ML20204G086

Rev 0 to Hope Creek SPDS Verification & Validation Design Review Rept

ML20204G086
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/12/1987
From:	Leanne Flores, Reimers G EIGEN ENGINEERING, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20204G054	List: ML20204G050 ML20204G086
References
PSE-3210-87-001, PSE-3210-87-001-R00, PSE-3210-87-1, PSE-3210-87-1-R, NUDOCS 8703260336
Download: ML20204G086 (537)

Text

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p ENCLOSUREcl V

PSE&G Summary and Assessment of the NRC SPDS Audit Conducted August 27-28, 1985 In reviewing the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) at Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS), PSE&G has developed this enclosure to clarify the items identified in the NRC SPDS Audit conducted August 27-28, 1985. The results of the NRC audit were documented in a letter from W. Butler (NRC) to R. L. Mittl (PSE&G) dated October 15, 1985. In turn, PSE&G reviewed the audit report and compiled a list of 18 major, unresolved items which required further resolution. These items were identified in Attachment 1 to the letter from Mr. C. A. McNeill, Jr.

(PSE&G) to Ms. E. Adensam (NRC) dated January 23, 1986. These same items are again reprinted in this enclosure; however, PSE&G has taken the liberty of expanding those items by identifying key points within each item that the NRC discussed in their October 15, 1985 letter.

Since Eigen Engineering, Inc. (EEI) is performing the HCGS SPDS Verification and Validation (V&V) program (see Enclosure 2 of this transmittal), each of the 18 major items listed in this enclosure was addressed by EEI. A summary of the EEI Design Verification Evaluation is provided for each of these 18 items.

llh Finally, a PSE&G Assessment for each of the 18 items is also provided for each item. Where the assessment of the item requires further PSE&G action, the appropriate action is identified. The schedule for completing these actions is discussed in the cover letter.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

1. Section 3.1.1 Eigen Engineering, Inc. (EEI) is performing the Hope Creek SPDS Verification and Validation (V&V) program. The V&V program will identify system requirements from Section 18.2 of NUREG-0800, NUREG-0737, NUREG-0696 and NSAC/39. EEI shall establish system requirements and incorporate them into a matrix which relates design characteristics to the system requirements.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

No formal documentation describes the projected organization & implementation of the V&V plan.

• No unified HCGS documents exist which delineate l system requirements or the basis for the requirements.

• The ten items listed for evaluation on page 8 of NSAC/39 are to be included for evaluation

() in the EEI V&V Program Plan.

• The expanded structure of the V&V plan alludes to NUREG-0737 / 0800 guidance and acceptance criteria, but the relationships are not complete or systematically described.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIPICATION EVALUATION:

Eigen has established a system design requirements section in their report (see sections 2 & 3 of enclosure

2) and has detailed the project organization.

Furthe rmo re , Eigen delineated how the various licensing documents apply to the Hope Creek SPDS system.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

In addition to the items stated in the above paragraph, PSE&G is developing a " Level A" document which will address the requirements as shown in Chapter 2, Page 8 of NSAC/39. This information will be discussed in the final V&V report on the new SPDS computer system.

Page 1 of 25

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

2. Section 3.1.2 EEI shall review SPDS system requirements against the existing SPDS design by directly comparing the as-built equipment and system characteristics with system requirements discussed in Item 1. EEI shall clearly and completely explain the methodology for the comparison and will identi.fy the SPDS characteristics in the final V&V report.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• EEI is to independently identify and list the system requirements and the source of the requirements, as described in Regulatory documents.

• EEI is to identify design characteristics and to incorporate items into the matrix which relate the design characteristics to the system require-ments.

• EEI is to directly compare the as-built equipment

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xg and system characteristics with the requirements listed by EEI in the matrix.

• It is essential that the methodology used to identify the as-built SPDS characteristics be completely and clearly identified in the report.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

EEI has established a system design requirements section and gives the design bases used for these requirements.

However, a complete comparison of these requirements

, with the as-built equipment was not performed in the EEI Design Review Report.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

With regard to an as-built comparison, a new computer system is being added. Therefore, 'Se SPDS characteris-tics will be addressed in a new "Le s1 A" system design document and in the subsequent hard.are & software V&V.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

3. Section 3.1.2, EEI shall compare the Hope Creek ,

simulator vs the Control Room and document any .

discrepr.ricie n. '

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-in the final V&V report. N l.

'ADDITfDNAL'hRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

It i essential that the sinulator be an exact duplicate of the Control Room

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used t for comparison. .._

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EIGEN DbSIGN_VERIPICATION EVALUATION: It'i s

A review of the Hope Cre*k simulator was not included in the EEI Design Review. Report.

PSE&G.jsSESSMENT:

The SPDS hardware & software V&V will not use the Hope

, Creek, simelator for test,?..g so that exact duplication is not ne't;4ssary (items such as phva.ical computer systems are[trbnsparent to ' the ' Opera tor.3 ) . A validation testing

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prograhjwill be developed for ths' new SPDS computer. ,,

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

4. Section 3.2.1 EEI shall identify the specific documents utilized in performing the Hope Creek SPDS Design Review effort. These documents will be identified in the final V&V report.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

EEI V&V program plan is stated to consist, in part, of a review and evaluation of existing HCGS system documentation. These documents are not specifically named or referenced.

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• The reference used to establish fulfillment of each p I' '

requirement will be documented in the matrix.

p ';r SPDS design deficiencies will be identified and documented.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

i f, EEI has listed the SPDS Design Review documents in

.. the Design Review Report (see enclosure 2, attachment

,'- , r 2). Deficiencies have also been identified within this

...- report.

t, PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

PSE&G has addressed each deficiency identified in the Design Review via this enclosure.

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

5. Section 3.2.1 EEI shall review documents generated by the human factors reylew during the system ,

development. The documents shall be audited by the V&V review team in order to ensure that identified l '

. deficiencies are properly resolved and appropriate s ' corrective actions implemented in the design of the l ^

l j " displays. The results of this review will be

included in the V&V final report.

1 ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS: 4 l l

• The existing human factors review shall be audited by the V&V Team and deficiencies documented.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

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y Eigen did review the Essex Human Factors report and l t

noted 3 deficiencies. However, since then, revisions to the Essex report,were issued. Also see DR # 9.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

t sJ The latest Essex Human factors report is being reviewed by PSE&G under the Control Room Design Review (CRDR)  :

program. All Human Engineering Deficiencies (HED) l l , , regarding SPDS will be addressed under this program. "

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

6. Section 3.2.2 The NRC audit team agrees that design review of the existing computer system which supports the SPDS is unnecessary, however, the features of these systems that are critical to the operation of the SPDS must be documented, coordinated, and controlled to prevent the installation of future computer system modifications that could impair the operation of the SPDS. PSE&G will provide a definition

,. of the computer systems features which make I up SPDS. EEI shall verify that the requirements l imposed upon the existing computers by the SPDS are adequately documented and coordinated. l The results will be included in the V&V final l report.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• It is important that all aspects of the plan and its execution be completely reported in sufficient detail to demonstrate to the NRC that the intent of the V&V Review is accomplished.

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• The general approach outlined for the HCGS SPDS V&V Design Review is acceptable. Nevertheless, since the specific steps that will be used to implement this l approach have not yet been developed, the NRC audit team could not reach a conclusion regarding the f expected adequacy of the V&V end product.

t g EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

l l The EEI Design Review Report identifies that there are i no established guidelines for ensuring that once the I

SPDS System is validated, that future changes will be reviewed for impact and consistency with " system" requirements.

l l PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

I With the advent of the new computer, a new set of documents will be generated. These documents will include detailed SPDS design basis documents, a

" Level A" computer design document, wiring diagrams, instrumentation list, and a complete management program. Procedures will be in place to assure that these documents are controlled and coordinated with any

.EOP changes prior to the start-up of the new SPDS system.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

7. Section 3.3.1 _ Validation testing will be coordinated with objectives and methodologies described in other sections of the V&V plan.

Several of the terms used in those sections are abstract and are not defined in the plan. EEI shall '

clarify these terms -and explain the methodology for 2

selecting acceptable' criteria. This shall be 4

documented in the V&V final report.

l ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• The previous SPDS testing was not ?ndependent ,

or suf fient iy documented. Thus PSE(G intends to perform val' '7 tion testing that demonstrates that randomly scler:ed portions of each system design characteriswics functions as intended.

• Operator performance shall be noted during each i drill and performance with and without the SPDS-4 will be compared.

• It [the validation testing] is intended to record

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i sufficient data to demonstrate whether the operators I can determine if plant conditions warrant entry into

an EOP,.how the appropriate EOP is selected, and 4 whether the transient is mitigated within an accep-4 table time frame. It is not clear to the NRC audit team how this will be accomplished and documented.

• It [the validation testing] is intended to confirm

that the displayed variables are " sufficient" to as-I sess the critical safety functions, and that the j SPDS system is suitably isolated from other safety-  :

related system.

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O Section 3.3.1 (continued)

• It is stated that acceptable validation testing criteria shall be developed from the results of the requirements review.

• The V&V plan does not explain the methodology for selecting acceptable criteria or how it will be determined that they are comprehensive and sufficient to accomplish their goals.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

EEI has issued a Rev. 2 of the V&V Plan to the NRC to clarify any abstractions. Rev. 2 also gives a basis for the acceptance criteria. However, the EEI V&V Report does not address all of the above audit concerns; it was intended that the remainder of the concerns be addressed in the validation report.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

PSE&G has reviewed Rev. 2 of the EEI V&V Plan and finds the subject terms to be acceptable. With the addition of w the new computer system, the new hardware and software will undergo a V&V process. Furthermore, the SPDS system will be validated, including the operator interface. .

Eigen has also reviewed the EOP's against the displays, and upon resolution of the identified discrepancies, this information will be adequate to assess critical plant parameters. .

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT: _

8. Section 3.3.2 PSE&G shall verify the ability of the SPDS to fulfill each requirement outlined in the system requirements matrix was completely tested during the previous development and/or installation testing. The NRC audit team recommended that PSE&G use the design characteristics vs. requirements matrix to document the existence of these previous tests. Whenever it cannot be determined that previous testing completely demonstrated the SPDS ability to fulfill a system requirement, thorough and rigorous testing of that feature shall be conducted as part of the validation process. PSE&G shall provide EEI with details of in-plant testing.

9. Section 3.3.2 PSE&G will develop and implement a structured methodology to obtain candid opinions and recommendations about the SPDS from the operators who participate in the dynamic testing. EEI shall interview operators in order to maintain independence. The results will be documented in the V&V final report.

10. Section 3.3.2 The intent to combine multiple fi failures in the dynamic validation test scenarios is

%- appropriate. PSE&G shall ensure that the dynamic test scenarios include events that are more severe than the FSAR design basis events. PSE&G committed to these scenarios in the October 14, 1985 letter to W. Butler (NRC) from R.L. Mittl (PSE&G). This commitment is based upon an August 29, 1985 discussion between PSE&G and the NRC Procedure Branch. The results of this testing shall be made available as part of the final SPDS V&V report.

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Section 3.3.2 (continued)

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

PSE&G has not yet determined exactly how the test will be performed to meet the validation requirements and how EEI will ensure the completeness and accuracy of the work they intend to do. The uncertainty is partly due to the use of indefinite vs. precisely stated descriptive terms in the plan.

• The EEI V&V plan does not presently mention most of the items in Tables 3 & 4 of NSAC/39.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

Most of the above stated audit concerns, addressing PSE&G action items, as well as the NSAC requirements, Table 3 & 4 are not required to be in the EEI Design Review Report.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

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With the advent of the new system, the V&V Program will review system capabilities and conduct testing to show that the SPDS meets intended design characteristics.

During the validation portion of the V&V, SPDS will be evaluated regarding operator interface and acceptance.

PSE&G will conduct a paper evaluation and dynamic testing on an as-needed basis to prove system capability. These tests and evaluations will use worst case scenarios.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

Section 3.4.1 None.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS: -

• EEI plans to review construction, installation, and testing specifications of the already-installed SPDS system to ensure that sensors are correctly connected and system power and supply transfer schemes are correct.

• The design review " walk-through" will include a randomly selected check of Class lE Isolation devices.

• Graphic displays will be reviewed to verify that the format and content of the SPDS are the same as those of the simulator.

• A formally documented detailed step-by-step execution plan for V&V verification does not exist.

() EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

Eigen reviewed the testing program used to verify the field inputs to the system and the methods of Class lE Isolation, and has found them to be acceptable.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

A new system is being installed, and therefore, a review of construction and installation specifications will be provided in the final V&V report. The V&V plan associated with the new system will have a step by step plan to verify new computer hardware & software.

Operator training will be updated to reflect any  !

system changes.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

11. Section 3.4.2 The design characteristic vs. system )

requirements matrix should be used to document the existence of the previous test and to identify untested features that require thorough and rigorous field verification as part of the V&V program.

EEI shall verify that testing has been accomplished and document these test results in the final V&V report.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• The use of random testing must be justified for each feature,on the basis that complete testing was performed earlier.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The above stated audit concerns are not fully addressed in the EEI Design Review Report. Rather it will be addressed in the validation section of the final V&V report.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

As stated earlier, PSE&G is planning to install a new SPDS computer system. The above stated NRC concerns will be addressed at that time by the continuing V&V program.

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

12. Section 4.2.2 PSE&G must verify the adequacy of the selected parameter set and provide the NRC with documentation of this review. The audit team suggests that this verification include a review of EOP tasks not supported by the SPDS and documentation of the basis for omitting from the SPDS parameter set the variables associated with these tasks. Operations Engineering, Inc. (OEI) will perform this task, the results of which will be provided in the revised Safety Analysis.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

Same as above.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The EEI SPDS Design Review Report has reviewed the selected EOP parameters included and those not included in the SPDS. Also see DR #'s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 22 in

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enclosure 2, section 6.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

PSE&G has revised the OEI documents (see enclosures 3 &

4) to include some of the selected parameters that were missing and provide justification-for those not included.

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.Oge PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

Section 4.3.1 None.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• The NRC audit team reviewed the values to be used for range checking and found that some were inconsistent with the instrument range or with credible parameter values.

• The validation algorithm used for RPV water level fails to account for the fact that none of the water level instruments are calibrated to provide valid indication for all plant conditions.

• None of the SPDS Displays alert the operator to a loss of less than all of the parameter inputs.

• The planned maintenance staffing will not provide for continous, on-site presence of maintenance

(~ technicians qualified to troubleshoot and repair all SPDS components.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The EEI Design Review Report addresses the above stated audit concerns on a generic basis. Also see DR #'s 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27, 30, 32, 34 in enclosure 2, section 6.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

PSE&G Engineering will be reviewing all parameter values that make up the SPDS displays to assure that the correct values are being used. OEI 8407-2 Page 2-2 has been 3

revised for the RPV Water Level (see enclosure 4). This revision clearly identifies what level readings are valid for all plant conditions. PSE&G will be installing a new SPDS computer system which will alert the operator to a loss cf less than all parameter inputs. In addition, the planned maintenance staffing will be revised to support the new reliability and Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) values.

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O PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

13. Section 4.3.2 With rerpect to the methodology for validation of displayed SPDS data, the NRC stated during the audit that there were some areas which needed improvement. Although it would be desirable to make the improvements prior to fuel load, it was indicated at the audit that the current methodology is considered adequate for first cycle operation.

NRC would require, however, that improved methods be implemented prior to startup from the first-refueling outage. The.NRC did not specify any particular algorithm or methodology that could be used to implement the desired improvements the NRC stated that this would be up to PSE&G.

The areas requiring improvements are as follows:

• The SPDS-does not inform the operator when some 4 inputs have been omitted from the calculation I of average parameter values

• The display that the operator can call up to i determine if inputs have been omitted from the average does not account for the fact that with

overlapping instrument ranges, some inputs will (j always be omitted from the average even when functioning normally.

• The operator does not have ready access to a concise display of the individual input values used to calculate the average parameter values.

• It appears that the use of process instrumentation t

averaging modules to develop average suppression pool

! temperature values does not provide for range checking individual instrument channels.

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- The validation algorithm does not provide for analysis of the notification of the operator about in-range instrument readings that are inconsistent with other inputs.

• Some of the values used in range checking of param-eter input are unrealistic.

• No provisions are made for selecting between " hot calibrated" and " cold calibrated" level instruments as appropriate for plant conditions.

In addition to the data validation problems, the update intervals and the resolutions of the secondary display trend plots are inadequate.

PSE&G is evaluating the above items with EEI to determine whether modifications are necessary based on system requirements. The.need for some items might be deter-mined during specific validation test. Other items might have to be corrected prior to validation testing. PSE&G training will alert Hope Creek operators of these problem-areas.

14. Section 4.3.2 Certain portions of the SPDS hardware are expected.to have "Mean-Time-To-Repair" (MTTR) that are quite short. Although the availability discussed in the audit shows an acceptable SPDS availability, the audit team believes that numerical results are based upon mean time to repair assumptions that are inconsistent with maintenance staffing plans.

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PSE&G is ceviewing the final reliability calculations developed by NUS Corp. The reliabilty calculations for SPDS hardware will be reviewed to determine if hardware or planned maintenance staffing levels require modifica-tions to assure acceptable systems availability.

1 i ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• PSE&G should also collect SPDS operating history data and use this information to evaluate the actual reli-ability of the system and its components.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The EEI V&V report addresses the above stated audit concerns on a generic basis. Also see enclosure 2, section 5, DR #'s 8, 9, 12, 13, 31, 33.

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PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

l All of the above stated audit concerns will be addressed

with the installation of - the new SPDS computer system and by the continuing V&V program.

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SUMMARY

OF NdC AUDIT:

15. Section 4.6.1 The report states that the Control Function Parameter Matrix is displayed on every control room CRIDS CRT that is not displaying the primary SPDS display. This statement is incorrect. i During the audit, it was agreed that SPDS would be l continuously displayed on at least one (1) CRIDS l CRT.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

.Same as above. )

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The EEI V&V report states that at least one CRT will display SPDS at all times. Also see enclosure 2, section 5, DR #1.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

Due to the incorporation of the new SPDS computer, SPDS

/' ' screens & programming will be removed f rom CRIDS.

Consequently there will be dedicated SPDS CRT's located in the Control Room, TSC,and EOF. These screens will display either the primary SPDS display or the CFPM.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

15. Section 4.6.1 The report states that the Control Function Parameter Matrix is displayed on every control room CRIDS CRT that is not displaying the primary SPDS display. This statement is incorrect.

During the audit, it was agreed that SPDS would be continuously displayed on at least one (1) CRIDS CRT.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

Same as above. ,

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

The EEI V&V report states that at least one CRT will display SPDS at all times. Also see DR # 1.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

Due to the incorporation of the new SPDS computer, SPDS screens & programming will be removed from CRIDS.

Consequently there will be dedicated SPDS CRT's located O in the Control Room, TSC,and EOF. These screens will display either the primary SPDS display or the CFPM.

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PSE&G LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

16. Section 4.8.2 The NRC indicated that procedural controls should be implemented to ensure that consistency is maintained among emergency operating procedures ( EO P 's ) ,

the SPDS, and other plant equipment. Changes to plant equipment or EOPs should be evaluated for their potential impact of the SPDS, and vice-versa. Hope Creek Operations will revise procedures to ensure PSE&G Enginee ring Group reviews all changes.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

• PSE&G provisions for training appear to fulfill the provisions of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 in this regard.

• Formal controls must be established to ensure that the SPDS, SPDS training and HCGS procedures remain mutually compatible.

In addition, plant operation without SPDS should be a scenario included in the simulator training program.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

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wJ See enclosure 2, section 5, DRf's 10 & 23.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

It should be noted that the driving force behind SPDS is the EOP's. Consequently the only changes that will be made to SPDS screens & programming will be to reflect EOP information requirements. Therefore, PSE&G Engineering will be receiving all EOP revisions for incorporation into SPDS. All SPDS modifications will then be forwarded to Hope Creek Operations for review to make sure that these changes meet their needs. A final copy will be submitted to the Nuclear Training Center for simulator updating. Procedures and Engineering Directives will be issued accordingly.

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SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

17. Section 5.1 In summary, the NRC concerns regarding the V&V program are:

• The plan uses certain abstract and non-specific terms to describe some V&V tasks. Before execution, the tasks must be researched, well planned, coordinated, and documented to ensure that their execution will result in an auditable V&V effort (see Item 7).

• The use of randomly selected channels and equipment in the V&V tests and audits is acceptable only if it is ensured that previously documented information exists to justify the use of random selections to demonstrate valid V&V for all SPDS items (see Item 8).

• The V&V process should be auditably documented to describe and demonstrate that the matrix and and the execution of the V&V methodologies will compare requirements with characteristics of equipment and procedures and identify and correct

_ all significant discrepancies (see Items 1 and 2).

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• PSE&G must ensure the methodology used for selecting acceptance criteria will give results that are accurate, comprehensive and complete, and will satisfy the intent of the V&V requirements (see Item 7).

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O Section 5.1 (continued)

Furthermore, the audit team had a number of recommendations for improving the planned V&V program:

• The contraints imposed by the SPDS upon the design features of supporting computers should be documented.

• Performance validation testing scenarios should include events that are outside of the FSAR Chapter 15 events.

• Performance validation testing should include a structure methodology for obtaining candid feed-back about the SPDS from operators who participate in the testing.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

Same as above.

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

EEI only sampled randomly, where supporting documentation was adequate; otherwise a complete review was done. EEI has generated a design requirements and review methodology matrix in enclosure 2, Attachment 1.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

EEI has issued a rev. 2 to the V&V plan to eliminate any vague terms used in the original submittal. All items associated with validation. testing will be done after installation of the new computer. A detailed plan will be formulated to address those issues.

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O PSEEG LICENSING

SUMMARY

OF NRC AUDIT:

18. Section 5.2 In summary, the'NRC concerns regarding 1 the SPDS design are:

• The SPDS does not automatically indicate when some inputs have been eliminated from the calculation of an average parameter value.

Furthermore, the operator cannot obtain unambiguous information regarding whether any input is outside of the expected range for the current operating conditions. Ideally, the SPDS

should automatically indicate if any input instrument is reading outside of its expected range and the operator should have ready access to a ccncise display of raw input data for each parameter so that the effect of individual instrument failures may be

, assessed.

• Some of the range limits used by the data validation algorithm are unrealistic.

• The data validation algorithm makes no a provisions for removing RPV level instruments that are not calibrated for the current plant conditions from the calculation of RPV average level.

• Tne update intervals for parameter time-history plots is too long.

• The parameter magnitude resolution of the time-history plots is insufficient.

Although the HCGS SPDS may be used on an interim basis, ultimate acceptability of the system will depend upon timely and acceptable resolution of these shortcomings.

i PSE&G shall implement processes that:

i

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• Maintain consistency between the Emergency Operating Procedures, operator training and the SPDS.

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U Section 5.2 (continued)

Document SPDS operating experience in order to establish the actual reliability of SPDS hardware and '

sof tware during operation and to focus the application of resources if improvements in SPDS reliability prove necessary.

Finally, the NRC audit team suggested that PSE&G consider the following NRC audit team concerns with the SPDS design process.

It is not clear that the task analysis used to select thc SPDS parameter set has been completed. PSE&G shall review the tasks that are not supported by the SPDS parameter set and ensure that a justifiable basis for not including the parameter needed for these steps exists and is documented.

• The SPDS paramater set selection nethodology does not appear to have given sufficient consideration to monitoring safety function status during operating modes other than full power operations. EEI shall

(^T verify that the SPDS parameter set is sufficient to

(_) monitor safety function status during all applicable modes of operation.

• The Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) assumption used in the SPDS availability analysis is not consistent with the plant maintenance staffing plans. PSE&G shall review the ef fect of more realistic MTTR assumption based upon the availability calculation and determine if additional actions are needed to achieve acceptable availability.

ADDITIONAL NRC AUDIT CONCERNS:

The data validation algorithm does not resolve in-range instrument readings that are inconsistent with other inputs. Thus, a failed in-range instrument may significantly bias average parameter values displayed by the SPDS.

Page 23 of 25

n Section 5.2 (continued)

EIGEN DESIGN VERIFICATION EVALUATION:

None.

PSE&G ASSESSMENT:

A new computer system will be installed at Hope Creek to handle SPDS. This system will resolve many of the outstandings issues raised by the present SPDS system.

• Data validation algorithms will be developed to do more effective range checking, eliminate values that are not applicable to the given process, eliminate values that are inconsistent with other inputs, and provide color ranges to values as the number of inputs to the calculation are reduced due to defective instruments. Furthermore, tertiary level displays will be developed as necessary so that detailed information will be given to the operator regarding the actual conditions of the input instrumentation.

PSE&G will provide increased resolution regarding the magnitude & update time of the time history plots.

() Update time will be reduced to 10 second intervals and resolution of the process variables will be increased to 5% of scale.

• Configuration control procedures are being developed l to maintain the SPDS documentation. They will include j coordination to revisions of the EOP's and subsequent modifications to operator training.

• PSE&G Engineering maintains a rapport with Hope Creek Operations and will incorporate any required changes based on Operations reference.

• PSE&G has converted the task analysis used to determine the SPDS parameter set. Engineering has addressed each parameter including a justification for not providing the information required for certain steps in the EOP's.

• The EOP's apply to all modes of operation. The SPDS system will be revised to support the EOP's in all those modes.

O Page 24 of 25

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I Section 5.2 (continue)

• SPDS system reliability will be recalculated to reflect the changes to the system. Upon recalculation, a new Mean-Time-to-Repair (MTTR) and subsequent staffing requirements will be established.

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E pGINEERING,INC GEN '

ENCLOSURE 2 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SPDS DESIGN REVIEW REPORT PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O February 12, 1987 Prepared for j l Public Service Electric & Gas Company Prepared by EIGEN Engineering, Inc.

San Jose, CA 1

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Luis E. Flores, P.E. Gregg 'R'eimers, P.E. j Project Manager Lead Reviewer  ;

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k 3150 ALMADEN EXPRESSWAY. SUITE 233 . SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA 95118 . (408) 978-8113

TABLE OF CONTENTS q

O Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.2 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.3 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.4 Project Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2.0 BACKGROUND

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Identification of System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Design Review Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 s

3.0

SUMMARY

OF REQUIREMENTS REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1 Display Content and Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2 Data Scan Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.3 Scale Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4 Data Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5 SPDS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.6 Electrical isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.7 Configuration Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.8 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.9 Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.10 Procedures And Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.11 Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 p 3.12 System Operation & Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.13 System Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.0

SUMMARY

OF DESIGN REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1 Display Content and Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2 Data Scan Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3 Scale Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.4 Data Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.5 SPDS Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4.0 Electrical isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.7 Configuration Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.8 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.9 Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.10 Procedures and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.11 Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.12 System Operation and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.13 System Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 5.0

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 6.0 SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6.1 Display Content and Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6.2 Data Sean Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6.3 Scale Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 6.4 Data Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 6.5 SPDS Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 6.6 Elect rical isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page 6.7 Configuration Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 6.8 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 6.9 Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 6.10 Procedures and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.11 Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.12 System Operation and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

PSE-3210 87 001, Rev. 0 f3

.V

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose 4

The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is an element of an integrated program addressing emergency response. NUREG 07371 recommends a SPDS for all operating nuclear power plants. As part I

of Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) implementation plan for the Hope Creek SPDS, an independent verification and validation (V&V) plan was developed. 2 The SPDS v erifica tion and validation plan documents an approved strategy that addresses System R equiremen t s, Design Review, Performance Valida tion, and Field Verification. It is the intent of t his report to document the results of the Systems Requirements Review and the Design Review; thereby providing traceability of the system quality to aid in the licensing process. -

1.2 Approach Typically the V&V of a digital system is an integrated part of the project. This would include the specification, design, and installation phases of the project. This type of approach is believed to generally minimize the impact of problem resolution. Although labeled a

's y s t e m ', the SPDS being implemented is actually an additional i

" function" assigned to the pla n t's process computer system. The Hope r

Creek process compulcr system was in the impicmentation st age when l

the decision to perform a formal V&V was made. Considering that much of the hardware was already procured, installed, and operating, l a conventional V&V was not considered practical.

I I

The Hope Creek SPDS V&V program is being performed in accordance l with the intent of NS AC-39. 3 However, as a consequence of the l

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(/ ~ design approach taken, a unified SPDS design requirt ments document f b

was = not.'i pr epard Therefore, the initial task'$f the V&y review was ,

% . . .. t , y to es t a bfhh a n d' d 6c dide'n t what thy ,;,vplicable SPOS requirements T

would have been. The resulting set of requirements furnished the ,

q basis of comparison for formulating all conclusions relative tY 'the system adequacy. ~.

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Tie plant Process Computer System is comprised of three existing i

14herconnected computers. The main computing f ys t em is the Control..\ ^

.ss s Room ' In'formvion Display S y' s t e'm (CRIDS). ' TIE, other subsystems, r which provife data input t o.. C RIDS, are the Ethergency Response Facilith Data Acquisition System (ERFDAS) and the Radiation Monitoring Skrtem (\RMS) (R'eference FSAR Sect ion 7.5.1.3.3). ,

The

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resultind comp'osite Cs,ist em will_ perform many functions in' addition to SID S. At the initiation of 'the V&V program, CRIDS pud ERFDAS M

were installed. The RMS had been - spesified and was in the

/ procurement stage. '

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' 'The purpose of an SPDS is to display information from which the t' centrol room operator can readily and reliably assess the safety ..

v (fatus of the plant. Therefore, yli Hope Creek documentation relating t,a SPDS displayed information was wit hin the scope of the V&V ,

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1 Mrie w and susceptible '~is t audit. This included all pre SPDS _ .,

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d oc um e n t a t ion relating to

-capability,y r:iisbility, and performance of '

the plant process computer svet S m. s i N. s I

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Project Organkation 1.4 ,

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,e y . 7 y The JSE&G Nuclear Engineering s Ocpartment, Hope Creek, has the

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overall ucsponpibility for the SPDS design. The ronceptual design ' and g t' ..

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Eigen En{ineering, Inc.

Page 2of 79 "\ b sm s

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1 PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 A display development was subcontracted to Operations Engineering, Inc.

3 '

of Fremont California, and the sof tware implementation is being

, w' performed by the PSE& G Computer Department. The V&V is being perf ormed by Eigen Engineering, Inc. of San Jose California,

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' s, N independent of the design and implementation process. The V&V

_\ l' team is composed of the following qualified individuals:

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3 Luis E. Flores, P.E.

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, Gregg A. Reimers, P.E.

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Kenneth V. Allen, P.E.

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\ As discussed in other areas of this report, Eigen Engineering, Inc.

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} has assisted PSE&G in the development and revision of SPDS design 4

- d oc um en t a t ion. To insure independence, all such efforts were performed and managed .by personnel other than the V&V review t eam.

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(3, 2 It BACKGROUND '

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,. ts c y 2.1 ) identification of System Requirements '

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4 Tyfically, ,the role of a V&V tcam is to review the details of ' a p

s} sicm during the s arious phases ,'of development. A key activity is

.t 7; the confirmation of the system requirements because they become the l c

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, reference for ;cMmpa ring all subsequent , design - and implementation .

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, ,,; 'fcatures. Asf discussed in Section 1.0 of this e,eport, PSE&G did not 7 document exp1Icit SPDS criteria; therefore, rather tha6 the V&V team .

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f' y, ' reviewing . the r equir emen t s,; they established a, Hope Creek specific- .

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[ system is j udgid, .. accept ed, and evaluated f[r future modifications.- ,. . , s

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The main obj ective ici ' compiling system requnernents was to ensure a

.i .  !) ,, / correct, comple t e, consistent, and testable desidn imgilementation. ,

A iM review ,of NOREG 0800, Section 18.2 4, provides the following general system acceptance criteria:

[bb g .. < A. The variables displayed on t he.' S PDS are sufficient to

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provide the m'nimum information required to assess the critical plant safety functions.

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interference with equipment and sensors that are used in -

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safety systems.

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C. Means are provided to ensure that the data displayed are a _ p,y ,

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' Characteristics of the SPDS . displays and other opera tional -

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interfaces are su f ficien t to allow reasonabic assurance that

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 ti i

V the information provided will be readily perceived and comprehended by the Hope Creck Operations Staff.

Due to the unique design approach taken by PSE& G for the Hope

\ Crcck SPDS, requirements dealing with specific hardware and sof tware details were not considered within the V&V scope. The reasons behind this decision include:

i -8

1) The process computer sys t em is essentially an "o f f- t he-shelf" system procured directly from the manufacturer and having extensive industry experience.

2) The hardware was already designed and procured and with the exception of the RMS portion of the process computer system, the system was already installed and operatingc 4

3) The human i.ictors review of the SPDS displays was

% included as part of the overall control room review and performed by others.

Therefore, the requirements list developed focuses on the sys t em's performance, e. g. , does the data manipulation and presen t a tion completely and adequately meet the system requirements.

.,' With this in mind, a review of NUREG 0737,Section I.D.2, yielded the following areas of concern which form the basis for the system requirements as identified in the V&V Program Plan.

1. Display Format And Content

2. Sensor Scan Intervals 1

3. Scale Optimi7ation U

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

4. Data -Validit y

5. -

SPDS Failure

6. Electrical isolation

7. Configuratign Control

8. Reliability

9. Location 1

10. Procedures And Training

11. Human Factors O 12. Operation and Maintenance 2.2 Design Review Methodology The objective of the design review was to ascertain that the implemen t a t ion of the system requirements into hardware and software was complete and without ambiguity.

The design review philosophy employed by the V&V team was to identify initially a review methodology for each specific system requirement. Each methodology identified specific design features to

be analyzed and design documents to be reviewed. A complete listing of these review methodologies is provided in Attachment 1.

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- , . - , , _ . , - . _ _ . . - - - . . . , _ , _ . , . _ - _ ~ ,, _ . . , . . .~ ... - -.-.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Although the Hope Creek SPDS was not designed in the typical " top-down" approach, a set of documents was developed which could be considered a type of design specification.

These d oc u m e n t s, prepared by Operations Engineering, Inc. of Fremont, California are:

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A. " Safety Analysis For HCGS SPDS Display Design And I mpl emen t a t ion ", O E l - 8 40 7 - 1. This document alt hough mostly consisting of a description of the resulting design,

' did define the SPDS philosophy and integration with emergency operation of the plant.

B. "H CG S SPDS Displa y Feature Development", OEl-8407-2.

This document consists primarily of a Function and Task-i Analysis of the Hope Creek E OP's and provides the basis for the parameter set utilized by the SPDS.

C. "H CG S SPDS Display Functional Descriptions", O El -8407 -3.

This document integrates the defined parameters into actual displays, designs and hierarchy.

The Hope Creek- SPDS design philosophy, as described in t h ese documents, is based on the assumption that the plant is " safe' as long as the plant operators can maintain a certain limited number of parameters within the ranges specified in the Plant Emergency

Operating Procedures (EOP's). Therefore, the Hope Creek SPDS is a comprehensive set of . control room displays aimed at providing the

operators the information necessary to execute the EO P's. Since the Hope Creek EO P's are symptom orien t.cd and not based on a limited set of specific transients or accident scenarios, plant safety can bc l l

assured for a wide range of events. Through adherence to the 1

i O

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O

~ t3 E O P's and the maintenance of plant conditions as specified therein, the plant will be in a safe condition.

The V&V team accepted this philosophy and thus based their review of the system's parameter set and display features on this principle.

During the course of the V&V review, the OEI documents were revised, combined, and identified as P S - J 106 -186 -01. At the time of this writing, the documents are again being revised, partially due to deficiencies identified during the design review process, and will be re-issued. The correlation of the new document numbers to the previous revisions is as follows:

ORIGINAL INTERMEDIATE CURRENT OEI 8407-1 PS-J106-186 01 H-1 RJXX-CDM-0483-0 OEI 8407-2 same as above H-1-RJXX CDM-0484-0 OEI 8407-3 same as above not assigned V

A doc u m en t a tion related deficiency was encountered when the V&V t eam at tempted to confirm actual data manipulation techniques such as engineering unit conversions and data validation algorithms. No formal documentation existed to document how each displayed variable was generated from raw input data and how these variables would behave under different input conditions.

PS& EG thus generated a set of documentation based on the existing programming identifying:

1) actual calculations performed on raw data to generate all displayed variables.

2) logic governing the behavior of each display feature on the CRT screen (i.e. - alarm limits).

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3) formal doc um en t a t io n of all cons t an t, coef ficients, and alarm limits used in the development of 1) and 2) above.

This documentation was issued in March, 1986 as PSE&G documents

• No. PS J-106-183 through 186 and constitute the complete basis for the V&V t ea m's verification of all data manipulation and validation techniques employed by the Hope Creek SPDS.

In addition, these documents represent the current display design baseline for configuration control purposes.

As appropriate during the design review phase of the V&V program, the V&V team . attempted to not only confirm the adequacy of the I. design but also to confirm the adequacy of the design ' documentation in order to insure an adequate configuration con t rol mechanism.

Attachment 2 to this report identifies . all Hope Creek SPDS documents reviewed during the review process.

O 4

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. _ . - - . _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . __=___,_ _. __ _ ___ _ .,__ _.__-.___ _ _ _

l PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

'l

~

3.0

SUMMARY

OF REQUIREMENTS REVIEW The following sections list the requirements identified during the

" requirements review" phase of this program and expand the generic requirement topics listed in Section 2.1 above. Additionally, since the NRC audit in August 1985 took place prior to the V&V design review, NRC identified concerns are also included where applicable.

. 3.1 Display Content and Format 3.1.1 The SPDS will continuously display information from which the safety status of the plant can be assessed (R e f. 4, Section 5.2.2).

3.1.2. The SPDS should provide a predetermined minimum set of critical plant variables to help the control room operators

\ evaluate plant safety (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.2.1).

3.1.3 The minimum information to be provided should be sufficient to provide information to the plant operators about: reactivity control, reactor core cooling and heat removal, coolant system integrity, radioactivity control, and con t ainmen t conditions (Ref. 4, Section 5.5).

3.1.4 The display should contain the minimum set of indicators and data needed to assess the plant functions that are used to determine the plant's safety status (Ref. 4, Section 5.5.1.1).

4 i 3.1.5 The SPDS user is made aware of important changes in critical

safety related va riabics when they occur ( R e f. 4,

! Section 5.2.2.1).

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 3.1.6 For each plant mode of operation, the display formats may cither he automatically displayed or manually selected (Ref. 4, Section 5.5.1.2).

3.1.7 The variables associated with each critical safety funct ion -

should also be available for display and operator assessment (Ref. 4, Section 5.0).

3.1.8 There should be provisions in the display to indicate to the control room - operator that a change in the mode of plant operation has occurred (Ref. 4, Section 5.5.1.2).

I 3.1.9 The display should be responsive to transient and accident sequences _ including scenarios which assume plant conditions beyond the design basis conditions, such as (i) Primary containment pressure at emergency venting level, (ii) Reactor water level below top of active fuel, and (iii) Reactor building radia tion at the r eac t vi' it y release alert level (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.2).

3.2 Data Scan Intervals 3.2.1 The displayed data should represent the current status of critical plant variables (Ref 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

3.2.2 The time delay from when the sensor signal is sampled to when it is displayed should be consistent with other control room displays (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

3.2.3 The sampling rate for cach critical plant variable is such that there is no meaningful loss of the data presented to the operator (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

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PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. 0 3.3 Scale Ontimization 3.3.1 Each critical . plant variable is displayed .with an accuracy su f ficien t for the control room operator to discriminate between conditions that impact the plant's safety status and normal operating conditions (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

3.3.2 The displays should be capable of presenting magnitudes and trends of critical plant variables or derived parameters (Ref 4, Section 5.1.4.1).

3.3.3 Scaling should be chosen to allow t racking of variables over a wide range of abnormal conditions. Therefore, displays for normal conditions should not fill the entire display area (Ikef. 4, Section 6.2.1).

O 3.4 Data Validation 3.4.1 The displayed data should be validated on a 'real time" basis where practical (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.3).

3.4.2 Redundant sensor readings should be compared before displaying the plant variable (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.3).

3.4.3 The SPDS should alert the con t rol room operator when a variable is off scale (Ref. 4, Section 6.2.1).

3.4.4 The displayed data should represent correct status of critical plant variabics (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

3.4.5 The display should not give false indications of plant status (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.1).

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PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. O b'

'V 3.5 SPDS Failures 3.5.1 The operating crew should be provided with the information and criteria they need to perform an operability evaluation of the SPDS. In addition, the crew must be able to casily recognize a failed SPDS (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.3.4).

3.6 Electrical Isolation 3.6.1 The SPDS shall be suitably isolated from electrical and electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in use for the safety systems (Ref. 4, Section 5.3).

3.7 Configuration Control 3.7.1 Major SPDS interfaces and performance characteristics (hardware and sof t ware) should be adequately documented to provide a basis for evaluating the acceptability of future system alterations / modifications (Ref. 3, Section 2).

3.7.2 Programs should be implemented to maintain consistency between the Emergency Operating Procedures, operator training and the SPDS (NRC SPDS V&V Audit - August 1985).

3.8 Reliability l

3.H.1 The SPDS reliabilit y analysis shall be reviewed for consistency with the overall requirements and objectives defined herein.

Included will be the review of any maintainability (i.e. repair)

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 assumptions incorporated wi t hin that analysis ( R e f. 3, Section 2).

3.8.2 A program should exist which documents SPDS operating experience in order to establish the actual reliability of SPDS hardware and sof tware during operation and to focus the application of resources if improvements in SPDS reliability prove necessary (NRC SPDS V&V Audit - August 1985).

3.9 Location 3.9.1 Critical plant variables for the SPDS are presented on a single primary display or on a group of displays at a single location (Ref. 4, Section 5.1.1.1).

3.9.2 The display should be located so that it is convenient to the

O- control room operating crew and where control room operators who are responsible for avoiding degraded and damaged core events can observe the displays (Ref. 4, Section 5.2.1.2).

l t

3.9.3 The SPDS should be readily distinguished from other displays on the control board (Ref. 4, Section 5.2.1.1).

+ 3.9.4 The SPDS displays should be readily accessible to the following personnel, but not necessarily simultaneously: Shift Supervisor, Control room Senior Reactor Opera t or, Shif t Technical Advisor, and one Reactor Operator ( Ref. 4, Section 5.2.1.2).

