHILLIPS translated these findings into a draf' inspection eport as MCCLESkt had contacted TUGCO's official points of contact (circled on E::hicit 64) and others. B&R thought it deficient and issued a nonconformance report. 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - - - _ - --
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - __. _. __- ._ _. * - T7 , . * . . * * 4'2 Mishandling: PHILLIPS handed a rough draft of the Details section of the ~~~ inspection report to WESTERMAN. With respect to this particular item (NAMCO ~ switches), WESTERMAN started searching for the travelers by going to BRANDT, TUGC0 QE, who was no*, on the list of contacts provided. After a long period of time (months), two additional work travelers were produced. WESTERMAN then concluded MCCLESKY had not contacted the right people which is jut not true. No explanation was provided as to why these work records were not in the QA reccros vault when MCCLESKY repeatedly asked for them; however, the specific NAMCO switch travelers should have been readily available as Unit I was completed. Even af ter WESTERMAN claimed BRANDT could provide inf ormtion, MCCLE5KY had a number of questions that BRANDT never answered. MCCLESKY left tne site in Fetruary 1986. Shortly before he left, there was disagreement it a meeting attended by PHILLIPS, MCCLESKY, BRANDT, WESTERMAN and SARNES regarding the f act that BRANDT never provided the information requested. The violation was dropped. TUGC0 should have oeen cited as originally written in Exhibit 50, page 4-4; however, after it drug out so long they finally found the records. At this point, they should have been cited for failure to retrieve records, a different violation, but according to WESTERMAN, there is no time limi t. . { The protracted time for getting NRC reports issued has caused many problems as i in this case because TUSCO is following-up while the draft report lingers in offices. The inspection ended November 30, 1785. WESTERMAN was on-stte such of l the time until the draft was transmitted to RIV in February 1986. He was l Insisting on not allowing violations to be written based on information recetved l in late December 1985, and early January 1986. This was not properly documented l In the NRC transatttal letter; t.e., additional inspection outside the l Inspection period. BEACH, NRC enforcement officer, cor.siders this improper in Attachment 00 of the 01A Report (Exhibit 65, Inspection Report 35-to/13, RIV Report Traveler) shows how reports linger for no g000 reason. I PHILLIPS has performed follow-up Inspection in subsequent inspection periods but
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has not closed the item because of the multiple problems found. In late December 1995, one switch was found to ce a Train "C" ( non sa f e r.y-r el at ed ) switch; therefoce, only one switch is the subject of further discussions. MCCLESK'I's field notes dated in Novemoer 1o85 conflict witn the Master Data Base, enecked on July 25, 1986. This information Master Data Sase was not produced for MCCLESKY in 1985, but PHILLIPS confirmed it was there in 198o. PHILLIPS found new findings; i.e., multiple violations of the work traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.0; tnerefore, the item remains cpen. Traveler EE 02-1415-58nt dated Julv ?. 1982: Comments: 1. The initial or first traveler was not reviewed, signed, or dated as required by procedure. 2. Operation Number 1 does not reference and require ctsassemuly per Instruction EEI-21, " Installation Requirements for NANCO Ltr.it Switches," Revision 0, cated August 20. 18S2.