3.9.5 The control room operating crew, not personnel outside the control room, control images displayed on the control room SPDS (Ref. 4, Section 5.2.1.2).

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 14 of 79

PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. O O

3.10 Procedures And Training 3.10.1 Procedures which describe the timely and correct safety status assessment when the SPDS is and is not available, will be developed in parallel wit h the development of the SPDS (Ref. 4, Section - 5.3.1).

3.10.2 Con t rol room operators should be trained to' respond to accident conditions both with and without the SPDS available

(Ref. 4, Section 5.3.1).

3.10.3 The control room operators training program contains instruction and training in the use of the SPDS in conjunctior:

with operating procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency operating conditions (Ref. 4, Section 5.3.1).

! O V

4 3.11 Human Factors 3.11.1 't h e SPDS shall be designed to incorporate accepted human fat' ors engineering principles (Ref. 4, Section 5.4.1).

3.12 System Oncration & Maintenance 3.12.1 No additional operating staff other than the normal control room operating crew should be needed to operate the display during normal and abnormal plant operation and during display d

outages (Ref. 4, Section 5.3.1.2).

3.12.2 Vendor equipment documentation shall be reviewtd to verify i m pl e men t a t ion of recommended periodic maintenance guidelines in plant procedures (Ref. 3. Section 2.0).

4

! O i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 15 of 79

1 PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. H

-(

3.13 System Testing i

• Each SPDS requirement is completely tested during developmental 4 .and/or installation testing when applicable. Whenever it cannot be determined that previous testing completely demonstrated the SPDS ability to fulfill a system requirement thorough and rigorous testing

, of the feature shall be conducted as part of the validation process (NRC SPDS VAV Audit - August 1985).

t i

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i I

t i

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 16 of 79 i

e , . - - - - - , , - - , , , - - - - , . - , , , , . , - . . . _ ,. ._-.,,,_-_-,,_n.,,,----,,---.- .--,,-n.,..n,--..,-,,cw.-, . . , - . . - - , . - . - - - - - - , - - , + . -

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O l I V 4.0

SUMMARY

OF DESIGN REVIEW The following sections provide a narrative discussion of the results of the design review effort. Each of the requirements listed in Section 3.0 are j addressed and specific conclusions concerning acceptability are stated. j Additionally, as many discussions with PSE&G have transpired since the beginning of the review, corrective actions for identified deficiencies are presented when available.

For record keeping purposes, the V&V team documented all design deficiencies individually on a "V& V Discrepancy Fo r m " . Each Discrcpancy Form was numbered sequentially and issued to PSE&G for comment and/or resolution. All Discrcpancy Forms are presented in Attachment 3 to this repor t.

i '

4.1 Display Content and Format

4.1.1 Requirement

Continuously Display Information To Enable Plant Safety Status Assessment A. Verification Task (s): Ensure that the system provides for continuous display capability and that the operators are aware that SPDS shall be continuously displayed. Refer to Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary: The CRIDS "Oper a t or Interface Description" identifies that CRIDS has 9 C R T's located within the control room and the compu t er vendor (Honeywell) equip , ent manual states that any of the "page displays" can be displayed on any CRT. Therefore the system has the capability of continuous display. Initially there was no

\

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 17 of 79

PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. O O evidence to ensure that the operators maint ained an SPDS V

display on at least one CRT. This lack of evidence resulted in Discrepa ncy # 11. Subsequent to the discrepancy, HCGS procedure OP- AP.ZZ 002(O) was revised to state "During all plant operational conditions at least one CRIDS screen must be dedicated to monitor SPDS . . . "

The draft SPDS lesson pl a n does not address this requirement.

C. Verification Reference (s):

n CRIDS Operator Interface Description, (no document number), page 9 System Specification Section 6, Honeywell 51004606, Rev. A i

r l Conduct Of Operations, OP-AP.ZZ-002(O), Rev. 3, Step 5.35 4

O -

SPDS Lesson Plan, (Draf t), 10/14/85 D.

Conclusion:

From a design point of view, this item and Discrepancy #11 are satisf acrory and may be considered

" closed". The effccilveness of the training shall be verified during the validation testing.

4.1.2 Requirement

Predetermined Minimum Set of Critical Variables 1

A. V erific a tion Task (s)

Review OEI 84071 for the establishment of a methodology in the selection of the SPDS variable set and OEI 8407 3 for proper implementation. Also review the SPDS lesson plan for the proper identification of the variables.

i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 18 of 79

. - , . _ , _ . . . _ . - . . - _ _ _ _ ..---,m.,- _ _ _ - - . , _ . - . - - _ - , _ _ . , - - ., . , , - - - - - , . . - - ..__-.,--,-,,--..._-_-.,-n--

PSE 3210 87-001, Rev. 0 q

B. Summary: The HCGS SPDS employs a procedure based concept to suppor t operator EOP response. OEI 8407-1 satisfactorily specifies the SPDS_ critical variables based on the EOP control functions and - provides guidance into display development in the _ form of a " Control Function Parameter Matrix" (CFPM). From this point on, a

. distinction het ween parameters and variables became necessary. The SPDS " parameters" correspond to the NUREG " critical plant variables" and are the EOP " cont rol function" entry conditions. The SPDS " variables" are the remaining inputs that support operator implementation of the " con trol functions" by aiding in evaluating EOP decision trees. Discrepancy #6 resulted because OEI 8407-1 identified the following 13 critical safety functions and OEI 8407-3 omittcd numbers 8 & 9.

1. RPV Water Level O 2. RPV Pressure

3. Rx Power

4. Drywell Pressurc

5. Drywell Temperature

6. Suppression Pool Water Level

7. Suppression Pool Water Temperature

8. Suppression Chamber Pressure

9. Suppression Chamber Temperature

10. Rx Bldg Sump Area Water Levels

11. Rx Bldg Area Temperatures

12. Rx Bldg Area Radiation Levels

13. Offsite radioactivily Release Rate Each of the above parameters, with the exception of #'s 8 and 9, represent an EOP entry condition and as such appears on all SPDS displays as " critical variables" in the CFPM, O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 19 of 79

PSE-3210 87 001, Rev. 0

D.

V Discrepancy #6 is considered ' closed" on the basis that the missing parameters are not EOP entry points. However, not all EOP entry conditions are included within the CFPht.

Specifically, reactor building dif f erential pressure is an entry condition for the Reactor Building Control EOP that does not appear in the CFPM. Discrepancy #19 was issued recommending that this EOP entry condition be added to the CFPM.

The SPDS draf t lesson plan identifies the critical parameter set with the exception of 'Offsite radioactivity Release Rate". This resulted in Discrepancy #10.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEl. 84071, Rev. 2, Table 2-2, and pages 5 2 thru 5-4.

O OEI 8407 3, Rev. O, Sections 2.0 & 4.0 EOP OP EO.ZZ 10l(O), Rev. O, RPV Control EOP OP EO.ZZ 102(O), Rev. 0, Containment Control EOP OP-EO.ZZ 103(O), Rev. O, Reactor Building Control EOP OP EO.ZZ lH4(O), Rev. 0, Radioactivity Release SPDS Lesson Plan, (Draft), 10/14/85 D.

Conclusion:

The methodology and design are satisfactory in that the CFPM implies safety status. That is, if plant p conditions warrant EOP entry, the CFPM will so indicate.

V Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 20 of 79

b i-PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O However, this item and Discrepancies #10 and ' #19 are still considered "open". PSE&G has agreed to correct the ' lesson plan by adding of f sit e radioactivity release rate as a critical parameter. Additionally, all EOP entry conditions will be in the CFPM; therefore, reactor building differential pressure will be added.

4.1.3 Requirement

The Minimum Information Should Address Reactivity Con t rol, Core Cooling, Coolant System Integrity,

! Radioactivity Control, and Containment Conditions i

A. Verifica tion Task (s): Verify that the SPDS critical i

(i.e. CFPM) envelope / address the required parameters safety functions and that each associated EOP control function is included in the scope of a methodology . to identify an SPDS variable set. Review the resulting display forma t s to ensure that the minimum required information is 2 displayed. Also review the met hod used to provide access to the above minimum information.

I i B. Summary: OEI 8407-1, Table 2 3, satisf actorily addresses and cross references cach of the required safety functions to one or more SPDS control parameters. Specifically, the resulting correlation was as follows:

i i .

i I

i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 21 of 79 i

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O p.

U Critical Safety Function SPDS Control Parameter Reactivity Control Reactor Power RPV Water Invel RPV Pressure Core Cooling & Heat Reactor Power Baroval RPV Water level RPV Pressure 1

Coolant Systen Integrity RPV Water level RPV Pressure Drywell Pressure Drywell Tepperature Suppression Pool Temp

! Suppression Pool Invel

> Suppression Chartber Press l Suppression Chamber Tarp 1

Containment Integrity Drywell Pressure Drywell Teperature Suppression Chamber Press Suppression Chraber Temp Suppression Pool Temp Suppression Pool level Reactor Bldg Area Temp Reactor Bldg Area Rad Reactor Bldg Area Isvel Radioactivity Control Reactor Bldg Area Rad Offsite Rad release Rate 4

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 22 of 79

_ , _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ ~ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ , _ _ _ _ . - - _

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O V Sec Section 4.1.2 above for the development and acceptance of the CFPM representation of the minimum set of critical variables. Document OEI 8407-2 provides the methodology and analysis of each of the CFPM associated c on t rol -

functions to identify the HCGS specific SPDS variable set (Ref. Section 4.1.4 below for the technical review of t his analysis).

Documents OEl 8407-3 and PS-106-184 01 illustrate that the primary SPDS display is composed of the CFPM parameters in a pictorial format and that each sub-level display contain the CFPM as a block diagram header. Wit h the exception of the reactor building differential pressure as discussed in Section 4.1.2 above, all of the critical parameters are accounted for. Access to sub. level displays was not reviewed in connection with this requirement since all displays are to contain the CFPM and thus the " critical"

\ variables are always displayed.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-1, Rev. 2, Display Design and Implementation OEI 8407 2, Rev. O, Display Functional Development OEI 8407 3, Rev. O, Display Functional Descriptions PS J106184-01, Rev. O, Display Design SPDS Lesson Plan, (draf t), 10/14/85 Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 23 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O D.

Conclusion:

The methodology and results of the design are sa tisf actory in demonstrating su f ficient pa r a me t er s for assessing reactivity control, core cooling, coolant system in t eg rit y, radioactivity control, and containment conditions.

This it em is considered " closed" although the subject de euments must be revised to include reactor building differential pressure within the CFPM as a result of Section 4.1.2 above.

4.1.4 Requirement

The Minimum Data Set Should Be Su f ficien t to Assess Plant Functions Used to Determine Safety Status A. Verification Task (s): Review and evaluate the " function task analysis" to ensure acceptability and completeness via a one-to one correlation with the decision points in the associated EO P's. Review the display formats to ensure 9 that all resulting analysis display features are incorporated.

B. Summary: Document OEI 8407-2 (function task analysis) was technically reviewed and compared each EOP decision point to ensure all necessary SPDS variables were defined. T he analysis was organized by EOP control functions and contained a stand alone analysis of each EOP decision poin t . The analysis topics were: Information Requirements, Information Processing, Information Processing Results, Display Featurcs.

The m e t hodology employed was sa tis f ac t ory, but numerous discrepancies resulted with respect to the implemen t a t ion.

The initial VAV review was based upon Draf t C of the E O P's. During the course of the V&V cffort revision 0 was issued for each EO P. These latest versions were again O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 24 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 V) compared for a one-to-one correspondence with the task analysis.

The resulting discrepancies were:

DR #1: EOP 101 (RPV Cont rol) contained a decision point "Can scram be reset ? " The task analysis concluded that <

CRIDS had insu f ficient information to develop a display feature. If the question was asked out of context of the EO P, the stated conclusion would have true (although not providing a basis for exclusion). However, in the context of the EOP the question can be interpreted as "Did the scram reset?" because it is asked immediately following the action statement " reset the sc ra m. " Since the analysis of a different decision poin t resulted in a display feature depicting RPS Status, in the opinion of the V&V t eam both decision points are satisfied by the latter display feature and the analysis should so state.

DR #2: An entry condition to EOP 104 (Radioactivity Release) states ". . . a t mospheric unit alarm received from RMS and the total of all vents ... equals or exceeds ..."

The associated task analysis only addressed the total release rate and not the atmospheric alarm condition. It could not be determined whether it is possible for all individual a t mospheric units to be below their respective alarm limits and yet the total combined release rate exceed Its limit. Under these conditions SPDS would not correctly indicate EOP ent ry.

DR #3: The analysis of numerous EOP decision points were not performed and no salisf actory basis for exclusion was provided. The st a t emen t provided was "The SPDS parameter set does not contain su f ficient information for Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 25 of 79

g PSE 3210-87-(Hil, I'.cv. O p

V developing a display feature to support this decision function." Specific plant references to t his situation were:

CRD Position, Boron injection, ADS /SRV Position, Couldown R a t e, Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit, MSIV Position, Minimum - Alternate Flooding Pressure, Main Condenser Av ail abilit y, Gross Fuel Failure, Steam Line Break, Primary Containment instrument Gas Availability, Main Turbine generator Online, Scram Valve Position, Reactor Building HVAC isolation, Reactor Building Blowout Door Position, Reactor Building Area Temper a t u r e, Knowledge of Fire in Progress, Reactor Building Arca Wat er Level, Reactor Building Radiation, Reactor Building Arca llVAC Dif ferential Temperature, CRD Pump Start, Procedure OP EO.ZZ 207 Execution, and Reactor Scram Condition. As the function task analysis determines the SPDS variable set, either data must be prosided to answer the EOP questions, or specific basis for exclusion stated.

NJ DR #4- Level restoration EOP 201 has numerous decision poin t s relative to ascertaining whether or not a particular reactor coolant injection system (including SRV position) is available or running. The associated "in f or m a t ion requirements" correctly identify reactor pressure and system availability as data inputs, llowever, the remainder of the analysis only addresses reactor pressure and ignores system availability. Therefore the analysis was incomplete.

Document OEI 8407 3 was reviewed for the incor poration of the display feature conclusions of function task analysis in document OEI 8407 2. A total of 10 SPDS displays were developed. The primary display pictorially presented the CFPM parameters only. Each of the remaining displays were of equal level below the primary display within the O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 26 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O) t V display _ hierarchy. The sub displays consis t ed of: _ Reactor Wa t er Level Cont rol, Reactor Pressure Con t rol, Reactor Po w e r Con t rol, Primary Containment pressure Con t rol, Drywell Tempera t ure Con t rol, Suppression Pool Wa ter Level Con t rol, Suppression Pool Temperature Con t r ol, Reactor Building Control, and Radioactivity Release Cont rol. All of the analyzed display features were incorporated, except for those identified in the following discrepancy.

DR #$: Numerous e x a m ples of features specified by the function task analysis were either missing or in conflict with the display formats identified in document OEI 8407-3.

The specific items identified were:

The CFPM reactor power block alarm condition was implemented solely on reactor power exceeding 5%, while the function task analysis

'd included "RPS Trip" as a precondition for alarming this condition.

As forma t t ed in document OEI 8407 3, reactor water level changes to the color red only at

< = + 12. 5 " . However, as a result of the various EOP decision points concerning water level, display features to indicate water level turning red at +54", 38", 115", -129", and 161" have been specified in document OEI 8407-2.

As forma t t ed in document UEl 8407 3, reactor pressure changes to the color red at > = 1108 psig.

Similar to water level, document OEI 8407 2 specifies display features to indicate teactor pressure turning red at < 100 psig, >100 psig, O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 27 of 79

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. 0

/7 V >140 psig,- <242 psig, <380 psig, >380_ psig, and

>1037 psig.

Features missing in document OEl 8407-3 that were specified in document OEI 8407-2 include:

" action flags" on the bar trend graphs, margin to ac tion tables, trend graph, and a table of the various water level ins t r umen t s. Sec Discrepancy #5 for more specific details.

Subsequent to the identification of this issue, document OEI 8407 2 was revised to include a table identifying which features were dropped and why.

However, the generic bases for exclusion lacked sufficient detail and are considered inadequate.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-2, Rev. C & 0, Display Functional Development OEI 8407-3, Rev. O, Display Functional Descriptions D.

Conclusion:

The discrepancies and this review item are considered "open" until the subsequent document revisions are reviewed due to the numerous changes involved.

PSE&G has responded that both of the subject documents will be revised in a manner such that display features will be resolved in favor of the function task analysis with the exception of "t rend plot flags". The analyses resulting in t his conclusion will be redone. Additionally, no variable will be excluded f rom SPDS solely because it *is not O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 28 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O available in C R I DS ", rather technical justification must be provided to justify any exclusion.

PSE& G intends to add data to support: CRD Position, Boron Injection, ADS /SRV Po s i t i o n , MSIV Position, Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure, Reactor Building HVAC isol a t io n, Reactor Building Area Tempera t u r e, Reactor Building Area Level, Reactor Scram Status.

Data not intended to be s uppor t ed, but case by case justifications provided, will include: Cooldown R a t e, Main Condenser Availability, Gross Fuel Failure, Steam Line Break, Primary Con t ainment Instrument Gas Availability, Main generator Online, Scram Valve Position, Reactor Building Blow-out door Position, Fire Information, Reactor Building Radiation Levels. Reactor Building Area HVAC p Dif f eren tial Tempera ture, CRD Pump Start, and EOP 207

'd Execution.

4.1.5 Requirement

SPDS Users Are Made Aware of impor t an t Changes in Critical Safety Related Pa ramet ers When They Occur i

A. Verification Task (s): Review the computer manual and operational description to determine CRIDS annunciation and alarm capabilities. Review document OEI 8407-2 for the specification of available alarm / annunciator capabilities to be applied to the CFPM parameters. Review document OEI 8407-3 and PS J106-184 01 for the implementation of the OEI 8407-2 requirements into the

, display forma t s. Refer to Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 29 of 79

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operator interface jtysc rip t ion) dentify the CRIDS alarm N

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'~- capabilhy as. the aWhy to assign each imin t a ' pro 2esV '

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and "shnifica n t " list h Should cither of these linsif' s L e */

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N, 0, T ' exceeded, an attribute suti:,as\ color can b;e changed and; W, ,

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6{'- A descriptile nessage is printed on the 'ala m

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page" (i.e. top 6 f,ines of every CRT).

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chronolog, if the point is defined to do so.

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" Document DEI 8407 2 specifics t h a,t cach CFPM par $ meter shall ch a rige color when i(s asso'cipted limit is Evteded.

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l. <- . . , , 3 See revicIvSection 4.1.4,f forf a disevsion r el a t iv e ",', o the ' '\

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1 actual setpoints (ie, EOP entry conditions).

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Document OEI 8407-3,s and PS-Jiu6-194 01 consistently -

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8 t 1 implement the color rrd I ~ t u ./'c a n indicalic4 alarm state. ,

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The documentation does ' cot a d br e.ss Abe other alarm ',

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'T ' The review of the calibration i thods is address'cd . In(, ' 3 f ' ',g l , Section 4.3.1. f e 5, A .. ,

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Conclusion:

-The " alarm page" consists of the top 6 lines of every display on each CRT. Alarmed points are listed in 2L this area in the order of occurrence. The " alarm j

,. chronolog" is a once per shift print out of all CRIDS alarms. The SPDS documentation does not include these

\ s

' ' t (' s capabilities within the SPDS bou ndaries. However, since all of the CFPM parameters are EOP entry points, it is

' presently assumed that the associated limits are annunciated elsewhere in the c on t rol room. Therefore, relying on color change alone k considcred adequate and this review item has been closed.

N tt i The assumption that CFPM parameters are annunciated will

, , , be confirmed during the validation testing when the 3d \ - A.

operators will be required to perform EOP actions without O  % '

SPDS.

s

4.1.6 Requirement

Display Formats May Be Automatically Or Manually Selected For Each Plant Mode of Operation A. Verification Task (s): None.

f B. Summary: The Hope Crcck SPDS philosophy is based upon

. the concept that it support the E O P's, which are symptom v

i orien t ed, and do not function as accident detectors.

&j Therefore the o pe ra t o rs are not required to identify the .

event or sequence of events initiating the emergency.

Using t his approach, the EOP's and SPDS are not based on a limited set of t ra nsien t s, plant modes, or accident

(

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 31 of 79

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PSE 3210-87 001, Rev. O p

scenarios. As a result, there is only one set J of displays and as the EOP's they apply to all plant modes. 1 b [ ,

\ However, OEI 8407-1 makes no direct reference to t his 1 approach. ThercIore, Discrepancy #7 resulted.'

i

[/ C. Verification RcIcrencc(s)-

a- .

Proposed revision to OEI 8407-1 D.

Conclusion:

The intent of t his requirement is satisfactorily

) met,by the sys t em design. Initially, the PSE&G response '

3 to this requirement was that HCGS does not consider SPDS plant modes other than power operation. The proposed revision to OEI 8407-1 does not take exception to the requirement, but rather clarifies that the various plant 3 modes are incorporated into the EOP's and therefore addressed by SPDS.

4.1.7 Requirement

Variabics Associated With Each Critical Safety f unc t ion Should Be Available For Display and Operator

<cssment A. Verification Task (s): Verify that the entire SPDS parameter

/ variable set is available to the operator at all times.

B. Summary: Looking at this requirement in the context of Ref erence 4, the requirement becomes "The sole use of j status lights --onc for each critical safety function-- is not adequa t e. .. " As reviewed in Section 4.1.3, the HCGS

(

SPDS does not utili7e status lights. However, to broaden the requirement of a v ailabilit y. it is the opinion of the O

V Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 32 of 79

PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. 0 V V&V team that all of the SPDS displays should be available at all times.

The CRIDS operator interface description identifies 9 CRT's located within the control room. Each of these CRT's has an individual keyboard and/or keypad that can directly call for SPDS to be displayed on that CRT.

C. Verification Reference (s):

CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O, Page 9 and Figures 1 & 2 D.

Conclusion:

The operator has access to SPDS variables /

displays at multiple locations within the control room at all times. This review item is " closed".

O

4.1.8 Requirement

The Display Should Indicate That A Change In Plant Mode Has Occurred A. Verification Task (s): None B. Summary: The HCGS SPDS philosophy, as discussed in earlier sections of t his report, does not require the displays to bc organized on a mode dependent hierarchy.

C. Verification Referenec(s): None D.

Conclusion:

This item is c l o s e d as the HCGS agproach to SPDS satisfies this requirement.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 33 of 79

l PSE 3210-87 001, Rev. 0

)

s 4.1.9 Requirement: Displays should Be Responsive To Transient and Accident Scenarios A. Verification Task (s): Verify that each EOP logic path is supported by the SPDS displays. Per form an SPDS display

" walk through" for the following scenarios and ensure that the EO P's are adequately suppor t ed. These scenarios were recommended during the August 1985 NRC audit.

Primary con t ain men t pressure at emergency venting level Reactor water level below the top of active fuct Reac tor building radiation at the reactivity release alert level Verif y Ihat important EOP decision point supporting variables indicate when limits are exceeded.

B. Summary: See review Section 4.1.2 for an evaluation of the selected SPDS variable set.

The " walk-through" verification has not yet been per f or med. A result of the V&V review and the NRC August 1985 audit has resulted in a content revision to all the displays. Therefore this activity will be performed upon completion of this revision effort.

A review of OEI 8407-2 identified that as a minimum all displayed parameters that represent operating limits (both normal and t ransien t ) and EOP ma r gir. to ac tion limits are specified to change to the color red when the limit is exceeded or the margin is depleted. Document s OEI 8407-3 O4 Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 34 of 79

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. O V and PS-J106-184-01 satisf actorily im plemen t these requirements, with the ' exceptions already iden t ified in review Section 4.1.4, Discrepancy #5.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-2, Rev. C & 0, Display Functional Development OEI 8407-3, Rev. O, Display Functional Descriptions PS-J 106-184-01, SPDS Display Design,3/4/86 l

Q.

Conclusion:

The variable set identified to convey an alarm status via a color change to red is complete. Although not all of the specified limit s were implemented (see Sec tion 4.1.4), PSE&G has agreed to provide additional 3 " margin to action" tables for variables where more than i one action limit exists, such as reactor pressure and water level. Based on the above and since the " scenario walk-throughs" have not been performed, this review remains

'open".

4.2 Data Scan Intervals

4.2.1 Requirement

Displayed Data Should Represent the Current Status of Critical Plant Variables.

A. Verification Task (s): Review computer documen t a t ion to identify the available scan interval capabilities of the syst em. Review the assigned scan (i.e. update) interval specified for cach SPDS point, including in t er media t y calculational results, for reasonable application of the syst em capabilitics wit h expected operator needs. See Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 35 of 79

l l

< PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. O I '%

Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

l

. B. Summary: The Honeywell manual identifics the fastest scan l 1

rate availabic is once per second, with longer intervals extending into minutes.

As part of the overall V&V methodology for algorithm i verification, both scan intervals and the computational order of computed values were reviewed. In general, all of the SPDS update intervals are accept a bic, except that updates for inputs from the RMS computer were identified as "(Later)". Most points were in the 2 second range with temperatures within the 5 to 60 second range. The PSE&G proposed revision to OEI 8407-1 specifies the following:

Less than 2 second updates for parameters that are direct inputs to the CRIDS computer (including Class IE circuits) 4 2 second updates fr parameters that input the NSSS computer 3 minute updates for parameters that input the RMS computer 1 second updates for the CRT's C. Verification Referenec(s):

5100293. Honeywell System Spec. Section 3, Rev. D e

i i

PS -J106-185-01, Rev. O SPDS Point Development i

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 36 of 79

,_. __- _ _ _ _ __ . _ ~_ .--- --_ _ ,-_ _ ___. _ _ -

PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. 0 4

J Design hiemorandum H-1-RJXX-CDht-0483-0 (Draft XXXX)

D.

Conclusion:

The scan interval for all points except those originating from the RhtS - computer are acceptabic. The RMS intervals were identified as *later". Therefore, this requirement is considered "open". The implemen t a t ion of the proposed new criteria should be addressed as part of the systems configuration control.

This requirement will be further evaluated as part of the validation testing.

4.2.2 Requirement

The Time Delay From Sampling To Display should Be Consistent With Other Control Room Displays

/

b) A. Verifica tion Task (s): Verif y that the actual system performance is consistent with the design relative to CRT update interval. See Sect ion 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary: None.

C. Verification Reference (s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

This requirement is addressed in Section 4.13.1 of t his report and will be further addressed during system validation testing.

4.2.3 Requirement

The Sampling Rate is Such That there is No hicaningful Loss of Data O

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, - - , - - .~ - - , , - . - . - - - , - , , . , -- - - - - - - - . -,

B - - J -2 4 -- -

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. O C\

O A. Verification Task (s): See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary None.

C. Verification Reference (s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

This requirement is satisf actorily addressed in the preceding two sections and is therefore considered

" closed".

4.3 Scale Optimization

4.3.1 Requirement

Critical Plant Variabics Are Displayed With an Accuracy S u f ficient to Discriminate Between Conditions that Impact Plant Safety Status A. Verifica tion Task (s): Review all alarm limi t s for reasonableness wit h respect to the span of the point to be monitored. See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary: Document PS-J 106-184 -01 was reviewed for all values or digital logic states used as a basis for an alarm threshold. All alarms were verified for proper imp!cmentation as specified in OEI 8407-3 and where

- applicable, to the appropriate EOP.

Discrepancy #13 resulted because the instrumented range for drywell pressure is 0-250 psig and the alarm set point is The ability to accura t ely distinguish between 1,68 psig.

normal and abnormal conditions is inadequate.

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I l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 l I

C. Verification Reference (s):

PS-J106-184-01, 3/4/86. SPDS Display Design PS-J IU6 185-01, Rev. O, Sf'OS Point Development PS J 106-186-01, Rev. O, (OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0) SPDS Display Functional Descriptions D.

Conclusion:

All alarm limits are sa t isf a c t ory, except for drywell high pressure. PSE&G has stated that the algorithm will be modified so that the alarm will be driven by a 0-5 psig narrow range instrument rather than the current 0-250 psig wide range. This approach will resolve Discrepancy #13 upon implementation.

For the purpose of t his report, this requirement is considered "open" un til complete implementation of the resolution stated for Discrepancy #13. The issue of accuracy control will be addressed in Section 4.7.

4.3.2 Requirement

Displays should Be Capable of Presenting Magnitudes and Trends of Critical Parameters A. Verification Task (s): Review the computer manual to determine trending capabilities of the CRIDS compu t er.

Review OEI 8407-2 to ensure trend graphs are specified for critical parameters when the associated EO P's require the parameter to be " maintained" relative to a specified value.

Review OEl 8407-3 to ensure the spccified trending was

, implemented into the displays. Review the trending l impl ement a t ions for adequate scaling and resolution relative to EOP demands.

J Eigen Engineering. Inc. Page 39 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O V.

B. S u mma r y: The CRIDS opera tor interface description identifies threc

• b uil t in" features for trending. These features are: Bar G r a phs, Video Graph, and Trend Pen.

None of these CRIDS features are identified within the SPDS documen t a t ion. However, document OEI 8407 2 does specify history bar graphs for:

Reactor pressure Reactor water level Drywell temperature Suppression pool level Suppression pool temperature Suppression chamber pressure Offsite radioactivity release rate p All of these parameters are related to EOP decision points about " main t aining" the process value with respect to a particular limit. Therefore, the parameter set historically trended is satisfactory.

Document OEl 8407-3 implements a trend graph for each of the specified parameters. However, " flags" (i.e. an action limit indicated by variable pointer to the process variable axis) were not implemented. This was included in Discrepancy #5 (See Section 4.1.4).

The trend plots are generated by utilizing a " daisy-chain" algorithm of computed points. Each point takes on the value of the preceding point at predefined in t er vals. This allows the graphs to exist on the same displays as the other tabular data, including the CFPM. This would be a restriction of the " built in" trending functions.

O V

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O f \

Document PS-J106 185-01 was reviewed to determine the duration and time increments of the various trends. The suppression pool temperature and offsite radiation trends have durations of 20 minutes at 1 minute increments. the others have 5 minute durations at 15 second increments.

The time axis is satisfactory for the intended purpose of main t aining a process relative to specified value. The design intent was not to display high speed t r a n sient response.

The vertical axis scaling is unaccept able. The resolution is inadequate (as documented by PSE&G operator comments) and does not utilize "round" numbers for sub-division increments. For example: 18.75 inches / division for reactor water level and 92.31 psig/ division for reactor pressure.

This is the basis for Discrepancy #9.

/m) .

U C. Verification References (s):

OEI 8407-2, Rev. O, SPDS Display Feature Development OEI 8407-3, Rev. 3, SPDS Display Functional Descriptions CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O PS-J106-185-01, 3/4/86, SPDS Point Development D.

Conclusion:

The parameter set provided with trending indication is adequate. The time axis scaling is considered adequate for the intended purpose of process control, not transient recording. The process variable scaling of the ver ! cal axis is unacceptable and is documented in Discrepancy #9 ( Also see Section 4.11). It should be noted that the NRC audit of August, 1985 concluded that the Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 41 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

,/-~

fb resolution of both the time and the process variable axis was insu f ficient. PSE&G proposes to defer this item to the validation test for final disposition.

The V&V Team agrecs that the usefulness should be evaluated during t es ting. R ega rdless, it is also the opinion of the V&V Team that the appropriate significant limits be demarcated on the vertical a xis. This requirement is considered "open' and is pending the validation test to l

identify a disposition.

4.3.3 Requirement

Sc alin g' Should Allow Tracking Over a Wide Range of Abnormal Conditions A. Verification Task (s): Compare the range of each trend graph with the associated control range of the EOP process.

B. Summary: Document OEI 8407-1 specifies the trend graph ranges. The specified reactor water level range is

-200 inches (i.e. below top of active fuel) to + 100 inches.

This is meets EOP requirements based on decision points.

The specified range for the reactor pressure graph is 0-1200 psig. This range matches the range of the various curves illustrated on EOP 102 (e.g. Suppression Pool Load Limit and Heat Capacity Temperature Limit).

The s u p pression pool t emperat ure graph range is l 75 -125 DegF. The range identified on the RHR and CS l

N PSH curves in EOP 102 is 180-200 DegF. Similarly, the Heat Capacity Tempera t u re Limit range is 100-200 DegF.

The SPDS suppression pool t empera t u re graph is inadequate

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PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. O m

as i t's maximum is below the EOP range for which it is to support. This sit u a tion is considered part of Discrepancy #9, trend plot resolution.

The suppression chamber pressure graph range is 0-200 psig. This matches the Drywell Spray Initiation graph range in EOP 102.

The drywell temperature graph range is 0-350 DegF.

Although there may actually be differences between drywell temperature and suppression chamber temperature, for the purposes of this evaluation they were assumed the same.

The Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit curve in EOP 102 has a suppression chamber temperature range of 40-380 DegF. The SPDS drywell temperature graph does not envelope the EO P. This sit ua tion is considered part of

- Discrepancy #9, trend plot resolution.

The suppression pool level graph range is 100-250 inches.

the range of the Heat Capacity Level Limit curve is 0-180 inches. This SPDS suppression level graph does not envelope the EO P. This situation is considered part of

!. Discrepancy #9, trend plot resolution.

The of fsit e noble gas release rate range is 5.00E+5 to 7.8 0 E+ 5 u C/sec. The alert level in EO P 104 is 6.3E+5 uC/sec which corresponds to mid-scale. This is satisfactory.

The of fsit e iodine gas release rate range is 1. 30 E + 3 to

1. 5 8 E + 3 u C/ s ec. The alert level i r. EOP 104 is 1.4 5 + 3 u C/sce which cor.csponds to mid-scale. This is sa t isfactory.

!O i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 43 of 79 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O

'DV C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-2, Rev. O, SPDS Display Feature Development EOP OP-EO.ZZ-102(O), Rev. O, Containment Control EOP OP-EO.ZZ-104(O), Rev. O, Radioactivity Release D.

Conclusion:

The following SPDS trend plots are concluded to have satisf actory scale ranges to allow tracking of abnormal conditions:

Reactor water level Reactor pressure Suppression chamber pressure Radioactivity release rate (noble gas and iodine)

The drywell and suppression pool temperature graphs do not extend the range high enough to envelope the required EOP ranges.

The suppression pool level graph does not extend the range low enough to envelope the required EOP range.

PSE&G has deferred response to Discrepancy #9 until after the validation t es t ing is completed. Th er e f o r e, this

requirement is considered "open".

i f

i T

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PSE-3210 87 001, Rev. 0 4.4 Data Validation

4.4.1 Requirement

The Displayed Data Should be Validated on a Real Time Basis Where Practical l

A. Verification Task (s): Review computer manuals to determine the " built in" data ~ validation techniques available. Review OEI 8407-1 for the es t a blish men t of a data validation methodology. Review OEI 8407-3 for the implementation of data v a lida t ion in accordance wit h Ihe specified m e t hodology. Review the SPDS lesson plan for the i inclusion of the data validation techniques implemented and for a discussion as to how an operator becomes aware that i a point is invalid. See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

G B. Summary: Section 3 of the Honeywell specification states that each point is checked on every scan for the following conditions: open circuit (i.e. thermocouples), comparison to range high and low limits (i.e. analog inputs), contact bounce (i.e. digital inputs), and hardware failures including point selection failure and converter overflow.

OEl 8407-1 does address data validation; however, it is limited to averaging and range checking. Input that fails the range check is suppressed both as a displayed point and as an in pu t to another calculated point (Note: the hardware failure checks are automatically included). These techniques are good, but by themselves are inadequate and form the basis for Discrepancy #33.

Document OEI 8407-3 and PS-J106-185-01 make wide use of

" averaging" and satisfactorily implement the t echnique ( Also see Section 4.4.3).

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%)

1 Both the CRIDS Operator Interface Description, and the 1 SPDS Lesson Plan satisf actorily identify how an operator would d e t ermin e if a particular poin t was not validated.

Rather than display an erroneous value, the system displays a wlite *?' in place of the value.

l l

C. Verification Reference (s):

l 1

5100293, Honeywell System Spec, Section 3, Rev. D CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O OEI 8407-1, Rev. 2, SPDS Display Design and Implement ation SPDS Lesson Plan, Draf t 10/14/85

\_/

PS-J106-185 01, Rev. O, SPDS Point Development Drawings D.

Conclusion:

The current data validation is limited to range checking and the averaging of multiple points when available. This is not considered adequate and is the basis for Discrepancy #33. The proposed revision to OEI 8407-1 specifies additional data validation techniques to be implemen t ed. It goes on to require that if those techniques are not used, a case by case justification must

. be provided and alternate t echniques implemen t ed. this requirement will be considered "open" until the new defined methodology is implemented.

It should be noted that the lack of data validation was the major issue in the NRC August.1985 audit.

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_ (~'%

4 1

• v 4.4.2 Requirement: Redundant Sensors should be Compared Before Display A: Verification Task (s): Review OEI 8407-3 and PS -J106-185-01 for the implementation of sensor comparison as a technique for data validation. See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary: Sensor comparison was not utilized at all. This is the basis for Discrepancy #8.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEl 8407-3. Rev. O, SPDS Display Functional Description PS-J 106-185 -01, Rev. O, SPDS Point Development Drawings

(~

D.

Conclusion:

This requirement was not addressed nor implemented. The revision to OEI 8407-1 states that this data validation technique will be implemented when sensors are available. This item will be considered "open" until the final disposition to Discrepancy #8 is implemented.

4.4.3 Requirement

SPDS Should Alert the Operator When a Point is Off Scale A. Verification Task (s): Review the computer manual to identify the capabilities available to inform the operator when a displayed point is off scale. Review OEI 8407-3 to ensure that the features are i m pic m cr.t ed. Review the lesson plan to ensure that the operators are trained to recognize the implemented techniques. See Section 4.13.1 I s for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

Eigen Engineering, 'nc. Page 47 of 79

c PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 v

B. Summary: The CRIDS computer displays a white "?" when a point has not been valida t ed. See Sec t ion 4.4.1 for additional discussion of this feature.

With respect to displayed data that is calculated from other inputs, should one or any combination of inputs be invalid, the displayed data may or may not be displayed as a "?"

mark, if the computation is an average, a result will always be available as long as at least one input is available. Therefore, the exclusion of failed inputs is not readily available to the operators. This is the basis for Discrepancy #22.

PS E& G has stated that they will include a feature to display data in " inverse video" when am of the associated inputs have f ailed. This approach is unsa tis f actory because V many of the implemented algorithms rely on the fact that out of range data is ignored from an average calculation.

This would result in some points being displayed in " inverse video" all the time.

C. Verification Reference (s):

Same as Section 4.4.1 above.

D.

Conclusion:

The current methods of informing the operator of f ailed inputs does not satisfy all implemented data configurations per Discrepancy #22. The PSE&G proposed solution only inverts the problem and displays some data as always f ailed. This requirement is considered 'open" pending a satisfactory resolution and implementation.

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PSE 3210-87-tMil, Rev. 0

,/

U 4.4.4 Requirement: Displayed Data Should Represent the Correct Status of the Vs.riable.

A. Verification Task (s): Review the algorithms used to develop each of the displayed SPDS points to ensure that the value displayed is a correct representation in accordance with intent of the function task analysis in OEI 8407-2. See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing evaluation.

B. Summary: Many of the a t t ribu t es specified by the various requirements of the V&V program were reviewed at the same time. This is true of the SPDS algorithms even though the a t t ribu t es are addressed separately within this report. In order to review the algorithms of computed points, a checklist was developed to ensure consistency in performing the reviews. The instructions provided for

.g-}

V completing the checklist are listed in Attachment 4. The following checklist topics were addressed relative to this requirement and summarized herein.

Curve Coefficients Curve Boundaries Equation Constants The review of this requirement resulted in the following discrepancies.

DR #12: OEI 8407-3 defines that two wide range drywell pressure sensors be averaged with a single narrow sensor.

Document PS -3106 - 185 -01 only specifies the two wide range units. PSE&G has stated that the narrow range input will be included.

i O

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-- __ ,- _ - - . _ - - --, =-.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O o

DR #14: The calculation for point B6042 (i.e. a reactor pressure vessel margin to limit) fails to convert from " psia" to "psig". PSE& G has stated that the conversion will be added.

DR # 15: The display of two different data points in a margin to action table on the suppression pool water level control display are both labeled with the same action.

However, the actions and parameters are actually different.

PSE&G has stated that the labeling and identified actions will be corrected and demarcated appropriately.

DR #16: The formula for the margin to action data point indicating "stop in j ec t ion" based on drywell water level could not be confirmed. Revision 0 of EOP 102 now contains the formula; however, the SPDS algorit hm m implemented does not contain the correct const an t s.

PSE&G has stated that the constants will be revised to reflect the EOP.

DR #20: Two different ranges were specified for drywell t empera tu re monitoring. OEl 8407-3 specifies a setpoint of

$47 DegF for a drywell temperature permissive and yet a range of 0-500 DegF is specified on a different page of the I same doc u m en t . PSE&G has acknowledged the mismatch and will make the correction based upon an associated l caution in EOP 102.

l f

I DR # 24: Document OEI 8407-3 specifies that a reactor pressure data point should display as either " Low",

" Medium", or "High" Currently, the point as implemented displays " Yes " or "No" based on a setpoint of 380 psig.

PSE&G has stated that t his particular display feature will O

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be deleted and the required information will be incorporated into the scaling of the associated trend plot.

DR #27: Document OEl 8407-3 specifics that all of. the A PRM's as having a range of 0-125%, while PS-J106-185-01 specifics 0-160% for channels B, C, D, E, and F.

DR #30: The of fsit e release rate limits for the margin to

" Emergency" data points could not be confirmed at 3.48E+7 for noble gases and 4.22E+6 for iodine.

DR # 31 : The reactor water level algorithm contains numerous deficiencies. As discussed during the August, 1985 NRC audit, it a t t empt s to average all available level instruments all of the time. This includes those calibrated for " hot" (i.e. power operation) conditions and those for

" cold" (i.e. shutdown). Additionally, some of the limits V used to determine intermediate values within the algorithm could not be confirmed. These include those related to drywell temperature and recirculation pump status for the fuel zone instruments.

DR #32: The algorithm for calculating the margin to the

" pressure suppression pressure" limit could not be completely verified (i.e. Point B6266). It has a low alarm setpoint of 0 psig which is not specified in OEI 8407-3.

Additionally, the const a nt s used in the in t ermedia t e calculation of primary containment level (i.e. Point B6043) could not be confirmed.

DR #34: Many of the computed " margin to limit " points rely on curves established in the EO P's. The methodology used to implement these curves consist s of identifying the order and coe f ficients of a polynomial that approximates Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 51 of 79

PSE 3210 87 001, Rev. O V the curve. With that pre-defined information, a ' built in" polynomial function is used to comput e the result. The basis for the order and coefficients used for all of the curves was not document ed. Subsequent to this review new data has been developed and documented.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-3. Rev. O, SPDS Display Functional Descriptions PS-J106-185-01, Rev. O, SPDS Point Development Drawings PS-J106-183-01, Rev. O, SPDS Curve Point Coefficients EOP OP-EO.ZZ-102(O), Rev. C & 0, Containment Control D.

Conclusion:

Wit h the exception of the above identified d discrepancies, the SPDS algorithms are satisf actory. This requirement shall be considered 'open' until all dispositions are identified and/or implemented.

4.4.5 Requirement

The Displays Should Not Give False Indications A. Verification Task (s): The function and task analysis, OEI 8407-2, will be reviewed for analytical errors. Also see Discrepancy #4 discussed in Sec tion 4.1.4. See Section 4.13.1 for developmental and/or installation testing ev.sluation.

B. Summary: Relative to the topic of reactor coolant inventory control, two errors based on system capability were identified. EOP 101 identifies the feedwater system operating range as 720 1250 psig. The function task O

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PSE 3210-87-001, Rev. O A

analysis (OEI 8407 2) utilized 0-1250 psig. This is the basis for Discrepancy #17. Similarly, OEI 8407-2 ' identifies the st andby liquid control (SLC) operating range as 0-60 psig. SLC can operate wcll in excess of 60 psig.

This is the basis for Discrepancy #18.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEI 8407-2, Rev. O, SPDS Display Feature Development EOP OP-EO.ZZ-101(O), Rev. O, RPV Control D.

Conclusion:

PSE&G has stated that these mismatches will be climinated during the process' of dispositioning Discrepancy #4. This requirement is considered "open" pending implementatron of the resolutions.

4.5 SPDS Failure

4.5.1 Requirement

SPDS Operability Criteria Must be Defined and The Symptoms of a Failed System Easily Recognized I

i A. Verification Task (s): Review the SPDS lesson plan for ' the j identification of SPDS failure criteria and the means of detection.

f B. Summary: Neither the SPDS lesson plan nor the CRIDS i operator interface description define the criteria of a failed SPDS (i.e. CRIDS), nor do they identify any me t hod for

detection. This is the basis for Discrepancy #21.

4 l

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. ..-~_m_. . _. , - , . . _ _ _ . _ , _ . _ . . - . . . . _ - - . . ~ . . _ _ _ , , - , _ _ _ . , , . _ _ . . . . _ , _ _ , _ , - _ . . _ _ _ . -

PSE.3210 87 001, Rev. O b)

's . C. Verification Reference (s):

SPDS Lesson Plan, Draft 10/14/85 CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O I

D.

Conclusion:

PSE&G has stated that f ailure recognition criteria will be added to the CRIDS _ operator interface description and a reference to the same shall be added to the SPDS lesson plan. This requirement is considered

'open" pending implementation of the stated resolution.

4.6 Elect rical isola tion l 4.6.1 Requirement: SPDS Shall be Suitably Electrically isolated

, \ A. Verification Task (s): Review FSAR question 421.13 to ensure that the method of isolation between safety related circuits is addressed. Review design drawings of all Class 1E sensors that are used in the SPDS parameter set to determine that the installation of electrical isolators is illustrated.

B. Summary: FS A R t,uestion 421.13 sa t isf ac t orily describes the equipment and methods used to achieve Class 1E isolation.

All safety related isolation for SPDS is provided by the ERFDAS compu t er link. The confirmation of electrical isolation for all Class IE inputs was performed as part of I requirement Section 4.4.4 ( Also see Attachment 4).

1 C. Verification Reference (s):

i FSAR, Amendment 13, Ouestion 421.13 Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 54 of 79

l PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. 0 ,

n., l

\

)  !

C22-1050-(39)-4 i

l C22-1050-(44)-4 J042, sh 8 & 9 Ell-383-(18)

J4042, sh 3 & 4 J4057, sh 4 & 5, Rev. 7 J4055, sh 4 Rev. 4 J25-0, sh 6, Rev. 3 D.

Conclusion:

Class 1E isol a t ion is satisfactorily identified f

( where required. This requirement is " closed'. Installation verification wn: be included at a later date as part of the

, field inspections.

1 4.7 Configuration Control l

4.7.1 - Requirement: SPDS Interfaces and Performance Characteristics are Documented and a Management System Impicmented A. Verification Task (s): Review SPDS administrative con t rols to ensure that a configuration control system is defined and implemented to define and control the SPDS database.

B. Summary: During the initial phases of t his review there was no evidence of a configuration control sys t em. This l v' Eigen Engineering, Inc. .

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?

e

. - - . ~ m. , . , , - - ,. , - - . _ - , - . . _ - . _ _ , _ . - _ - - - . _ . , - . - . . . . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ .__ _ - - - - . .

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. O n

(j ' resulted in Discrepancy # 23. The concern became that once the system is validated therc 'was to mechanism to ensure it remains validated. P'S E& G is in the process of developing a configuration control system.

The subject of computer systems was incorporated into existing plant modification control procedures. No evidence has been provided for review to verify implementation of these procedures. Recently a new procedure to provide compu t er configuration control was drafted (i.e.

V PN -ht S P-10 ). Additionally, a list of SPDS inputs and a hardware flow path diagram have been dra f ted. However none of these new documents have been issued for use.

Another aspect of configuration control was discussed in S e c t i o n 4. 3.1. This concerned the calibration and testing of the SPDS inpu t s. Although the methodology is Os satisfactory, there is no evidence of consistent implementation.

C. Verification Reference (s):

Procedure SA-AP.ZZ-008(O), Rev. 3 l

Procedure SEI-4.2, Rev. 2 Procedure PSE-GP-014, Rev. 0 l

! Procedure Gh18-Eh1P-009, Rev.1 Procedure VPN-htSP-10, Draft A L e t t er, D. Shaffer ( PSE& G ) to L. Flores (Eigen), dated 4/29/86,

Subject:

SPDS Parameter input List l

j \

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(J 1

J53007-1, Draf t 4/7/86, Unit i SPDS Hardware Flow Path D.

Conclusion:

Initially t h e r e- was no configuration control program. Currently efforts are being made to finalize a detailed program.

Once the plan is finalized, PSE&G will still have to address the period of time based on the revision status of the documents reviewed for this report and the date plan implementation begins. This is necessary to ensure that the system is maintained in a configuration that satisfies the requirements identified by the V&V process.

This requirement is "open" pending complete implementation of configuration control and demonstration of a reviewed

.g as built system.

V

4.7.2 Requirement

Programs Should Be implemented to Maintain Consistency Between the EOP's and SPDS Operator Training A. Verification Task (s): Verify that the SPDS lesson plan -

satisfactorily correlates SPDS intent and operation relative to the EOP's. Verify that the SPDS lesson plan is procedurally maintained current wit h respect to EOP changes.

B. Summary: The draf t SPDS lesson plan does coordinate SPDS display features wit h specific EOP decision points.

H ow e v e r, there was no program identified to ensure that an SPDS lesson plan update is required in conjunction ,with EOP revisions, a

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 57 of 79

s p k

y PSE-3210-87 001, Rev. O p

t

.h C. Verification Reference (s):

SPDS Lesson Plan, drafi 10/14/85 D.

Conclusion:

There was no evidence that the SPDS lesson plan is procedurally controlled to be maintained current with respect to EOP revisions. This requirement is considered "open" and resolution will be addressed as part of Discrepancy #23 (Ref. Section 4.7.1).

4.8 Reliability

4.8.1 Requirement

SPDS Reliability Analysis Shall be Consistent With Overall System Objectives I

p A. Verification Task (s): Review the reliability analysis for

. consistency with overall system requirements. Review repair assumptions for reasonableness.

B. Summary: A reliability study was performed for the SPDS portion of the process compu t er system. The model utilized satisf actorily represents the actual system l configuration. During the August, 1985 NRC audit, a mean time to repair of I hr was agreed to be marginal.

I Therefore, PSE&G stated that the reliability analysis would be revised to either change the mean time to repair value or provide a justification for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

C. Verification Reference (s):

SPDS Reliability Analysis. (no date / no revision)

A U

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

.O D' D.

Conclusion:

This requirement will remain "open" until the revised reliability analysis is issued and reviewed. This document . should also be incorporated into' the con figuration I

control system.

4.8.2 R equir e r.icn t : Implement and Maintain a Program to improve SPDS Reliability A. Verifica tion Task (s): Verify that a program exists to document SPDS operating experience in order to establish the actual reliability of SPDS.

B. Summary: No such documented program has been submitted t for review.

C. Verification Referenec(s): None.

O D.

Conclusion:

No documentation has been reviewed to dats.

This requirement shall remain "open" until the appropriate SPDS reliability program impicmentation documentation is ll reviewed and accepted.

i 4.9 Location

., 4.9.1 Requirement: Critical Plant Variables Are Presented On a Single Primary Disp lay A. Verification Task (s): Verify that the critical parameters are displayed on a single display.

B. Summary: The critical parameters were previously defined as the EOP entry conditions (CFPM). The top level Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 59 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O

[~

\. s primary dis pl a y is a silhouette of the reactor and containment buildings. The only points displayed are the i

CFPM parameters.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OE! 8407-3, Rev. O, SPDS Display Functional Description D.

Conclusion:

The CFPM parameters are displayed on the primary display. This requirement is " closed".

4.9.2 Requirement

The Display Should Be Located So that it is Convenient To the Control Room Operating Crew A. Verification Task (s): Verify that the SPDS display (s) are readily accessible to the control room operators.

v B. Summary: The CRIDS operator interface description documents that there are 9 CRT's located within the control room. Eight are distributed on the various sections of pancis 10C650 and 10C651. The r.inth is located on the operators console,10C649.

C. Verification Reference (s):

. CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O D.

Conclusion:

There are 9 C RT's located within the control

! room by which the operators have access to SPDS. This requirement is " closed".

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 60 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O h.

d 4.9.3 Requirement: SPDS Displays Are Readily Distinguished From Other Displays A. Verification Task (s): Verify that the SPDS displays are uniquely identified from other CRT displays.

B. Summary: During a site inspection, the CRIDS displays were reviewed and only ~ the SPDS displays were found to contain the CFPM matrix. The primary SPDS display is labeled as such per OEl 8407-3.

C. Verification Reference (s):

OEl 8407-3, Rev. O, SPDS Display Functional Description D.

Conclusion:

Utilizing the CFPM and labeling, this requirement is satisfactorily implemented. This requirement is closed".

4.9.4 Requirement

The SPDS Displays Are Readily Accessible to the:

Shif t Supervisor, Control Room Senior Operator, Shift

. Technical Advisor, and One Reactor Operator.

J A. Verification Task (s): Verify that SPDS is accessible to the:

shift supervisor, control room senior operator, shift technical advisor, and one reactor operator.

B. Summary: As determined in Section 4.9.2 above, there are 9 CRT's located within the control room. Additionally, there is one located in the shif t supervisors office.

C. Verification Referenec(s):

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 61 of 79

' PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O D.

Conclusion:

There are 9 C R T's located within the control room by which the operators. have access to SPDS.

Additionally, there is one located in the shift supervisorr office. This requirement is " closed"

4.9.5 Requirement

The Control Room Operating Crew Shall Cont rol the Images Displayed on the Control Room SPDS A. Verifica t ion Task (s): Determine who has control of displaying SPDS.

B. Summary: The CRIDS operator interface description documents that cach CRT has its own keyboard which is used to request a display on the associated CRT.

C. Verification Reference (s):

CRIDS Operator Interface Description, Rev. O D.

Conclusion:

Each CRT is controlled by its a s s oci r, t ed keyboard. This satisfies the requirement. This item is

" closed".

4.10 Procedures and Training 4.10.1 Requirement: Procedures which Describe the Timely and Corrcet Safety Assessment When SPDS Is and Is Not Available Shall Be Developed A. Verification Task (s): None.

N)

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O L/

B. Summary: None.

C. Verification Reference (s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

The EO P's are used to determine the safety status of the plant. SPDS aids the operators in evaluating the EO P's. This requirement is inherently addressed by the design philosophy of the system and is considered " closed".

1 4.10.2 Requirement: Con t rol Room Operators should be Trained to Respond to Accident Conditions Both With and Without SPDS Available.

A. Verification Task (s): None.

B. Sununary: None.

f f C. Verification Reference (s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

The EOP t raining program existed prior to the introduction of SPDS. The SPDS lesson plan does not-replace the EOP program, but rather enhances it. The ability of the operators to perform both with and without SPDS will be determined during the validation t es ting.

From a design point of view this requirement is satisfied and ? closed" 4.10.3 Requirement: Opera t or SPDS Training includes the Use of SPDS With Normal, Abnormal, and Er:icrgency Procedures.

A. Verification Task (s): None.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 63 of 79

. _ _ _ _ _ . _.m PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O i .

'v B. Summary: None.

C. Verification Referenec(s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

The EO P's are used to determine the safety status of the plant. SPDS aids the operators in evaluating 1

the EO P's. This requirement is inherently addressed by the-design philosophy of the system and is considered closed".

4.11 Human Factors 4.11.1 Requirement: SPDS Shall be Designed to incorporate Accept ed Human Factors Engineering Principles A. Verification Task (s): Review the Essex human factors report and verify that the discrepancies identified have been

-O satisfactorily resolved.

B. Summary: The Essex human factors review identified three SPDS related concerns. These arc M113, M119, and M126.

they focus on the use of abbreviations, trend plot resolution, and trend plot down scale indication. PSE&G has stated that abbreviations will be revised wherc ,

appropriate to achieve consistency. The trend plot disposition has been deferred until completion of the validation t es t ing. Since none of the concerns have been resolved they are the basis for Discrepancy #9. Also see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.

C. Verification Reference (s):

Control Room Design Review Supplemental Report I, HCGS, p 12/27/85 ,

V'  !

l Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 64 of 79 )

l l

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.A PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

/ \

-? t V

D.

Conclusion:

None of the identified human factors engineering concerns have been resolved and -implemented.

Therefore, Discrepancy #9 and this requirement are "open".

i 4.12 System Operation and Maintenance 4.12.1 No Additional Staff Should be Required to Operate SPDS A. Verification Task (s): During the validation testing, verify

, that only the regular operating crew is required to operate SPDS.

B. Summary: None.

C. Verification Reference (s): None.

D.

Conclusion:

This requirement will be confirmed during the validation testing. From a design point of view, this requirement is " closed" 4.12.2 Requirement: Vendor Recommended Periodic Maintenance L

Should be implemented into Procedures A. Verification Task (s): Review preventive maintenance records during the fic!d " walk through".

B. Summary: None.

C. Verification Reference (s): None.

4 O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 65 of 79

-rv,-- . - - , , - ,---.n, - - , , -

-v- . - . , . _ ,

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

-D.

Conclusion:

This requirement will be confirmed during the field inspections and " walk t h rou ghs". From a design point of view this requirement is considered " closed".

4.13 System Testing 4.13.1 Requirement: Verif y That - Each Applicable SPDS Feature Is Tested During System Development and/or Installation A. Verification Task (s): Review . test results to ensure that the SPDS display update interval is comparable - to the associated data scan intervals (Ref. Section 4.1.1) and that i specified color changes occur (Ref. Section 4.1.5). Verify that the specified data scan intervals are achieved (Ref.

i Section 4.2). Verify that the displayed data point ranges are consistent with the plant instrument loops from which the signal taps are associated ( R ef. Section 4.3.1). Review test results to ensure that the data validation algorithms validate displayed data on a "real time" basis. (Ref.

l Section 4.4).

B. Su mmary: Startup test procedures GTP-3 and GTP-12 s

address calibration of computer inputs. Procedure GTP-3 addresses computer input / output from the plant instruments to the display of the associated raw data. It requires that the process variable be simul a t ed and varied at the sensor.

i. -

All analog and digit al outputs from the sensor to the computer are to be verified for proper response. This includes "as found" and "as lef t " accuracy measurements at 25, 50, and 100 % of full scale, and alarm setpoints for raw data inputs.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 66 of 79 2

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O V Procedure GTP-12 electrically simulates three input levels (0, 50, and 100G ) at the computer input terminals for each analog input. The resulting computer display of the input data is then verified to.be accurate within 0.25 % with the proper engineering u ni t s. Additionally, a_I l other computer responses from varying the input are to . be verified to be in accordance with - design requirements (i.e. the results of calculations and derivations based on the raw data tested in accordance with GTP-3).

- Neither GTP-3 nor GTP-12 address data and screen update interval testing; therefore, confirmation of these system dynamic responses will be deferred to the validation testing phase of the V&V program.

Approximately 35 SPDS points were audited for test procedure implementation. Inputs from the RMS computer V were not reviewed as they were not available. GTP-3 t es t in g of accuracy, range, and alarm limits of the raw data points reviewed was satisf ac tory. However, most of the SPDS displayed variables are " composed poin t s. " That is, they are derived / computed rather than directly measured. The application of GTP-12 was limited to accuracy and range ~ checking of the first computer point (i.e. raw data points, similar to GTP-3) and did not include composed points. No evidence of testing the accuracy, range, alarm limits, and validation of displayed computed variables was found within the entire test program.

C. Verification Reference (s):

PSSUG GTP-3, Rev. 3, instrument and Con t rol Functional Loop Calibration O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 67 of 79

- ~ - . . . . . - . -.

l 1

I I

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O

V PS S U G - GT P- 12, Rev. 2, Computer Point Checkout and Verification 4

PS-J106-183 01, Rev. O, SPDS Curve Coefficients i

D.

Conclusion:

The system's ability to " continuously" generate and update the required information during all plant conditions (Ref. Section 4.1.5) will be tested during the validation tests by simulating EOP scenarios and confirming adequate system performance.

j~

The SPDS displays are plant mode independent (Ref.

l Sec tion 4.1.6) and do not change format in response to plant mode changes; therefore, no testing is required for this feature.

. The process instrumentation loop is believed to be the 1 major source of error in any data acquisition sptem. The

test program defined by GTP-3 satisf ac torily tested data 1

input / output to the CRIDS computer and ensures the

! necessary level of accuracy.

Testing of composed points for accuracy is not necessary

~

, t. s the error of a mainframe digital computer system is

significantly less than that of the data input. In general,

the accuracy of the computed data is believed to be consistent with the inputs to the system. However, it should be noted that some of the SPDS variables are the i result of computations involsing a polynomial curve fit.

Error can be introduced if the constants and coefficients are not correctly chosen. The constants and coef ficient s

.{ defining the various curves are satisfactorily documen ted in PS-J106-185-01; however, they have not yet been imp?cmented into the CRIDS database.

4 g g Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 68 of 79

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. 0 h

V Testing of all SPDS displayed computed . variables must be performed (including variables ' computed by other related computer systems and t ra ns ferred to CRIDS, such as RMS and NSSS) to ensure proper alarm limits so that ' the

operator becomes aware of impo r t a n t changes ( R e f.

Sec t ion 4.1.5). These - tests will either be performed by PSE&G after implementing modifications to resolve design discrepancies or by the VAV team during validation testing.

-No evidence was found ' documenting the testing of data 3

scan intervals. This applies to both raw data input and the update intervals for composed points. These tests will also be performed by PSE&G after implementing modifications to resolve design discrepancies or by the V&V team during validation testing.

PSE&G has stated that data validation algorithms will be I tested using the actual hardware and sof tware upon implementation of the revised data validation techniques

( R e f. Section 4.4). The VAV team will review the results of these tests during the validation testing.

I Procedures GTP 3 & 12 were originally issued in June 1983.

The revisions reviewed were issued in March 1985 and i April 1985 respectively. The SPDS point development i

j. d r a win gs, PS -J 106 - 185 - 01, were the first documents issued 1* that specified SPDS ranges and " composed point" definitions i

1 i (i.e. algorithms for compu t ed values). Additionally, i documents PS-J106 185 01 and PS-J106-186-01 were first issued in March 1986 and were the first to specify alarm i limits. No test packages were found (GTP-3 and GTP-12) that referenced SPDS compulcr point design requiremen t s.

j

. Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 69 of 79 l - .- - , .- .. --_._-~ _ __ - ,. _ - . . - - , _ _ , _ _ . . - - _ . -

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O Sec Section 4.7 for further discussion of SPDS configuration control.

)

1 This design requirement is considered "open" un til the almvc testing is completed and reviewed. l l

l l

l I

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 70 of 79 l

t

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O b

V , 5.0

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES The following table summarizes the status of each design category. Included asc the number of discrepancies. disposition / r esol u t ion, and status.

Additionally, cross reference to NRC concerns identified during the audit of August.1985 are listed. ,

I l

Discrepancy NRC Audit l Requirenent Number Status Resciution Reference 3.1 Display DR-11 Closed Inplemented 4.6.1 Control & DR-6 Clocod Justification 4.2.1 i

Format DR-10 Open Action Defined -

DR-19 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 DR-1 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 DR-2 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 p DR-3 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 DR-4 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 DR-5 Open Action Defined 4.2.2 DR-7 Open Action Defined -

3.2 Scan None - -

4.3.1 Intervals 3.3 Scale DR-13 Open Action Defined -

OptimizationDR-9 Open Pending 4.3.2 3.4 Data DR-33 Open Action Defined 4.3.2 Validation DR-8 Open Action Defined 4.3.2 DR-22 Open Pending 4.2.2 DR-12 Open Action Defined -

DR-14 Open Action Defined -

DR-15 Open Action Defined -

DR-16 Open Action Defined -

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 71 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Hev. O Discrepancy NRC Audit Requirenent Number Status Resolution Reference DR-20 Open M tion Defined -

DR-24 Open M tion Defined -

DR-27 Open Pending -

DR-30 Open E tion Defined -

DR-31 Open M tion Defined 4.3.2 DR-32 Open Pending -

DR-34 Open M tion Defined -

DR-17 Open M tion Defined -

DR-18 Open Mtion Defined -

3.5 SPDS DR-21 Open E tion Defined 4.3.1 Failure 3.6 - - -

4.7.2 Electrical Isolation 3.7 DR-23 Open E tion Required 4.8.2 Configuration Control 1

3.8 None - - 4.3.2 1

Reliability 3.9 None - - 4.5.2 Location 3

> 3.10 None - - -

l Procedures

& Training O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 72 of 79

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f PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O i

Discrepancy NRC Audit Requirement Manber Status Resolution Reference 3.11 Human DR-9 Open Pending 3.2.1 Factors i

3.12 None - - -

i Operation 8 Maintenance i

.i l

l i

A l

i I

(

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 73 of 79 l

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PSE 3210-87-001, Rev; O 6.0 . SYSTEM DESKiN EVALUATION The objectives of the V&V program are to provide reasonable assurance that the four design requirements stated in Section 2.1 are satisfied. It should be recognized that t his design review is only the first phase of the review process. Considering that an approach has been defined in many cases to resolve the open issues, and that the validation test is expected to resolve some of the open i t ems, it is the conclusion of this review team that the overall system design, including proposed changes, of the Hope Creek SPDS for the most part adequately meets the system requirements and performance objectives identified in Section 2.0 of this report. In particular:

A. The variables displayed by the SPDS will be sufficient to provide the minimum information required to assess the critical plant safety functions.

O V B. The SPDS is suitably isolated f rom electrical and elec t ronic interference with equipment and sensors that are used in safety syst ems.

C. If the proposed changes regarding data validation and configuration i control are implemented, there will be adequate means to insure that the data displayed will be valid.

D. Characteristics of the SPDS displays and other operational in t erf aces, as described in the proposed revised design, will be sufficient to allow reasonable assurance that the information provided will be readily perceived and comprehended by the llCGS operating staff.

The following sections summarire the conclusions of the V&V review scam regarding specific system requirements.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 71 of 79

.& L 3

PSE.3210-87-001, Rev. O

D- 6.1 Display Content and Format in the opinion of the review team, the content and format of the J Hope Creek SPDS displays as designed, including relatively minor changes proposed, adequately meets all applicable system requirements. In fact, the display philosophy of tying specific j displays to specific EOP's provides a very effective way of meeting the information needs of the plant operators during emergency operating conditions.

4 i

y:

6.2 Data Scan Intervals The instrument scan rates as specified in the design basis documen t s appear adequate, although the actual attainment of the specified scan rates could not be determined. In the case of the RMS System, the design documentation appearcd to be incomplete.

Wit h regards to screen update times, again the proposed design criteria are adequate, but the actual system per formance could not be verified.

a I

In the opinion of the V&V team, PSE&G is apparently having dif ficul t y attaining the proposed data rates, specifically for points coming thru the ERFDAS Subsystem, with the current hardware. In addition, the main processor, CRIDS, appears to be having difficulty attaining the screen update rates specified, especially under transient conditions.

t Finally, the scan rate verification testing that was performed during plant st a r t up, appears not to have been uniformly applied to all inputs and all subsystems or at least not properly documented.

1 O

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 75 of 79 i

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. O bV It is the conclusion of the V&V team that the subject of data scan g

rates remains an open it em u r.t il PSE&G can adequately confirm that the syst em, in its final configuration, will meet the requirements of the design basis documents.

6.3 Scale Optimization .

t For the purpose of this review scale optimization covers two subjects, variable resolution and range. With a few exceptions, which the proposed revision to the design resolves, variable range adequacy has been confirmed.

] The subject of variable resolution has been satisfactorily addressed via the installation tests that were performed with the exception of

- inputs associated with the RMS System.

r

\ In the opinion of the V&V t ea m, this it em remains open pending con firma t ion of the resolution of inputs associa t ed with RMS. In addition, there still remains a question regarding the resolution of the trend plots. It is the V&V t ea m's opinion that th- time l

resolution is adequate for addressing parameter trending (not t

transient analysis) as required to support the implementation of the EO P's. On the othu hand, the scale resolution of the trend plots do i not appear, in some cases, to be adequate. This subject is still being studied by PSEAG and its resolution has been deferred to the validation test phase.

6.4 Data Validation Current data validation techniques are limited to range checking and averaging, which are not considered su f ficien t . The proposed revised

\

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 76 of 79 i

,-----..,,,n,--- ,,m _w., -.----------ng-, - - - - ,-,----------,.-m- .

PSE 3210-87 001, Rev. O V design describes more stringent data validation techniques which, if implemented, would resolve this issue.

This item remains open until specific data validation algorithms are reviewed and their implementation confirmed.

6.5 SPDS Failure in the opinion of the V&V team, t his item can be closed upon implementation of the procedural changes proposed by PSE&G in answer to Discrepancy #21.

6.6 Elect rical isolation in the opinion of the V&V team, Class IE isolation is adequately V addressed in the design documentation and can be considered closed.

6.7 Configuration Control in the opinion of the V&V team, con figu ra t ion con t rol for the Hope Creek SPDS in any formalized manner is non-existent. First, there does not appear to exist any formal set of controlled documents which could be considered a " controllable" design basis. Two sets of documents evaluated under this program, the three "OEl" documents and the PSE& G documents PS J 106183 through 186 dealing with the data algorit hms and display shape and behavior would, if formally issued, baselined, and controlled, constitute an acceptable " partial" design basis for the system.

To date, no formal documentation has been issued describing the q hardware and sof tware configuration and their various int erf aces.

b Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 77 of 79

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O These documen t s should be developed and issued to complete the design basis of the system.

Finally, although there appears to be a configuration cont rol program plan in draft form, it has yet to be issued. This plan would have to be implemented upon baselining the aforementioned design basis documentation package.

6.8 Reliability Although a reliabilit y analysis was co nduct ed early in 1985 and submitted during the NRC V&V audit in August 19E5, there was a commitment made by PSE& G to justify the one hour "mean time to repair" (MTTR) via st u f fing and spare parts commitments or revise the analysis based on a justifiable MTTR assumption.

No formal justification or revised analysis has been presented to the V&V team and thus this item remains open.

In addition, a formal program for acquiring actual reliability data does not appear to have been implemented as commit t ed during the NRC VAV audit, it is PSE& G's contention that t his item has not been addressed due to the probability that the current SPDS hardware will be extensively revised, in part to address greater system reliability.

1 6.9 Loca tion in the opinion of the V&V t ea m, the current design and hardware configuration adequately addresses these requirements.

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 f\

.h 6.10 Procedures and Training Although certain modifications to the training program have been proposed, the basic procedures and training program which pertain ' to the SPDS are deemed satisfactory.

As a recommendation, the V&V team feels that the t raining program be strengthen in the area of actual operator integration with the SPDS, especially during EOP performance.

6.11 Human Factors An extensive human factors program was implemented at Hope Creek during the control room review process and it included SPDS.

Ccriain human engineering deficiencies (HED's) were issued at that

p time and a few remain unresolved primarily since resolution was deferred to the validation test phase of the SPDS V&V program.

Although resolution of these concerns remains open, the V&V team does not Icel that any of the items are of great concern.

l 6.12 System Operation and Maintenance in the opinion of the V&V t ea m, the design philosophy of the Hope Creek SPDS adequately addresses the requirements associated with system operation. This t opic will be further addressed during the validation test phase.

Maintenance st a f fing levels and expertise and spare parts availability remain an open item as they relate to system MTTR assumptions as discussed in Section 6.8 of this report.

l l

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Page 79 of 79

PSE 3210 87-tMil, Rev. O REFERENCES

1. Requiremen t s for Emergency Response Capability (Gencric Letter 82-33),

NUREG 0737, Supplement 1, dated 12/17/82.

2. Hope Creek Generating S t a t ion SPDS Verification And Validation Pl a n, PSE 1210-01, Rev. 2.

3. Verification and Validation for Safety Parameter Display Systems, NSAC 39,12/81.

I

4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N UR EG -0800, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Saf ety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Pl a n t s,

i Section 18.2, Human Factors Review Guidelines for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Rev. 0 - November 1984.

O

PSE-3210 87-001, Rev. 0 i

i i

ATTACHh1ENT 1 i

Review hiethodologies e

d I

1 I

i

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O Report O Section Design Requirment Design Review Approach 3.01.1 The SPDS will 1. Review PSE&G administrative control continuously display procedure (s) and lesson plan to ensure that information frm SPDS is continuously displayed on at least which the safety one of the control rom CRIDS CRIs at all status of the plant times.

can be assessed.

2. Include as a checklist evaluation it s during the sinulator validation testing to document whether the crew being tested places the SPDS display on at least one CRT during the duration of the test.

3.01.2 'Ihe SPDS should 1. Review OEI 8407-1 for the establishment provide a of the methodology used in selection of the predetermined SPDS variable set.

minimum set of critical plant 2. Cmpare the defined variable set with variables to help OEI 8407-3 for. consistent inplementation.

control rom operators evaluate 3. Review the EOPs to determine plant safety. (ie. correlation between the EOP entry points, EOP control and the selected SPDS parameter set.

functions)

4. Review the lesson plan for identification of the selected parameters.

3.01.3 '1he min information 1. Review OEI 8407-1 to verify that all of to be provided the information requirments map into SPDS should be sufficient variables (i.e. EOP control functions).

to provide information to the 2. Raview OEI 8407-l&2 to verify that the plant operators analysis of the SPDS variables address about: reactivity Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type B&C variables as control, Rx coru a minimum. Variables typically not cooling and heat monitored, but rather determined by sanple reaval, coolant and analysis need not be included.

syst e integrity, radioactivity 3. Review OEI-8407-3 to verify that the control, and CFPM design includes all the specified containment variables.

conditions.

4. Vary the RG 1.97 Type B&C variables during the simulator testing to monitor operator awareness of variable fluctuations.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 1 of 11

l PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 i

Q V.

Report Section Design Requirenent Design Review Approach 3.01.4 'Ihe display should 1. Review OEI 8407-2 and the HCGS E0Ps for contain the mininnan cruplete and accurate determination of the set of indicators parameters required, and data needed to assess the plant 2. Review OEI-8407-3 to determine that the functions that are detailed display design is consistent with used to determine OEI-8407-2 conclusions.

the plant's safety status. 3. Review the SPDS lesson plan and the actual systen to ensure the actual SPDS displays match the specified layout and content of OEI-8407-3.

4. Determine if the Operation's Department was included in the developnent of the SPDS displays. Verify that any concerns were addressed.

3.01.5 'Ihe SPDS user is 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual made aware of to determine the alarm and annunciation inportant changes in capabilities of the CRIDS ccuputer systen.

O critical safety related variables 2. Review OEI-8407-3 for the functional when they occur. description of the alarm settings assigned to the various SPDS variables / parameters.

3. Review pre-op test procedures for the inclusion of alarm testing and review the alann tests performed on the SPDS displays after they are installed or if the test doctanentation is not available, perform and document tests of the SPDS alarms.

4. Include as a checklist evaluation iten during the simulator validation testing to document whether the crew being tested are alerted to inportant changes in the SPDS parameters being displayed.

3.01.6 For each plant mode 1. Review OEI 8407-3 for inplenentation of of operation, the the methods being used to present displays

- display formats may during each plant node of operation, either be autcznatically 2. Review the SPDS lesson plan to displayed or determine that the display selection for manually selected. each mode of plant operation is discussed. j Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 2 of 11 l

- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .1

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O q Report Q Section Design Requirement Design Review Approach

3. Include as an evaluation it s during the field verification testing program to document whether the displays are usable

- under various plant nodes of operation.

3.01.7 The variables 1. Review the Honeywell equiptent manual associated for each to determine the methodology established to critical safety select and display individual functions function should also frun the display being presented, be available for display and operator 2. Review the display page links to ensure assessment. that the variables associated for each critical safety function are available for display and operator assessment.

3. Review the SPDS lesson plan to ensure that the variables associated for each critical safety function are identified during the training session to provide the operators infonnation on how averaged b

%J points are derived for display purposes.

4. Include as a checklist evaluation iten during the simulator validation testing to document whether the crew being tested is knowledgeable of the methods that may be used to verify the value of a questionable averaged data point.

3.01.9 The display should 1. Review the point scan intervals of the be responsive to SPDS parameter set and cmpare then to the transient and maximum expected rate of change of the SPDS accident sequences. parameters available in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

2. Review OEI 8407-1 for the establishment of a methodology to make the display

- responsive to transient and accident sequences. Cmpare the displays described in OEI 8407-3 for consistent implenentation of the specified methodology.

3. Review display response using various EOP transient scenarios during simulator validation testing.

(]

V Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 3 of 11

l PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O l

,Q Report Q' Section Design Requirement Design Review Approach

4. Include as a checklist evaluation item l during the simulator validation testing to l document whether the crew being tested is j able to follow the EOP scenarios including I l

transients.

3.02.1 'Ihe displayed data 1 - 3. Review the CRIDS point flow diagrams should represent the for SPDS displays to verify that the plant current and correct instrumentation which ccrnprises each point status of critical provides a correct representation of the plant variables. data for that point.

NOTE: Also see Report Section 3.4.4 4. Include as an evaluation its during the field verification testing program to document the actual scan update interval of displayed data for randmly selected sensors.

3.02.2 The time delay frm 1. Review Honeywell equipnent manual to hV when the sensor signal is sampled to determine the time delays present frm the time when the sensor signal is sampled to when it is displayed when it is displayed.

should be consistent with other control 2. Review Honeywell test procedures and a rom displays. results frm factory acceptance tests for verification of these times.

3. Review the point scan rates of the SPDS parameters for consistency with the plant instrumentation used for these functions.

4. Include as an evaluation its during the field verification testing program to document the consistency of displayed data for the same parameters.

3.02.3 The sampling rate 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual for each critical to determine display update capabilities plant variable is and sensor sampling rates.

such that there is no meaningful loss 2. Review the point scan intervals of the of information in SPDS parameter set and the display update the data presented time for consistency with the plant A to the operator. instrumentation used for these functions.

U Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 4 of 11

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Report d,o Section Design Requirment Design Review Approach

3. Include as an evaluation it s during the field verification testing program to document delay time of displayed data for randomly selected sensors.

3.03.1 Each critical plant 1. Review Honeywell equipnent manuals for variable is available accuracies.

displayed with an accuracy sufficient 2. Review analog input construction test for the control rom results to ensure that SPDS point accuracy operator to is cmparable normal control rom discriminate between indications.

conditions that impact the plant's 3. Review OEI 8407-3 to determine the safety status and range and resolution cmpatibility of the normal operating SPDS parameters used to provide data for conditions. EOP decision / entry points.

4. Include as an evaluation its during the simulator verification testing program

• to document whether the displays allow the operator to discriminate between plant conditions and EOP control bands, j~ 3.03.2 The display should 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual be capable of to determine the trending capabilities of presenting magnitudes the CRIDS cmputer systs.

and trends of critical plant 2. Review OEI-8407-3 for the establishment of a methodology to present trend and variables or derived variables. magnitudes on the various displays.

Cmpare the actual displays with those described in OEI-8407-3 for consistent imp 1 mentation of trending for critical l plant variables.

3. Cmpare the trending capabilities available on the displays with the EOP's to determine that the information being presented will assist the plant operators in the execution of the various EOP decision points.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 5 of 11

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 O Report (V Section Design Requirement Design Review Approach

4. Include as a checklist evaluation iten during the simulator testing to document whether the trending information being presented on the displays supports the EOP scenarios being run.

3.03.3 Scaling should also 1. Conpare OEI 8407-3 with FSAR Chapter be chosen to allow 15, Regulation Guide 1.97 and the EOP to assure that the range of the variables tracking of variables over a being displayed will cover abnormal plant wide range of conditions.

abnormal conditions.

Therefore, displays 2. Develop several scenarios to walk-through for normal SPDS response and document via a checklist conditions should whether the data being displayed will cover not fill the entire abnormal conditions during the EOP display area. scenarios being run.

1 5

3.04.1 Displayed data 1. Review the Honeywell equipment manual should be validated to determine the methodology established to on a "real time" perform validation of inccming data before basis where it is displayed.

~

practical.

i 2. Review Honeywell test procedure and test results used during factory acceptance testing for this feature.

3. Review the SPDS lesson plan to i determine if the validation methodology is addressed.

l I

l' 3.04.2 Redundant sensor 1. Review the Honeywell equipment manual readings should be to determine the methodology established to ccenpared before perform validation of incoming data before displaying plant it is displayed.

variable.

i 2. Review OEI 8407-3 to determine i

implanentation of the validation

! methodology to ensure that data of

! redundant sensor readings are ccinpared with each other before being presented on the i SPDS displays.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attaclynent 1, Page 6 of 11

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O Report O Section Design Requirenent Design Review Approach

3. Review pre-op test procedures and test results for the inclusion of validation of redundant sensors before processing their data.

4. Include as an evaluation iten during the field verification testing program to document whether or not the lack of redundant sensor validation inpacts operator performance.

3.04.3 The SPDS should 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual alert the control to determine the capability of the ccuputer recun operator when a for the assignment of alarm limits for the variable is off analog and digital channels being scale. nonitored.

2. Review Honeywell test procedures and test results for the factory acceptance tests on this feature.

3. Review OEI 8407-3 to ensure inplenentation of the techniques used to determine and alert the control room operator to off-scale data.

4. Include as an evaluation item during i field verification testing to document the ability of the SPDS to alert the control roam operator to off-scale data.

3.05.1 'Ihe operating crew 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual r

should be provided to determine the nethodology used to

! with the information provide information of various ccriputer and criteria they equipnent failures and evaluate systen need to preform an availability.

operability evaluation of the 2. Review Honeywell failover test SPDS. In addition, procedure and factory test results 1 the crew must be generated during factory acceptance able to easily testing.

recognize a failed 1

SPDS. 3. Review SPDS lesson plan to ensure that Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attac}vnent 1, Page 7 of 11 l

i

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 O Report V

a Section Design Requirsent Design Review Approach training program includes the information and criteria needed to perform an operability evaluation of the SPDS.

4. Review pre-op test procedures and test results to determine that failure of CRIDS conputer equipnent was included in the testing program.

5. Include as a checklist item during simulator validation test to detemine if the operators ct.n detect a failed SPDS and respond accordingly.

3.06.1 The SPDS shall be 1. Review FSAR question 421.13 frm suitably isolated Amendment 7 to ensure that the method of from electrical or isolation between safety-related circuits electronic interference and nonsafety-related circuits is with equipnent and addressed.

sensors that are in use for the safety 2. Review the design drawings for rand ely systems. selected Class 1E sensors that are used in the SPDS parameter set to detemine that the installation of the electrical isolators is shown.

3. Review GTP construction test results for the inclusion and proper operation of SPDS Class 1E isolated signals to ERFDAS.

3.09.1 Critical plant 1. Review OEI 8407-1 for a definition or variables for the establishnent of a methodology for display SPDS are presented hierarchy. Ccmpare the displays as l* on a single primary described in OEI 8407-3 for consistent i display or on a impimentation of the specified hierarchy.

' group of displays at

a single location. 2. Review OEI 8407-3, SPDS lesson plan, and the actual systm to determine that each sublevel display can be selected j

directly frun the top level display and l

that the method of implannntation is clearly identified.

3. Review SPDS administrative control Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachnent 1, Page 8 of 11

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 A Report V Section Design Requirment Design Review Approach procedure (s) and the lesson plan to ensure that at least one of the control rom CRIDS CRTs is set'to display the SPDS top level display at all time during normal plant conditions.