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ - ._ . .. . ; * . , ' * 43 l l 3. Operation No. 2 & 3 states to tighten " snug tight." Since these valves are "'- equipment qualification tested (sessmic), what would happen if there are drastic dif f erences (i f snug tight approaches loose) and then the switches on the valves vibrate during an earthquake. This might cause failure if the switches on the valves in the field are not tested to the same tightness as those tested. I 4. Operation No. 5 does not require determination per Procedure EEI-8, " Class IE and Non-Class 1E Cable Terminations," Revision 3, dated May 18, 1982. . 5. Operation No. 6 does not require steps to te in accordance with eel-21. 6. Drawing Revision was not recorded; and Procedure Revision were not recorded. Replacement Travelar EE 93-0450-5801 dated May 23, 1983: { - I l 1. This second traveler does not reference the first traveler and was not In the QA records file at the time the inspection was performed. One could I easily conf use which traveler is the first or last one. 2. The first statement on this traveler is that the switch must be replaced because it needs to traval the reverse direction. This means one of two things: (1) the design drawing / traveler was correct and was not installed ' per these documents, or (2) the design drawing / traveler was wrong and the Norkers installed the switch per these documents. (No such description in the NCR was written if the first is the case and no DCA was written if the second was the case.) ! ! The discrepancies above show a weakness (if not a violation) of 04 program j requirements; that is, generic with respect to not requiring installation of j switches per procedures. Even if procedures were referenced on the traveler, no I revision was on the traveler and no revisions for the drawing were recordec. What effect this has had on several hundred installations is unknown at th:s point. Exhibit 66, " Conversation Record," dated July 8, 1986, documents the TUSCO representative's statement that they had similar problems as did MCCLE5KY. Safetv Significance: The replacement of hundreds of switches wsed ir various system is still unknown as the traveler system procedure was not fellowed. Although the original problem with identification was mysteriously solved, switches identified on the traveler vs switches installed was a violation at the
l time it was found. After the document was found, RIV management should have
directed the violation to be changed to a failure to retrieve the accuments which is a violation, in fact, if TUGC0 had been requireo to pursue this :ssue, they may have found :nd prevented multiple violations on tnetr travelar system identified in NRC Inspection Report So-20/17; i.e., 30 of 00 miscel;aneous work ! travelars reviewed were deficient. ]
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. f * . . * * 44 This item has wasted a great deal of the NRC inspectors time and is still not ' - ' solved. This in itself is safety significant in that the anspector ends up inspecting less. This would not have happened if WESTERMAN and JCHNSON nad not intervened. Concern No. 5 PHILLIPS and YOUN6 was concerned about the technical adequacy of BISCO fire seals installed at Comanche Peak because certain configurations had recently failed in testing. A detailed review of the certifications showed them to be at least indeterminate and, at worst, false. Records of testing were destroyed in two successive fires according to BISCO management; however, test dates and dates of the fire conflicted in one case. RIV management appeared to be more concerned about protocol of who to address the memorandum to than these technical problems. Exhibit 49, pages 17 and 18 of Attachment MM to the NRC CIA Report, generally describes the concern; however, greater detail about these concerns is described in a subsequent paragraph (Mishandling). Exhibit 50, pages 6-1 through 6-4 of the original draft Inspection Report 85-16/13, describes one unresolved item and two violations. Exhibit 51, pages 7 through 9 of the final Inspection Report S5-1s/13, shows two unresolved items. P M IPS' Understanding of Concern No. 5: Requirements: The requirements are described in Exhibits 1 and 52 which include appropriate portions of 10 CFR 50 to Appendix S, Criterion XV; 10 CFR 50.55(e); and FSAR, Section 9.5, pages 9.5-29, 58, 67, 68, 69 and 223 as described in Exhibit 67. The testing requirements are ASTME 119 and IEEE o34 Nencomoltance with these Reautrements: Ennib:t 50 adequately describes the 4 noncompliance. Bactorcund: PHILLIPS identified an unresolved item and a v2clation concerning certifications and damaged seals in 1994 (DUNG was assigned to follow-up and close these items, if possible, during inspection 85-16/10. Procer Handlino YOUNG brought the additional findings as described in Exhibit o7 to PHILLIPS's attention about midway through the inspection pertoc.