4. Include as a checklist evaluation it s during the simulator validation testing to document whether the crew being tested places the top level SPDS display on at least one CRT.

3.09.2 'Ihe display should 1. Review SPDS administrative control

be located so that procedure (s) and the lesson plan to it is convenient to determine the assignments and utilization the control rom of the CRTs under accident conditions as operating crew and specified.

where control room operators who are 2. Include as a checklist evaluation it e responsible for during the simulator validation testing to avoiding degraded document that both the operating crew and 3

and damaged core the person assigned degraded core avoidance events can observe - responsibility can both access SPDS.

the SPDS display.

l 3.09.3 The SPDS should be 1. Review OEI 8407-3 for a description of readily the SPDS display details and conpare the distinguished from to the actual display screens used by the 4 other displays on CRIDS systs.

the control board.

1

2. Review the SPDS lesson plan to determine that the SPDS display formats are described and presented to the operators during the training sessions.

3. Include as a checklist evaluation it s during the simulator validation testing to document whether the SPDS displays are distinguishable from the normal CRIDS '

displays, i

i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachnent 1, Page 9 of 11 a

,,,_._.-__,_m,.___,______. _ _ , - , _ ..,m_---_. .,__,,____,_,,,c. .-,_._y.__ _,,_-_ . . ,_- .,-

l PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 5

i Report

Section Design Requirement Design Review Approach j

i 3.09.4 'Ihe display should 1. Review SPDS lesson plan to detemine i be readily that the SPDS displays are accessible to i accessible to the the various personnel associated with the j following personnel, assessment of the plant's safety status but not necessarily during accident conditions.

4 simultaneously:

S.hift Supervisor, 2. Include as a checklist evaluation item j Control Rom Senior during the simulator validation testing to j Reactor Operator, document whether the SPDS displays are i Shift Technical available to the above personnel.

Advisor, and One j i Reactor operator. '

)

3.09.5 'Ihe control rom 1. Review the Honeywell equipnent manual l

operating crew, not to determine technique used for selection

! personnel outside of CRT displays.

! the control room, control images 2. Review SPDS adininistrative procedure (s)

! displayed on the to determine utilization of CRTs. ,

j control room SPDS.

3. Review the SPDS lesson plan to 1 determine that the utilization of CRrs is j included in the training plan.

4. Include as a checklist item during the sinulator validation testing to doctanent j whether the crew being tested controls i usage of the ccmputer rom CRIDS console.

}

! 3.10.1 Procedures which 1. Review the SPDS lesson plan to i

! describe the timely determine that the training program

! and correct safety addresses the assessment of the plant's .

! status assessment safety status both with and without SPDS.

i when the SPDS is and is not available, 2. Include in the simulator validation ,

will be developed in test a ccmparison of operator effectiveness

! parallel with the both with and without SPDS.

l* developnent of the

! SPDS.

3.10.2 control rom 1. Review the SPDS lesson plan to

, operators should be detemine that the training program l trained to respond addresses the response of the plant's l to accident safety status both with and without SPDS.

conditions both with and without the SPDS 2. Include as a checklist it s in the l l available, simulator validation test to determine  ;

i I whether the operators can offectively make Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 10 of 11 l

l l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Report O Section Design Requinenent Design Review Approach the transition to and fran SPDS during an event.

3.10.3 control room 1. This requirenent will be evaluated as operators training part of the " effectiveness" determination program contains of the verification testing, instructions and training in the use of the SPDS in conjunction with operating procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency operating conditions.

3.11.1 %e SPDS shall be 1. Review Essex human factors report and designed to verify that the discrepancies noted have incorporate accepted been satisfactorily resolved.

human factors engineering principles.

3.12.1 No additional 1. Review the SPDS lesson plan to operating staff determine that the training program other than the addresses the assessment of the plant's normal control room safety status both with and without SPDS.

operatin;; crew a nild be needed to 2. Include as a checklist item in the operate the display simulator validation test to identify any during normal and additional personnel required to operate abnormal plant SPDS.

operation and during display outages.

l.

I i

l

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!O I Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 1, Page 11 of 11

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j ATTACllMENT 2 1

!O l Ilope Creek SPDS Design Review I

l Document List i l i e

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PSE-3210.-87-001, Rev. O Hope Creek SPDS VW Technical Doctanent List (PSE-3210)

Doctanent # Doctanent Title Rev Date

- SPDS Lesson Plan lylV85

- HCI;S Instrument Index, sorted by 03/0V86 instrtsnent id

- CRIDS Oxnputer "F" List 12/6/ 85 l

- CRIDS Operator Interface Description 0

- IKI3S 0)ntrol Rocan Design Review, 12/27/85 Supplanent 1

- SPDS Reliability Study (handout during 8/85 NRC audit) 220 SPDS Primary Display 3 221 SPDS RW Water Level Control Display 3 222 SPDS RPV Pressure Level Control Display 3 2 23 SPDS Reactor Power Control Display 3 224 SPDS Primary Contairinent Pressure 2 Control Display

{

225 SPDS Drywell Temperature Control Display 2 226 SPDS Suppression Pool Water Level 3 Control Display 227 SPDS Suppression Pool Taoperature 2 Control Display 228 SPDS Reactor Building Control Display 2 229 SPDS Radioactivity Release Control 3

Display 51002993 floneywell Sycten Specification, Sec 3 D 51002997 lioneywell systen Specification, Sec 7 A l

l 51 0043 06 lioneywell Systen Specification, Sec 6 A 511030W lioneywell 4500 Test Aldo Index F C22-1050-(39)-4 C22-1050-(44)-4 NURfIl 1186 IKIIS Tech Spec, Figure B3/4.3-1 4/86 Eigen Digineering, Inc. Attadsnent 2, Page 1 of 6 l

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

[

!! ope Creek SPDS V&V Technical Document List (PSE-3210)

Document # Docunent Title Rev Date I/fP-!U-0004 Plant Cmputer (CRIDS/NSSS) Points Test 0 04/11/84 Records E-154 Technical Specification For Instrument 9 AC Pwr Sup E11-383-(10)

FSAR FIG 5.1-4, Sh 2 Nuclear Doller Vessel Instnmentation Amend 13 FSAR Fig 7.5-2, Sh 2 Panel Spaco Allocation Main Control Area Amend 13 FSAR Ouestion 421.13 Electrical Isolation Amend 13 G48-EMP-009 Operational Design Chango Control 1 J-105 Technical Specification For CRIDS 9 J-25-0, Sh 6 logic Diagram Plant Ioak Detection 3 J-4055, Sh 4 Icop Diagram IIPCI 4 J-4057, Sh 4 Inop Diagram Contaiment Atmosphero 7 Control J-4057, Sh 5 Inop Diagram Containment Atnesphere 7 Control J-625 CRIDS Cmputer I/O List 10 J042, Sh 8 & 9 J25-0, Sh 6 3 J4042, Sh 3 & 4 J4055, Sh 4 4 J4057, Sh 4 & 5 7 J53007-1 Unit 1 SPDS !!ardware Flow Path (Draft) 4/7/06 OEI-8407-1 Safety Analysis For SPDS 2 OEI-8407-2 SPDS Display Feature Develo[nont 0 OEI-8407-3 SPDS Display Functional Description 0 OP-AP.ZZ-002(0) Conduct of Oporations 3 OP-DO.ZZ-099(0) Post Scram itecovery 0 OP-EO.ZZ-100(0) Scram 0 OP-EO.ZZ-101(0) Ihmetor / Pressure vessel contrul 0 OP-EO.ZZ-102(0) Containnunt Control proceduru 0 Eigen Enginooring, Inc. Attactment 2, Pago 2 of 6

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O a Pe cree

• seos v'v reca ic 1 o c - #t '1 t (PSE-3210)

Doctanent # Document Title Rev Date OP-EO.ZZ-103(0) Reactor Building control 0 OP-EO.ZZ-104(Q) Radioactivity Release 0 OP-EO.ZZ-201(O) Dnergency Depressurization 0 OP-EO.ZZ-202(Q) Emergency Depressurization 0 Steam Cooling Procedure 0 OP-EO.ZZ-203(Q)

OP-EO.ZZ-204(Q) Spray Cooling 0 OP-EO.ZZ-205(Q) Alternate Shutdown Cooling 0 OP-EO.ZZ-206(Q) Reactor Flooding 0 OP-EO.ZZ-207(Q) level / Power Control O PS-J106-183-01 SPDS Curve Coofficients 0 PS-J106-184-01 SPDS Display Design 0 PS-J106-185-01 SPDS Point Developnent Drawings O PS-J106-186-01 OEI 8407-1, OEI 8407-2, & OEI 8407-3 0 PSE-SP-G-014 Allowable Scopo Changes for Instl Change 0 Requests PSE3220-C-00000 CRIDS Drawing Format And Symbols 0 PSE3220-S-B5007, Shi CRIDS B5007 0 PSE3220-S-B5007, Sh2 CRIDS B5007 0 PSE3220-S-B5019 CRIDS B5019 0 PSE3220-S-B5026, Shi CRIDS B5026 0 PSE3220-S-B5026, Sh2 CRIDS B5026 0 j PSE3220-S-B5030 CRIDS B5030 0 isE3220-S-B5040 CRIDS B5040 0 PSE3220-S-B5050 CRIDS B5050 0 PSE3220-S-B5070 CRIDS B5070 A

! PSE3220-S-B5084 CRIDS B5084 0 PSE3220-S-B5093 CRIDS B5093 0 l PSE3220-S-B5094 CRIDS B5094 0 PSE3220-S-B5097 CRIDS B5097 0 PSE3220-S-B5098 CRIDS B5090 0 PSE3220-S-!M000 CRIDS B6000 0 Eigen Enginnering, Inc. Attacismnt. 2, Pago 3 of 6

r PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O Hope Creek SPDS V&V Technical Doctment List (PSE-3210)

Document # Document Title Rev Date PSE3220-S-B6001 CRIDS B6001 0 PSE3220-S-B6002 CRIDS B6002 0 PSE3220-S-B6003 CRIDS B6003 0 PSE3220-S-B6004 CRIDS B6004 0 PSE3220-S-B6005 CRIDS B6005 0 PSE3220-S-B6006 CRIDS B6006 0 PSE3220-S-B6007 CRIDS B6007 0 PSE3220-S-B6008 CRIDS B6008 0 PSE3220-S-B6009 CRIDS B6009 0 PSE3220-S-B6010 CRIDS B6010 0 PSE3220-S-B6011 CRIDS B6011 0 PSE3220-S-B6012 CRIDS B6012 0 PSE3220-S-B6013 CRIDS B6013 0 O es=322o-s-a6o14 PSE3220-S-B6015 ca1os 86o24 CRIDS B6015 o

0 PSE3220-S-B6016 CRIDS B6016 0 PSE3220-S-B6017 CRIDS B6017 0 PSE3220-S-B6018 CRIDS B6018 0 PSE3220-S-B6019 CRIDS B6019 0 PSE3220-S-B6020 CRIDS B6020 0 PSE3220-S-B6021 CRIDS B6021 0 PSE3220-S-B6022 CRIDS B6022 0 PSE3220-S-B6023 CRIDS B6023 0 PSE3220-S-B6024 CRIDS B6024 0 PSE3220-S-B6041 CRIDS B6041 0 PSE3220-S-B6042 CRIDS B6042 0 PSE3220-S-B6044 CRIDG B6044 0 PSE3220-S-B6045 CRIDS B6045 0 PSE3220-S-B6066 CRIDS IM066-1M046 Trervi Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6087 CDIDS IM007-B6067 Tivnd Plot 0 PSE3220-S-lM100 CRIUS 16108-B6088 Trend Plot 0 Elgon Engirwering, Inc. Attacimint 2, Pago 4 of 6

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O ry

/ Ilope Crmk SPDS V&V 'Ibchnical Document List (PSE-3210)

Docunent # Document Title Rev Date PSE3220-S-B6129 CRIDS B6129-B6109 T mod Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6150 CluDS B6130-B6150 Trend Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6171 CRIDS B6171-B6151 Trond Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6192 CRIDS B6172-B6192 Trend Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6213 CRIDS B6213-B6193 Trond Plot 0 PSE3220-S-B6219 CRIDS B6219 0 PSE3220-S-B6225 CRIDS B6225 0 PSE3220-S-B6230 CRIDS B6230 0 PSE3220-S-B6235 CRIDS B6235 0 PSE3220-S-BG241 CluDS B6241 0 PSE3220-S-B6248 CRIDS B6240 0 PSE3220-S-BG253 cruds B6253 0 PSE3220-S-B6259 CRIDS B6259 0 PSE3220-S-B6266 CRIDS B6266 0 PSE3220-S-B6277 CRIDS B6277 0 PSE3220-S-B6270 CRIDS B6278 0 PSE3220-S-T2391 CluDS T2391 0 PSE3220-S-T2409 CRIDS T2409 0 PSE3220-S-T2410 CluDS T2410 0 PSE3220-S-T2411 CRItXI T2411 0 PSE3220-S-T2412 CRItXi T2412 0 PSE3220-S-T2413 CRItXi T2413 0 PSE3220-S-T2414 CRIDS T2414 0 PSE3220-S-T2422 CRIDS T2422 0 PSE3220-S-T2423 CRitXi T2423 0 PSE3220-S-T2424 CHIDS T2424 0 PSE3220-S-T2425 CRIDS T2425 0 PSE3220-S-T2426 CRIDS T2426 0 PSE3220-S-T2420 CRItXi T2420 0 PSE3220-S-T2429 CRI!Xi T2429 0 PSE3220-S-T2430 CRItXi T2430 0 Elgon Engtrymring, try:. Attaclamnt 2, Pago 5 of 6

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Hope Creek SPDS V&V Technical Doctment List (PSE-3210)

Doctanent # Document Title Rev Date PSE3220-S-T2431 CRIDS T2431 0 PSE3220-S-T2432 CRIDS T2432 0 l PSE3220-S-T2433 CRIDS T2433 0 I

PSE3220-S-T2435 CRIDS T2435 0 l PSE3220-S-T2436 CRIDS T2436 0 l PSE3220-S-T2441 CRIDS T2441 0 l PSE3220-S-T2442 CRIDS T2442 0 i PSE3220-S-T2443 CRIDS T2443 0 PSE3220-S-T2444 CRIDS T2444 0 PSE3220-S-T2445 CRIDS T2445 0 l PSE3220-S-T2446 CRIDS T2446 0 PSE3220-S-T2447 CRIDS T2447 0 f 0 PSE3220-S-T2448 CRIDS T2448 PSE3220-S-T2449 CRIDS T2449 0 i PSE3220-S-T2462 CRIDS T2462 0 1 PSE3220-S-T2477, Sh1 CRIDS T2477 0 PSE3220-S-T2477, Sh2 CRIDS T2477 0 l

! PSE3220-S-T2479 CRIDS T2479 0 l PSSUG-CIT-12 ccmpater Point checkout And Verification 2

{ PSSUG-UIT-15 Digital control circuit Checkout 3

PSSUG-0!T-2 General Instr Calibr Procedure For Field 5 Devices PSStXi-GIT-3 Instr And Control Functional Icop 3

- Calibration 1 SA-AAP.ZZ-000(0) Station Design Changen, Tents, & 3 Experiments SEI-4.2 Sito Engr Insttmetion: Design Charyp 2 Control VIH-MSP-10 Prococa Ccepitor Systamn A DrafL

!O Elgon Engirmring, Irc. AttacIntent 2, Pago 6 of 6

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 1.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-18-85 Referencost 1) OEI 8407-2, Rev. C 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 5.0 Status: OPEN i

Items EOP decision point analysis contradicts actual SPDS capability.

Problem Description Tho "Dovolopment of Display Featuros" analysis of EOP OP-EO.ZZ-101, Rov. C, decision points RC/Q-24,

& 30 "Can scram be rosot?" [Ref (1), Pg 4-17) claims that SPDS does not contain sufficient information to support a dieplay featuro for this decision point.

Asking the decision point "Can the scram bo resot?" out of contoxt of the EOP would be the same as asking "have all scram initiation inputs l clearod?". It is truo that the curront SPDS paramotor not does not provido sufficient information to answer this question. However, in the context of the EOP the decision point "Can the scram bo resot?" is equivalent to "did tho scram resot?" becauso tho decision point immediately follows tho action statomont "Roset the scram" i (RC/Q-23 and RC/Q-29 respectively). RPS trip status is within the SPDS paramotor not and thoroforo invalidatos the conclusion of Hof (1).

Disponition Datos Not yot implomonted Disposition:

Mothodology -

A PSE&G lottor from H.P. Drownownki to 1,. Floros, I

(dated July 21, 1906) staton that tho discropancy will bo ronolved by annworing tho EOP-101 quantion by uning the oxinting HPS trip ntatus display fonturo.

Elgon Engincoring, Inc. Attachmont 3, Pago 1 of $5 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O i

Documentation Incorporaticn - ,

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX2VDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

Page 4-14, has been revised to that the existing RPS logic status which indicates " TRIPPED" or

" RESET" will be used to determine if scram has I been reset.

I Hardware / software Implementation -

Implementation is not required since RPS logic e status (point T2391) already exists on the j Pressure Control screen (222-03) and the Power Control screen (223-03).

.x -

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachmont 3, Page i of 55 t

.. J

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT i

No. 2.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-14-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-2, Rev. C ,

2) OP-EO.ZZ-104, Rev. C i 3)

V6V Matrix #

5.0 Status: OPEN .

I L l Item: Entry point analysis only addresses release rate .

and not a RMS alarm condition.

L Problem Descriptions  !

EOP [Ref(2)] entry point condition states i j

... atmospheric unit alarm received from RMS AND t the total of all vents . . . equals or exceeds . . ".

SPDS " Development of Display Feature" analysis -

[Ref(1), pg 12-31 only addresses the total release  !

l rate exceeding etther of the defined limits and 4

j not a RMS atmospheric unit alarming condition. It

could not be determined whethor it is possible for

all individual atmospheric units to be below i respective alarm limits and yet the total combined l release rate exceed its limit. Under thosu  ;

conditions, the EOP does NOT call for entry. The

]!

! SPDS analysis contradicts this situation. f 1 I Disposition Dates Not yet implemented i

. Dispositions .

i Methodology -

I A PSE&O letter fru R.F. Drownowski to L. Flores, I (dated August 25, 1986) states that tho .

l discrepancy will be resolved by revising tho EOP  ;

f entry condition to includo both atmonphoric alarms I i from HMS and the total of all vont HMS readings.

I i

Documentation Incorporation - r Design Memorandum H-1-HJXX-CDM-0404-0 (Draft  ;

e XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-196-01.

j Pago 12-3, has buon revisod to includo HMS [

j atmonphoric alarms as part of tho COP-104 ontry i i condition description. The display featuro of the l

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachmont 3, Pago 3 of 55

{

a l 1 l 1  :

i PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 CFPM block has not been revised to require a color change when RMS alarms are received, the only CFPM J color changes remain to be when Noble gas (point

B50997) or Iodine (point B5098) exceed their total i release rates.

i!

i Hardware / software Implementation -

) None to date, l,

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O Eigon Engineering, Inc. Attachmont 3, Page 4 of 55 i

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

('h '

\2 IICGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 3.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-14-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-2, Rev. C 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 5.0 Status: OPEN Items Analysis of numerous decision and entry points not not performod and no basis for exclusion provided.

Problem Descriptions Tho statomont "The SPDS paramotor set does not contain sufficient information for developing a display fonture to support this decision function" does not provido sufficient justification as to why those points woro not analyzed and included.

SPECIFIC

REFERENCES:

r- A) Rod Position, pg.2-53, 2-62, 2-79, 3-33, 3-60, (T) 4-11, 4-16 and 4-19.

Boron Inj., pg.2-63, 2-70, 3-34, 3-36, 3-40, B) 3-69, 4-13 and 4-23.

C) ADS /SitV Position, pg.2-52, 2-54, 2-59, 2-60, 2-61, 3-42, 3-43, 3-61, 3-65, 3-67, 0-9 and 0-10.

D) Cooldown Rato pg.2-51 and 3-60.

E) Maximum Coro uncovery timo limit, pg.2-67 and 3-74.

F) MSIV Position, pg.2-73.

G) Minimum A1tornato flooding pressuro, pg.2-74.

11 ) Main Condonsor Availability, pg.3-26.

1) Gross Fuel failuro, pg.3-27.

J) Steam lino Dronk, pg.3-20.

K) Primary containmont instrumont gas availability, pg.3-30.

L) Main turbino gonorator on-lino, pg.4-14.

M) Scram valvo ponition, pg.4-15.

N) Honctor building IIVAC isolation, pg.9-6,10-6 and 11-6.

P) Honctor building blow-out door ponition, pg.9-0, 10-0, and 11-0.

Q) Honctor building aron temp., pg.9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-12 and 9-13.

R) Knowledgo of firo in progrunn or containod, pg.9-14, 9-15, 9-16 and 9-17.

O Figon Enginnoring, Inc. Attachmont 3, Pago 5 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O S) Reactor building area level, pg.10-11, 10-12, 10-13, and 10-14.

T) Reactor building rad., pg.11-9, 11-10, 11-11, 12-5, 12-6, 12-11 and 12-12.

U) Reactor building area llVAC diff. temp.,

pg.9-1.

V) CRD pump start, pg.4-18.

W) OP-EO.ZZ-207 oxocution, pg.3-48.

X) Reactor scram condition, pg.3-3, 4-4.

Disposition Datos Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G lotter from R.F. Drownowski to b. Flores, (dated August 26, 1906) states that the discropancy will be resolved by revisions to OEI documents 8407-2 and 0407-3 (i.e. proposed design memoranda)to either add additional pointo to the displays or provido additional justification for

( not supporting a particular decision point on SPDS.

Documentation Incorporation -

A. Design Memorandum Il-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

1. CRD Position: Pagos 2-49, 2-73, 3-24, 3-30, 5-51 and 4-7.

The requiremont for a numeric indication of the control rods that are not inserted to at least position 02, to bo shown as "CRD NOT INSERTED", is described for incorporation on the SPDS scroon(s)

(which scroon(s) in not definod in this document).

2. Doron Injection indications pagos 2-40, 2-56, 2-57, 3-26, 3-29, 3-52, 4-0, and 4-10.

Tho requiremont for statun of each SLCS pump and dinchargo prennuro abovo LATER psig, to be shown an "SLCS STATUS", in dopcribed for incorporation on tho SPDS scroon(n) (which neroon(n) in not dofinod in thin document).

3. ADS /SRV ponition: Pagon 2-50, 2-54, 2-66, 2-69, 3-14, 3-33, 3-45, 3-49 and 0-9.

( Attachmont 3, Pago 6 of 55 Eigon I:nginnoring, Inc. l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O The requirement for the current status of the ADS /SRV's to be shown as "OPEN ADS /SRV" is described for incorporation on the SPDS screen (s)

(which screen (s) is not defined in this document).

4. ADS position: Page 3-32.

The requirement for the current status of the 5 ADS valves to be shown as "OPEN ADS VALVES" is described for incorporation on the SPDS screen (s)

(which screen (s) is not defined in this document).

5. MSIV posit, ion: Page 2-67.

The requirement for the current status of OPEN MSIV's to be shown as "OPEN MSIV" is described for incorporation on the SPDS screen (s) (which screen (s) is not defined in this document).

6. Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressures Pages 2-55, 2-68 and 3-50 (EOP-207, Rev. O, Table LP-P-1).

The documentation states that "The prediction of O- future plant conditions is not within the scope of the SPDS."

The table requirements can be determined from the SPDS screens by the number of Open SRV's and the current value of Reactor Pressure.

7.0 Reactor Building HVAC Isolation: Pages 9-6, 10-6 and 11-6.

The requiremont for the current status of CLOSED HVAC isolation damper positions to bo shown as "HVAC ISLN" is described for incorporation on the SPDS screon(s) (which screon(s) is not defined. In

, this document).

8.0 Reactor Building Area Temperature Pages 9-4, 10-4, 10-9, 10-8, 10-10, 10-12, 10-13 and 11.4 The requirement for a tabular prosentation of the value for each Remoto Building area's temperaturo and water lovel (Tablo 9-2) in described for replacement of the existing table on the Reactor Building Control Scroon (220-02).

Elgon Engincoring, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 7 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O 9.0 Reactor Building Area Levels Pages 9-1, 9-8, 9-11, 10-1 and 11-1.

Included as part of Item 8, above.

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O Attachment 3, Page 8 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

l a

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O

k- HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 3.1 Classification: n/a Date n/a

References:

1) n/a 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 0.0 Status: OPEN Items Continuation of DR 3.0 Problem

Description:

See DR 3.0.

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented Disposition:

Documentation Incorporation (continued) -

) 10.0 Reactor Scram Condition (RPS Logic Status):

Pages 2-5, 3-3 and 4-3.

The requirement to alarm (change to red) the existing reactor "PWR" CFPM block (point B5026) when a scram condition exJsts and reactor power is at or above 5% has been revised to include a verification of several variables to assure that a scram condition does exist.

The status of the RPS logic already exists as "RPS LOGIC STATUS" (point T2391) on the Pressure Control screen (222-03) and Reactor Power screen (223-03).

11.0 Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit Pages i

2-61 and 3-56.

t

Determining the maximum core uncovery time is a i complex process that requires making assumptions

based on current conditions. Implementing this function would exceed the SPDS requirement of l

~

" aiding" the operator. Therefore, the requirements to display the basic data are described in this document, so the operator has Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 9 of 55

i PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O i

the information to make assumptions necessary to

determine this information.

12. Primary Containment Instrument Gas: Page 3-22.

The requirement for the status of the current receiver pressure and containment isolation valve l positions to be presented on RPV Pressure Control screen (222-03) (screen assignment assumed) are

! described in this document.

13. CFPM Reactor Building Radiation Levelst

! Pages 9-3 and 10-3.

4 The requirement to alarm (change to red) the existing " RAD" CFPM block (point T2479) has been i revised to use the entry condition of any reactor building area alarm or HVAC exhaust area alarm is described in this document.

I i

! B. The following decision points have no

, "information requirements" and therefore are not

displayed on the SPDS screens. The operators have i the information available on the main control

boards to make the necessary decisions.

} 1. Cooldown Rate: Pages 2-47 and 3-44

2. Main Condenser Available Page 3-18

- 3. Gross Fuel Failure Page 3-19

4. Steam Line Breaks Page 3-20

5. Main Generation On-Line Page 4-9

6. Scram Valve Position: Page 4-2

! 7. Fire Information: Page 10-14, 10-15 and 10-16

! 8. CRD Pump Start: Page 4-15

9. EOP-207 Execution: Page 3-37 i

l, Hardware / software Implementation -

l None to date.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 10 of 55 i

i ve--mm,-----,-w-y-w,w__ __

w y r ,- _ +-e--y-~mm-vw----w-e-w--cw

-g - -*-e -w-*------+-----*~*----

. . _.. .-. - .. . .-- .-. ~ .. .

4 PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O

{LOj HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 4.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-14-85 1

References:

-1) OEI 8407-2, Rev. C

2) OP-EO.ZZ-201, Rev. C 3)

V&V Matrix #: 5.0 Status: OPEN Item: Inappropriate correlation of injection system eligibility with status and capability.

Problem Descriptions l Level restoration EOP-201 has numerous decision points relative to ascertaining whether or not a

j. particular reactor injection system.(including SRV i position) is_available or running. The

" Development of Display Features" analysis correctly identifies the information requirements

- as RPV press & system availability.

4 l However, the analysis only discusses RPV pressure and does not address system operation or equipment 3

availability (status). Therefore, the analysis is d

incomplete.

! SPECIFIC

REFERENCES:

A) Pumps running, pg.2-21, 2-34, 2-35, 2-36,

. 2-38, 2-39 and 3-53.

! B) System operating, pg.2-29, 2-31 and 2-45.

C) System injecting, pg.2-34, 2-37 and 2-44.

i D) SRV position, pg.2-71 and 2-75.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, proposes to either update existing points, add new points, or provide additional justification for not supporting a particular decision point.

O Attachment 3, Page 11 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Document Incorporation -

1. Subsystems lined up and pumps running: Pages 2-17, 2-30, 2-31, and 3-39.

These decision points are identified to determine the results of operator action. Therefore, these decision points need not be directly supported by SPDS. The operator can best answer these questions while lining up and starting the subject subsystems.

2. HPCI or RCIC operable Page 2-24.

System operability is determined by demonstration and maintained by Administrative controls.

Therefore, this decision point is not within the intended SPDS scope.

3. Systems injecting: Pages 2-26, 2-28, 2-32, 2-34, 2-35 and 2-41.

The existing injection table shown on RPV Water Level Control screen (221-03) will be revised to p, include loop flows and valve positions as a

\s,/ verification of injection status.

4. ADS /SRV position: Pages 2-50, 2-54, 2-66, 2-69 3-14, 3-33, 3-45 and 3-49.

The requirement for the current status of the 14 ADS /SRV valves to be shown as "OPEN ADS /SRV" is described for incorporation on the SPDS screen (s)

(which screen (s) is not defined in this document).

f 5. ADS position: Page 3-32 The requirement for the current status of the 5 ADS valves to be shown as "OPEN ADS VALVES" is l.

described for incorporation on the SPDS screen (s) l (which screen (s) is not defined in this document).

Hardware / software Implementation -

l

) None to date for items 3, 4, and 5.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 12 of 55 1

l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 5.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-14-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-2, Rev. C

2) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 5.0 Status: OPEN Items Conflicting and missing information between the two design documents.

Problem

Description:

The display features described in the SPDS Functional Descriptions [Ref (2)] are in conflict with or are not contained in the SPDS Display Feature Development (Ref (1)) analysis. The display development and implementation cannot contradict or alter analysis conclusions without further evaluation for impact.

EXAMPLES: Typical examples of conflicting O information ares l

1. The CFPM matrix Rx power block was analyzed l solely on current value relative to 5% power [Ref (1)), pg.4-5 while Ref (2) pg.4-5 also incorporated RPS status.

2. Reactor Water level from Ref (2) pg.4-5 is specified to be RED at <=+12.5" but in Ref (1) it is specified to change color at various other i levels on the following pages:

A) pg.2-1,3-1 and 4-1 (at -38").

l B) pg.3-56 (at -115").

C) pg.2-13,2-15,2-19 and 2-24 (at -129").

. D) pg.2-17,2-32 and 3-31 (at -161").

Also the " Display Functional Description" [Ref (2)] specifies that the CFPM level indication be red at > +54 inches. None of the conclusions in the task analysis (Ref (1)] substantiate this.

3. Reactor Pressure from Ref (2) is specified to be RED at >=1108 psig, but in Ref (1) is specified to change color at various other pressures on the following pages:

pg.2-22 (at above 100 and below 380 psig).

(') A)

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 13 of 55 i

J

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O B) pg.2-41 (at below 100 psig).

C) pg.2-28 (at above 100 psig).

D) pg.2-50 (at above 140 psig).

E) pg.2-37 (at above 380 psig).

F) pg.2-46 (at below 242 psig).

G) pg.2-9, 3-9 and 4-9 (at above 1037 psig).

Typical examples of information not contained in Ref (2), but described in Ref (1) on the following pages are:

1. pg.2-84, the action flags shown do not appear on the displays (typical discussion on pg.2-12, item 4). (NOTE: Action flags are also illustrated in the SPDS Safety Analysis, OEI-8407-1 Rev. 2)

2. pg.2-84, the margin to action table shown does not appear on the displays (typical discussion on pg.2-12, item 3).

3. pg.3-3 and 4-3, the table of water level values shown does not appear on the displays.

4. pg.3-9 and 4-9, the margin to limit table (item

2) does not appear on the displays.

I 5. pg.3-19, the flag (item 3) does not appear on the displays.

((_]

/ 6. pg.3-58 and 3-72, the trend graph (item 4) is not on the display, but the data is contained in the plant condition table on the display.

7. pg.3-56, the table of water level margin (item

2) does not appear on the displays.

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

I

) A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores,

l. (dated August 26, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revision of the primary display and CFPM block to alarm on EOP entry conditions and subsequent use of a control ,

, function parameter such as RX Power or level to be

! presented in a tabular " Margin to Action" format.

Documentation Incorporation -

l Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft l 3 XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 14 of 55 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

1. CFPM RX Power: Page 2-5, 3-3 and 4-3.

The requirement to alarm (change to red) the existing "PWR" CFPM block (point B5026) when a scram condition exists and reactor power is at or above 5% has been revised to include a verification of several variables to assure that a scram condition does exist.

2. CFPM RX Water Level: Page 2-1, 3-1 and 4-1.

The requirement to alarm (change to red) the existing "LVL" CFPM block (point B5007) has been revised to use the entry condition of at or below

-38 inches.

3. RX Water Level: Pages 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 2-27, 2-43, 2-70, 2-74, 3-1, and 3-23.

The requirements for current RX water level to be compared to various levels (+12.5", -38.0",

-129.0", -161.0") for development as a " MARGIN TO ACTION-RPV'LVL" table are described for

/~'i incorporation on the RPV Water Level Control

(_/ screen (221-03) (screen assignment assumed) in this document.

4. RX Water Level: Page 2-14, 2-27, 2-43, 2-70 and 3-23.

The requirement to add -161" to the "Y"-axis of the Rx level trend plot is described in this document.

5. RX Water Level: Page 3-41.

The requirement for current fuel zone water level to be compared to -276" for development of a

. " MARGIN TO ACTION" table is described for incorporation on the RPV Pressure Control screen (222-03) (screen assignment assumed) in this document.

6. CFPM RX Pressure: Page 2-8, 3-5, and 4-5.

The requirement to alarm (change to red) the existing " PRESS" CFPM block (point B5019) has been revised to use the entry condition of at or above f~ 1037 psig.

(

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 15 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

Page 2-42.

7. RX Pressure:

The requirement for current Rx pressure to be compared to 242 psig for development of a " MARGIN TO ACTION" table is described for incorporation on the RPV Pressure Control screen (222-03) (screen assignment assumed) in this document.

8. RX Pressure: Page 2-18, 2-22, 2-23, 2-25, 2-37, 2-46, and 3-43.

The requirement to add points to the "Y"-axis of the existing trend graph at 100 psig, 140 psig and

- 380 psig are described for incorporation on the Rx Pressure Control screen (222-03).

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l Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 16 of 55 4

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 6.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 11-14-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-1, Rev. 1

2) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 3.0 Status: CLOSED Item: Suppression Chamber pressure and temperature are not included in the CFPM.

Problem

Description:

The SPDS parameters, Suppression Chamber pressure and temperature shown in Ref 1, Table 2-2 (Pg 2-7) and in Table 2-3, items 3 & 4 (Pg 2-8 and 2-9) are not included in the Control Function Parameter Matrix (CFPM) described in Ref 1 (Pg 5-2) and Ref 2 (Pg 4-1).

As the plant safety status is based on the EOP's, justification for excluding any control functions C,,w) from the CFPM should be provided. However, no justification for excluding these parameters was found.

Disposition Date: 01/21/86 Disposition:

The SPDS Functional Description, OEI-8704-3, Rev.

O, Page 4-2, provides adequate justification as to why suppression chamber temperature and pressure are not included within the Control Function Parameter Matrix.

Specifically, these variables are not included in the EOP's because the function task analysis performed as part of the EOP development did not identify them as control functions.

O Attachment 3, Page 17 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

)

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 7.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 12-19-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-2, Rev 0

2) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 9.0 Status: OPEN Item: The effects of various plant operating modes are not incorporated.

Problem

Description:

The SPDS display design methodology does not appear to have given consideration to monitoring safety function status during operating modes other than power operation. Particularly, parameter alarm limits as described in the

" Development of Display Features" analysis (Ref (1)) are based solely on the plant being in the i RUN mode.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented

Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 21, 1986) states that the discrepancy l

will be resolved by adding the following paragraph:

"The Hope Creek SPDS does not consider plant

operating modes other than power operations, l.

however, the plant operators are trained to avoid conflicts between the EOP entry conditions and l control functions and the actual plant values for an operating mode other than power operations."

Documentation Incorporation -

Der.ign Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0483-0 (Draft fXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

Page 2-3 states that:

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 18 of 55 i

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.- =__ _- _ _ ._ .-

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O C) kl "This set of parameters is defined such that the plant will be maintained in a safe condition as long as these parameters are maintained within the ranges specified in the EOPs. Thus, since the EOPs provide sufficient emergency response instructions for transients and accidents occurring under all plant operating conditions, a SPDS parameter set derived from an analysis of the EOPs will provide adequate infoiration for assessing plant safety status under all modes of operation."

The above statement is considered as an acceptable justification to this discrepancy. Therefore, the proposed paragraph contained in the methodology letter is not acceptable since it does not agree with the design criteria of the design memorandum.

Hardware / software Implementation -

None required.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 19 of 55

.. _ . _ = . - - . - - - . -.- -- ~. - - . _ . . - . - . . _.

1 .,

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O.. HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT s

No. 8.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 12-19-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-1, Rev 2

2) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 13.0 Status: OPEN l

Item: Redundant sensor readings are not compared before

. being displayed.

, Problem

Description:

) The SPDS Safety Analysis (Ref (1), Pg 7-1] and i

" Display Functional Descriptions" [Ref (2), Pg 2-1 describe the methodology used to implement the checking of sensor inputs by assuring their values

are on-scale before being used for data a

processing. ,

This method of data validation does not meet the i requirement of comparing redundant sensor readings before displaying the plant variable.

f- Disposition Date: Not yet implemented i Disposition:

i i Methodology - ,

! A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores,

! (dated August 26, 1986) states that the discrepancy '

will be resolved by investigating the available CRIDS data validation techniques.

Documentation Incorporation -

l' Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI i 8407-3), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

Page 7.1-1, Section 2.1. Item 3, states that "When available, redundant inputs will be compared...".

l Hardware / software Implementation -

i None to date.

C:)

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 20 of 55 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O f~w k_ HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 9.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 12-19-85

References:

1) Control Room Design

2) Review: Sup 1, 12/27/85

3) Lesson Plan, 10/14/85 V&V Matrix #: 32.0 Status: OPEN Item: Not all " Human Engineering Discrepancy" reports are closed out.

Problem

Description:

Not all of the HED's identified in Appendix B of Ref (1) are satisfactorily closed out.

Specifically, M113: This HED concerns the use of abbreviations.

Part of the resolution states that training will ensure familiarization with SPDS abbreviations.

However, the SPDS lesson plan [Ref (3)] does not

-w include a list of abbreviations.

M119: This HED concerns trend plot resolution and defers resolution until the SPDS simulator validation test is complete.

M126: This HED concerns the trend plot depiction of off scale low readings and defers resolution until the SPDS simulator validation test is complete.

Disposition Date Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 21, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by the following responses to the Essex Corp's HED:

1. M113 - Abbreviations will be revised to agree with the acronym list. Shorter abbreviations will be included in the abbreviation list.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 21 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

2. M119 & M126 - Defers disposition until SPDS simulator verification and validation test.

Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI 8407-3), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

Display design has not been completed at this time to allow verification that M113 has been incorporated in the displays.

Hardware / software Implementation - }

None to date.

=

L O

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 22 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

'N HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 10.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 01/02/86

References:

1) OEI 8407-1, Rev 2

2) Lesson Plan, 10/14/85 3)

V&V Matrix #: 3.0 Status: OPEN Items Lesson Plan variable list does not match that of the Safety Analysis.

Problem

Description:

The SPDS Safety Analysis (Ref (1), Table 2-2]

lists 13 SPDS variables and the lesson plan (Ref (2), Pg 31] only lists 12. The Lesson Plan has omitted "Off-site radioactivity release rate" from its introduction. However, the details of the Lesson Plan do address all 13 variables.

rN Disposition Date: Not yet implemented

! U Disposition:

The SPDS lesson plan shall be revised to reflect all 13 variables.

I i

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 23 of 55 l

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_ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ . . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ , _ , . , _,, _ . , _ _ _ , _ . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ . _ , ,

(

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 11.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 01/02/86

References:

1) (none) 2)

3)

V&V Matrix #: 2.0 Status: CLOSED 1

Item Lack of a control room procedure addressing that SPDS must be continuously displayed.

I Problem

Description:

There is no evidence of any control room administrative controls to ensure that SPDS is displayed at all times in the control room.

l Disposition Date: 7/21/86

! Dispositions i() Methodology -

! A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, l (dated July 21, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising the appropriate operating procedure.

Documentation Incorporation -

EOP OP-AP.ZZ-002(Q)-Rev. 3, page 29, paragraph

! 5.35 does require at least one CRIDS screen be l dedicated to monitor SPDS.

, Hardware / software Implementation -

None required.

l O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 24 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

)

HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 12.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 ,

2) Point B5030&B5050, Rev A 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: The actual inputs used to determine AVG DW/SC PRESS are not consistent with those analyzed.

Problem

Description:

The SPDS Display Functional Description [Ref (1)),

Pg 2-11&l7, specifies that three pressure transmitters (2 wide range + 1 narrow range) are to be averaged. However only two of the three inputs (wide range) are implemented (Ref(2)).

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented l Disposition:

Methodology -

2 A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 8, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising the display design requirements.

Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI

, 8407-3), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, Section 7.5 will resolve this concern.

See Discrepancy 13.0 for continuation of this problem.

' Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 25 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

/~T kl HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 13.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

,1) OEI 8407-3, Rev. O

2) Point B5030, Rev A j

~

3)

V&V Matrix #: 17.0 Status: OPEN Item: Insufficient resolution to inform operator of critical pressure changes.

Problem

Description:

The SPDS Functional Description [Ref (1), Pg 2-11&l7) specifies two wide range pressure

, transmitters, each with a range of (-5) thru 250 psig, to be averaged with one (-5) thru 5 psig i transmitter to yield drywell pressure. The

! drywell pressure alarm limit (i.e. display turns red) is 1.68 psig. The accuracy of the algorithm is inadequate for determining this low of an alarm setpoint.

Disposition Date Not yet implemented Dispositions Methodology -

l A PSE&G 1etter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 8, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising the display design requirements to use the narrow range signals when i

drywell / suppression pressure is less than 5 psig

, and wide range when it is above 5 psig.

Documentation Incorporation -

l Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft l XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01.

j Pages 2-9, 3-6, 4-6, 5-4 and 7.4.

This document has not been revised to show these l requirements. The information requirements 3 section should discuss these conditions, Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 26 of 55 f

i a

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!, l t

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 1

j A draft marked-up copy of the Design Memorandum H-1-CDM-RJXX-XXXX-0 (OEI 8407-3), Section 7.5 does i discuss how this point will be developed. ,

i i Hardware / software Implementation -

- None to date.  ;

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i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 27 of 55  !

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

-~

HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT 4

No. 14.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

1) Point B6042, Rev A 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Items Composition algorithm for RPV PRESS minus RPV P(SAT) fails to convert PSIA to PSIG.

Problem

Description:

The algorithm for the composed point B6042, RPV PRESS - RPV P(SAT) (Ref (1)), is inconsistent in the use of engineering units between the output of the pressure / temperature saturation curves (i.e.

points B6034 thru B6039) and the input to the average calculation B6040. Specifically, there is no conversion from PSIA to PSIG.

() Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

4 A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated June 11, 1986) File RJ (SE.86.6.11-2) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising J-0625-Rev 10 (point B6040) to use PSIA engineering units.

Documentation Incorporation -

None to date.

j Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 28 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

, HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 15.0 Classification: SYSTEM Dato 01-30-86 1

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 ,

t

2) OP-EO.ZZ-102, Rev. C 3)

< V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item Suppression Pool Water Level Control Margin to l Limit Matrix terminology.

4 Problem Descriptions i

] SPDS Display Function Description (Ref (1), Pg

5-62) identifies two distinct separate actions as i STOP INJ and each has a different limit and i different action associated with it. It appears I that the "stop injection" action with a limit of i 93 Ft is addressing drywell level (Ref (2),

j SC/L-30) and the action with a limit of 236.5 i Inches is addressing torus level (Ref (2),

SC/L-28). The drywell level information is j inappropriately associated with and incorrectly 1 labeled as suppression pool level in the " margin j to limit" box.

! Disposition Dates Not yet implemented 4

Disposition:

1 l Methodology -

i A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores,

! (dated June-11, 1986) File RJ (SE.86.6.11-2)

I states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising the table to distinguish between the two STOP INJ actions.

f Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft i

XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, pages 7-22 and 7-23 have been revised to show these requirements and algorithm corrections.

l Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 29 of 55 i

l

. ___--- . ___ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . __ .__=_

i 1

! 1 i

PSE-3210-07-001, Rev. 0 1

e The draft marked-up copy of Design Memorandum

H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI 8407-3), page 5-62, also

. shows these requirements and formula correction. ,

! Hardware / software Implementation -

1 l None to date.

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

-s HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 16.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

1) Point B6044, Rev A 2)'OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: No basis for algorithm in calculating PRI CONT LVL MARGIN - STP INJ Problem

Description:

The algorithm for computing " Primary Containment Level Margin - Stop Injection" has been implemented as (Ref (1)):

(DW PRESS - SUPP PRESS)

• 1

• 12 Margin = 93 - ( --------------------------------) Ft 12 There is no basis provided for this formula in the

" Display Functional Descriptions" (Ref (2)).

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology - ,

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated June 11, 1986) File RJ (SEC.86.6.11-2) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising J-0625-0, Rev. 10, point B6044.

Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, page 7-22, describes the requirement to correct this algorithm.

The marked-up draft copy of Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX (OEI 8407-3), page 5-62, also shows the revision to this calculation.

(} Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 31 of 55 s

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O

Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

O l

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 32 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

('d~h HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 17.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 01-30-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0

2) EOP OP-EO.ZZ-101, Rev. C

3) Point T2413, Rev A V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Items Ambiguous "FW IN RANGE" low pressure limit.

Problem

Description:

SPDS Display Functional Description [Ref (1), Pg 5-9) specifies that the feedwater in range yes/no indication be based on a reactor pressure range of 0-1250 psig.

Although the actual range implemented [Ref (3))

agrees with the EOP [Ref (2), RC/L-3), which is 720-1250 psig. The implementation does not agree with the display design and the display design O contradicts the EOP.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated June 11, 1986) File RJ (SE.86.6.11-2) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by correcting the pressure range to 750-1250 psig.

Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, page 2-28, states that the resolution to Discrepancy #5, Item C, revised the information requirements so that the table information is based on flow values and no longer depends on Rx pressure.

Discrepancy #5 will be used to track

() implementation of the table revision.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 33 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O

Ilardware/ software Implementation -

None to date.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 34 of 55

_s

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 l HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 18.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev. 0 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: Standby Liquid Control pressure range too low.

i Problem Descriptions

! The SPDS Display Functional Description (Ref (1),

Pg 5-9] specifies the reactor pressure range for which standby liquid control is eligible to inject is 0 thru 60 psig. Standby liquid control should be capable of injecting at pressures considerably in excess of 60 psig.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 8, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revising pressure range to

} 0-1250 psig.

1 j Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, page 2-40, states that the resolution to Discrepancy #3, Item B, revised the information 1 j-requirements for SLCS INJ STATUS to use SLCS Flow  ;

and Disch Pressure and no longer depends on Rx pressure.

' I Discrepancy #5 will be used to track implementation of the new requirements.

j Hardware / software Implementation -

() None to date.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 35 of 55 i

.~ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . - - _ . _ . . _ _ - _ -

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O n

O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 19.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 01-30-86

References:

1).OEI 8407-2 Rev 0

2) OEI 8407-3 Rev 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 3.0 Status: OPEN Item SPDS display design methodology does not distinguish between " entry" and " decision" points.

Problem

Description:

The EOP functional task analysis (Ref (1)]

analyzes both EOP entry points and decision points. However, the design of the SPDS primary display does not account for EOP entry points nor distinguish them from decision points.

The " Control Function Parameter Matrix" is comprised of a mix of both entry points and decision points. Ref 1), Pg 1-9, states that the O " Primary SPDS display" is a technique to indicate the status of SPDS variables relative to " normal" control values specified within the EOP's. This should be the function of the CFPM as it appears on each'of the second level displays, not the primary display. EOP entry points are inherent to the requirement that the SPDS user be made aware of important changes. Therefore the relation between EOP entry points and the primary SPDS display must be addressed.

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated July 21, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by requiring that the SPDS primary display and CFPM top bar on secondary displays alarm (change to red) at EOP entry conditions.

O Attachment 3, Page 36 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O Documentation Incorporation -

Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 (Draft XXXX), marked-up rough draft of PS-J106-186-01, has been revised for each of the EOP entry conditions to be supported by the CFPM matrix block shown on each secondary screen and the functions shown on the primary display.

Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 37 of 55 I

l I

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

/^T l HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 20.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 01-30-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: Two different ranges specified for drywell temperature monitoring.

Problem

Description:

OEI 8407-3, Rev 0 (Ref (1)) specifies 547 DegF for the setpoint of the drywell temperature permissive  !

utilized in the reactor water level algorithm on '

4 page 2-6. On page 2-12 of the same document, the drywell temperature range specified is 0 thru 500 ,. ,

DegF. _,

This range mismatch must be justified. '

Disposition Date Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, '

(dated July 21, 1986) states that';the discrepancy will be resolved by revising the temperature ,

compensation requirements utilized'in the' reactor-

~

water level algorithm and cotrecting the RTD .

, ranges used for drywell temperature variable. ,

Documentation Incorporation -

DesignMemorandumH-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0(Draft '

XXXX), marked-up rough-draft of PS-J106-186-01, page 2-2, has been revised to use the same limit <

as caution 6 of EOP-102. -

The marked-up copy of Design Memorandam H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI 8407-3), Section 7.6, -

shows a revised RTD range of 0-600 De'gf for ,

i drywell temperature measurement. -

O Attachment 3, Page 38 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

~

/(- '.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 Hardware / software Implementation -

-None to date.

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PSE-3'210-87-001, Rev. O b

\/ HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 21.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 01-30-86

References:

1) Lesson Plan, 10/14/85 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 27.0 Status: OPEN Item: Lesson plan lacks criteria defining a failed SPDS Problem

Description:

The SPDS Lesson Plan (draft) [Ref (1)] does not define criteria to guide operators in the assessment of SPDS operability.

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented i

Disposition:

) The failure recognition criteria shall be addressed within the CRIDS lesson plan and a reference as such shall be added to the SPDS lesson plan.

I l

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'Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 40 of 55 l "i t i ,

r i s

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 (D

\_/ HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 22.0 Classification: SYSTEM Date 12-19-85

References:

1) OEI 8407-1, Rev 2

2) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0 3)

V&V Matrix #: 14.0 Status: OPEN Item: The identification of the automatic exclusion of failed inputs is not readily available to user.

Problem

Description:

Ref (1), Section 7.0 and Ref (2), Section 2.0 describe the methodology used to average multiple sensors of the same variable in order to present a single value for the SPDS display.

The requirement that " variables associated for each critical function be also available for l display and operator assessment" does not appear to have been met since the information of which

[)' sensors were used in the average to obtain the value being displayed are not easily obtainable by the operator.

t

! The details of which points are used to obtain the j averaged values are only very generally discussed i in the SPDS lesson plan and no discussion is l presented as to where more detail information may l be found.

l Disposition Date: Not yet implemented l

Disposition:

Methodology - -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated August 26, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by presenting display feature variable fields in reverse video when an individual point (s) is eliminated from the calculated average.

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Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 41 of 55 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O i /^%

kJ The point development drawings will be used to show individual points that make up the average displayed value.

Documentation Incorporation -

The marked-up draft copy of Design Memorandum H-1-RJXX-CDM-XXXX-0 (OEI 8407-3), page 7.1-3, describes the methodology to be used when an individual point is eliminated from a calculated display point.

Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

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O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 42 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 23.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-04-86

References:

1) (none) 2)

3)

V&V Matrix #: 99.0 Status: OPEN Item: There is no evidence of an SPDS configuration management control program.

Problem

Description:

There are no established guidelines for ensuring that once the SPDS system is validated, that future changes will be reviewed for impact and consistency with " system" requirements.

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated August 26, 1986) states that the discrepancy has been resolved with existing procedures or specifications: SA-AP.ZZ-008(Q),

Rev. 3, SEI-4.2 Rev. 2, PSE-GP-014, Rev. O and GM-8-EMP-009, Rev. 1.

Documentation Incorporation -

After the above letter was written, a new procedure, Vice President-Nuclear Procure, VPN-MSP-10 Draft A, Titled: Process Computer System, was prepared and issued for review on 9/12/86.

This procedure appears to address computer system hardware and software control and should supersede the above documents for process computer system configuration control.

Hardware / software Implementation -

None to date.

I Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 43 of 55 1

4 PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

(~)

(_s HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 24.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-14-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) CRIDS Point T2426

3) EOP OP.ZZ-102,LR-6 & LR-9 V&V Matrix # 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: The requirements of Ref (1) have not been met by the limit at which CRIDS is programed.

Problem

Description:

The description of this point in the SPDS function description (PG 5-15) states that this point will show " Low" below 100 psig, " Medium" between 100 to 380 psig and "High" equal to or greater than 380 psig.

The CRIDS point development drawing, Ref (2),

shows that the point will change from "Yes/No" at 380 psig and does not provide any type of alarm at

() 100 psig.

Disposition Date Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

A PSE&G letter from R.F. Drewnowski to L. Flores, (dated August 26, 1986) states that the discrepancy will be resolved by revision to the display features requirements for this point (T2426).

Documentation Incorporation -

4 Discrepancy #5, Item 8, addresses this problem by eliminating this point and showing the values as points on the "Y" axis of the Rx pressure trend plot.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 44 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O Discrepancy #5 will be used to track

~

implementation of this resolution.

Hardware / software Implementation -

None required.

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l O Attachment 3, Page 45 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 25.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-14-86

References:

1) CPS List, dated 12/6/85

2) CRIDS Point B6225 3)

V&V Matrix #: 0.0 Status: VOID Item: The composed point calcuation sequence appears to be out of order.

Problem

Description:

Based on the scanning sequence given in the CPS List, Ref (1) the scanning order of the points used for B6225 are not in sequential order.

The CPS List, shows that Point B6224 (PG 124) is scanned before points B6220,B6221 and B6222 (PG 127) which provide data to this point.

The data used for B6224 would always be 2 seconds

\ behind the rest of the points used in this algorithm.

This is not consistent with all the other composed points in which all points are scanned in sequential ascending order.

Disposition Dates n/a Disposition:

None required.

i*

I i Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 46 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O A

- HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 26.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-14-86

References:

1) CPS List, dated 12/6/85

2) CRIDS Point B6042 3)

V&V Matrix # 11.0 Status: VOID 4

Item: The composed point calulation sequence appears to be out of order.

Problem

Description:

Based on the scanning sequence given in the CPS List Ref (1), the scanning order of the points used for B6042 are not in chronological order.

The CPS List shows that result B6042 (PG 108), is scanned before input B6040 (PG 110).

On every other scan of input B6040, the result B6042 is calculated prior to the input point being s,)

updated. This yields a result that is based on data 7 seconds old contrary to the 5 second scan interval of input B6040. No justification for this configuration has been provided.

Disposition Dates n/a Disposition:

None required.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 47 of 55 J

, , - - - - - . , - - - - - , . , , - - , - - -m . ,,--..--n,-m . . , , - , - - - , , - - - - - , ,,,n--.- ng .--. . . . - - -e,n. - - .- - - - ---

. _ _ _ . - _- - _ _- . . - _ . . - . ._ . = = _ .

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PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

(

HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 27.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-14-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) J-625, Rev 9 (I/O 1st)

3) CRIDS Point B5026 V&V Matrix #: 0.0 Status: OPEN 3

Item: The instrument ranges shown in Ref (3) do not match the I/O List Ref (2).

Problem

Description:

APRM Channels B, C, D, E, & F on Ref(3) incorrectly identify APRM range as 0-160% instead of 0-125% as per Ref(1) and Ref(2).

Disposition Date: Not yet implemented Dispositions

() None to date.

l Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 48 of 55

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 28.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-14-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) EOP OP.ZZ-103,RB-2

3) CRIDS Point B6278 V&V Matrix # 0.0 Status: OPEN Item: The Ref (3) alarm limit has not been defined in the Composed Point Scan list (CPS)

Problem

Description:

The alarm limit shown in the EOP Ref (2) is not included in the CPS list dated 12/6/85 (PG 102) and is shown as LATER in the OEI document Ref (1),

PG 5-88.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented

^

Disposition:

None to date.

O Attachment 3, Page 49 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

- HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 29.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-17-86

References:

1) C51-1080-25(1.2,14,16&l8)

2) CRIDS POINT B5026 3)

V&V Matrix #: 34.0 Status: VOID Item: Unable to verify electrical isolation of APRM inputs to the CRIDS computer.

Problem

Description:

A review of GE drawing 791E411AC Ref (1) shows the APRM Power level channels going directly to the BOP computer without any electrical isolation.

Unable to locate any Bechtel logic diagrams that may show isolation modules for these functions.

Disposition Dates n/a Disposition:

None required.

O Attachment 3, Page 50 of 55 Eigen Engineering, Inc.

. . - . . - , . . . . , , , .. . . - _ . . J

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 30.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-17-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) EOP OP.ZZ-104, Rev 0

3) CRIDS points B6006,B6008 V&V Matrix #2 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: The limit values used for these points can not be verified from available documentation.

Problem

Description:

The values being used as limits for CRIDS points B6006 and B6008, Ref (3) are not shown in the EOP, Ref (2) nor in the OEI document, Ref (1).

These points correspond to the offsite release rates for noble gas and iodine. Since the limits are not contained in the source documentation, they cannot be verified as being correct.

O Disposition Date Not yet implemented Disposition:

None to date.

i.

i i

I i

1 l

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 51 of 55 l

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 7-s HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 31.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-17-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) EOP OP.ZZ-101, Rev 0

3) CRIDS point B5007 V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Items The limit values used in Reactor Water Level can not be verified from available documentation.

Problem

Description:

The reactor water level algorithm contains numerous deficiencies. As discussed during the August 1985 NRC audit, it attempts to average all available level instruments all of the time. This includes those calibrated for " hot" (i.e. power operation) conditions and those for " cold" (i.e.

shutdown). Additionally, some of the limits used to determine intermediate values within the algorithm could not be confirmed. These include y those related to drywell temperature and recirculation pump status for the fuel zone instruments.

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

None to date.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 52 of 55 i

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. O O HCGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 32.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 02-17-86

References:

1) OEI 8407-3, Rev 0

2) Composed Point Scan (CPS)

3) CRIDS points B6226 &B6044 V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: The " PSP" margin algorithm can not be verified from the available documentation.

Problem

Description:

The algorithm for calculating the margin to the

" pressure suppression pressure" limit could not be completely verified (i.e. Point B6266). It has a low alarm setpoint of 0 psig which is not specified in OEI 8407-3. Additionally, the constants used in the intermediate calculation of primary containment level (i.e. Point B6043) could not be confirmed.

O Disposition Date Not yet implemented Disposition:

None to date.

O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 53 of 55

! PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0 HCGS V6V DISCREPANCY REPORT

! No. 33.0 Classification: HARDWARE Date 12/31/86 1

References:

1) OEI 8407-1, Rev 2 ,

2)

3) t V&V Matrix #

12.0 Status: OPEN t

i I Items SPDS Lacks Sufficient Data Validation 1

i j Problem Description OEI 8407-1 does address data validation; however, it is limited to averaging and range checking.

Inputs that fail the range check are suppressed both as a displayed point and as an input to another calculated point. The " averaging" implemented only reduces the impact of an input i

failure.

1 1

These techniques are good, but by themselves are

( inadequate. A more comprehensive and complete data validation scheme should be considered.

~

j 1

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented f- Dispositions i

j Nonrs to date.

i I

i i

() Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 54 of 55 1

2

PSE-3210-87-001, Rev. 0

[~)

\/ IICGS V&V DISCREPANCY REPORT No. 34.0 Classification: DOCUMENT Date 12/31/86

References:

1) PS-J106-185-01, Re.v. 0 2) 3)

V&V Matrix #: 11.0 Status: OPEN Item: Polynomial curve fit routinos lack documentation defining order, coefficients, and boundaries used.

Problem

Description:

Many of the computed " margin to limit" points rely on polynomial approximations to curves defined within the EOP's. There was no documentation found to provide justification for the polynomial characteristics implemented. This includes the curve boundaries, coefficients, and polynomial order. Therefore, those displayed points that utilize curve fit routines to calculate r'N intermediate values can not be confirmed.

(_)

Disposition Dates Not yet implemented Disposition:

Methodology -

Document PS-J106-183-01, Rev. O, was generated to document a basis for all polynomial approximations utilized.

Documentation Incorporation -

The data developed in PS-J106-103-01, Rev. O, has yet to be implemented in the point development drawings.

liardware/ software Implementation -

None to date.

O

'V Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 3, Page 55 of 55

1

', l t

PSE-3210 87 tHil, Rev. 0 i

i 1

l.

I t

I l

i i

1 4

l 1

1 I

4 ATTACllMENT 4

! Instructions For The Verification l

l of SPDS Composed Points l

'. l l

l t

I i

i F

i i

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PSE 3210 87 001, Rev. O lastructicas For Verification of SPDS Control Wtallom The attached checklist identifies the various sof twarc cont rolled attributes of each SPDS point displayed. These a t t ribu t es, as defined in PSE&G documents PS J106-183-01, PS J106 184 01, and PS J106 185 01, are to be reviewed and compared to other plant documentation (e.g. Instrument Index, instrument Loop Diagrams, Emergency Operating Procedures, and etc.) and the SPDS design documen t a ilon (l.c. OEI 8704 3). The following descriptions are intended to provide uniform guidance in the execution and documentation of these comparisons.

1. LIMIT VALUE:

All numbers used in computing a point that are a reference of fset for determining a dif ference or margin are to be considered " limits". All limits in O an algorithm (l.c. from the analog / digital raw data input to the final displayed parameter) shall be verified for proper implementation as specified in the SPDS Display Functional Description and where applicable the appropriate EO P. All references utilized to confirm the limits shall be listed. Only if all the limits associated with computing the displayed parameter are correct, should the "Satisf actory" column be designated with a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded.

2. Ill/ LOW ALARM:

All numbers or digital logie states used as a comparison for an alarm threshold

. are to be considered " alarms". All alarms in an algorithm shall be verified for proper implement at ion as specified in the SPDS Display Functional Description and where applicable the appropriate EO P. All references utillied to confirm the alarms shall be listed. Only if all the alarms auotiated with the displayed O

Eigen Engineering. Inc. Attachment 4 Page 1 of 5 J

PSE 3210-87 tHil, Rev.11 A

t V parameter are correct, should the "Sa tisf actory" column be designated with a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded.

3. CURVE COEFFICIENTS:

All numbers used as coe f ficien t s in the establishment of an N th order polynomial curve fit shall be considered

• Curve Coef ficients". The documen t a t ion that es t a blishes the curve coef ficient s shall be reviewed for adequate t r aceabilit y to source data, accuracy of the established curve, and properly documented signo f f s. Only if all the coef ficient s associated with the displayed parameter are correct, should the "Satisf actory" column be designated with a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded.

4. CURVE BOUNDARIES:

(" All numbers used as breakpoints in the establishment of segments for a discontinuous curve shall be considered " Curve Boundaries". The documentation that establishes the curve boundaries shall be reviewed for adequate traceability to source data, accuracy of the established curve, and properly documented signof f s. Only if all the boundaries associated with the displayed parameter are correct, should the "Sa tis f act or y

• column be designated with a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded.

5. CONSTANTS: ,

All numbers used within equations that are engineering unit conversion const ant s or correction factors shall be considered " Cons t a n t s". The documentation that establishes the cons t a n t s shall be reviewed for adequate t r ac ea bilit y to source data, accuracy of the established equ a t ion and corresponding display precision, and properly documen t ed signof fs. Only if all the constants anociated with the displa > ed pa r amet er are cor r ec t , should the "Satisf actory" column be designated oith a YES. Ot her wise, a diurepancy reguri shall be initiated and recorded.

Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 4, Page 2 of 5

PSE.3210-87 001, Rev. O O

V fi. INPUT RAN(iE VERSUS 1/0 RANOE:

All analog / digital raw data inputs shall be reviewed for proper range implementation in the point algorithm. All analog inputs shall have a specified range and digit al inputs shall have a specified binary state (e.g. open/ closed, closed /open, closed /not closed, or on/of f). Only if all the ranges associated with the displayed parameter are correct, should the "Sa tisf actory

• column be designated wit h a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded.

7. SilAPE / VARIANT / BEllAVIOR:

All displayed points may have a comliin a t ion of shape, variance, and behavior a t tribut es assocluted with them (e.g. point / alarm status l alarm / bad / normall, digital contact value lopen / closed / unreadabicl, or value status lro value /

normal / inserted etc.l). Each point may also have, in addition to a numerical V value, an associated parameter description (e.g. press, level, or t emp) and engineering units. Each of these is programmed separately. Therefore, cach has to be reviewed for coordination of color coding. That is to say that the color code of the parameter description, the value, and the engineering units must be consistent for all plant conditions. Only if all the attributes associated with the displayed parameter are correct, should the "Sa tisf actory" column be designated with a YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated und 1 recorded.

8. ALGORITilM:

The algorithm for all displayed points shall be reviewed for a consistent in t eg r a t ion of all of the above as specified in the SPDS Display functional Descriptions. Also the algorithm shall be ictiewed for ma t hema tical correctness and consistency of engineering units. Onl3 if the algorithm awociated wilh the displayed parameter is correct. should the "Natisf actos y" column be designated wlili a YES. 01herwise, a disercpancy repori shall be initialcd and rccordcd.

V Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 4, Page 3 of 5 h

t PSE 3210 87 001, Rev. 0

O

9. CALCULATION ORDER:

i.

All algorithms for displayed poin t s shall be reviewed to ensure that cach calculation within the algorithm unes the latest available data. That is, each input to a calculation shall be reviewed uguinst the 'F List" to verify that for a >

given scan interval, all inpu t s are determined prior to performing the calculation. Only if the calculation order associated with the displayed l parameter is correct, should the " Satisfactory" column be designated with a i YES. 01herwise, a discrepancy repori shall be initiated and recorded.

3

10. SCAN INTERVALS:

All displayed points, including data input points and intermediate ' calculations, shall be reviewed for reasonable and consistent update intervals so that the displayed point represents "real time" with respect to other control room inst r ument a t ion for the same variable, and is comparable with realistic va riable i i rates of change. Only if the scan Intervals associated with the displayed j parameter is correct, should the 'Sa tisf act ory" column be designated with a i

YES. Otherwise, a discrepancy repori shall be initiated and recorded.

11. SAFETY RELATED ISOLATION: i f

All plant input sources for each displayed point shall be compared against the

, plant lustrument index to determine if the sensing instrument in safety related.

if found to be safety related, the appropriate loop / schematic diagrams shall J

l, be reviewed to ensure that un isolution device exis t s. Only if the isolation i assocInted with safety related inputs is correct, should the ' Satisfactory' column be designated with a YES. O t her w ise, a discrepancy report shall be initiated and recorded. '

i i

I >

!O Eigen Engineering, Inc. Attachment 4 Page 4 of 5

]

l l

PSE 3210 87 001, Rev. O V Should a particular checklist item not pertain to a poin t , enter NA in the "SatisIactory" column. Upon completion of Ihe checklisI, the reviewer shall sign und date the form. A completed and signed form rih all exist for each display ed point.

n fd e

liigen I!ngineering. Inc. At tachmtni 4, l' age 3 of $

)

ENCLOSURE 3

( HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DESIGN MEMORANDA NUMBER: H- 1-RJXX-C DM-04 83-0 DISPLAY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

SUMMARY

NOTE:

The basis for this design memoranda attachment is Operations Engineering, Inc. Document Number 8407-1, Revision 2, dated December 1985 (PSEsiG Document Control No. PSJ106-186-01) .

This attachment incorporates changes required by the Emergency Operating Procedures, and the results of the SPDS Design Review Report.

REVIEW AND APPROVAL:

Originator d15l67 Dato

&f Verifier (*

2/U/J@

Da to b.bb 2 S!87 Originator's Dato SAG Grout M Date/

Group fload fload

-^

Manaqor ; Dato Nuclear Syntoms Engintoring -

llope Crook O

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! J TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 OVERVIEW.................................... 1-1 2.0 DESIGN BASIS OF DISPLAYS.................... 2-1 3.0 ANALYSIS OF EOP DECISION FUNCTIONS.......... 3-1 4.0 DISPLAY STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT............... 4-1 5.0 DISPLAY DESIGN.............................. 5-1 6.0 SPDS COMPUTER SYSTEMS....................... 6-1 7.0 VALIDATION OF SPDS PARAMETER VALUES......... 7-1 8.0 APPLICATION OF liUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES.................................. 8-1 9.0 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VALIDATION............... 9-1 rS 10.0 OPERATOR TRAINING........................... 10-1

\

x_-)

APPENDIX As DEFINITIONS APPENDIX 3: REACTOR HUILDING DEFINITIONS FIGURES l

l l Number Titto Pago 1-1 SPDS DISPLAY DEVELOPMENT Pit 0 CESS 1-2 1-2 SPDS DISPLAY DESIGN - INTERFACES WITil SYSTEM llARDWARE l-4 l 4-1 DISPLAY STitVCTUllE 4-2 l

9-1 EVALUATION MODEL FOR PEl4FoltMANCE 9-3 VALIDATION l

i l ,

l (sq

/

I

r~ 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

TAHLES Number Title Paco 2-1 NUREG-0737 SPDS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 2-4 AS ADDRESSED fly Tile IICGS EOPS 2-2 HCGS SPDS PARAMETERS 2-6 2-3 CORRELATION IlETWEEN CRITICAL SAFETY 2-7 FUNCTIONS AND SPDS PARAMETERS d(' N 11 x

e

O 1.0 OVERVIEW The design of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) will use a methodology based on a function and task analysis of the plant's Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The HCGS EOPs are based upon Revision 3 of the symptomatic Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) that were issued i through the BWR Owners Group and approved for implomontation by the NRC. The methodology employed for converting the generic EPGs to plant-specific EOP Technical Guidelines is described in the Hope Creek Generating Station Procedures Generation Package (previously submitted to the NRC).

Sections 4.1.a and 4.1.f of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 stipulate that the SPDS shall present information sufficient to assnas plant safety status, with the principal purposo and function of the system being "to aid the control room personnel during abnormal and omorgency conditions in datormining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant correctivo action by operators..."

Plant conditions affecting reactivity control, reactor

(^T coro cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system l

(_) integrity, radioactivity control, and containment integrity are specifically identified as parameters for which information should be provided.

The plant's EOPs fully address those conditions through the symptom-based approach to omorgency responso.

Information requirements are identified through tho

, SPDS Function and Task Analysis of the plant EOPs, and a structured not of SPDS displays is then dusigned to provido this information in a format which is directly usable by the plant operating staff in executing the proceduros.

An overview of the process which will be followed for SPDS display development and implomontation is presented in Figure 1-1. Information requirements will bo identiflod through the SPDS Function and Task Analysis. Display features will be designed to support those information requirements directly, and also to support the information processing (including decision making) performed by the operating staff when executing the EOPs.

1-1

A 1

l EOF FWCTION AND TABE ANALYSIS l 1.

Y l y

1 '

CONTROL FUticTIONS T CONTROL FUNCTION PARANETRRS

-4l INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ,

I I I I I I Y l i I -

sop synocirvan l l l INFORMATION ,

Amo omaanzEarION I I l PROCESSING 5

I 1 1 4

I I I I I l

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DISPLAY STROCTULA l D! API.AY FEATURES _ , _

l l I I I f i

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BOMAN FAC'.O'tS o

- ,- y l --> DISPLAY DESIGN < ENGINEERING

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- PRI'.4CIPLES

< l 1 l  ;

l l l 1 I Y I i l l

i l CRT PRESENTATICf.' 0F DISPLAYS <-----+--

1 1 l l l '

i i I l I ENERGENCY OPERAYING U SP.'.t I l PROCEDURES TRAINIFO I

I l l I r V

! l T Y  ;

1 1 '

PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION Or DISPLAYS l

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l l l 1 lEstiskans.~ ss.ss9xcetickn1 _ .I -

I Figure 1-1: SPDS DISPLAY DEVEL WHENT PROCESS  ;

6"2 l 1

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x_) Additionally, the SPDS Function and Task Analysis will identify the specific set of control function

.- parameters (variable set) for the Hope Creek plant.

"- The structure of the SPDS displays will be defined based on the structure and organization of the EOPs, and the identified EOP control functions.

The display structure, identified information requirements, and display features incorporating information processing will be integrated into the design of individual displays. This process will provide a basis for structuring, organizing, and accessing the set of displays in a manner which directly f acilitates execution of the plant's EOPs.

Human f actors engineering principles will be applied to the design of display features, the design of each individual display, and the presentation of displays on the system CRT.

Operators were trained on the use of procedures and on the interim SPDS implementation prior to participating in an evaluation of the displays. Where evaluation results indicated that revisions to the displays were appropriate and necessary, such modifications will be incorporated into the SPDS prior to final system f'ss implementation.

The display design process interfaces with system hardware as shown in Figure 1-2:

' Data acquisition and input to the computer system evolves from the information requirements identified in the EOP Function and Task Analysis.

' Data processing takes the acquired data and processes it consistent with the information processing incorporated in the design of the various display features.

' Display structure and composition considers hardware provided for accessing and presenting the displays on the computer system's CRT.

l-3

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I INFORMATION RBQUIREMENTS l l l l 1. c I I o T N I

P T

- -- - -- DATA ACQUISITION j U .

INFORMATION l -

l T I

> DATA PROCESSING l E l PROCESSING 1 R

1_ .

U

-- - g 1*%. l < -- > E

/* l DISPLAY STRUCTURE -

g x

l DISPLAY DESIGN I<-- --

--->- N y

E

- - = = - - - - - - - - - - - - - R -

HUMAN FACTORS l F l

l ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES l - - - - -- --> A

- - - - - - - --- -- c E .

F

, I Y

CRT PRESENTATION OF DISPLAYS O Figure 1-2: SPDS DISPLAY DESIGN - INTERFACES WITH SYSTEM HARDWARE l-4

l l

l O Additional details on specific aspects of the SPDS display design process described above will be provided in the subsequent sections of this report.

Definitions of terms used to describe the program for i developing the Hope Creek Generating Station SPDS displays are provided in Appendix A. An outline'of the HCGS Reactor Building is provided in Appendix B, where it shows the major structural components of the building. The nomenclature identified represents the o terms used in the EOPs and subsequently the SPDS displays.

l

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(-) 2.0 DESIGN BASIS OF DISPLAYS The Hope Creek Generating Station SPDS uses a procedures-based display concept. Whereas displays could be developed to serve as incipient accident detectors, industry experience with previous SPDS designs indicates that displays would be more meaningful and more useful to operators if the displayed information would more closely support emergency response (e.g., the operator's actions, and the decisions that must be made in order for the correct emergency response actions to be taken).

Emergency response actions and the associated decision-making carried out by the operating crew will be directly supported by developing the SPDS displays such that they support execution of the HCGS EOPs. The generic EPGs, f rom which the EOPs were developed, have been evaluated by the NRC and accepted as a satisf actory basis for emergency response procedures.

Since the EOPs are symptom-oriented and not based on a limited set of specific transients, plant modes, or accident scenarios; plant safety can be assured for a wide range of events and severe accidents, through adherence to the EOPs and maintaining plant conditions

(_i as specified therein. Selection of SPDS parameters to

\/ monitor plant safety status using EOP Function and Task Analysis results provides a basis for parameter selection that not only integrates with NRC-approved guidelines and procedures for eraergency response but also is analytically traceable to the post-TMI requiremen_s for additional analysis of transients and accidents.

As previously pointed out, the EOPs will be utilized in the display design process via an SPDS Function and Task Analysis. The SPDS Function and Task Analysis will satisfy the requirements stated in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Sections 5.1.b(ii) and 4.2.a. The results of the analysis will be used as the basis for SPDS display development. The SPDS Function and Task Analysis will be used as design input for the development of the SPDS displays, rather than post-implementation review criteria.

2-1

(~h

\_J

l Since the EOPs address all of the functions and conditions specified in Section 4.1.f of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 (as shown in Table 2-1), and since the EOP Function and Task Analysis identifies the operator's emergency response information requirements, the display development methodology employed will bind Section 4.1.f with Sections 4.2.a (design basis of SPDS displays) and 5.1.b.ii (use of EOP Function and Task Analysis). As a result, the displays developed through this process will fully support emergency response information requirements, which in turn encompass the SPDS basis functions and conditions specified in Section 4.1.f.

Eleven emergency response control functions are identified in the HCGS EOPs by applying the generic-work completed under an EPRI/ DOE project for the BWR Owners Group which developed procedures-based displays. These control functions are the following:

EOP Control Function ACRONYM Monitor and control RPV RPVWLC (RPV Water Level water level. Control)

I)

\#

Monitor and control RPV RPVPC (RPV Pressure pressure. Control)

Monitor and control RXPC (Reactor [RX]

reactor power. Power Control)

Monitor and control PCPC (Primary Primary Containment Containment pressure. Pressure Control)

Monitor and control DWTC (Drywell Drywell temperature. Temperature Control)

Monitor and control SPWLC (Suppression Suppression Pool water Pool Water level. Level Control)

Monitor and control SPWTC (Suppression Suppression Pool water Pool Water temperature. Temperature Control)

% 2-2

in e i

\~/ Monitor and control RBWLC (Reactor Reactor Building area Building Water water levels. Level Control)

Monitor and control Reactor RBTC (Reactor auilding area temperatures. Building Temperature Control)

Monitor and control Reactor RBRLC (Reactor Building area radiation Building levels. Radiation Level Control)

Monitor and control off-site OSRRC (Off-Site Radio-radioactivity release. activity Release Control)

The SPDS parameter set (shown in Table 2-2), evolves from the identified EOP control functions. There is a 1 to 1 correspondence between the EOP control functions and the HCGS parameters with the exception that there are 2 parameters for Primary Containment Pressure Control: Drywall pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure. In addition, Suppression Chamber temperature

(}x and Reactor Building differential pressure will be included in the HCGS parameter set because of their explicit relationship to controlling Primary Containment pressure and temperature. This set of parameters is defined such that the plant will be maintained in a safe condition as long as these parameters are maintained within the ranges specified in the EOPs. Thus, since the EOPs provide sufficient emergency response instructions for transients and accidents occurring under all plant operating conditions, an SPDS parameter set derived from an analysis of the EOPs will provide adequate information for assessing plant safety status under all modes of operation.

Future revisions or updates to the EOPs will be evaluated to determine what additions to the SPDS parameter set might be necessary (if any); subsequent update of SPDS displays can be easily accommodated.

2-3 p

y~5 N]

TABLE 2-1 NUREG-0737 SPDS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AS ADDRESSED BY 'IHE HCGS EOPs NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.f Information Requirements Associated EOPs

1. Reactivity Control OP-EO.ZZ-101,

" Reactor / Pressure Vessel Control" OP-EO-ZZ-207,

" Level / Power Control"

2. Reactor Core Cooling OP-EO.ZZ-101, and Heat Removal " Reactor / Pressure Vessel Control" OP-EO.ZZ-201, " Level Re s to ra t io n" i

i g_j OP-EO.ZZ-202,

" Ene rg e ncy Depres suriza tion" OP-EO.ZZ-203,

" Steam Cooling" OP-EO.ZZ-204, " Spray Cooling" OP-EO.ZZ-205,

" Alternate Shutdown Cooling" OP-EO.ZZ-206,

" Reactor Flooding" OP-EO.ZZ-207,

" Level / Power Control" l

l (THIS TABLE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)

~D ss) 2-4

w d

TABLE 2-1 (Continued)

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.f Information Requirements Associated EOPs

3. Reactor Coolant OP-EO.ZZ-101, System Integrity " Reactor / Pressure Vessel Control" 4

OP-EO.ZZ-102,

" Containment Control" OP-EO.ZZ-201, " Level Restoration" O' OP-EO.ZZ-207, " Level /

Power Control"

4. Containment Integrity OP-EO.ZZ-102,

" Containment Control" OP-EO.ZZ-103,

" Reactor Building Control"

5. Radioactivity Control OP-EO.ZZ-103,

) " Reactor Building Control" OP-EO.ZZ-104,

" Rad ioac t iv ity I Release Control" 2-5 l.

g 1 1 V

TABLE 2-2 HCGS SPDS PARAMETERS

1. RPV water level i

2. RPV pressure

3. Reactor power

4. Drywell pressure

5. Drywell temperature

6. Suppression Pool water level

7. Suppression Pool water temperature

8. Suppression Chamber pressure

9. Suppression Chamber temperature

10. Reactor Building sump and area water levels (areas as defined in Table 4 of OP-EO.ZZ-103) f

( 11. Reactor Building area temperatures (areas as defined in Table 1 and Table 2 of OP-EO.ZZ-103)

12. Reactor Building area radiation levels (area as defined in Table 3 of OP-EO.ZZ-103)

13. Of f-site radioactivity release rate The correlation between " Critical Safety Functions" (as defined in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1) and the HCGS SPDS parameters is shown in Table 2-3.

The emergency response control functions apply to the entire control room operating crew rather than to just one individual operator or supervisor, since the symptom-based EOPs do not specify a division of labor between operators and supervisors, and do not restrict actions or decision-making to a specific location.

Analysis results and their application to SPDS display design thereby directly support integrated emergency response.

2-6 O

V

r~

(hj TABLE 2-3 CORRELATION BETWEEN CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND SPDS PARAMETERS Critical Safety Function 1 Associated SPDS Parameters 2

1. Reactivity Control Reactor power RPV water level RPV pressure Suppression Pool tempe ra ture

2. Reactor Core Cooling Reactor power and Heat Removal RPV water level RPV pressure

( 3. Reactor Coolant Sys tem Integrity RPV water level RPV pressure Drywell pressure Drywell tempe ra t u re Suppression Pool water temperature Suppression Pool water level Suppression Chanber pressure Suppression Chanber tempe ra ture (THIS TABLE CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)

O 2-7

TABLE 2-3 (Continued)

Critical Safety Function 1 Associated SPDS Parameters 2

4. Containment Integrity Drywell pressure Drywell temperature Suppression Chamber pressure

, Suppression Chamber temperature Suppression Pool water temperature Reactor Building area temperature Reactor Building area radiation level i

i Reactor Building area water level

5. Radioactivity Control Reactor Building area radiation level Off-site radioactivity release rate Notes: 1. As defined in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1

2. From associated EOPs, as shown in Table 2-1 2-8 1 _ _

l l

1

~ <

I In executing the EOPs, the operator is not required to l identify the event or sequence of events which '

initiated the emergency (or potential emergency) .

Rather, actions are specified to directly control a few parameters which can be directly monitored. By designing the SPDS displays based on information required to execute the EOPs, this same symptomatic approach to emergency response is totally integrated for the operating staff.

References The following references were used in the construction of this document:

1. NUREG 0737 Supplement 1, Sections 5.1.b(ii), 4.2.a, 4.1.e, and 4.1.f.

2. NUREG 0700.

3. NUREG 0800, Section 18.2

4. EPRI Report NP-3702 " Computer Generated Display System Guidelines, Vol. 1: Display Design."

() 5. NSAC-39 " Verification and Validation for Safety Parameter Display System," December 1981.

2-9 O

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i )

N_/ 3.0 ANALYSIS OF EOP DECISION FUNCTIONS The EOPs specify performance of the control functions in a series of decision and action functions. These decision and action functions were identified in the EOP Function and Task Analysis.