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Because these technical problems might affect other plants, PHILLIPS wrote a memorandum to expedste the issue. The memorandum recommended an CIA investigation prior to a technical evaluation or a joint office Investigation and IE because if 01 found false or misleading certifications, the issue was much broader than the specific Comanche Peak technical problem as these seals are used in many plants. This recommendation also considered the long stand:ng understanding that if potential wrong doing may be involved, tne investigators should review it first or jointly. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _
. , . . , . . .. 45 '"'-- Mishandlinat The mishandling started when WESTERMAN received information regarding potentially deficient fire stops. Instead of assisting the inspectors, WESTERMAN and JOHNSON actively blocked the memorandum from going forward to Headquarters. JOHNSON came on-site in January 1986, not to discuss
l the technical issues, but to criticite PHILLIPS for addressing the issue to a l branch chief in headquarters instead of his signature. PHILLIPS accepted the
criticism without telling JOHNSON that he was following WESTERMAN's directions as to the addressee. This issue was raised in sid-November 1985 and was still in the review cycle in aid March 1986. If JOHNSON had been an experienced _ sanager, he would have forwarded this issue insedia,tely as he could have - rewritten it to suit his style i~ ss n an hour. It took about 5 sonths for the seacrandum to leave RIV. In ~ itatement, he defines it as worrying the inspector's work to death an his ey have done to all of PHILLIPS' work since he supported jEEEEEEElviolations in the Inspection Report 66-07/05 in September 1985 through Inspection Report 86-08/06, etc. The violations on BISCO seals were sishandled because of WESTERMAN's and JOHNSON's lack of construction knowledge and expertenca as evidenced acove and in WESTERMAN's statement (Attachment D, DIA Report) as quoted below 'A. Now, first off, the violation that I read you in here said that there was no non-conformances required by G1-OP-le.0-4, Revision 1. That's talking about Class 1-E equipment with deficient IEEE-323-344 test reports. We are talking in this particular documentation wsth Appendix R requirements for which there was not documentation of test requirements in accordance with ASTME 119 and IEEE 634 That's why I'm telling you the violation is not proper even if there had been a violation. I cannot go from - you want to make this an exhibit to take a look at -- from the procedure which he says they violated which deals with IEEE-323/344, which is environmental and sessaic qualification of electrical equipment, to say that on an Appendix R type ites, which is ASTHE 119 and IEEE 134, that that procedure would have required them to write a non-conformance report." j Comment: It is ey opinion that this statement is technically incorrect because this is not solely an Appendix R requirement. The fire stops used throughout l the plant are required to meet test criteria of IEEE 634 and ASTME 119. Also, l' such fire stops are an integral part of a bundle of Class IE cables which penetrate walls, floors, etc., and are not Just a fire protection system requirement. Exhibit 68, pages 9 and 10 of IEEE 634, support this in paragraphs 2.1 and !. It also appears that the design Criteria 3 and 17 of Appendix A and Criteria 111 and XII of 10 CFR 50 require the cable and fire stops to provide protection to e cable from a redundancy standpoint alone, i Page 6351 "Q. There are several parts of the TDR. There's the issue of I ' deficiency and also a box called potentially reportable under Part 21. A. I will you that I told Mr. Phillips if he wanted to make a j violation out of that, he snould make a vtolatton out of that. l I do not remember his line of logic, but he gave se some line of l ' logic about not wanting to cite on deportability. I ____- 1