In the SPDS display design development process, each decision function for each control function will be separately evaluated in terms of the control function status information (i.e., process variable) that the operator requires in order to make the decision. In addition to explicitly identified information requirements, a second input for display development will be the associated information processing which the operator would perform in making the decision (e.g.,

comparison of the current value of a parameter to a setpoint or limit value). At the conclusion of this information requirements analysis, a compilation of information needs will be assembled under the respective control functions. This information set will serve as the data base for display feature development.

Any EOP task not supported by the SPDS will be 3 evaluated in Attachment 2 of this Design Memorandum.

(O The justification for omitting support for certain EOP tasks from the SPDS variable set will also be included.

The alternate information (i.e., indicators, etc.) used by the operator to make the EOP decision will be included in Attachment 2.

4.0 DISPLAY STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT Development of a structure for the SPDS displays will be an iterative process. A hierarchical structure evolves by assigning a display to control functions and then defining a top-level display for a summary presentation of plant safety status.

The structure described above is illustrated, conceptually, in Figure 4-1.

h 3-1/4-1 r3 N)

t O .

Top-level (Primary)

Display i

. Secondsry-Level Secondary-Level Secondary-Level Display Display Display (i.e., RPV Power) l O

, , Third-level displays (Typical)

(i.e., Containment Isolation Status)

Note: Any display can be reached by direct access Figure 4-1: Display Structure O

4-2

A ib') 5.0 DISPLAY DESIGN Individual display features will be developed to directly assist the operator's decision-making process. The methods chosen to present information on the displays will have a technical basis and will do more than simply replicate existing control room instrumentation. To meet these criteria, the following process will be used for designing display features:

1. Each identified decision function will be examined to determine the information required to be within the SPDS variable set to facilitate the decision process.

2. Each decision and its associated information will be examined to determine what processing the operator is required to perform on the information in order to make the decision.

3. The result of this information processing will be identified.

4. A display feature to present this information processing result will be designed.

5. For those decision functions that are not within the SPDS variable set, the alternate information used by the operator to make the decision will be identified in Attachment 2 as required.

This process will result in the development of display features which relieve the operator of the task of processing much of the information contained in the variable set in order to make the decisions required for execution of the EOPs.

Display features designed to support the decision functions, and the explicit information requirements supporting action functions, will be combined in a display consistent with the general principles of display format, the technical scope of the display, and the location of the display within the display structure.

5-1 0

I'i'~')) '

The procedures-based displays will be derived through application of generic work completed under an EPRI/ DOE project for the BWR Owners Group. Display features will be adopted and modified for use in Hope Creek's SPDS displays. The Control Function Parameter Matrix and the History Bar Graph will be modified for use on the HCGS SPDS displays consistent with human factors engineering recommendations and computer system graphics capabilities. '

Control Function Parameter Matrix The Control Function Parameter Matrix (CFPM) is a concise presentation (or indication) of each control function's EOP entry condition. The matrix is comprised of five groupings of parameters, arranged consistent with the organization of the 100-series EOPs:

[

SUPPRESSION REACTOR OFF-SITE

% REACTOR DRYWELL POOL BUILDING RELEASE CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 7- (OP-EO.ZZ-101) (ZZ-102) (22-102) (ZZ-103) (22-104)

O)

The CFPM will appear on each SPDS display other than the top-level display, arranged horizontally across the top. The field, where the parameter, its value, and the associated engineering units are presented, will be color-coded to indicate current status of the parameter relative to the control function entry value.

Conceptual design of each of the groupings comprising the CFPM is shown below.

Reactor Control:

REACTOR <---Location LVL PRES PWR <---Parameter (color coded) 30 1025 50 <---Current Value (color coded)

IN PSIG PCT <---Engineering Units (color coded) 5-2

/O

U,-

Drywell Control:

DRYWELL <---Location PRES TEMP <---Parameter (color coded) 1.50 130 <---Current Value (color coded)

PSIG DEGF <---Engineering Units (color coded)

Suppression Pool Control:

SUPP POOL <---Location LVL TEMP <---Parameter (color coded) 100 90 <---Current Value (color coded)

IN DEGP <---Engineering Units (color coded)

Reactor Building Control REACTOR BLDG <---Location LVL TEMP RAD D/P <---Parameter (color coded)

MAX NORM NORM NN.NN <---Current Status or Value NORM INWG (color coded)

O\ <---Engineering Units (color coded)

Off-Site Release Control:

OFF-SITE <---Location GAS IODINE <---Parameter (color coded) 6.30E+2 1.45E-2 <---Current Value (color coded)

UC/S UC/S <---Engineering Units (color coded).

History Bar Graphs Historical data on past values of an SPDS parameter will be presented in bar graph format. History bar graphs will be included on a display when, for example, trend information is required in order to evaluate the ability of being able to maintain the value of a parameter below a specified setpoint or limit.

5-3

The general design of history bar graphs is shown below.

Current value

<--of pa rameter,

[SPDS PARAMETER] including engineering units I 300 i- [Value Scale]

150

/ / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / --

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 0 l

5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0

)

MINUTES When placed on displays at the control-function-level, history bar graphs will be consistently located in the

Os upper right quadrant of the display field. The current value of the parameter displayed in the box above the history bar graph will be color coded consistent with its status relative to the normal control band specified for that' parameter in the EOPs.

1 i

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5-4

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i w .-=-+-v-e -,v n - &.rv - o--- ---_r ,--- * , - - + - ---re- .----------w, - -

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\2 6.0 SPDS COMPUTER SYSTEMS An SPDS display will be presented on at least one CRT in the Control Room at all times. The CRT(s) will be controlled by the SPDS Computer Sys tems ( SCS ) . The SCS will have sufficient memory to accommodate future (new)

SPDS parameters, computer points for data acquisition, and displays as the need arises. Data links connect the various computer systems and are used to provide data input to the SPDS.

The SPDS computer system is not Class lE. However, the system does present information to the operator during all plant conditions using data acquired from both Class lE and non-Class lE circuits. Where the computer I/O is connected to Class lE circuits, isolation devices are provided. Refer to the response to HCGS FSAR question 421.13 for a complete discussion of these isolation devices.

The SPDS shall have the following data through-put classes:

Class 1 - less than or equal to 5 seconds.

()

• Class 2 - less than or equal to 10 seconds.

• Class 3 - less than or equal to 15 seconds.

Class 4 - less than or equal to 30 seconds.

Class 5 - less than or equal to 3 ninutes (RMS only)

The above data through-put classes represe nt the total time from sensor change to CRT update. The above through-put classes will be applied to each computer point individual based on process consideration.

6-1 l

k

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'\s) 7.0 VALIDATION OF SPDS PARAMETER VALUES The control room operator must be able to rapidly and reliably determine the safety status of the plant. In order for SPDS to aid in this process, the displayed data must be current and accurate. To provide confidence in the data accuracy and guard against presenting misleading information to the operators, displayed data shall be validated on a "real-time" basis.

As defined in the preceding sections of this specification, the Control Function Parameter Matrix comprises the " critical" plant variables. As such, each CFPM parameter shall be validated on a "real-time" basis. Additionally, all other displayed variables (i.e., including both analog and digital signals) should be validated when practical. Visual techniques shall be developed to ensure that the following categories of data validation are incorporated in the data displays:

A. VALID - The displayed data has satisfactorily

~

completed the associated data validation algorithm and the conclusion is affirmative.

• B. INVALID - The displayed data has satisfactorily completed the associated data validation algorithm and the conclusion is negative.

C. UNVALIDATED - The displayed data has not satisfactorily completed the associated data validation algorithm.

Various methods may be used to validate the SPDS parameter / variable set. As a minimum, each analog point value shall be subjected to a range check.

Digital point validation techniques and additional analog point validation techniques which may be employed are as follows:

A. Instrument circuit checking to identify a

" failed" instrument. When used, the type of circuit checking implemented shall be identified.

B. Comparison of redundant inputs, where possible.

7-1 1

r's U C. Comparison with another pint with which there is a known relationship (e.g., pressure versus saturation temperature, flow and valve position).

D. Other techniques may be used as required on a

" case by case basis"; however, when alternate techniques are applied they shall be described and justified.

The specific data validation techniques used for the Hope Creek SPDS shall be in accordance with accepted industry standards.

O 7-2

P G APPLICATION OF HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 8.0 Consistent with the guidance provided in Section 4.1.e of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, " accepted human factors 4 principles" will be employed in the SPDS display development process. Relevant criteria will be derived from the Computer System Survey (CSS) results of the HCGS CRDR conducted by PSE&G's human factor's consultant. Additionally, the guidance provided in

" Computer- Generated Display System Guidelines, Volume 1: Display Design," (EPRI Report NP-3701, September 1984) will be consulted and followed where appropriate. In general, the following human factor's aspects of display design will be emphasized:

• Logical, functional arrangements and groupings of information 4

• Intelligibility

• Consistency in the manner of presenting information

• Acceptable content density

• Content integration

• Readability

• Effective, unambiguous, consistent, and readily identifiable color usage

• Application of highlighting techniques

'Understandability of presented information i

• Efficient utilization of display area 4

'Use of hierarchical labeling to promote readability l

and unambiguous interpretation of presented information 8-1 1

- _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - . - -_ . , - - . _ _ - . _ . _ _ , _ . _ _ _ , ~ ~ . - _ . - , _ _ _ _ _ . , , , . _ . . , _ _ . - . . - _ . - - . - _ - ,

r- The original CSS was reviewed from a human factors

(

perspo tive as part of the Hope Creek Control Room Design Review (CRDR) with consideration given to acceptance criteria in NUREG-0700. Additionally, the interim implementation of the SPDS was also reviewed with consideration given-to acceptance criteria in NUREG-0800, Section 18.2. Any changes to the SPDS shall be subjected to a human factors review similar to that described above.

O 8-2

r 9.0 SYSTEM PERPORMANCE VALIDATION

- Confirmation that the SPDS meets system performance requirements will be achieved through a hardware and software review as well as dynamic system testing where appropriate. An integrated program will be developed detailing validation criteria and objectives, evaluation methods, qualification requirements of review team members, data collection, assessment of evaluation findings, and the mechanism for incorporating recommended modifications to the displays as appropriate and necessary. In developing the Verification and Validation (V&V) Program, guidance contained in the following documents will be considered:

' Computer-Generated Display System Guidelines, Volume 2: Developing an Evaluation Plan (EPRI NP-3701, September 1984)

'NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews", September 1981 (Section 6.7.2)

• NUREG-0835, " Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System", October 1981

'NSAC-39, " Verification and Validation for Safety

() Parameter Display Systems", December 1981 In general, the Verification and Validation Program will assess the display system and the included displays with respect to:

' Compatibility

'Understandability

' Usability Compatibility addresses the nature of physical presentations to the user and expected user responses with respect to human input-output abilities and limitations. Understandability addresses integrated system design in the sense that the structure, format and content of the user-system dialog must achieve meaningful communication. Usability addresses the ability and effectiveness of the system to support the operator in assessing plant safety status and executing the EOPs over the full range of plant operating modes.

9-1 0

< Methods to be employed for the V & V of system perform-(_ ance shall be determined by an independent V & V team.

Simulated transients used in the SPDS evaluation will be the same as those used for EOP Verification and Validation. These scenarios include multiple failures (concurrent and sequential) and will exercise the EOPs and the SPDS displays to the maximum extent possible.

Review team members for the evaluation will be independent of the design group. Trained operators will participate in all phases of the Performance Validation Program. Assessment of validation results, and the recommendation and implementation of corrective actions to resolve discrepancies will involve members from both the design and evaluation groups.

Performance Validation Program documentation will include:

1. A Program plan

2. Completed checklists and other collected data

3. Assessments of the results of the evaluations

4. Recommendations for corrections of deficiencies O

9-2 O

3 -10.0 OPERATOR TRAINING

\

(d Control room operators have been formally trained on the simulator regarding the use of the interim SPDS displays, their information content, the means of accessing displays, and the anticipated use of displays during both normal and abnormal plant conditions prior to implementation of the SPDS at the plant. Operator training on plant. safety status assessment, both with and without the use of SPDS, has been conducted.

When the SPDS validation program (Section 9.0) has been completed and the final SPDS implementation is in place, the operators will be trained based on the changes made as a result of this program.

O i

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i APPENDIX A  !

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E DEF INITIONS 1

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DEFI N I T I O ,N,S '

. ,,, . e Although many of the terms listed below <.tra -of ten 'used in a:.

broader sense, the following de finitiontr, nave behr. adopted for use in describing the Hope Creek Cenerating Station SPDS Display' Design program.

ACTION FUNCTION-An operator function involving the performance of a conscious movemsnt, operation of controls, or' execution of a series of girocedural steps.

Example: " Inject boron inte the RPV with SLC,"-

DECISION ANALYSIS: ,

A specialized form of task analysis in which opc5htor decisions are identified and systematically-3x6minea to identify associated information requirementa.

DECISION FUNC TION:

r- An operator function involving a detorminati.on, ' ,

(_)3 evaluation, or judgement tnrough which a procedural -

branch path or action is. celected. 4 Example: "If suppression pcol' temperature cannot be 'l maintai,ned below thn Heat Capacity Temperature'Lipit,..."

FUNCTION:

A higher order activity by which the plan operat. lng crew meets' the objectives of the operatir.g procedtyes.

Within the context of- tho .SPDS Display Design '

description, functions include decisions and actions.

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: ,

The process of ident.itying and analyzing the'functiont performed by the control room operating crew in executing the Emergency Operating Procedures.

INFORMATION REQUIREMENT: .

Knowledge of plant status required as an input-to making a decision or taking an action. '

s_- -

A-1

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, ,r1 t '-

? jf,' O 1-n I. - 2' TASK J , C A 1 A well defined subdivision of a function; a specific

, e activity contributing toward the accomplishment of a

j. function.

e I

i / Examples Starting a pump, opening a valve, etc.

.! i

' +

'i "

l' TASK At1ALYSIS:

dE The process of identifying and analyzing the tasks 5

performed by the control room operating crew in

.v executing the Emergency Operating Procedures.

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APPENDIX B 1

REACTOR SU.ILDING DEFI NITIONS O

l 4

P O

O n Reactor W Building Primary

[ Reactor ]  !

)

Containment Pressure l Vessel i l

l O

V Drywell Suppression Chamber 3,,_,,

l p ression k REACTOR BUILDING DEFINITIONS B-1 O

ENCLOSURE 4 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM DESIGN DOCUMENT NUMBER: H-1-RJXX-CDM-0484-0 DISPLAY FEATURE DEVELOPMENT Note:

The basis for this design memoranda attachment is Operations Engineering, Inc. Document Number 8407-2, Revision 0, dated l

January, 1986 (PSEEG Document Control No. PSJ106-186-2).

This attachment incorporates changes required by the Energency Operating Procedures, and the results of the SPDS Design Review Report.

REVIEW AND APPROVAL:

l d. 21 87 d,) / / .

2[o[}f Date Verifier /W Da t'e Originator 9o A h

/U'Eig inVtor 's 4,s/n Date /

8.W h a4>

SAG G Q z/s/87 Cath Group Head Head

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ManagWr - Date Nuclear Systems Engineering -

Hope Creek l

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\_)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section . Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose...................................... 1-1 1.2 Approach..................................... 1-1 1.3 Organization................................. 1-6 1.4 Application.................................. 1-6 1.5 History Bar Graphs........................... 1-8 2.0 RPV. WATER LEVEL CONTROL........................... 2-1 3.0 RPV PRESSURE CONTROL.............................. 3-1 4.0 REACTOR POWER CONTROL............................. 4-1 5.0 PRIMARY CONTAINME-NT PRESSURE CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 6.0 DRYWELL TEMPERATURE CONTROL....................... 6-1 7.0 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL CONTROL.............. 7-1 8.0 SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL.............. 8-1 9.0 REACTOR BUILDING AREA WATER LEVEL CONTROL......... 9-1 10.0 REACTOR BUILDING AREA TEMPERATURE CONTROL. . . . . . . . . 10-1 11.0 REACTOR BUILDING RADIATION LEVEL CONTROL.......... 11-1 12.0 OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL............. 12-1 0

G

t V)

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE This document provides the results of analysis of the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) Eme rgency Operating Procedures (EOPs), as applicable to the design and development of displays for the HCGS Safety Parameter Display Systen (SPDS).

The justification for using emergency operating procedures as the basis for display design, and the basis and criteria used for selection of the SPDS parameters, is detailed in the HCGS SPDS Safety Analysis: Display Design Requirements Summary (Attachment No. 1).

1.2 APPROACH

. . The Hope Creek Gencrating Station SPDS employs a symptom-based function-oriented display concept.

The initial work for development of the SPDS displays relied upon the results of a generic Function and Task Analysis of Revision 3 of the BWR Emergency Procedure (N Guidelines (EPGs). The HCGS EOPs are based upon and developed from this same version of the EPGs, and thus the results of the generic analysis are directly applicable.

4 The generic function and task analysis results were supplemented by the results of the plant-specific Function and Task Analysis of the HCGS Eme rge ncy Operating Procedures, completed as part of the HCGS Detailed Control Room Design Review.

i 1-1 O

,,,7 ,, -., _-.,-__,.

, , - - -m - -- . . - - , . . , ,,- , , - - , , , ,,.,,..,.._._m_,----~,--,-----7_, _

A

\~) As described in the SPDS Safety Analysis: Display Design Requirements Summary, eleven control functions were identified through application of the Function and Task Analysis results. The SPDS parameter set evolves from these control functions, and is comprised of the following:

• RPV water level RPV pressure

• Reactor power

• Drywell pressure

• Suppression Chamber pressure *

• Drywell temperature Suppression Chamber temperature

• Suppression Pool water level Suppression Pool water temperatures

(}

• Reactor Building area temperatures Reactor Building area water levels Reactor Building area radiation levels

• Off-Site radioactivity release rate Although suppression chamber pressure and temperature are not EOP control functions, they are included in the SPDS parameter set because of their explicit relationship to controlling primary containment (drywell and suppression chamber) pressure and temperature.

l l

6 1-2 O

O' Having identified the control functions and SPDS parameters, the identification of variables to be monitored and display feature development shall be done by analyzing the plant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures. For each control function, all decisions required to be made in executing associated actions specified in the EOPs (refer to Table 1-1) will be identified.

Each EOP decision for each identified control function shall be analyzed to identify the minimum level of information required for assessing plant safety status as follows:

• The information within the SPDS parameter set that is required to make the decision is identified.

• The information processing that the operator must perform in order to make the decision is described.

• The result of this information processing is identified.

Display features which present the decision information

( processing results were then designed. The results of this analysis are documented in Sections 2 through 12 of this report.

The process described and followed for designing the HCGS SPDS display features provides a presentation of information on the current and historical status of key plant variables (the SPDS parameters) in 'a' form;which directly supports execution of the EOPs. Additionally, display features so designed relieve the operator of many information processing tasks otherwise required in order to make decisions called for in the EOPs.

The Hope Creek SPDS need not consider plant operating modes other than power operations, because the plant operators are trained to avoid conficts between the EOP entry conditions and control functicns, and the actual plant values for an operating mode other than power operations.

1-3 O

TABLE l-1 CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED EOPs Control Function Associated EOPs (Steps)

Monitor and-control RPV OP-EO.ZZ-101 water level (Entry, RC, RC/L)

OP-EO.ZZ-201 (LR)

OP-EO.ZZ-203 (STC)

OP-EO.ZZ-204 (SPC)

OP-EO.ZZ-205 (ASC)

OP-EO.ZZ-206 .

(RF)

OP-EO.ZZ-207 (LP)

Monitor and control RPV OP-EO.ZZ-101 pressure (Entry, RC. RC/P)

OP-EO.ZZ-102 (SP/T)

OP-EO .ZZ-201 (LR)

OP-EO.ZZ-202 (ED)

! OP-EO.ZZ-203

(STC) l 1 OP-EO.ZZ-204

! (SPC)

I OP-EO.ZZ-205 (ASC)

() 1-4

'l

i'

\

TABLE l-1 (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ-206 (RF)

OP-EO.ZZ-207 (LP)

Monitor and control reactor OP-EO.ZZ-101 power (Entry, RC, RC/Q)

OP-EO.ZZ-207 (LR)

Control Function Associated EOPs (Steps)

Monitor and control Primary OP-EO.ZZ-102 Containment (Drywell and (Entry, DW/P)

Suppression Chamber) pressure Monitor and control Drywell OP-EO.ZZ-102 temperature (Entry, DW/T)

Monitor and control Suppression OP-EO.ZZ-102 Pool water level (Entry, SP/L)

Monitor and control S,uppression OP-EO.ZZ-102 Pool water temperature (Entry, SP/T)

Monitor and control Reactor OP-EO.ZZ-103 Building area floor water level (Entry, RB, RB/L)

Monitor and control Reactor OP-EO.ZZ-103 Building area temperatures (Entry, RB, RB/T)

Monitor and control Reactor OP-EO.ZZ-103 Building area radiation levels (Entry, RB, RB/ R)

Monitor and control off-site OP-EO.ZZ-104 radioactivity release (Entry, RR)

O 1-5

l n

( ')

l.3 organization The EOP decision analysis results and supporting SPDS  ;

display features are presented in the remaining j portions of this document, organized under the headings  ;

of the identified EOP control functions. For each control function, all decisions required to be made in executing associated EOP actions are identified, analysis results are provided, and candidate display features appropriate to the analysis results are presented (consistent with the information requirements of the SPDS parameter set).

1.4 Application Display features are selected and grouped on individual displays consistent with a display structure that parallels the identified EOP control functions and the procedures organization.

The composite design of individual SPDS displays, and the design-of the SPDS displays as a group, satisfies the system functional requirements stated in NUREG-0737 i

Supplement 1:

()

• The SPDS should provide a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room 4

operators to aid them in rapidly and reliably de te rmining the safety status of the plant.

...the principal function and purpose of the SPDS is to aid the control room pesonnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnornal conditions warrant corrective action...

The system will continuously display information from which the safety status of the plant can be rapidly and reliably assessed...

6 1-6 l

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• The SPDS display shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors principles so that the displayed information can be readily perceived and comprehended by SPDS users.

Additionally, the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 Section 18.2 and Appendix A to Section 18.2 was applied in the display design process. The integrated design of the individual displays considered computer hardware and sof tware characteristics, duplication of the information presented, and human factors aspects of display format, organization, and composition.

A top level " Primary SPDS Display" is provided which presents an overview of the current status of the SPDS control function parameters. Color coding is used as a display enhancement technique to indicate the status of SPDS parameters relative to EOP control function entry conditions. Display features comprising the Primary SPDS Display were selected from EOP decision analysis results of all control functions.

Supplementing the top-level display, additional secondary-level displays are provided as follows:

()

• RPV Water Level Control

• RPV Pressure Control

• Reactor Power Control

• Primary Containment Pressure Control

• Drywell Temperature Control

• Suppression Pool Water Level Control

• Suppression Pool Temperature Control

• Reactor Building Control

• Off-Site Radioactivity Release Control 1-7 O

O Display features from associated control function analysis were selected and integrated in the design of these individual displays.

The EOP decision analysis results contained in Sections 2 through 12 document the technical analysis substantiating the design of the SPDS displays, and the information presented therein. In addition, information contained in this document may be used as source material relevant to the development of the SPDS Performance Validation- Program, and for development of a training course on the technical basis and use of the SPDS.

1.5 History Bar Graphs History bar graphs are designed to aid the operators in determining trends (increasing / decreasing) for various control functions. The graphs depict the current and previous values of the applicable control function pa rame te r. The various history bar graphs are illustrated on the following pages. Each bar on the graph shall

~

represent. a 10 second scan time interval. Furthe rmore , the actual current value is shown in the box located in the g- upper right corner of the graph along with the engineering

(,, units.

l 1-8 i

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Figure 1: HISTORY BAR GRAPH - REACTOR LEVEL ,

-200 IN REACTOR LEVEL

+100 0

-100

/ / / / / / / / / TAP

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / --

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+ + + + + + - -300

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 MINUTES

.r\

(_) Pigure 2: HISTORY BAR GRAPH - REACTOR PRES 590 PSIG REACTOR PRES

+1200

/ / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / -- 600

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

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+ l '

+ l l +l + -- 0

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 MINUTES

<s 1-9

)

('D Figure 3: HISTORY BAR GRAPH - REACTOR PWR 20 PCT REACTOR PWR

+130

- 65

/ / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / --

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+ + + + + + 0

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 MINUTES Figure 4: SUPP POOL TEMP SUPPR POOL TEMP

+125

__ 100

/ / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+ + + __ 75

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 MINUTES 1-10

o

'wj Figure 5: SUPP CHMBR PRES 45.0 PSIG SUPPR CHMBR PRES

+200 100

/ / / / / / -

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+- +-. + -

+ 0

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 MINUTES Figure 6: DRYWELL TEMP O 160 DEGP

'\) DRYWELL TEMP

+300 l

225

/ / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / -

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+ + + + + +_,_ 100

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 MINUTES l

l l

O 1-11

~ _ . _ __. .. _ . - _ -. . . - - . __ . . - . .- . _ . . .

. Figure 7: SUPP POOL LVL i

1

160 IN

, SUPP POOL LVL

+250

/ / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / -- 175

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

i / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / '

i / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

i / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

i + + + - -

+ 50

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 i MINUTES a

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_ - - . _ . . - . . . . . , . . . . , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . = . . _ . - _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - . . .

a _ __ __ _ _ & . _

SECTION 2 i

RPV WATER LEVEL CONTROL l

l l

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O k_) Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: (Is) RPV water level below -38 ' inches...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. RPV water level - current value; shutdown range , upset

~

. range, narrow range, wide range, and fuel zone range level instruments

2. RPV pressure - current value; wide range

3. Drywell temperature - current value i

4. Recirculation pump status - current status; both pumps Information Processing:

1. De te rmine the current value of reactor pressure.

1

2. Determine the current value of Drywell temperature.

0' 3. Determine the current recirculation pump dif ferential pressure for both pumps.

l 4. Dete rmine the current reactor water level from the eligible instruments identified on 2-2.

)

2-1 O

k o)

\s, Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is) RPV water level below -38 inches...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Processing: (Continued)

INSTRUMENT REACTOR DRYWELL RECIRC. PUMP RANGE CHANNEL PRESSURE TEMP. STATUS NARROW A P< Itr psig N/A N/A RANGE B P< Itr psig N/A N/A C P< Itr psig T> 135*F N/A WIDE A P< ltr psig N/A N/A RANGE B P< Itr psig N/A N/A FUEL A P< Itr psig N/A NOT RUNNING ZONE B P< ltr psig N/A NOT RUNNING UPSET A P> 0 psig N/A N/A RANGE B P> 0 psig N/A N/A

}

S/D A P> 0 psig T> 135'F N/A RANGE B P> 0 psig T> 135'F N/A

5. Compare the current value of RPV water level to -38 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV water level relative to -38 inches.

2-2

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level below -38 inches...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition Display Feature: (Continued)

1. Color code change of the REACTOR LVL block of the CFPM when the current value of RPV water level is at or below -38 inches. (Note: The RPV water level value displayed shall be derived per the above information processing.)

LVL

-155 IN

2. Tabular presentation of the current RPV water level value indicated by each instrument channel.

RPV LVL

% INSTRUMENT A B C CHANNELS (INCH) (INCH) (INCH)

WIDE RANGE -153 -154 N/A NARROW RANGE -158 -157 -158 S/D RANGE ~-159 -158 N/A FUEL RANGE L*** L*** N/A UPSET RANGE L*** N/A N/A 2-3 O

'(3

'# Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Functions (Is] RPV water level ... undetermined?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revisions- 0 Stept Entry Condition Information Requirements:

None. This decision function shall be satisfied by data validation techniques. If the SPDS cannot determine a valid water level, the REACTOR LVL block of the CFPM will undergo a color code change and a question mark (?) will be displayed instead of a numeric value.

i l

1 2-4

I

\_/

Control Function Parameter RPV water level Decision Function: (Does al scram condition (exist] and (is]

reactor power > 5%?

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: 0 Stept Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Current value of CFPM parameters that are scram inputs:

a. Reactor level (See pages 2-2 and 2-3)

b. Reactor wide range pressure

c. Drywell narrow range pressure

d. Reactor power using APRMs

2. APRM channel bypass switches - current status

3. RPS trip logic (Channels A&B) - current status Information Processing

() 1.

2.

Determination of which APRM channels are not bypassed.

Compare current value of reactor power to 5% (it is recognized that the APRMs are not accurate at low power levels, however, since the purpose here is to ascertain power relative to 5 percent, the APRMs are considered adequate. Caution should be exercised in developing APRM data validation so as to not reject what may be typically considered downscale readings) .

3. If reactor power is greater than 5%, compare the followings

a. Principal reactor scran parameters with Technical Specification limits. Specifically:

1. Is reactor level < = +12.5 inches?

2. Is reactor pressure > = 1037 psig?

3. Is reactor power > = 5%?

4. Is Drywell pressure > = 1.68 psig?

b. RPS (Channels A&li) logic status with TRIPPED indication to determine status of anticipatory scrams.

2-5

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level (Continued)

Decision Function [Does a] scram condition [ exist) and (is]

reactor power > 5%?

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: 0 Step Entry Condition Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of reactor power relative to 5%

2. If reactor power is at or above 54, status of a coincident scram condition Display Feataures:

1. Color code change of the REACTOR PWR block of the CFPM when the current value of reactor power is at or above 5% and SCRAM condition exists.

PhR PCT

2. A display of the RPS logic status, indicating " TRIPPED" or " RESET".

RPS LOGIC STATUS TRIPPED 1

2-6 0

Control Function Parameter RPV water level Decision Function (Does a] scram condition (exist] and [is]

reactor power > 5%? (Continued)

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: O Stept Entry Condition Display Features: (Continued)

3. Tabular presentation of individual APRM channel information.

APRM RX POWER Channel (PCT) BYPASSED A  ? YES C 3.0 NO E  ? NO B 5.0 No D  ? YES P 10.0 NO 2-7 0

- . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . __ _ _ ~ . . _ .

O Control Function Parameter RPV water level i Decision Functions (Is] reac tor power . . . undetermined?

OP-EO.ZZ

101 Revision: 0 Step Entry Condition w

J 1

1 Information Requirements:

i None. This decision function is satisfied by data

! validation techniques described in Attachment 3, Section

2.0. If the SPDS cannot determine a valid power level, the REACTOR PWR block of the CFPM will undergo a color code change and a question mark (?) will be displayed instead of a numeric value.

O .

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2-8

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A Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure above 1037 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Stept Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 1037 psig Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to 1037 psig.

Display Features:

1. Color code change of the REACTOR PRES block of the CFPM

(~'

when the current value of reactor pressure is at or above 1037 psig.

PRES 900 PSIG 2-9 O

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(_ ' Control Function Parametert RPV weter level ,

Decision Functions (Is] Drywell prassure above 1.68 psig? - - -

OP-EO.22 101 Revision: 0 [ Sj epj, Entry Coadit. ion Information Reg:lirements: ,

1. Drywell. Pressure - current value s

Information Processinar , ,

1. Compare th( current va),uc of Dr,ywell prossure to 1.68 psig. .

Information Processing Resultc1

1. Status of the current- value of Drywell pressure relative to 1.68 psig.'

Display Featurest

1. Color code change of the DRYWELL PRF:S block of the CTPM

(~)

(>

when the value of Drywell pressure 13 at or above 1.68 psig.

1 PRES 1.70 PSIG 1

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} Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level ... undetermined?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 & Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-2, and LR-2 201 i

i,

Information Requirements

None. This decision function shall be satisfied by data j validation techniques. If the SPDS cannot determine a valid f s water level, the REACTOR LVL block of the CFPM will undergo a color code change and a question mark (?) will be i ,

displayed instead of a numeric value.

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(/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level s.

- Decision Function: [If] RPV water level cannot be maintained i

j above +12.5"...

[ ,; ' OP-Ed.ZZ: 101 , Revision:

s 0 Step: RC/L-4 ,

Information Requirements:

1. RPV water level - current value

2. RPV water level - historical values Information Processing:

1. . Compare the current value of RPV water level to 12.5 inches.

, 2. Determine the RPV water level trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

(} 1.

Display Feature:

Status of RPV water level relative to 12.5 inches.

N 1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 12.5 inches, noting the action which is to be taken when RPV water level cannot be maintained above 12.5 inches (i.e. scram); MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Table 2-1, Figure 1:

Margin to Action-RPV LVL) .

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV water level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9,

! Figure 1). A value of +12.5 inches shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the graph.

h y

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- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: Can [is] RPV water level be [being) maintained above -129 inches?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-5 Information Requirements:

1. RPV water level - current value

2. RPV water level - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV water level to -129 inches.

2. De te rmine the RPV water level trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

Status of RPV water level relative to -129 inches.

( l.

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to -129 inches, noting the action which is to be taken when RPV water level cannot be maintained above -129 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Table 2-1, Figure 1: margin to Action - RPV LVL).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV water IcVel (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 1). A value or 129 inches shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the graph.

2-13 0

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level i Decision Function: [If] RPV water level cannot be maintained above -129 inches,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Stept RC/L-7 J

NOTE: See page 2-13 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

2-14 O

Control Function Parameter:

RPV water level Decision Function: Can [is] RPV water level be [being]

maintained above TAF [-161 inches]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 & Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-8, LP-ll, LP-14, 207 and LP-26 Information Requirements:

1. RPV water level - current value

2. RPV water level - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV water level to -161 inches (TAF).

2. De te rmine the RPV water level trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

, s 1. Status of the current value of RPV water level relative to -161 inches (TAF).

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to -161 inches, noting the action which is to be taken when RPV water level cannot be maintained above -161 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Table 2-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION - RPV LVL).

l 2-15

%)

f

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Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: Can RPV water level be maintained above TAF

[-161 inches]? (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 & Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-8, LP-ll, LP-14,

~207 and LP-26 Display Feature: (Continued)

2. A "RPV LVL ABOVE TAF" alarm block with a text change (BELOW) and a color code change when the current value of RPV water level is at or below the Top of Active Fuel.

RPV LVL RPV LVL BELOW > ABOVE TAF TAF O

3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV water level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 1). A value of -161 inches (TAF) shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the graph.

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2-16 1

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~/ ControlFunctionP$rameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If] RPV water level falls below -129 inches OP-EO.ZZ: 101' Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-9 1

NOTE: See page 2-13 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

l 1

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! 2-17 l

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Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: Are two or more subsystems lined up with pumps running?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-3 Information Requirements:

None. This decision point is identified to determine the results of operator " action" statement OP-EO.ZZ-201(Q) ,

Rev. O, Step LR-1. Although operator actions can have consequences impacting plant safety status, they do not determine . safety status. Therefore, this decision point need not be directly supported by SPDS. The operator can best answer this question while lining up and starting the subject subsystems.

4 I ,

2-18 1

l

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4 4

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: If at anytime RPV pressure goes below or above 100 or 380 psig respectively . . . [i.e. ,

has RPV pressure crossed .either threshold of 100 psig or 380 psig?]

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-6 Information Requirements:

1. RPV Pressure - current value

2. RPV pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 100 psig j and 380 psig.

2. Determine the RPV pressure trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to j 100 psig and 380 psig.

Display Feature:

l. History bar graph depicting the current and previous i values of RPV pressure (see Section 1.5,-Page 1-9,

Figure 2). Both 100 and 380 psig shall be included as ordinates on the Y-axis,of the graph.

S i- 2. Present "RPV PRES" value depicting the current RPV pressure (see Page 2-9, Display Feature #1).

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j 2-19

($)

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} Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: . .

.or water level trend reve rses , . . .

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-7 l

l 3

1 NOTE: See pages 2-12, _2-13, 2-15, and 2-16 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

2-20 0

- - nr-,+, ,e _ - -- - - , - - . . , , , - -- -- , - , . , - - - - - - - - ..m -w - , - - , , -----------,---r- -, . -n- , , .-

G- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If] RPV water level drops to -129 inches,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-7

+ --------________________________________________________,,,_,____

NOTE: See page 2-17 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 2-21

Control Function ~ Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level trending up or down?

OP-EO.22: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-7 NOTE: See pages 2-12, 2-13, 2-15, and 2-16 for the Information Requirements; In fo rma tion Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

1 I

2-22 O

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..--->,---------,,_,r, .ww--,--mn- -,m --

,,y-

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Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure greater than 380 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-9 i Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 380 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to 380 psig.

Display Features:

1. Presentation of RPV pressure depicting the current value of RPV pressure (see Page 2-9, Display Feature

1. 1).

l l 2-23 i

()

1 i

(m) Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure greater than 100 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: O Step: LR-10 and LR-15 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value i

Information Processing:

1.

Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 100 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1.

Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to 100 psig.

Display Feature:

1.

Presentation of RPV pressure depicting the current value of RPV pressure (see Page 2-9, Display Feature

1. 1).

O 2-24 l

L

I Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] HPCI or RCIC operable?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-ll Information Requirements:

None. System operability is determined by demonstration and maintained by administrative controls and therefore, there are no "information requirements".

4 i

t 2-25

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure going up?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-14 and -25 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value

2. RPV pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Determine the RPV pressure trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results: -

1. Status of the RPV pressure trend.

Display Feature:

(N 1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 2).

2-26 O

N- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] any Core Spray injection subsystem operating?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-16 Information Requirements:

1. Core Spray loop flow - current value (Div. I&II)

2. Core Spray test line MOV position - current status (Div. I&II)

Information Processing:

1. Compare both Div. I&II loop flow with ltr GPM.

2. Compare both Div. I&II test line MOV position with CLOSED indication.

Information Processing Results:

1. Determine if either Core Spray Div. I or II currently has a flow rate > ltr GPM, coincident with the

(') associated full flow test line MOV being closed.

Display Feature:

l. Tabular presentation of injectiori system / subsystem availability (see Table 2-1, Figure 2: Cooling System Injection Status).

2-27

VO Control Function Parameter:- RPV water level Decision Function: When RPV water drops to TAF [-161 inches]...

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-17, -37 and -39 1

NOTE: See pages 2-15 and _2-16 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information' Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 2-28 O

s Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: JIs] any injection subsystem or aternate injection subsystem injecting?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: O Step: LR-19, and -31 Information Requirements:

1. C6re Spray injection status - current status (see Page 2-27)

2. Feedwater flow to RPV - current value

3. CRD. cooling water flow - current value

4. RCIC loop flow

5. RCIC test line MOV position

6. HPCI loop flow

7. HPCI test line MOV position

8. RHR - LPCI injection status There are no information requirements relative to alternate injection systems (e.g. Fire Water System, Service Water System, and Condensate Transfer Systen) that are required.

These systems require manual alignment and initiation, therefore, the operators will be cognizant of their associated status.

Information Processing:

1. Determine Core Spray system injection status (see Page 2-76).

f 2. Compare feedwater loop flow with ltr GPM.

3. Compare CRD cooling water flow with ltr GPM.

4. RCIC;

a. Compare RCIC flow with ltr GPM.

i b. Compare test line MOV position with CLOSED indication.

I S. HPCI;

a. Compare HPCI flow with ltr GPM.

I b. Compare test line MOV position with CLOSED r^' indication.

6. RHR/LPCI;

a. Compare RHR Flow with ltr GPM.

b. Compare test line MOV position with closed indication.

l 2-29 t

Cw- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] any injection subsystem or aternate injection subsystem injecting? (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: O Step: LR-19, and -31 Information Processing Results:

1. Determine if either Core Spray Div. I or II currently has a flow rate > ltr GPM, coincident with the associated test line MOV being closed

2. Determine if feedwater loop flow is > ltr GPM

3. Determine if CRD cooling water flow is > ltr GPM

4. Determine if RCIC flow is > ltr GPM, coincident with the associated test line MOV being closed

5. Determine if HPCI flow is > ltr GPM, coincident with the associated test line MOV being closed Display Feature:

O 1. Tabular presentation of injection system / subsystem availability (see Table 2-1, Figure 2: Cooling System Injection Status).

l l

2-30 l

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O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] Fire Water lined up with at least one pump running?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: O Step: LR-21 and -3 3 Information Requirements:

None. The Fire Water System requires manual valve alignment and system initiation to inject into the RPV. Therefore, the operator will already be aware of the system status.

O 2-31 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] Service Water lined up with at least one pump running?

O P-EO . Z Z : 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-23 and -35 Information Requirements:

None. The Service Water System requires manual valve alignment and system initiation to inject into the RPV.

Therefore, the operator will already be aware of the system status.

O 1

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i 2-32 O

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.. __. .- -. ~

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Are] HPCI and RCIC and CRD injecting?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-27 Information Requirements:

1. CRD cooling water flow - current value

2. RCIC loop flow

3. RCIC test line MOV position

4. HPCI loop flow

5. HPCI test line MOV position Information Processing:

J

1. Compare CRD. cooling water flow with ltr GPM.

i 2. RCIC;

a. Compare RCIC flow with ltr GPM.

ON b. Compare test line MOV position with CLOSED indication.

3. HPCI;

a. Compare HPCI flow with ltr GPM.

b. Compare test line MOV position with CLOSED indication.

Information Processing Results:

1. De te rmine if CRD cooling water flow is > ltr GPM.

2. Determine if RCIC flow is > ltr GPM, coincident with the associated test line MOV being closed.

3. De te rmine if HPCI flow is > ltr GPM, coincident with the associated test line MOV being closed.

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of injection system / subsystem

. availability (see Table 2-1, Figure 2: Cooling Systen Injection Status).

2-33

/ 's

(/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Are] 1 or more injection subsystems lined up with at least 1 pump running?

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-29 NOTE: See pages 2-29 and 2-30 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

ex a

2-34

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i Control Function Parameter: RPV water level ,

1 . .

Decision Functions- [If] any systen, injection subsystem, or i

standby injection subsystem becomes available

with at leas t 1 pump running , ...

t i

if OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step LR-36 ,

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NOTE: See pages 2-29 and 2-30 for the Information

- Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; ' and Display  !

Feature discussion for the Decision j Function described above.

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2-35 i

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- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: When RPV water level is increasing, ...

(Is RPV water level increasing?)

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-40, RF-18, and 206 RF-20 NOTE: See pages 2-12, 2-13, 2-15, and 2-16 Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

2 l

l i

i 2-36 O

i

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: -. . . or pressure drops below 100 psig, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 201 Revision: 0 Step: LR-40 NOTE: See page 2-19 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above. -

e t

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i 2-37 i

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(/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If] boron injaction is require 3 ... ,

OP-EO.ZZ: 101, Revision: 0 ,

Step: RC/L-24 LR-2, and _

201, & 204 '

SPC-2

---

,.---------------------- z----------- '

Information Requirements: '

7

.5

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current value

2. Suppression Pool temberature - Sistorical values ,j.

3. Control Rod Drive position - current status (See page 2-49) '

Information Processing: ,*

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool t

temperature to 110*F.

2. Compare t'he Suppression Pool temperature trend so increasing / decreasing.

, L .,

i Information Processing Resu lts * '

j

\/ 1. Status of the current value and trend of Suppression < ,

Pool temperature relative to 110*P..

Display Feature: -

.w

1. Tabular presenEatiun of the ,terpe.ilature margin to 110*F, noting Tihe action which-is to be taken before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110*F; MARGIN TO ACTION bo):.is cQlor coded consistent to the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter rel~ative to the ACTION VALUS. ^

.c.

CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE ' TO ACTION

PARAMETER (*F) ACTION (*F) ('F) l SUPP 120 BORON INJ 110 -10 POOL TEMP (RX NOT S/D)d 1

a E

i (_) '

2-38 .~

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,.-4--..,.,--.-n - - - - - - - - - - .

• 4--.--

. - ~ , , , - - _ g e - -, , --

N}lj; (d l

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, . Control Function Parameter: RPV water level 1.C *

~

h - Decision Function: [If] boron injection is required ...

(Continued)

GP-EO.ZZ: 101,201 Revision: 0 Step: RC/L-2, LR-2, and

& 204 SPC-2 i

4

\' '

Display Feature: (Continued) i

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous

~,

values of Suppression Pool temperature. A value of

+110*F shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis

[" of the graph (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4).

3. Presentation of CRD position (see Page 2-49, Display l Feature #1).

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-+ 2-39 g,,

i t ,'

B l n - -- _. _.., - - _ -. . .

5 ' Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: =. .. or [ boron injection] has been initiated, s OP-EO.ZZ: 101, hevision: O Step: RC/L-2, LR-2, and

,; 201, & 204 SPC-2 Information Requirements:

1. SLCS injection pump A status - current status

(' 2. SLCS pump A discharge pressure - current value

, 3.- SLCS injection pump B status - current status s

4. SLCS pump B discharge pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the status of each pump with ON.

2. Compare the discharge of each pump with ltr PSIG (relief valve setpoint).

Information Processing Results:

O 1. Determine if either SLCS pump is ON and the associated discharge pressure is less than ltr PSIG.

Display Feature:

a. 1. "SLCS STATUS" block depicting system injection status.

SLCS PUMP SLCS PUMP STATUS STATUS RUNNING > NOT PUMNING

-u-l

, 2-40 f"] '

NJ ,

1

'I w.

J - Control Function Parameter: RPV water level 6'

.) ,

Decision Function: When at least one Core Spray subsystem is i operating with suction from the Suppression Pool, ...

1

/< OP-EO.ZZ: 204 Revision: 0 Step: SPC-4 i

NOTE: See page 2-27 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for Core Spray injection i status. No information is required to determine the source of water as the Suppression Pool is the normal (i.e.,

preferred) source and manual operator action O is required to transfer to another source.

Therefore, the operator is always aware of this information.

'I \

~ 2-41

\

k- Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: ...and RPV pressure is below 24 2 psig , . . .

OP-EO.ZZ: 204, Revision: 0 Step: SPC-4 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 242 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to 242 psig.

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 242 psig, noting the action which is to be taken when RPV pressure is below 242 psig and at least one core spray (O

'j subsystem is operating with suction f rom the Suppression Pool; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE.

CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (PSIG) ACTION (PSIG) (PSIG)

RPV PRES 200 STOP EXT INJ 242 -42 EXCEPT CRD r

1 2-42 i

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1 l Control Function Parameter: RPV water level 1

Decision Function: When RPV water level is restored to above TAF [-161 inches],...  ;

OP-EO.ZZ: 204 Revision: 0 Step: SPC-6 NOTE: See pages 2-15 and 2-16 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for.the Decision

Function described above.

J i

i l

l 2-43 i \

i i

I

.-..r__. . . . , _ _ , , _ _ , . _ - . _

e

(~3 i

\/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure stabilized at least 55 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

OP-EO.ZZ: 205 Revision: 0 Step: ASC-8 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value

2. RPV pressure - historical values

3. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

4. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Determine the RPV pressure trend (increasing /

decreasing).

2. Determine the Suppression Chamber pressure trend

,_ (increasing / decreasing).

( )

\'

3. De te rmine the dif ference between the current value of RPV pressure and the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure.

4. Determine the dif ference between the trends of RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current and historical differential pressure values between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber, relative to 55 psig.

Display Feature:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV pressure (see Section 1. 5, Page 1-9, Figure 2).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chanber pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

2-44 I t v

O

(% )

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure stabilized at leas t 55 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

OP-EO.ZZ: 205 Revision: 0 Step: ASC-8 Display Features: (Continued)

3. Tabular presentation of the dif ference between the current values of RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.

VALUE PARAMETER (PSIG)

RPV PRES 90 SC PRES 25 DIFF PRES 75 (RPV-SC)

O i

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i 2-45

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l

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Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure stabilized . below 140 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: '205 Revision: 0 Step: ASC-10 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value (see Page 2-22)

2. RPV pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 140 psig.

2. Determine the RPV pressure trend (increasing /

decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of.the current value of RPV pressure relative to 140 psig.

. () Display Feature

l. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 2). A value of 140 psig shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the bar graph.

t I

l l 2-46 i (2)

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If} the cooldown rate exceeds 90'F/hr, . . .

OP-EO.ZZ: 205 Revision: 0 S t'ep : ASC-12 Information Requirements:

None. The cooldown rate is not necessary to achieve or determine the current plant safety status and, therefore, no information is required for the SPDS. The operator can determine the cooldown rate per the normal procedure.

O 4

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i 9

1 i

2-47 r

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, , _ , . - ~ . . - - . - , , - . . ,

?

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level

, Decision Function: Can at least 3 ADS /SRVs be opened?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-1 Information Requirements:

None. System operability is determined by demonstration and maintained by administrative controls. The re f o re , there are no "inf ormation requirements" as the decision function is not within the intended SPDS scope.

The operator's knowledge of plant conditions will enable him to determine operability of the ADS /SRVs.

i 1

i 4

C:)

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s 2-48 i

J 4

1 i

i

, . . - - - - . - - - _ _ . - . . _ . . . , _ . - . _ , , _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ - - _ _ , _ _ . . . _. _-,,__.___._._m_ -- . . _ _ , _ _ _ _ - . . , _ _ _ _ . , - .

Control _ Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: (Are] all control rods inse rted to or beyond position 02?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: O Step: RF-3 and RF-15 Information Requirements:

1. Control rod position - current position of each control rod Information Processing:

1. Compare current position of each control rod with position 02.

Information Processing Results:

1. Determino quantity of individual control rods at position 04 or greater.

Display Feature:

1. A display of the CRS INSERTED, with a nuneric O- indication of the quantity of control rods that are not inserted to'at least position 02. Color code change of the indicated quantity when it is greater than zero and RPS is tripped.

CRS NOT INSERTED 4

2-49 O

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] at least 1 SRV open? ,

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-4 Information Requirements:

1. ADS /SRV position - current status Information Processing:

1. Compare the current position of ADS /SRV with OPEN indication.

Information Processing Results:

1. Quantity of the individual ADS /SRVs in the OPEN position.

Display Feature:

1. An "OPEN ADS /SRV" status block depicting the current number of open ADS /SRVs.

O OPEN ADS /SRV 10

! 2-50 0

~O Lj Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If] RPV water level can be determined, ...

(Can RPV water level be determined?)

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-6, -16, and -29 NOTE: See pages 2-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 2-51 O

(^'s Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: . . . And Suppression Chamber pressure can be maintained below 57.2 psig.

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-6 and RF-34 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

2. . Suppression Chanber pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Chanber pressure to 57.2 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to 57.2 psig.

2. Determine the Suppression Chamber pressure trend yj (increasing / decreasing).

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 57.2 psig, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Chamber pressure can be maintained below 57.2 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Section 5, Page 5-21, Table 5-1, Figure 1).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure. A value of 57.2 psig shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the graph (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

2-52 O

i O'

\/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: RPV pressure is below the pressure in table RF-P-l[ Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure]...

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-5 and RF-7 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value

2. ADS /SRV positions - current status Information Processing:

1. Determine the current value of RPV pressure.

2. Determine the current status of ADS /SRV positions.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to Table RF-P-1.

2. Status of the individual ADS /SRVs (considering the current value of RPV pressure relative to Table RF-P-1).

Display Features:

1. Presentation of RPV pressure depicting the current RPV pressure value.

CURRENT VALUE PARAMETER (PSIG)

RPV PRES 790

2. An "OPEN ADS /SRV" status block depicting the current I number of open valves (see Page 2-50, Display Feature

1. 1).

2-53 I

t i

t i

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: ... or no SRVs are open, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: O Step: RF-7 NOTE: See page 2-51 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 2-54 O

'/ Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: Can RPV pressure be increased to above the appropriate value in Table RF-P-l[ Min.

Alternate Flooding Pressure] with at least 1 SRV open?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: O Stept RF-8, _RF-10, and RF-12 Information Requirements:

None. The prediction of future plant conditions is not within the scope of the SPDS.

2-55 O

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: ... or the reactor is determined to be shut-down and no boron has been injected into the RPV, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-15 Information Requirements:

1. APRM output (each APRM channel) - current value

2. APRM BYPASS switch position (each RPS channel) -

current status

3. SRM count rate (each SRM channel) - current value

4. S RM pe riod and log count rate (each channel) - current value i

5. SLCS Injection status - (See Page 2-40)

Information Processing:

() None. Determining reactor " shutdown" status is a complex process that requires making assumptions based upon current conditions.

Implementing this function in SPDS would exceed the SPDS requirement of " aiding" the operator. Therefore, the basic data will be displayed, but the operator must determine shutdown status.

Information Processing Results:

None required for the SPDS.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of individual APRM channe]

information (see Page 2-6, Display Feature #3).

2. "SLCS STATUS" block depicting system injection status (see Page 2-40, Display Feature #1) .

2-56 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: ... or the reactor is determined to be shut-down and no boron has been injected into the RPV, ...

4 OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-15 Display Featurec: (Continued)

3. Presentation of individual SRM channel information.

SRM 6-5-

LOG COUNT 4-RATE 3-2-

1- ----

0 0-ABCD SRM COUNT RATE PERIOD A XXXX CPS XXXX SEC B XXXX CPS XXXX SEC C XXXX CPS XXXX SEC D XXXX CPS XXXX SEC 2-57 O

e

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: .[Can] RPV pressure be maintained at least 70 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Stept RF-23, -25, and -31 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value

2. RPV pressure - historical values

3. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

4. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Determine the RPV pressure trend (increasing / ,

decreasin'g).

2. Determine the Suppression Chamber pressure trend (increasing / decreasing).

3. De te rmine the difference between the current value of RPV pressure and the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure.

4. De te rmine the dif ference between the trends of RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current and historical differential pressure values between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber, relative to 70 psig.

Display Feature:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 2).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

2-58

A Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Can] RPV pressure be maintained at least 70 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Stept RF-23, RF-25, and RF-31 Display Features (Continued)

3. Tabular presentation of the difference between the current values of RPV pressure and Suppression Chamber pressure (see Page 2-45, Display Feature #3).

O 2-59 O

, . . _ _ . . ~ -. . .. ,_. .. __ . _ _ _ _ .- _ _____ _

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level

. Decision Function: [Is] there evidence that the RPV is filled?

OP-EO.22: 206 Revision: O Step RF-30 4

i i

4 NOTE: See page 2-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing;

{ Information Processing Results; and Display

) Feature discussion for the Decision

, Function described above.

i t

T I

f i

}

I 2-60 l

i f

r

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Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Has) RPV water level indication been restored within the time allowed in curve RF-T-1 (Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: O Step RF-33 Information Requirements:

1. APRM output (each APRM channel) - current value

2. APRM BYPASS switch position (each RPS channel) -

current status

3. SRM count rate (each SRM channel) - current value

4. SRM period and log count rate (each channel) - current value

5. RPV water level - current value (See Pages 2-1 to 2-4)

Information Processing:

(s None. Determining maximum core uncovery time limit is a complex

(, process that requires making assumptions based upon current conditions. Implementing this function in SPDS would exceed the SPDS requirement of " aiding" the operator. Therefore, the basic data will be displayed, but the operator must determine this status.

Information Processing Results:

None required for the SPDS.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of individual APRM channel inf ormation (see Page 2-6, Display Feature #3).

2. Presentation of individual SRM channel intornation (see Page 2-57, Display Feature # 3 ) .

3. Presentation of current RPV water level value (see Pages 2-1 to 2-3, Display Features #1 and #2).

2-61

! (Q

_/

l l

.I ,

-(

s Control Function Parameter RPV water level Decision Functions' [Is] reactor power unknown (undetermined]?

OP-EO.22: 207 Revision: O Stept LP-2, and LP-ll NOTE: See page 2-8 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display l Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

f

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1 t

i l

i i

l T

i 2-62 i

l

i 1

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Control Function Parameter RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] reactor power >5% ...?

OP-EO.22:- 207 Revision: 0 Stept LP-3 and LP-ll Information Requirements:

1. Reactor power using APRMs - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of reactor power to 5%.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of reactor power relative to 5%.

Display Feature:

1. Color code change of the REACTOR PWR box when the current value of reactor power is at or above 5%.

O PWR 7

PCT 2-63 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is) Suppression Pool temperature above 110*F

[ Boron Injection temperature)?

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-4 and LP-ll Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current average value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 110'P.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 110 ' F .

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 110*F, noting the action which is to be taken before

% Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110*F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE.

CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER ('P) ACTION ('F) (*F)

SUPP 120 BORON INJ 110 -10 POOL TEMP (RX NOT S/D)

J 2-64 i

i

. - - , ~ - , -

/~%

k -)

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Is] Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: O Step: LP-5 and LP-11 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell pressure to 1.68 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell pressure relative to 1.68 psig.

Display Feature:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 1.68 psig, noting the action which is to be taken when O Drywell pressure is above 1.68 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Section

, 5, Page 5-21, Table 5-1, Pigure 1).

i 2-65 0

-,..y._.. ... - _ . ,..,my,,, _ _ __,,,.__y.m._,-,_ ,_.,_._.,__,m ,. ,__.r,__ _ . __ _ , . _ . , _ . - , _ , _ _ , , , , ,

.s * * , y t

\ ~ t

., _ (

\

~

., 1..

f

(_/ Control Function' Parameters" RPV water level '

Decis' ion Function (Arel any SRVs open or cycling?

OP-EO.22: 207 Revisient 0 Stept LP-6 a nd LP-l'1 '

,/ $

Information Requireyents: ,

l. RPV pressure - current valut ,

_s, ,

^

2. RPV pressure -- historical values ')

3. ADS /SRV positioEs - current status [

Information Processina -

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to the lowort SRV lif ting pressure (1108 psig). *

2. Determine of the RPV pressure trend (increasing /

decreasing). .

3. Compare the current stytus of each ADS /S.RV with "OPEN" ind ic a tions. s q b

\s Information Processing Results:

1. Determination if RPV pressure is cycling about the lowest SRV lif ting pressure (1108 psig), s

2. Status of the individual ADS /SRVs positions. .s Display Feature:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous . s values of T!RV pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 2). ,,

2. Tabular presentation of the difference between the -

loweat SRV lif ting pressure and the c6rrent value of RPV pressure. Color code negative dif ferential pressures. -

n DIFF PRES: SPV LIFT - RPV 208 Pa!G

3. An "OPEN ADS /SRV" status block depicting the current.

number of open ADS /SRVs (see Display Feature # 1, page 2-50).

~

2-66 r

T e

~ .. . .., . ._ _ .~ - ._ _ -- . ___

!l ' *

.h'

{$ ,

l' O.. Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Arel any MSIVs open? r OP-EO.ZZ: 207 _ Revision: 0 Step: LP-7

(.

s .; Information Requirements:

I i

1. MSIV position - current status of each value Information Processing: i t

-x 1. Determine the current status of each MSIV position with OPEN indications.

Y .- ,

Information Processing Results:

I >

s 1. Quantity 'of OPEN MSIVs.

3 .,

Display Feature:

1. An "OPEN MSIV" status block depicting the current number of open MSIVs.

r OPEN MSIV 0

x k

k i

i 2

I

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2-67 .

<. . , , l l

I k

j v I

l k i 4 ,

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I 4

w--ev-r---- --e-,--ww , , -ye,w._-we,,--.,,,.+--m.-e,--,--,>g w-m- --,--..ww-----mw,-wweww,-cewe,h-v,,,wr*- -----*,-evec+-e- ,p.-- ---*- --w-we- --w-

i

'^

Control Function Pa rame te r: RPV water level x e). .

/' Decision Function: When RPV pressure is below the pressure in table LF-P-1 [ Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure] ...

OP-EO.22: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-15 y

NOTE: See page 2-50 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

k

\

2-68

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="~z- ': .

- -- - - - - - - - - -- -- ~ -- - --- -

4

.' . f g.

. ' 5k .

- x t

, ~ ,1 'i I

f I.

Control Function Parameter: RPV water level i

Decision Function: . . . or no S RVs are ope n . . .

-OP-EO.22: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-15

>e i I l V ,

i

\j t

i i

9 t

i'

{ NOTE: See page 2-50 for the Information ,

i Requirements; Information Processing;

Information Processing Results; and Display i Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above. ,

i ,

t I

i k

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4 I

3. .

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I 2-69 l

l

O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [Ca n] RPV water level be restored and maintained above TAF (-161 inches)?

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: O Step: LP-16, -18, and -20 NOTE: See pages 2-15 and 2-16 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 2-70 0

,o Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: When the hot shutdown boron weight

[395 ppm boron concentration] injection requirements . . .

O P-EO . Z Z : 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-24 The EOP describes three methods for hot shutdown boron weight injection. They are:

1. Procedures OP-EP.ZZ-304 (Q)

[ Boron Injection Using RWCU] .

2. Procedure OP-EO.ZZ-305 (Q)

[ Boron Injection Using CRD).

3. SLCS Tank level has been reduced below 3100 gallons by SLCS injection.

For methods 1 and 2, boron concentration levels must be determined by the Chemistry Dept. SPDS does not contain the information needed to support display features for boron concentrations injected using these methods. SPDS, however, can

,) support a display feature for method 3. See page 2-72 for the discussion of this display feature.

4 2-71 O

- , . _ . , _ , - - _ . , m.--_ ,,_ _ , . . _ _

. Nl Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: ... SLC tank level has been reduced below 3100 gallons by SLC injection ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-24 Information Requirements:

1. SLCS Tank Level - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare of the current value of SLCS tank level to 3100 gallons.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of SLCS tank level relative to 3100 gallons.

Display Feature:

1. Presentation of the current value of SLCS tank level.

SLCS TANK LEVEL (GALLONS )

3100 i

.l i 2-72 i

C:)

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t

..- .. .. .-- .. - , ._- = . . . . ,

1 O

. Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: . . . or all control rods are inserted to or -

beyond position 02, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-24 NOTE: See page 2-49 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display l

i Feature discussion forfthe Decision Function described above.

(:)

4 j'

A 2-73 O

i

)

a O Control Function Parameter: RPV water level Decision Function: [If] RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above +12.5 inches ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 207 Revision: 0 Step: LP-25 NOTE: See page 2-12 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O i

l l

2-74 A

U l

1 i .--,

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() TABLE 2-1 ]

l l

l Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION - RPV LVL CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (INCH) ACTION (INCH) (INCH)

RPV LVL -155.0 SCRAM - 12.5 -167.5 RCIC/HPCI - 38.0 -117.0 CS/LPCI -129.0 - 26.0 i

TAF/ ENTER Z2-201 -161.0 -

6.0 i

O 2-75 i

O

, - - - - - - ,,-----,.--.,,,,.,--.,---,,,,n.,- , - . , , , , - . - - - - , - - - - - , - . . , , , , , , , _ _ . , _ . _ _ . _ _ , , - - - - - , - - - - , - - , - - - - , - . - - - - - - - - - - - , . - - - - , , - - -

. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . ~ = . . . - ._ - - . . . _ .-. - - .

O TABLE 2-1 (Continued)

Figure 2: COOLING SYSTEM INJECTION STATUS 1 l

FEEDWATER YES CRD YES ,

RCIC YES HPIC YES CORE SPRAY NO RHR LPCI NO 4

1 l

O l

l l 2-76 l

l O

l t

J + r a -- - - - - -

O l

l i

SECTION 3 1

l l

RPV PRESSURE CONTROL O

i l

O

i 2

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level below -38 inches...?

OP-EO.2Z: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition 4

i NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-1 to 2-3 or the Infor-mation Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display

Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above. -

i 1

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l O

d L

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. 3-1 i

O 1

i . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ - . _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . , _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _

%) Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is) RPV water level ... undetermined?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-4 for the l Information Requirements; Information I

Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

9 I

f I

3-2 i

i f

k

/~'s k- Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Does al RPV scram condition [ exist] and

[is] reactor power >S%?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

4 i

i 3-3 l

i O

O Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure i

Decision Function: [Is] reactor power ... undetermined?

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-8 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

]

I 1

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I l

3-4 l l

i

(  !

1

, 1 i e

, , , - y ,,v.------.--- --,,----,-,,m ,p.,-,mm-,%_.w-,4, r- , --.~m-__ . - . , _ . , _ , _

i s

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure above 1037 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-9 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-5 0

~ .

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig...?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-10 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i 4

i 4

t 1

i l

d k

l 3-6

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function:. [If] Emergency Depressurization is imminent,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-2 Information Requirements:

Plant conditions which may indicate that Emergency RPV Depressurization is imminent:

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current value

2. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values

3. RPV pressure - current value

4. RPV pressure - historical values

5. Drywell temperature - current value i

6. Drywell temperature - historical values

7. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

8. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values

9. Suppression Pool water level - current value

10. Suppression Pool water level - historical values

11. RPV water level - current value l

i

! 3-7 l ($)

l l

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] Emergency Depressurization is imminent, ... (Continued)

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: O Step: RC/P-2 Information Requirements: (Continued)

12. Reactor building area temperatures - current values from each of the following areas:

CRD Pump Room -

4202 RACS Pump Room - 4209 RACS Hx Room -

4211 HPCI Pump Room - 4111 Core Spray Pump Room - A - 4119

- B - 4104

-C- 4116

- D - 4105 RHR Pump Room - A - 4113

-B- 4109

-C- 4114

-D- 4107

}

SACS Pump Room - A & C - 4309

-B& D- 4307

13. Reactor Building area water levels - current values from each of the areas listed in item 12.

14. Reactor Building radiation levels - current values from each of the following areas:

Personnel airlock - Elev. 102 Motorized equipment hatch - Elev. 132 Open equipment hatch - Elev. 142 Equipment airlock - Elev. 102 Spent fuel pool and demin. equip. - Elev. 162 RWCU demin. equip. - Elev. 145 Spent fuel pool - Elev. 181 Safeguard equip room - Elev. 77 Sample station ' area - Elev. 145 Reactor Building exhaust

15. Radioactive release rate - current values from each of the following effluent vent pathways North Plant Vent - Noble gas and iodine

~s South Plant Vent - Noble gas and iodine FRVS Vent - Noble gas only 3-8

4" 1

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [IF] Emergency Depressurization is imminent, ... (Continued)

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-2 Information Processing (Continued)

1. Identify the Suppression Pool HEAT CAPACITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT (HCTL) based on the current RPV pressure and the corresponding current Suppression Pool temperature.

2. Identify.the SUPPRESSION POOL LOAD LIMIT (SPLL) based on the current RPV pressure and the corresponding current Suppression Pool level.

3. Identify the PRESSURE SUPPRESSION PRESSURE (PSP) based on the current Suppression Pool water level and the corresponding current Suppression Chamber pressure.

4. Compare the current Suppression Chamber pressure with 57.2 psig.

5. Compare the current Drywell temperature with 340'F.

6. Compare the current RPV pressure with " increasing".

7 .- Compare the curren't RPV water level with - 161 inches (TAF).

8. Compare the current RPV pressure with 700 psig.

9. Compare the RPV level trend with " decreasing".

10. Compare the Reactor Building area temperature with

" increasing".

11. Compare Reactor Building floor water level with

" increasing".

12. Compare each Reactor Building area radiation monitor value with its alarm setpoint (i.e. increasing).

13. Compare each Reactor Building area temperature with its respective limit in EOP - 103, Table 1.

14. Compare each Reactor Building area floor water level

(} with its respective limit in EOP - 103, Table 2.

3-9

's.) Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] Emergency Depressurization is imminent, ... (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-2 Information Processing Results:

1. " Sign" and " magnitude" of the margin to the HEAT CAPACITY TEMPERATURE LIMIT.

2. " Sign" and " magnitude" of the margin to the SUPPRESSION POOL LOAD LIMIT.

3. " Sign" and " magnitude" of the margin to the PRESSURE SUPPRESSION PRESSURE LIMIT.

4. Status of Suppression . Chamber pressure rel ative to 57.2 psig.

5. Status of Drywell temperature relative to 340*F (i.e.

~.

above or below) .

x_s 6. Status of RPV pressure trend (i.e. increasing /

decreasing).

7. Status of RPV level relative to -161 inches (TAF) (i.e.

above/below and increasing / decreasing).

8. Status of RPV level relative to 700 psig (i.e. above or below).

9. Identification of which Reactor Building areas have increasing temperature trends and which have tempera-tures in excess of the associated safe operating limit.

10. Identification of which Reactor Building areas have increasing water level trends and which have water levels in excess of the associated safe operating limit.

11. Identification of which Reactor Building areas have increasing radiation level trends, and which have radiation levels in excess of the associated alarm setpoints.

3-10 0

. , - - . - _ - - _ . ~ . . _ . . . . .~ _ - . - . . _ . - - - - . . ~ ~ ~ . - -

4 LO Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function:. [If] Emergency Depressurization is imminent, ... (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-2 Display Features

1. A tabular presentation of key parameter margins to Emergency RPV Depressurization; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the i parameter relative to the associated limit value.

MARGIN PARAMETER LIMIT' TO LIMIT SP-TEMP HCTL 65 DEGF l RPV PRES L*** PSIG l

j DW TEMP 340 210-DEGF 4

SC PRES PSP 7 PSIG PC LVL L*** IN SP LVL HC LL 50 IN 4

DT (HC) 21 DEGF t SP LVL SPLL 50 IN j RPV PRESS L*** PSIG j 2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous l- values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5,

l. Page 1-11, Figure 5). A value of 57.2 psig shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the bar graph'.

j 3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous

[ values of RPV pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, j Figure 2).

4. History bar graph depicting the current and previous l values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5,

{_ Page 1-10, Figure 4).

[ 5. History bar graph depicting the current and previous

! values of Drywell temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 6). A value of 340*F shall be included as

! an ordinate on the Y-axis of the bar graph.

j 6. History bar graph depicting the current and previous

, values of Suppression Pool water level (see Section 1. 5,

! Page 1-12, Figure 7).

i j 3-11

i i

l l

l r- .

k)x m Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] Emergency Depressurization is -

imminent, ... (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-2 Display Features: (Continued)

7. History bar graph depicting current and previous values of RPV level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 1).

8. Tabular presentation of the current and three previous values (at 10 minute intervals) of Reactor Building area temperatures (see Table 9-2, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Status, Page 9-15).

9. Tabular presentation of the current and .three previous values (at 10 minute in te rvals) of Reactor Building area floor water levels (see Table 9-2, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Status, Page 9-15 ) .

10. Tabular presentation of the status of each Reactor

['

\

Building area radiation level with respect to the radiation monitor alarm level (see Page 11-9, Display Features #1 and 2).

11. Tabular presentation of plant conditions which may indicate heat addition to water in the Suppression Pool.

DIFF. PRES: SRV LIFT - RPV 208 PSIG DIFF. PRES: DW - SC 2 PSIG DIFF. TEMP: DW - S P 30 DEGP 3-12 O

1 Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ... and boron injection is not required.

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Stept RC/P-2 Note: See Section 2, Page 2-38 for the Information Requirements; Information Processings; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-13 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Are] any SRVs open or cycling?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-4 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-66 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

t

\

3-14 e

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below curve SP-T-1 [ Heat Capacity Temperature Limit] , ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-6 Note: See Section 3, Pages 3-7 to 3-12 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

a f

l i

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l O 3-15 a

i

---y, . . ,- --c-%y.

, . - . . - -- ,e,_v ___. , . - - . - - . - _ - . _ _ < _-,-_ -_ - , - , , , , - . - - .-_ _-..--__-__

s/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ... or if Suppression Pool water level cannot be maintained below SP-T-3 (Suppression Pool Load Limit)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-6 NOTE: See Section 3, Pages 3-7 and 3-12 for the Ir: formation Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i e

i l

I 3-16 i

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Control Futiction Parameter: ,RPVigressure w.

t, h, i

Decision Functi(on: [If] boron ipjection is required , . . . _.v

\

s s

OP-EO.ZZ - 101 Revision: O Step: RC/P-8.- y "ko ti \-

>^,(

Y-NOTE: See-Section 2, Pages 2-38 and 2-39 for the j

, Information Recgdrements; In forma ticin y '

Processing; Informetion Processing Fes,ults; and Display FeTture discussion (for the .

Decision Function described abo,ve,c... 3-4 5 $ i /

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1. c. ,.,,,c,. , - , . . _-c-,.,---.-,,-g ey-v,,. r I

. . .. _ -- . =- .

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure

'. Decision Function: ... and main condenser is available, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-8 P ,

Information Requirements:

None. The previous step in EOP-101 ( RC/P-7 ) instructs the operators to maintain condenser vacuum; the operator will be aware of the condenser vacuum via normal control room i'

instrumentation should it become unavailable.

s s'

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y b

i 4,

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n-f' 3-18 O-l

- - - , , , - , , - - - - , , . , , , - , - . , - , , . , - - - -n,--.,,-ew, , , _ _ ., ,- .._.,__.,.~,_.-,_,.-,_ ,- .. _-. _.,,,,,- ,--.,.~.. , -_.

t y- ).

t i'

i. ,* .

\ ~4 i -,sf 4 Control Function Parameter: RPV pressute Decision Function: ...and there is no-indication of gross

.b ct J e-

-, f fuel failure,.'... .'

33 .a -

Ig OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-8 4(

o

f i, ,;a ,

Information' Requirements:

None. Fuel failure is determined by. sample and analysis and

'therefore need not be' supported-by the SPDS.

4 t

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, 3-19 s

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j

t Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ...or steam line break, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-8 Information Requirements: ,

None. The operator can identify an MSLB by reviewing the alarm chronolog and Primary Containment isolation logic status for events resulting in an MSIV isolaton.

f O

L 4

i

+ 3-20 t

/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: On.ly if Suppression Pool water level is above 0 inches.*

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-10 l

l Information Requirements: l

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 0 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to 0 inches.

Display Features:

l. Color code change of the SUPP POOL LVL box when the O value of Suppression Pool water level is below 0 inches.

LVL 2

l IN

• - ZERO REFERENCE IS 94" UP FROM BOTTOM OF TORUS

{

l 3-21 O

r

(_/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] Primary Containment Instrument Gas is or becomes unavailable...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Step: RC/P-10 Information Requirements:

1. Primary Containment instrument gas air receiver pressure

- current values of each receiver

2. Primary Containment instrument gas containment isolation valve position - current status of the inboard and outboard valves for each line Information Processing:

1. Compare the PCIGS receiver pressure with ltr psig (A and B).

2. Compare the current air line isolation valve position with OPEN ( A a nd B ) .

(~T s/ Information Processing Results:

1. De te rmine if either or both the A and B PCIGS are available.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the status of PCIGS.

CURRENT PRES VALVES PCIGS TRAIN (PSIG) ISOLATED

Loop A 100 Yes Loop B 100 No 3-22 C) l l

1 l

l A

k-,/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: When RPV water level is stabilized above TAF (-161 inches), ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-ll NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-15 and 2-16 for the Information Requirements; In f o rma tion Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-23 I

'T A

6 t

\%/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ...and all control rods are inserted to or beyond position 02,...

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: O Step: RC/P-ll and RF-3 and 206 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-49 and for the

. Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 0

3-24 0

/

\ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ...or cold shutdown boron weight (660 ppm boron concentration) has been injected...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-ll j

The EOP describes three methods for cold shutdown boron weight injection. They are:

1. Procedure OP-EO.ZZ-304(O)

(Boron Injection Using RWCU]

2. Procedure OP-EO.ZZ-305(O)

(Boron Injection Using CRD]

3. SLCS Tank Level has been reduced below 1600 gallons by SLCS injection.

For methods 1 and 2, boron concentration levels must be

determined by the Chemistry Dept. SPDS shall support a display feature for method 3. See Section 2, Page 2-72 for

, the discussion of this display feature.

3-25 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: ...and, the reactor is shutdown and no boron has been injected into the RPV ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/P-ll NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-56 and 2-57 for the Information Requirements; In f orma tion Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

t 4

4 i

3-26 O

.O. Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] the reactor is not scrammed, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Step: ED I

NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-49 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

l l

6 I

i l.

I 3-27

()

l-I L

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] boron injection required?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: O Step: ED-2 NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-39 and 2-40 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

k I

F I

h a

3-28 O

. , _ ~ , _ . _ . . _ - - . , _ , . . _ . - - - . _ , - . - - , _ . . , _ - . - _ _ . . - . , - . . - - . _ , _.v.,.. m_ ~ _ ,,. .--