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. - ' . ' * . . * ' 46 x Now, if you go back to the final report, he added in an item in "~~ here on page 9-A. Now that was his choice." Comment; PHILLIPS does not recall WESTERMAN's advocating the proposed violation conce.ning f ailure to adequately evaluate a construction deficierc7 IExhibit 50, page 6-4). The basis of the proposed violation was that the TUGOD engineer did not know (evaluatel tf the fire stops involved systems for safe shut down. 'Ti.is teing the case, an improper evaluation always leads to a nc reporting sitL4ttan. WESTERMAN would not allow such a violation to be written'. These discussions with TUGC0 and the unresolved item.in Inspection Report 85-16/13 finally forced an adequate evaluation ano a potentially reportable itee followed as evidenced in Exhibit 69. The design deficiency report in the exhibit is still unresolved. NRC follow-up inspection has no'c seen accomplished to date to determine the full acceptability of the way these tecnnical.1Ssues have been handled; however, a quick review in January 1986 indicates the 50.55:e) was considered nonrepo,rtable but not all of. PijlLLIP3' and (0UNG's technical concerns were addressed. < Safety Significance: The saf ety significance of this, issue is similar to Concern 1, 2, and 3 and should be considered a part of that greater concern. , ( '.. 4 . ; y 'l i _________;
* ., + e . * . * . - 1 i i i i LIST OF EXHIBITS 1 Part50,Appefdix B, Criteria 18............................pp 413-416 ~ 2 FSAR Section 17.1.7, Design Contro1.........................pp 17.1-14 thru 18 ! TUSCo QA, Se'ction 3.0, Design Contro1.......................p 1 4 B&R Traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.3...........................pp 1-11 $ Westinghouse Procedure......................................pp 1-8 s 6 Traveler HE 79-248-5'500,....................................p 1-8 7- C o n t e n t i o n 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . )s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 3 - 4
EL 3' DUREG-0797, Miscellaneous Item 2............................pp K-99 tnrv 102
. 9 RIV Report 79-03/03......................................... Letter and page 3 > 101 IE Proceoure for Vessel Installation: BOO 51.................pp Il-1 thru 2 . ' 10b IEP for Vessel Installation.u 50053...'.......................pp 11-1 thru 2 s 4 10c IEP for Vessel Installation: 50055..........................pp 11-1 thru 2 ano 111-1 thru 2 Trangnittal Lettar..........................................pp 1-2 N qt i g o o f V i o l a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 2 - 5 11 Original Final Draft Inscection Repc-t 85-07/05 Submitted to nicutt. ...................pp 1-21
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Transmittal Letter..........................................pp 1-2 Notice of Violation.........................................pp 1-4 ' * 12a Secono Final Draft > Inspection Report 85-07/05, Rev.1, Signed October 2, 1985, Submitted to n!V and HQ.............pp 1-21 12b @ Comments CIA Report..................................................pp 30, 42, 43 OIA Attachment..............................................pp 9 thru 14 13 Rtport 85-07/05 Issued February 3, 1986..................... A 14 TSSR Section 17.1.16.................................... ...pp 17.1 ~3 tnra ~9 . I n. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - . r 4 . . = . . .. LIST OF EXHIBITS 15 TUGC0 QAP Section 15, Nonconforming items...................pp 1-2 Section 16. l i Corrective Action...........................................p 1 ! to SLR QAM, Section 16, Contrcl of Nonconforming items.........p 1 ) 17 FSAR Sect. ton 17.1.18, Audits................................p 17.1-3o 18 ANSI N45.2.12, Draft 3, Revision 0, 1973, Requirements for Auditing QA Programs for Nuclear Plants.....................pp 1,5,6 ; 1 19 TUGCo QAP Section 18, Audits................................p 1 20 NRC Inspection Report 84-32/11, Nottce of Violation and Letter......................................................pp1-3 1 21 MAC Audit of TUGCo and Response.............................pp 1-6,13,16 22 Worsham, Forsythe, Samples & Wooldrige Meme, May 29, 1965...pp 1-2 l 2 NRC Board Notification Nos. 85-067 and 85-076 Memo..........pp 1-2 24 PS Lebeln Report. February 1922.............................pp 2. 3, 44 25 TUGCo 7eansmittal Letter to NRC (enclosure Lobbtn Report) 26 NRC CA7 Report..............................................pp S-1 thru 3 VIII-1 thru 5 27 NUREG-0797, SSER No. 11;....................................pp 31-33 28 Ccamanche Peak Response Action Plan--ISAP VII.a.4...... ....pp 5-9 29 Results Report--ISAP VII.a.4................................pp 1-53 30 Letter and Draft of the Notice of Violation So-00/0c........pp 4-4 31 List of Quality Assurec Structures, Systems, and Components..................................................pp 1-2 .
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( LIST OF EXHIBITS ! . Original and Final inspection Report ' 32 Catails................pp 16 and 17 " 33 Identification .nd Control of Materials Parts and Components, FSAR 17.1.9.................................pp 17.1-25 thru 17 ~4 TUGC0 DAP, Section 8.0, Identification and Control of items.. .........................................p 1 l 35 Code Requirements NCA 3886.6 and NCA 41!4.S............ ....pp 36, 4o 36 B&R QAM, Section 9.0, Identification and Control of Items...pp 1-4 . 37 -B&R Procedure CP-CPM-6.9E, Revisions 2 and 4................pp 16-19 , 01-QAP-11.1-26, Revisions 4 and 88..........................pp 6, 7, S 38 B&R Isometric PRP-CS-2-RB-076 (1 page) and 3til of Materials (1 page) 39 IE Inspection Procedures 49051,-53,-54,-55, and -56 (23 pages) 40a Portions of 01A Attachment D................................pp 112,11* and 148-159 40b Portions of Attacnment J....................................pp 1-3 anc 9-13 41a Attachment M M o f 01 A R e p o r t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p 9 42a Original Draft inspection Report 35-14/11...................pp 1-4 42b Second Draft Report $5-14/11 (with otrecteo cnanges)........pp 67-79 42c Final Inspection Report 55-14/11, March 6, 198e.............pp 10 and 13 43 FSAR Section 17.1.17, QA Records............................pp 17.1-40 thru 41 44a ANSI N45.2.9, Requirements for Collection. Storage, and Maintenance of CA Records...................................pp 11-12, 14, 16-21 44b FSAR Commitment, ANSI N45.2.9........... ................... 45 TUSCO QAP, Section 17.0, Site Construction Quality Records and Record Retention and Storage............p 1 4e Attachment Mh to 01A Recort.............................. ..pp 11-12
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-____ - _ * . * * . , v . LIST OF EXHIBITS 47 Attachment MM of OIA Report.................................pp 13-14 48 TUGCo QA Record Receipt Controll/ Storage Procedure CP-DD-18.4, Revision 7............................pp 1-2 CP-CPM-7.1, Revision 3, and.................................pp 2-4 STA-302, Revision 11........................................p 2 49 OIA Report, Attachment MM...................................pp 14-18 ~ 50 Original Rough Draft Report 85-16/13........................pp 3-1 thru 3-5 4-1 thru 4-4 o 6-1 thru 6-4 51 Final NRC' Inspection Report 95-16/13............. ..........pp 5-9 52 Regulation 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)..............................p 388 53 TUSCO QAP, Section 6.0, Document Control....................p . 1 54 IE Gui dance on 10 Code of Feder al Regul ati on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p 8-9 55 Trend Analysts..............,...............................pp 1-10 So South Texas Memorandum (Lessons Learned.....................pp 1-5 B&R Engineering Memorandum..................................pp 1-2 57 McCleskey's Field Notes 574 Review of Procedure NE0 CS-1................................; 1 57b Review of Construction Deftctency File......................pp 1-10 58 Johnson's Comments on Draft Report Se-16/13.................pp 1-5 59 Comanche Peak 50.55(e) Tracking.............................p 1 60 NURES 0797, SSER 11, Ceauents on 50.55(e) Reporting.........pp 0-279-280 61 TUGC0 Letter .TXX-4508) Unit Number Correction..............p 1 62 OIA Report, Attachment MM.................'..................;p 13-13
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. . , . I . I I ! LIST OF EXHIBITS I . . 63 McClesky Field Notes on IE Bulletin Revtew Notes dated November 1, 1985................................p 2 Notes dated Novemoer 2s, 1925...............................pp 1-10 Notes dated November 26, 1985...............................pp 1 and * 64 TUGC0 Official Contact List.................................pp 2 65 RIV Traveler for Report 85-16/13............................p 1 6o Conversation. Record, Phillips--Baker........................pp 1 and ; 67 BISCO Fire Penetration Seal Memorandum November 25, 1935, Draft....................................pp 1-; March s, 198o, Final........................................pp 1-3 8 Attachments (14 pages) oa IEEE Standarc e;4...........................................pp 9-10 69 TUGCD/ BISCO Seal Documents Design Deficiency Report.................................... TXX-43;8....................................................p;1i TXX-4966....................................................; 1 TIX-4996....................................................c 1 50.55te) Evaluation No. 0177................................a 1 TSG-19695...................................................pp 1-2 5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
-- n -w wo . ' I. Ffndtne Sumart- Our to QA. B&RP1 arttoand Procedures. do not reflect current autnarity delegations and G&H. f( ARS Response: At the time of, the audit we were operating under properly. approver deviations. I These deviations were incorporated ints a permanent QA Plan Manual revisfort on July 1,1978. E., Finding Summary: enange review provides significant risk of error and is. inThe curre noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. . Resoonse: We disagree err both counts. The gar Resident Engineer has exercised extremely good judgment in implementing the authority deisgated:to.him. Of the; approximately 2000. changes /devia- tions/cTarffications issued under the systant, we are aware of none .. that trave provided exposure to. & significant risk of error. To provide greater visibility of the design change functierr, e system was. implemented err May 25, 1978 that provides an analysts of all
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changes, and permits continuing evaluation of the field efforts. Thts. system is current for ongoing activities at the present time and wtTT be compTeted. for past activities art or before July 15. 1 19E T6dr cetter r.nac u are in fact irt compliance w1tn- LG CFR SQL, (LC , l (Appendix 5 is, supported by internal audits by TUGCQ QA personnei and s independent audits by two separate NRC Inspectors. We propose to (Teave the design change sfysten as is. -
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3'. Ffndine Summary: anc :nanges thereto TUGC0 priorQA does. not review ali procurement docunents to release.
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Response: We disagree that this is a requirement. ~ requirement section, approved by TUGC0 CA, is included with eachA separate QA purchase order and is. applicaole to all supplements. these requirements. are authori:ed only by Quality Assurance. Changes to 4. Findf ne Sumary: complex anc. atificuit to maintairr,.The current array of QA manuals and pro Response: We agree. The new Plan manuai was, issued July I,1978. Tne corporate goal QA Program. of streamlining; it'. Manual is currently under study with the ' E. Findine Sumarv: clearly. Records do not reflect the as. poured configuration Response: Configuratiert has always been made visible to inspectors, .
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o ' ; W Wi?-d&% M * MM!WMt W W W ~% , -~ *#5 * . A' ,m . 4 . . OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. (APPENDIX. 8) / I Oroantzatierr Reconnendation: (planntng). Separate - inspection fron Quality Engineering Reseense: We had begurt work orr this before the audit. Our product assurance groupt has taken responsibility for Quality Engineering. . Recommendation: comit:ee. Re. evaluate the charter of the Quality Surveillance . Response: 4 Consittee. We have decided te discontinue the Quality Surveillance to keep top managrenent apprised of the status of QA matt including August quality 15, 1978'. trends. The first suc!t. report utiT be issued by * ' . Reconnendation: M re more seasoreti inspectoNr. litre any future engtneers fr6iii outside the company wf th experience fit nuclear plant construction. Response: We are orr the tookout for we1T qual.ffied: personnel and continue to review appiteants from outside the company. The . reTativeTy young: fnspectors.wil1 be strengthened best and qufckest by taking from them the responsibility for inspectiore pTanning and provfding them wf tte adequate, but concise instructions and checklists. This has beert done and fs effective. II Quality Assurance Progrant Recommendatfort: Revamp our present QA manual systeur. Resoonse: We agree. L918. TUGCG QA issued a revised QA Manual on July I, Opfnferr: worn ts doneOtttairtfng by others.our ASME Code stanrp wfTT be difficult if all the ' - Resoonse: We know ft wtiT be dtfficutt, but tt carr be done. The M. stamp. report oces not accurately record our stated. reasorr for obtaining an III Desterr Controi Recommendatiert: Abandorr our present system of expediting field . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - - - - ^ -
' . -"ILmw.tro.aws;.smesseb rsawr~mamvm+eswre i 1 -_=-- h
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+ D. . . 3 ' . A , changes. Reseense: We wilt leave ft as it is. . ' IV Procurement Document control Recommendation: All procurement documents should be reviewed by QA. , Resconse: We dfsagree for reasons stated on Page 1. . .. V Instructions Recommendation: Streamline inspection planning and checkTist. preparation Resoonse: We agree,, and have been actfve in this effort since January. - Recommendation: Of scontinue mappfng individuai standard imbeds. Resconse: Mapping has been dtscentinued,' but we have retained. e reasonante degree of traceabtTity on embedded. f tems. Reconnendation: Comofne construction and QA procedures. R'esconse: Sfnce January we have been doing this for new procedures and, wnerr revisfng aid procedures. Reconsnendtion: Of scontinue requiring B&R Houston approvat of procecures. * Resconse: All procedures except those invoTving ASME Code wort are now approved at the site. Observation: ATT appTicable CC/00A's are not included. fn supporting COctEDentatTon. . Reseense: Refer ta Page I.,, Appendix A., Itenr 5. R, econnendatton: Estabtfsh a formai site procedure for planning construct 1ctr worie. Resoonse: This planning is. being done. We don't intend to create a. formal procedure for it. O . _ _ . . . . . . . _ ..- __._ _ . . ._. 3 ...
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* - _ .. ,;.c._ _.=eenue MeisseasduuL1 mis 2srast ' ..2 , * .. . o 7 . . , VI- Document Control Observation:~ The ARMS system should be backed up by a manual systes- (stated vercally in exit management interview). ~-- - Response: The auditors. lack of confidence in ARMS was the risTirt if insufficient familfarizatfort with the system. orr their part. . . . . , . ~ - . . . . . . = - ' FVII Control of Purchased Material Ecuiement, and ServicesC ' ' , , Observation: The QA plan f s not up to date in this. area . . . . I Response: Manual'.revisfort was. compTeted arr JuTy L. . . . . Statement: Source inspectors. (TUGC0 QA) appear te be at the mercy of tne supplfer fr> determining * what changes have beerr incorporated. R'esponse: . Thfs. fs not true. We (TUGCO' QA) prepare our owrr chectlists after searching the appropriate filer. We agree wittr the auditors' (verbal) consents that this method, placas are additional burdere orr ourselves; however, the orfginal (and. TogicaI} approach of depending uport G&M. ta prepare the checklists dfg not, worie. VIII Tdentfficatforr and Control ch MateriaTs, Parts, and Comoonents ' No observations j 1 IX Soecial Processes ] Reconnendation: The use of Iridium 192 shouTd. be regiaced by x ray for all snop welds. and for field welds where practicaT.. l Resoonse: Browrr & Root is studying t.*rfs reconnendatfort,, and is comitted ts have a report for TUGCO/TUSL by July 15. 1 ' Recernmendation: Reduce the ntanber of individuals reviewing, raciograpns and estabitsh the policy that Code-acceptabTe indications. be recorded but not repaired.
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Resconse: This had been accomplished prior to the audit, but apparently the auditor- talked with someone who wastr't aware of it. Reconnendattent C7arify the responstbf Tity of the NDE supervisor relative to code work. i - I - l l ! l
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i i l , Response: The auditors were confused .in this area. Our only Level
LIL at the site. is in civil work, not ASME Tec. III Div.1 work.
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, )r Inspection
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Included in here was a re-statement of observations covered elsewhe the report. - , XI Test Control - Recommendation: used ouring startup.Existing nonconformance control systeins: shouTd be _ Response: . . . . The new CA Manuat,. wf th fnput free TUGC0 Operations, will
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accress. nonconformance controT systems. XII ControT of Measurine and Test Ecufement ' Recommendation: Equipment shoute not be recaTibrated on the due date if te nas not. beerr used. - * Resoonse: The recommendation has. beert adopted for f tems whose calteratiare is not subject te change white not frt use. Implementatfort date was July 1. - - XIII Insoectierr,. Test and Ocerattne Status No observations XIV HandTine, Storace and Shiocing Recommendation: revieweo. Extertor storage & protectiotr practices should be Resconse: We had previously reviewed the storage practices and have no: reason ta teTieve that a problem extsts. Various NRC inspectors have also fnspected tafs activity. However,, Westinghouse is revtewing: this,, and thefr metallurgist wtll report by JuTy 15. XV Controi of Nonconfor-nances - .. Observation: Contrcl. Thfs is a restatement of concerrr over nonconformance Resoonser - ratner- than corrected at CPSES.We reject the inference that problems are circu J _
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- XVL . Corrective Action-
/ No specific findings. - _ _ . . _ . XVII [w:ords, . Recommendation: This sectiert restated the need for ff[ protection syster. . __ Rese.nse: The f nert gas' system will be installed by Augdit:.1,,_I,373;,,, ' , _ , _ _ , _ . --:.. XVIIIAudfts ~ ' ~ . Recorrmendation: . The audit (D'aTTas). and survet1Tance (. site) acetytt1es snould be comained. Response: We intend to Teave our audit progars. separate frdar site survet11ance. . e
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