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Has] boron injection been initiated?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Step: ED-3 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-40 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-29 0

~~~ -- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: (Are] all rods inserted to or beyond position 02?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: O Step: ED-4 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-49 for-the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

j i

l r

I l

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l l

3-30 l

t i

(

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool water level above 0 inches?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Step: ED-6 NOTE: See Page 3-21 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O .

3-31

O Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Are] all 5 ADS valves open?

O P-EO . Z Z : 202 Revision: O Step: ED-8 Information Requirements:

1. ADS valve positions - current status Information Processings

1. Determine the current status of ADS valve positions.

Information Processing Results:

() 1. Status of the individual ADS valves.

Display Features:

1. An "OPEN ADS VALVES" status block depicting the current number of open ADS valves.

OPEN ADS VALVES 5

3-32 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Are] at least 3 ADS /SRVs open?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Stept ED-10 and RF-1 206 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-50 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 4

l- 3-33 1

()

1 I

/~}:

k_/ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure at least 50 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

i OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Step: ED-ll  !

Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value l

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Determine the dif ference between the current value of RPV pressure and the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of the dif ferential pressure between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber, relative to

,\ 50 psig.

Display Feature

1. Tabular presentation of the current value of the dif ferential pressure between the RPV and the Suppression Chamber.

PLANT CONDITIONS CURRENT VALUE DIFF PRES: RPV - SC 875 PSIG DIFF PRES: SRV LIFT - RPV 208 PSIG DIFF TEMP: BORON INJ - SP 10 PSIG DIFF LVL SP - SRV DISCH 72 IN 3-34

f' Control Function Parameter:- .RPV pressure .

Decision Function: (Can] Suppression Chamber pressure be maintained below 57.2 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Step: ED-13 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-52 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O

, i 3-35 l

C:)

,I f

l.

s Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Functions [Ca n] RPV water level be determined?

OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: O a nd Step: ED-14 and STC-4 203 Revision: 1 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-4 for the Information Requirements; In f o rma tion Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O e

i 3-36 i

. _ - . . . . _ ~ . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . . _ _ - . _ _ _ ._ .- . - - _ . _ .

i l '-

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure i

Decision Function (Is] OP-EO.ZZ-207 being executed?

1 '

.OP-EO.ZZ: 202 Revision: 0 Stept ED-15 e

Information Requirements:

None. The SPDS parameter set need not support this step in the EOP.

j The operators will know if EOP-207 is being executed.

i 1

I t

4 2

2 l

l; i

i 1

I i

3-37

O Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] at anytime RPV Emergency Depressuri-zation is required,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 203 Revision: 1 Step: STC-1 NOTE: See Pages 3-7 to 3-12 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and

Display Feature discussion for the i Decision Function described above.

O

. . . - - . - _ . . ~ . . _ _ . . - . - . . _ _ _ . . _ . ._

E

\/ _ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] at anytime any system, inj ection subsystem, alternate injection subsystem j or standby; injection subsystem becomes available with at least one pump running, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 203 . Revision: 1 Step: STC-2 1

NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-18 for the Information Requirements; In fo rma tion Processing; Information Processing Results;

, and Display Feature discussion for the

Decision Function described above.

f.

4 9

i

}

l 3

i 3-39

.i

. . . . .v____.--_.-.._....-. , _ , _ _ . . . . . . ~ . _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . . _ . _ , - . . , . . _ , . _ . _ . . . _ . . . . . . _ . _ , _ _ . _ . - - _ . . _ , . . -

u Control Function Parameter RPV pressure Decision Function [If] at anytime RPV pressure drops below 700 psig, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 203 Revision: 1 Step: STC-3 and STC-7 Information Requirements:

1. RPV pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of RPV pressure to 700 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV pressure relative to 700 psig.

e Display Feature

1. Presentation of REACTOR PRES (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 2).

3-40 0

-\ -Control Function Parameter RPV pressure Decision Function: When RPV water level drops to -276 inches (Fuel Zone indication), ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 203 Revision: 1 Stept STC-6 Information Requirements:

- 1. RPV water level - current value (see Pages 2-1 to 2-3) l Information Processing

1. Compare the current value of RPV water level relative to

-276 inches (Fuel Zone ind ica t io n) .

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of RPV water relative to

-276 inches (Fuel Zone ind ica tion) .

i. Display Features

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to -276 j inches, noting the action which is to be taken when RPV f water level drops to -115 inches, MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the i parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE.

CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION -

PARAMETER (INCH) ACTION (INCH) (INCH)

RPV LVL -155 OPEN 1 SRV -276 121

NO INJ AVAIL 1

l 3-41

( Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure stabilized at least 55 psig above Suppression Chamber pressure?

O P-EO . Z Z : 205 Revision: O Step: ASC-8 NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-44 and 2-45 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; >

and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-42 O

I l

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure stabilized below 140 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 205 Revision: 0 Step: ASC-10 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-46 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-43 O

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [If] the cooldown rate exceeds 90'F/hr, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 205 Revision: 0 Step: ASC-12 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-47 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O t

3-44

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t/ Control Functio.1 Perameter: RPV pressure y

Decision Functi(q: o, [Is] at least 1 SRV open?

'i, OP-EO.Zq:i 206 '

Revision: O' Step: RF-4

', t.

---

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1 t .: _ t NOTC See Sedt. ton 2, Page 2-50 for the.,Information ..

, Requirements: Information Processing; Infor-s i mation Propessing Results; and Display ,

Feathre , discussion for the Decision Function described above. . t s

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Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function [If] RPV water level can be determined, . . .

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-6 and -29 r

NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-4 for the Information Requirements; Information 4

Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the

, .g Decision Function described above.

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i Control Function Parataeter, RPV pressure Decision Function: and Suppression Chamber pressure can be maintained below 57.2 psig.

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revi5 ion: O stept RF-6

, + >, t ,

4 4~

NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-52 for the l Information' Requirements; Information Processing;'Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the

, Decision Function described above, f

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3-47 i.'

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r^s U Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [When] RPV pressure is below the pressure in table RF-P-1 [ Minimum Alternate '

Flooding Pressure], ...

OP-FO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RF-7 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-53, for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the 4 Decision Function described above.

i L

O II 3-48 O

s4 Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure j

Decision Function: . . . cy; no SRVs are open?

l l

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-7

^

l NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-54 for the Information Requirements: Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Func* ion described above.

b O

i i

r 3-49 1

L

O Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Can] RPV pressure be increased to above the appropriate value in table RF-P-1

[ Minimum Alternate Flooding Pressure]

with at least 1 SRV open?

OP-EO.22: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-8, -10 and -12 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-55 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O l

3-50

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure

.,.. Decision Function: [When] all control rods are inserted to or beyond position 02 ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-15

}; NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-49 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 3-51 O

_ i

Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: . . . or the reactor is determined to be shutdown and no boron has been injected into the RPV, ...

OP-EO.Z2: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-15 i

NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-56 and 2-57, for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O A

3-52 O

k Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level increasing?

i- OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-18 and -20 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-36 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

C:)

1 2

3-53

C:)

i

. - ~ . - _ . , - - - , , . . . . . . . . . . . - , . , _ . _ _ _ , _ _ _ - = . - . - _ . _ . _ _ , . _ _ , , _ , _ , , . . _ . . , . - . _ - - - . . _ _ _ .. _. _

^

Control Functidn Parameter: RPV pressure 1

. Decision Function: [Can] RPV pressure be maintained at least 70 psig above Suppression Chamber 3 pressure?

i OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-23, -25 and -31  ;

, NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-58 and 2-59 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the

Decision Function described above.

i i

1

(

O 4

e d

k t

L k

l 3-54

- . - _ . . = . - , . .. ~ . .

[ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Is] there evidence that the RPV is filled?

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-30 Note: See Section 2 Page 2-4 for the Decision Function described above, l'

2 i

b l

{

3-55

O

'~ Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: [Has] RPV water level indication been restored within the time allowed in curve RF-T-1 [ Maximum Core Uncovery Time Limit}?

OP-EO.22: 206 Revision: 0 Step: 'RF-33 l

l NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-61 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Result; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i 3-56 O

l

, - ,,,__.,..-_,.-m, -

, , _ , - _ , , . , , . _ _ , . _ - . . , . . - - . , . . ~ . - . . _ . . - , . = - _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

O Control Function Parameter: RPV pressure Decision Function: When Suppression Chamber pressure can be maintained below 57.2 psig, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 206 Revision: 0 Step: RF-34 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-52 for the Information Requirements; Information

Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

l l

l 3-57 0

4 . -

O SECTION 4 REACTOR POWER CONTROL O

O

- ~.

-- V Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level below -38 inches ...?

i OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-1 to 2-3 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

I a

y 9

i O.

e I

t I

r i

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l 4-1 O

-ew,,---,- +r_- , - . . , , - - . . . , . . - . , . . . - . ._s.

t Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Is] RPV water level undetermined?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Pevision: O Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-4 for.the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O.

4-2 O

i.

j.

Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision-Function: [Does a] scram condition [ exist] and [is]

reactor power >5%?

1 j OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition l t

NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the

. Decision Function described above.

1 4

I V.

I i

e i

L i

I i

4-3

I i

i I

Control Function Parameter: Reactor power  !

Decision Function: [Is] reactor power ... unde te rmined?

(Can reactor power be determined?)

OP-EO.Z2: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition 7

NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-8 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 4

4-4 O

f

' ' ~ ~ r. - .-, , . , __ , , , _ _ _ _ _ - , __

t-l-

k- Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Is] RPV pressure above 1037 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-9, for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O o

4-5 O

O- Control Function Parameter: Reactor power l Decision Function: [Is] Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition l

NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-10 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

.O 4-6 O

e

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _.J

b v Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Are] all rods inserted to or beyond position 02?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-2, -4, -14,

-21, -24, -31, and -37 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-49 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

k 6

l l

4-7 O

..i ,

( Control Function Parameter: Reactor power

! Decision Function: The reactor is determined to be shutdown and no boron has been injected into the RPV ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-4 i

NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-56 and 2-57 for the Information' Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 4-8 O

Control Function Parameter:

Reactor power Decision Function: [Is] the main turbine on-line?

OP-EO.22: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-5 Information Requirements:

None. The SPDS parameter set need not contain the information to support this step in the EOP.

Knowledge of the main turbine status is not necessary to determine the plant safety status. Whether or not the turbine is operating and on-line, the EOP proceeds to the same point (RC/O-10) with the RECIRC pumps tripped if necessary.

? $

O k

i l

l t

4_9

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L

- [w Control Function Parameter: Reactor power

(, Decision Function: [Is] reactor power ... undetermined?

(Can reactor power be determined?)

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-7 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-8 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 4-10 0

l '

Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Is] reactor power above 5%?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-8 NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-63 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 4-11 O

ii... , ..

= . _ - _ _ _ . . . . ._. .- . - -

(-s' Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: (Are] all scram valves open?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-ll Information Requirements:

None. The SPDS parameter set need not contain the information to support this step in the EOP.

The operator's knowledge of plant conditions will enable him to determine scram valve position. The full-core display, in the control room contains position indication for the scram valves. Blue lights (one per HCU) will come on when the inlet and outlet scram valves are open. Review of this display will show the position of both individual scram valves.

O 4-12

[

~. - Control Function Parameter:

Reactor power Decision Function: When inward rod motion stops...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-13 and .

Information Requirements:

None. The SPDS parameter sets need not contain the information to support this step in the EOP.

The operator's knowledge of plant conditions will enable him to determine if the' control rods were moving and have stopped. This information is available on the rod control panel boards in the control room.  ;

l I

i w

l I

l i

I.

i 4-13

Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: [Can] the scram be reset?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/Q-26 and -33 Information Requirements:

1. RPS logic output - current status 1

Information Processing:

1. Compare the current RPS logic output status with RESET indication.

Information Processing Results:

1. Determine the current status of RPS logic out status.

D (V

Display Features:

1. A display of RPS logic status, indicating " TRIPPED" or

" RESET" (see Section 2, Page 2-5, Display Feature #2).

i 4-14

s-5 Control Function Paran.ater: Reactor power i Decision Function: ICan) an CP;D pump be started? ,

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-17

_____________________________L_______________________________ ,

Information Requirements: --_

None.- The SPDS parameterysAt nepd not contain the information to support this step in the EOP .  ;

CRD Pump operability vil.' . be determined by the operator's < ' .

knowledge of plant condihions' when an attempt is made to '

f ,14 start the pump. , '

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Control Function Parameter: Reactor power g.. , '

h , Decision' Function: [Was) inward rod motion observed?

M ' ' f(' ! ..

OP-E .22: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/Q-30 and -36

\ -j s', ,_____________________________________________________________

j i Information. Requirements:

None.\ Thd SPDS parameter set does not contain the,necessary

) informatida needed to develop display features to support this step in the EOP. 1

,5

,, See Page 4-13 for a discussion of this EOP step.

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\/ - Reactor power Control Function Parameter:

Decision Function: Before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110*F, ...

~

OEdEO.Z2: 3 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/Q-38.

a.

<  ?

Information Requirements'J  :

. T';

1.j Suppression Pool temperature - current value

<7

2. 'b Suppression Pool temperature - historical values

-, ci Information Processings:

,- r c/ 1.' '

Comparison of the' current value of Suppression Pool

'J

, temperature to 110*F.

l 1 j' 2.' Determination of the' Suppression Pool temperature trend

,1 (increasing / decreasing). t ,

Information Processings' Results:

' ~

Status of the current value of Suppression ~ Pool

( l.

temperature relative'to 110*F.

3, cs Display Features:

lt.

j 1./' Tabular presentation of the temperatur$l margin to 110*F,

-' noting the action which is to' be taken 'before

/pf Suppression Pocl. tem MARGIN TO

e. ACTION box is color $perature reacheswith coded consistent

~

110*F; the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE f

(see Section 2, Page 2-64, Display Fea,ture #1).

3

2. History,bar graph depicting the current and g previous values of Suppression Pool temperature ;(see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4). /

/

a

?

1 i

j. /

i 4-17 O  :

y, '>

i i

fI

Control Function Parameter: Reactor power r/ Decision Function: [Is} SLC injecting into the RPV?

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-41 I t l NOTE: See Section 2, Page 2-40 for the 7 Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

86 4-18 O

O i

i-O Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: When the cold shutdown boron weight

[660 ppm boron concentration] . . . have not been met.

l I

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: O Step: RC/Q-44 NOTE:

4 See Section 3, Page 3-25, for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O t

i 4

4

?

4 4-19 1

O I

i

. . , -., ,-,,+,,,,...n. .., ----,-,..,...-,n- -

.,-,.~-e,n,-.,--n--,----,. .- - - - - ~ ~ ~ . , ~ . - - ~ ~ .

A Control Function Parameter: Reactor power Decision Function: When SLC has injected the cold shutdown boron weight [660 ppm boron concentration], less than 1600 gallons remaining in the SLC tank ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 101 Revision: 0 Step: RC/O-45 NOTE: See Section 3, Page 3-25 and Section 2, Page 2-72 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature for Decision Function described above.

O 4-20

O SECTION 5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL O

A O

- _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ - . _ - _ _ _ _ __ J

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool temperature above 95*F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool average temperature - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 95*F.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 95*F.

Display Features:

1. Color code change of the SUPP POOL TEMP block of the 3

CFPM when the value of Suppression Pool temperature is at or above 95*F.

TEMP 95 DEGF 1

0 5-1 O

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure-Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool water level outside the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch limit?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water level to the range between 74.5 and 78.5 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to the range between 74.5 and 78.5 inches.

Display Features:

1. Color code change of the SUPP POOL LVL block of the CFPM when the value of Suppression Pool water level is oatside of the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch range.

LVL 66 IN l

O 5-2 O

l l

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 135'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value Information ProEessing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell volumetric average temperature to 135'F.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell volumetric average temperature relative to 135'F.

Display Features

1. Color code change of the DRYWELL TEMP block of the CFPM when the value of Drywell temperature is at 135.

TEMP 135 DEGF I

l 5-3 O

I

(~h k- Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is) Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Drywell pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell pressure to 1.68 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell pressure relative to 1.68 psig.

Display Features:

1. Color code change of the DRYWELL PRES block of the CFPM

() when the value of Drywell pressure is at or above 1.68 psig.

PRES 1.70 PSIG E

5-4 J

O

,-,-y, , . . - - , , - , . - - - . - - - . , - , , . - - - . . . , . - . .

Control-Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-2 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell pressure to 1.68 psig.

Information Processing Results :

1. Status of the current value of Drywell pressure relative to 1.68 psig.

Display Features:

1. See Table 5-1, Figure 1, Margin to Action.

5-5 O

l N_)\

i 1

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure  !

l Decision Function: ... only if Drywell average temperature is below 212*F OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-3 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value J

Information Processing:

s

1. Compare the current value of Drywell temperature to 212*F.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell temperature relative to 212*F.

Display Features:

~

1. Presentation of the DRYWELL TEMP (see Section 6, Pages 6-11, Table 6-1, Figure 1).

5-6

(:)

Control Function' Parameter: . Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Before Suppression Chamber pressure reaches 14.8 psig, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-4 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure to 14.8 psig.

2. Determine the Suppression Chamber pressure trend (increasing / decreasing).

() Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to 14.8 psig.

Display Features:

1. Tabular preser.tation of the pressure margin to 14.8 psig, noting tha action which is to be taken when Suppression Chamt er pressure reaches 14.5' psig, MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 5-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

5-7 O

.t )

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: ... but only if Suppression Pool water level is below 180 inches, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-4 l

l -------------------------------------------------------------

Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water to 180 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to 180 inches.

fg Display Features:

1. Presentation of the SUPP POOL LVL (See Section 7, Page 7-23, Table 7-1, Figure 1).

5-8 O

l

l t

O

(_j Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Can Suppression Chamber pressure be maintained below 14.8 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-5 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure to 14.8 psig.

2. Determine the Suppression Chamber pressure trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber O pressure relative to 14.8 psig.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 14.8 psig, noting the action which is to be taken when SuppressionChamber pressure cannot be maintained below 14.8 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 5-1, figure 1: l MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5, i I

Page 1-11, Figure 5).

5-9 O

s Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Chamber presssure greater than 14.8 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-6 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure to 14.8 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to 14.8 psig.

Display Features:

() 2. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 14.8 psig, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Chamber pressure is greater than 14.8 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 5-1,' Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

h s

5-10 l

,, - _._,____m-___~,_,..,___--._._,__.,.m.. _m __.-,_ , , _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . . . _ . , - . _ . , _ . . - . ,

( Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure

\_/

Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure below curve DW-P-1 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-7 l

Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber temperature - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current values of Suppression Chamber pressure and Suppression Chamber temperature to the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL).

Information Processing Results:

1. Margin between the current value of Suppression Chamber Os temperature relative to the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL) based on the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure.

Display Features -

1. A "DSIPL" alarm block with a color code change when the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit margin is less than or equal to zero.

DSIPL 5-11 O

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure below curve DW-P-1 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit] ? (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-7 Display Features:

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure margin to the DSIPL; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 5-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. Presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature value.

SC TEMP (DEGF) 100 5-12 O

l

. . . J

llh Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Can Suppression Chamber pressure be main-tained below curve DW-P-2 [ Pressure Suppression Pressure)?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-9 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - current value

3. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current values of Suppression Chamber pressure and Suppression Pool water level to the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) Limit.

2. Determination of the Suppression Chamber pressure trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP).

Display Features:

1. A " PSP" alarm block with a color code change when the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit margin is less than or equal to zero.

PSP l

5-13 9

/~'

(_)T Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Can Suppression Chamber pressure be main-tained below curve DW-P-2 [ Pressure Suppression Pressure] ? (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-9 Display Features: (Continued)

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Chamber pressure and Primary Containment water level margin to the PSP; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 5-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

O 5-14 O

O Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Can Suppression Chamber pressure be main-tained below 57.2 psig?

OP-EO.22: 102 Revision: O Stept DW/P-ll Note: See Section 2, Pages 2-52 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 5-15 O

4-I). Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Ns Decision Function: Can Suppression Chamber pressure be main-

- tained below 70 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-13 l

Information Requirements:

I 1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value 2.

Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values i

Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Chamber 3

pressure to 70 psig.

2. Determination of the Suppression Chamber pressure trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

i

() 1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to 70 psig.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 70 psig, noting the action which is to be taken if Suppression Chamber pressure cannot be maintained below 70 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the 4 CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION i

VALUE (see TABLE 5-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

4 5-16 O

V 4

6

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e

• Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: Irrespective of adequate core cooling being assured: If Suppression Pool water level is less than 180 inches, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/P-15 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparicon of the current value of Suppression Pool water to 180 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water

() level relative to 180 inches.

Display Features:

1. Presentation of the SUPP POOL LVL (see Section 7, Page 7-23, Table 7-1, Figure 1).

5-17 O

-n-9 Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: ... and if Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure are below curve DW-P-1 [Drywell.

Spray Initiation Pressure Limit],...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/P-15 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber temperature - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

3. Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit function (Suppression Chamber temperature as a function of Suppression Chamber pressure)

Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Chamber temperature to the Suppression Chamber temperature value

'O of the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL),

for the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure relative to the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL).

Display Features:

1. A "DSIPL" alarm block with a color code change when the combination of the values of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure is at or above the Drywell spray Initiation Pressure Limit (see Page 5-11, Display Feature $1).

5-18 O

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: ... and li Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure are below curve DW-P-1

[Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit], ... (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Steps DW/P-15 Display Features

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure margin to the DSIPL; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 5-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. Presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature valve (see Page 5-12, Display Feature #3).

O i .

5-19

Control Function Parameter: Primary Containment pressure Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Chamber pressure below 70 psig?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: 0 Steps: DW/P-16 Information Requirements :

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure to 70 psig.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber pressure relative to 70 psig.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the pressure margin to 70 psig noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Chamber pressure is at or above 70 psig; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 5-1, figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

l l

l 5-20 i

TABLE 5-1 FIGURE 1: Margin to Action CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (PSIG) . ACTION (PSIG) (PSIG)

DRYWELL 1.70 INIT CACS 1.68 -0.02 PRESSURE AND FRVS SUPP 25 ISOL FRVS, BEFORE CHAMBER SPRAY SP 14.8 PRESSURE -10.2 ISO L FRVS ,

S/D RECIRC, 14.8 SPRAY DW EMER DEPRES F LOO DING , 57.2 32.2 ENTER ZZ-101 ISOL FRVS, 45 S/D RECIRC, 70 O S/D DW COOL VENT PC ABOVE 70 Figure 2: Margin to Limit MARGIN PARAMETER LIMIT TO LIMIT SC TEMP DSIPL 50 DEGP SC PRES -10 PSIG SP LVL PSP L *** IN SC PRES 7 PSIG

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,s e Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature

) ,

j '

Decision Function: [ls] Suppression Pool temperature above q ,

t 95'F?

O P-EO'. Z Z :

102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition i

\ .'

1 NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-1 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information ,

Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

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P 6-1 0

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l .*

i

.\- f t Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature l

2 Decision Fun'ction: [Is] Suppression Pool water level outside the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch limit?

OP-EO.ZZ: 1.02 Revision: O Stept Entry condition

.' NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-2 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

t

• t 4

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6-2

_ - _ _ _ . _ - - . -. 7

'4 O Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: [Is} Drywell temperature above 135'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

I O

6-3 O

U

)

i Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature

, Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: Entry condition 1

NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-4 for the Information Requirements ; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i l

l i

6-4

O Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: (Is] Drywell temperature above 135*F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/T-2 and DW/T-3 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value Information Prpcessing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell temperature to 135'F.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the. current value of Drywell temperature relative to 135'F.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 135'F, noting the action which is to be taken when Drywell temperature is above 135'F, MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see Table 6-1, Figure 1:

Margin to Action).

6-5

O Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: Can [Is] Drywell air cooler inlet

+

temperature be (being] maintained below 200'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/T-4 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value

2. Drywell temperature - historical values Note: Consistent with standard operating practice, the Drywell volumetric average temperature is assumed to be equal to the cooler inlet temperature.

Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell temperature to 200'F.

2. Determine the Drywell temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell temperature relative to 200'F.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 200'F, noting the action which is to be taken if drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 200'F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 6-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

History bar graph depicting the current and previous

! 2.

l values of Drywell temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 6).

6-6 O

l - - - - - - - , - ., -__ __.

b' Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: Before Drywell temperature reaches 340*F, OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: DW/T-7 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value

2. Drywell temperature - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Drywell temperature to 340*F.

2. Determine the Drywell temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell temperature

~

relative to 340*F.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 340*F, noting the action which is to be taken before drywell temperature reaches 340*F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 6-1, Figure 1:

MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Drywell temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 6).

6-7 O

. Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: ...but only if Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure are below curve SP-L-4 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limitl,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/T-7 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chanber average temperature - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current values of Suppression Chamber pressure and Suppression Chamber temperature to the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL).

Information Processing Results:

1. Margin between the current value of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure relative to g\m}/

I the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL)

Display Features:

1. A "DSIPL" alarm block with a color code change when the combination of the values of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure is at or above the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (see Section 5, page 5-11, Display Feature #1).

1 l

l 6-8 O

Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: ...but only if Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure are below curve SP-L-4 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit],...

(Continued) l OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step:- DW/T-7 Display Features: (Continued)

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure margin to the DSIPL; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 6-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. Presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature value (see Section 5, page 5-12, Display Feature #3).

O 6-9 0

k/ Control Function Parameter: Drywell temperature Decision Function: Can Drywell temperature be maintained below 340*F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: DW/T-8 Information Requirements:

1. Drywell volumetric average temperature - current value ]

2. Drywell temperature - historical values Information Processing:

l

1. Comparison of the current value of Drywell temperature to i J

340*F.

2. Determination of the Drywell temperature trend 1

(increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Drywell temperature

(~T relative to 340*F.

V Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 340*F, noting the action which is to be taken if Drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 340*F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 6-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

! 2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Drywell temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 6).

l 6-10

Table 6-1 Figure 1: Margin to Action CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (DEGF) ACTION (DEGF) (DEGF)

DRYWELL 130 COOLING 135 5 TEMP - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------

l R/B RECIRC 200 70 l SCRAM l ISOL FRVS, BEFORE S/D RECIPC, 340 210 l SPRAY DW l

l 340 EMERDEPRESSl Figure 2: Margin to Limit MARGIN PARAMETER LIMIT TO LIMIT 1 _-__------_-_____--------____

SC TEMP DSIPL 50 DEGF SC PRES 10 PSIG 9

6-11

O SECTION 7 l

SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL CONTROL O

O i

... . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool temperature above 95'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-1 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

a I

i 7-1 l ()

l I --

(D

\~# Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool water level outside the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch limit?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-2 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

I O

I i

l l

l l

1 7-2 O

---,.,-c, - -

O- Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 135'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-3 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

~

7-3 0

(~r N- Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 1.68 psig?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 5, page 5-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Dicplay Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i O

l l

l 7-4

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool water level outside the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch limit?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-2 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Pool water level to the range between 74.5 inches and 78.5 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to the range between 74.5 inches and 78.5 inches.

Display Features:

1. Color code change of the SUPPR POOL LVL box when the value of Suppression Pool water level is outside of the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch range (see page 5-2, Display Feature #1).

.()

l b

b

I Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Is Suppression Pool water level low

[below 74.5 inches)?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-3 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 74.5 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to 74.5.

Display Features:

~ 1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 74.5 s inches, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level is below 74.5 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

7-6 O

~

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Is Suppression Pool water level high

[above 78.5 inches]?

OP-EO.22: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-3 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 78.5 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to 78.5 inches.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 78.5 O inches, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level exceeds 78.5 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to'the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: ' MARGIN TO ACTION).

7-7 0

n=mu s s i e i

l

,r's

('~') Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: If at anytime the combination of 5uppression Pool water level and [hThe can not be maintained above curve SP-L-1

[ Heat Capacity Level Limit] , . . .

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/L-4 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - historical values

3. Suppression Pool temperature - current value

4. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values

5. RPV pressure - current value

6. RPV pressure - historical values Information Processing:

1. Determine the Suppression Pool temperature value of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL), for the current value of RPV pressure based on suppression pool temperature.

2. Determine /h Th c: the difference between the current value of Suppression Pool temperature and the HCTL, for the current value of RPV pressure.

3. Determine thej$,The trend (increasing / decreasing).

4. Determine Heat Ca acity Level Limit (HCLL) for the current value of Teh

5. Determine the Suppression Pool water level trend (increasing / decreasing).

7-8 O

e

r Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: If at anytime the combination of Suppression Pool water level and A The can not be maintained above curve SP-L-1

[ Heat Capacity Level Limit],...

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/L-4 Information Processing:

6. Compare the currer.: value of the Heat Capacity Level Limit to the current actual Suppression Pool water level.

Information Processing Results:

1. The current value on HCTL margin.

2. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to the Suppression Pool water level value of the HCLL,'for the current value of [iThc' Display Features:

.(~'? 1. A "HCLL" alarm block with a color code change when the A /> combination of the values of Suppression Pool water level and ,{sT he is below the HCLL.

lHCLLl

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Pool water level and gg The margin to the HCLL; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool water level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-12, Figure 7).

7-9 O

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: If at anytime the combination of Suppression Pool water level and The can not be maintained above curve SP-L-1

[ Heat Capacity Level Limit] , . . .

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-4 Display Features: (Continued)

4. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-30, Figure 4).

5. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of RPV prssure (see Section 1.5, Page 1-9, Figure 2).

O 7-10 0

.J

k l _

Control Function Parameter: Sappression Pool water level Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool water level be maintained above 47 inches?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-6 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 47 inches.

2. Determine the Suppression Pool water level trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to 47 inchen.

O Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 47 inches, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level is at or below 47 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool water level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-14, Figure 7).

7-11 O

I i

,.r-(j Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: If the combination of Suppression Porl water level and temperature cannot be maintained above curve SP-L-2 [NPSH limit for ECCS pumps],...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-10 Information Requirements: 1

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - historical values

3. Suppression Pool temperature - current value

4. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values

5. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

6. Suppression Chamber pressure - historical values

7. Core Spray loop flows - current value

(~T 8. Core Spray pumps - current status O

9. RHR loop flows - current value

10. RHR pumps - current status Information Processing :

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water level to the Suppression Pool water level value of the NPSH limit for ECCS pumps (for the current value of

! Suppression Pool temperature).

2. Determine the Suppression Pool water level trend (increasing / decreasing).

f 3. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to the Suppression Pool temperature value of the NPSH limit for ECCS pumps (for the current value of Suppression Pool water level).

4. Determine the Suppression Pool temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

7-12 l

t NY l

l l .

t

\

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: If the combination of Suppression Pool water level and temperature cannot be maintained above curve SP-L-2 [NPSH limit for ECCS pumps],...(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-10 Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level and Suppression Pool temperature relative to the NPSH limit for ECCS pumps.

Display Features:

1. A "NPSH" alarm matrix with a color code change (for the respective pump) when the combination of the values of Suppression Pool water level and Suppression Pool temperature is at or below the NPSH limit.

NPSH LIMIT CS RHR

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Pool water level and Suppression Pool temperature margin to NPSH; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relat ive to the associated limit value (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool water level. (See Section 1.5, Page 1-12, Figure 7).

4. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature. (See Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4).

5. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Chamber pressure. (See Section 1.5, Page 1-11, Figure 5).

7-13 0

.s

~ Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool water level be maintained below curve SP-L-3

[ Suppression Pool Load Limit] ?

OP-EO.22: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-16 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - historical values

3. RPV pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool water level to the current value of RPV pressure to determine the Suppression Pool Load Limit (SPLL).

2. Determine the suppression pool water level trend (increasing / decreasing).

() Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water level relative to the Suppression Pool Load Limit (SPLL)

Display Features:

1. A "SPLL" alarm block with a color code change when the combination of the values of Suppression Pool water level and RPV pressure is at or above the Suppression Pool Load Limit.

SPLL 7-14 (v)

-~

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool water level be ,

maintained below curve SP-L-3 .

(Suppression Pool Load Limit]?

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/ L-16 Display Features: (Continued)

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Pool water level margin to the SPLL; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 7-1, 1 Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT) .

3. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool water level. (See Section 1.5, Page 1-12, Figure 7).

O 7-15

O 4

i

e m

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Can the combination of RPV pressure and Suppression Pool water level be maintained below curve SP-L-3

[ Suppression Pool Load Limit] ?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-19 and -23 NOTE: See Section 7, Page 7-14 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results and Display Feataure discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O l

l l

1 1

7-16 i

O i

/ Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Can adequate core cooling be assured from systems that take suction internal to the Primary Containment?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/L-21 and -29 NOTE: See Section 2, pages 2-14, 2-15 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 7-17 O

i

~

n Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool water level be maintained below 142.5 inches?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: O Step: SP/L-27 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value

2. Suppression Pool water level - historical values Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 142.5 inches.

2. Determination of the Suppression Pool water level trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Proce'ssing Results:

1. Status of Suppression Pool water level relative to 142.5 g-) inches.

V Display Features:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool water level (see Section 1.5, Page 1-12, Figure 7).

2. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 236.5 inches, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level is at or above 142.5 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION) .

7-18 O

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression, Pool water level Decision Function: Is the combination of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure below curve SP-L-4 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-31 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber average temperature - current value

2. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Chamber temperature to the Suppression Chamber pressure to determine the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit (DSIPL).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Chamber

() temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure relative to the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit.

Display Features:

1. A "DSIPL" alarm block with a color code change when the combination of the values of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure is at or above the Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit.

lDSIPLl 7-19 O

i l

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Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: Is the combination of Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure below curve SP-L-4 [Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit}?

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: '102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-31 Display Features: (Continued)

2. Tabular presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperature and Suppression Chamber pressure margin to the DSIPL; MARGIN TO LIMIT box is color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the associated limit value (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 2: MARGIN TO LIMIT).

3. Presentation of the Suppression Chamber temperataure value.

SC TEMP

( DEGF)

{ .

100 P

t l

l l

l 7-20 l <

i J

Control Function Parameter: Suppressior Pool water level Decision Function: Is Suppression Pool water level below 142.5 inches?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision:.0 Step: SP/L-32 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool water level - current value Information Processing:

1. Comparison of the current value of Suppression Pool water level to 142.5 inches.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool water

(

level relative to 142.5 inches.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 142.5

("' inches, noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression Pool water level is at or above 142.5 inches; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

7-21 0

s q_) Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool water level Decision Function: When [ Primary] Containment water level reaches 93 feet ...

OP-EO.22: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/L-35 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Chamber pressure - current value

2. Drywell pressure - current value Information Processing:

1. Determine the Primary Containment water level based on the current values of Suppression Chamber and Drywell pressures.

2. Conpare the current value of Primary Containment water level to 93 feet.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Primary Containment water

(] level relative to 93 inches.

(,/

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the water level margin to 93 feet, noting the action which is to be taken before Primary Containment water level reaches 93 feet; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 7-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

NOTE: Primary Containment level is calculated as shown:

Level (Feet) = [(Supp Chamber Press-DW Press) 2.3 i ft ] + 4.2 ft.

psi 7-22 O

A

(_) Table 7-1 Figure 1: Margin to Action CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (INCH) ACTION (INCH) (INCH) l lPCLVL 22.7(FT) STOP EXT INJ 93(FT) ll5.7(FT) l l

lSUPP 66 S/D RECIRC, POOL LVL S/D DW COOL, 142.5 l

l SPRAY DW (DSIPL) 76.5 l

l STOP EXT INJ ACC ASSD 142.5 l

l ____________..______________..___________l M/U SP LVL 78.5 12.5 l ____________..______________..___________l LOWER SP LVL 74.5 8.5 l ____________..______________..___________l R/B RECIRC, l l SCRAM, 47 19.0 l l SPRAY SC l l

() ____________________________________________________________

Figure 2: Margin to Limit MARGIN PARAMETER LIMIT TO LIMIT SC TEMP DSIPL lSCPRES 50 DEGF l

-10 PSIG l_SPLVL__________________________l SPLL 50 IN lRPVPRES L***PSIGl SP LVL HCLL 40 IN l

lDT(HC) 21 DEGP 7-23

O SECTION 8 SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL O

O 1

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool temperature above 95'F?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 5, Page 5-1 for the Information Requirements;-Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 8-1

. -- _. _ -= _ .

C)

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision-Function: [Is] Suppression Pool water level outside the 74.5 inch to 78.5 inch limit?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: Entry condition

+

NOTE: See Section 5, Page 5-2 for the Information Requirements;'Information Processing; Information

+

Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

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-- E. L. u- , . _ _ _ _ , . , _ . . . _ _ - , ,_,-.-mm _-__._,_,.c.._ . --y,.., _ , . .

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 135'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 5, Page 5-3 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 8-3 O

Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: [Is] Drywell temperature above 1.68 psig?

l. OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 5, Page 5-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 8-4 (

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k_ Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: [Is] Suppression Pool temperature above 95*F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-2 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 95*F.

Information Processing Results

l. Status of the current valuc of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 95*F.

f Display Features:

4 1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 95*F, 4 noting the action which is to be taken when Suppression I' Pool temperature exceeds 95* F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is I

kTI color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 8-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

d 1 8-5 O

, , . .-. -..,.-r.-, , , . . . . . _ -

.. , ._ ,..,v ,, ,..,.,,,,_ne,-. .-,,.,,,,n .,,,un....,.,m_.. e., ,-. ..,.y_._,. .-.. . - . . , - --e , -p. , y

O V Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: If... a scram occurs...

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 2evision: 0 Step: SP/T-3 NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-5 and 2-6 for the Information Requirements, Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

i l

8-6 O

l

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Control Function Parameter: Suppress' ion Pool temperature Decision Function: ...before Suppidssion Pool temperature can be restored and maintained below 95*F OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-3 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current value

2. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 95'F.

2. Determine the Suppression Pool temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

/"% 1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 95'F.

Display Features:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4).

2. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 95'F, noting the action which is to be taken before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 95'F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 8-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

8-7 O

g.. .. .. ..

[ Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 105'F,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/T-5 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool temperature - current value l 2. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 95'F.

2. Determine the Suppression Pool temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 95'F.

(

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 105'F, noting the action wh,ich is to be taken before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 105'F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 8-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4).

8-8 O

r O

V Decision Function: Are any SRVs stuck open?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-3 NOTE: See Section 2, Pages 2-66 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion Based on that decision function, the SPDS shall display the number of open SRV's (see Page 2-50, Display Feature $1). With this information and the required operator actions defined in OP-EO.ZZ-102, Step SP/T-15, the operator can reduce Suppression Pool temperature if any of the open SRV's are

" stuck".

O 8-9 O

. Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Is stuck SRV closed within 2 minutes?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-8 The SPDS parameter set need not specifically develop a display feature to support this step in the EOP.

Classifying an SRV as " stuck open" is an operator determination (see Page 8-9), therefore, the duration that an SRV is stuck open must be determined by the operator.

O 8-10 0

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool temperature be maintained below 110* F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-9 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool average temperature - current value

2. Suppression Pool average temperature - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 110*F.

2. Determine the Suppression Pool temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 110*F.

Display Features

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to ll5'F, noting the action which is to be taken bef ore Suppression Pool temperature reaches 105*F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 8-1, Figure 1: MARGIN TO ACTION).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4). A value of 110*F shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the bar graph.

8-11 O

a. .  :. .-

l

.D-O Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool temperature be s returned to below 95'F in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/T-ll Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool average temperature - current value

2. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values 3.- Time at which Suppression Pool temperature last equaled 95'F

, Information Processing: -'

I

l. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 95'F. .

2. Determine the Suppression Pcol temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

() 3. Determine the time interval since Suppression Pool temperature last equaled 95'F.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 95'F.

2. If Suppression Pool temperature is greater than 95'F, the time interval over which it has been greater than 95'F.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the immediate time period over which Suppression Pool temperature has been greater than 95'F.

SP TEMP HRS: MIN ABOVE 95 DEGF l ____________12:15 l 8-12

4

( Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool temperature be returned to below 95*F in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />?

OP-EO.22: 102 Revision: O Chep: SP/T-ll Display Features: (Continued)

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4).

O 8-13 0

l 7-~

\- Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool temperature be maintained below 120'F?

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: O Step: SP/T-15 Information Requirements:

1. Suppression Pool average temperature ' current value

2. Suppression Pool temperature - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Suppression Pool temperature to 120*F.

2. Determine of the Suppression Pool temperature trend (increasing / decreasing).

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of Suppression Pool temperature relative to 120*F.

(} Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the temperature margin to 120*F, noting the action which is to be taken before Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below 120*F; MARGIN TO ACTION box is color coded consistent with the CURRENT VALUE of the parameter relative to the ACTION VALUE (see TABLE 8-1, Figure 1:' MARGIN TO ACTION). l

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of Suppression Pool temperature (see Section 1.5, Page 1-10, Figure 4). A value of 120*F shall be included as an ordinate on the Y-axis of the bar graph.

8-14 O

\# Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can Suppression Pool temperature be maintained below curve SP-T-1 [ Heat Capacity Temperature Limit] ?

O P-EO . Z Z : 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-17 NOTE: See Section 3, Pages 3-7 to 3-12 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; -

Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 8-15 O

1

. Control Function Parameter: Suppression Pool temperature Decision Function: Can the combination of RPV pressure and Suppression Pool temperature be maintained below curve SP-T-1 [ Heat Capacity Temperature Limit]

OP-EO.ZZ: 102 Revision: 0 Step: SP/T-18 NOTE: See Section 3, Pages 3-7 to 3-12 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 8-16 O

O Table 8-1 l Figure 1: Margin to Action CURRENT ACTION MARGIN VALUE VALUE TO ACTION PARAMETER (DEGF) ACTION (DEGF) (DEGF) lSUPP 100 COOLING 95 -5 POOL TEMP l .

l ___________.._______.__________l STOP TEST, BEFORE 5 l CLOSE SRVS 105 l l R/B RECIRC, 110 10 l

SCRAM l ___________..______..__________l COOL DOWN 20 RPV l 120 l l

l O

8-17 0

m. A-. 4 aM = ah==-hh- h_a m4. 4 -a s-.-

e m _ - a_ A_ mA _a,. _. _ _ a-ei._ .A.a %s . - _

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SECTION 9 REACTOR BUILDING i O AREA WATER LEVEL CONTROL I

f v

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y--m---c-v -w s-v--e e - ve wwe,w,,,,p._ ,,.- ,-g-.mv.w -

l'

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Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: ... (Are any] Reactor Building floor [ water]

levels above Table 2 Column 1 [the maximum normal operating valuel ?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water levels - current statuses Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current floor water level status to the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in TABLE 9-1 via digital indication.

Information Processing Results:

1. Current status of each area's current floor water status relative to the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in TABLE 9-1.

Display Feature:

1. Text and color code change of the REACTOR BLDG LVL block of the CFPM when the floor water level in any Reactor Building area is at or above the respective maximum normal value listed in TABLE 9-1.

LVL LVL NORM MAX NORM i

9-1 0

m k)

'" Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: [Is] Reactor Building differential pressure 0 [zero) inches H 2 O?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building to atmosphere differential pressure -

current value Information Processing:

1. Compare the current value of Reactor Building-to-atmosphere differential pressure to 0 (zero) inches of water.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of Reactor Building-to-atmosphere relative to 0 (zero) inches of water.

O Display Features:

1. Color code change of the REACTOR BLDG D/P block of the CFPM when the Reactor Building-to-atmosphere i

differential pressure is at 0 inches of water.

D/P 0.00 INWG 9-2 l

l 1

1

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building local radiation monitor (in] alarm?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements :

i 1. Reactor Building area radiation levels - current value

2. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation levels - current values

! Information Processing:

i 1. Compare each area's current radiation level to the respective radiation monitor alarm values listed in Section 11, Table 11-1, Radiation Monitor' Alarm levels.

Information Processing Results:

l t

1. Status of each area's current radiation level relative j to the respective radiation monitor alarm values listed in Section 11, Table 11-1, Radiation Monitor Alarm Levels.

2. Status of the current HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to the HVAC exhaust radiation monitor alarm value listed in Section 11, Table 11-1, Radiation Monitor Alarm Levels.

Display Features:

1. Text and color code change of the REACTOR BLD RAD block of the CFPM when the radiation level in any Reactor Building area or HVAC exhaust area is at or above the respective radiation monitor alarm value listed in i section 11, Table 11-1, Radiation Monitor Alarm Levels.

RAD RAD MAX NORM' NORM 9-3 O

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level i

Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building [ area) temperature above Table 1, Column 1 j [ Max. normal operating temp]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition l

l Information Requirements:

, 1. Reactor building area temperatures - current value Information Processing:

1. Compare of each current temperature to the respective maximum normal operating temperature value listed in Section 10, Table 10-1, Reactor Building Area Temperatures.

1 Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current temperature relative to i the respective maximum normal operating temperature j value listed in Section 10, Table 10-1 Reactor Area Temperatures.

I Display Features:

l 1. Text and color code change of the REACTOR BLDG TEMP 1 block of the CFPM when the temperature in any Reactor i Building area is at or above the respective maximum j normal operating value listed in Section 10, Table 10-1 Reactor Building Area Temperatures.

i l

j TEMP TEMP  !

MAX

{ NORM NORM l

! 9-4 1

1

.- . _ = _ - _ -

i i Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: If at any time Reactor Building HVAC exhaust exceeds 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-1 i

Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation levels - current value

2. Reactor Building HVAC [ exhaust] flow - current status Information Processingt i 1. Determine the status of the Reactor Building HVAC system

^

(running or not running, as indicated by system [ exhaust]

flowrate).

, 2. Comparison of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

() Information Processing Results:

1. Reactor Building HVAC system status (running or not running ) .

2. Status of current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

Display Feature

1. Digital presentation of the current value of Reactor Building exhaust radiation level (whenever the system is running), with a color code change of the displayed value when the radiation level is at or above 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

RX BLDG EXH RAD (UC/CC) 3.25E-2 9-5 i

r Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: If at any time Reactor Building HVAC isolates ...

OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-2 Information Requirements:

1. HVAC isolation damper positions - current status Information Processing :

1. Compare the current status of HVAC isolation damper positions with closed.

Information Processing Results:

1. Isolation status of the individual HVAC systems.

Display Features

1. An "HVAC ISLN" status block depicting the current status

() of HVAC isolation "Yes" or "No".

HVAC ISLN YES 9-6 O

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: ... and exhaust radiation level is less than 3 x 10-2 uCi/ce, ...

OP-EO.Z2: 103 Revision: O Step: RB-2 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation levels - current value

2. Reactor Building HVAC [ exhaust] flow - current status Information Processing:

1. Determine the status of the Reactor Building HVAC system (running or not running, as indicated by system (exhaust]

flowrate).

2. Comparison of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

() Information Processing Results:

1. Reactor Building HVAC systen status (running or not running).

2. Status of current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

Display Feature

1. Digital presentation of the current value of Reactor Building exhaust radiation level (whenever the systen is running, see Page 9-5 Display Feature #1) .

9-7

() Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: [Are any] Reactor Bldg floor [ water) levels above Table 2 Column 1 (the maximum normal operating value]?

-OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/L-2 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water levels - current values Information Processing:

1. Determine if any area's current floor water level exceed the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in Table 9-1.

Information Processing Results:

1. Current value of each area's floor water level relative to the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in Table 9-1.

Display Features

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area floor water level with a color code change relative to the area's maximum normal floor water level value (see Table 9-2).

9-8 O

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: Can floor [ water] levels be maintained below Table 2 Column 1 (the maximum normal operating value]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: RB/L-4 i

Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water levels - current values i

Information Processing  !

1. Compare each area's current floor water level to the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in TABLE 9-1.

Information Processing Results:

1. Current value of each area's current floor water level relative to the respective maximum normal operating floor water level value listed in TABLE 9-1.

I O Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the status of each Reactor Building area floor water level with a color code change when water level is at or above 1.0 inches (see Table 9-2).

9-9 O

1 O Control Function Parameter Reactor Building water level Decision Function: Is any primary ssytem discharging to the area?

OP-EO.ZZ

103 Revision: O Step: RB/L-6 The SPDS parameter set need not contain the necessary information needed to develop display features to support this step in the EO P.

The leakage detection systems used at Hope Creek are discussed in FSAR Section 5.2.5. By using this system and/or their knowledge of the plant primary systems, the operators will be able to  ;

determine the response to the above decision function.

i l

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i l 9-10

!* 1

. I

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building water level Decision Function: Before [any] floor [ water] level reaches Table 2 Column 1 [ maximum normal operating value],...

O P-EO . Z Z : 103 Revision: O Stept RB/L-7 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water levels - current values Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current water level to the respective maximum normal operating value listed in Table 9-1.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current water level relative to the respective maximum normal operating value listed in Table 9-1.

Display Features

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area floor water level relative to the area's maximum normal operating value (see TABLE 9-2, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Levels).

9-11 O

(j Control Function Parameter Reactor Building water level Decision Function: Is [ water] level in both division above Table 2 Column 2 [the maximum safe operating value]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Stops: RB/L-8 and 10 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water lovels - current values Information Processing:

1. Comparo each area's current water level to the respective maximum safe operating value listed in Tablo 9-1.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current water lovel relativo to the respectivo maximum normal operating value listed in Tablo 9-1.

O Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area floor water lovel relative to the area's maxinun normal operating value (see TABLE 9-2, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Lovels).

9-12 O

l

O Control Function Parameter Reactor Building water level Decision Function: Is [ water] level going up in the other division?

OP-EO.zzi 103 Revision: 0 Stept RB/L-12 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building floor water levels - current values

2. Reactor Building floor water levels - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare each Division I area's current water level to the respective Division II area's current water level.

2. Determine water level trend (increasing / decreasing) with respect to the other division.

Information Processing Results:

() 1. Identification of each Division I area's current water level relative to the respective Division II area's current water level.

2. Identification of which Reactor Building areas have increasing water level trends.

Display Feature

1. Tabular presentation of each Division I and II areas' current and three previous values (at 10-minute intervals) of water level (see Table 9-2, Reactor Building Area Floor Water Levels and Temperatures).

9-13

i l

~

TABLE 9-1 REACTOR BUILDING FLOOR WATER LEVEL ALARM VALUES Reactor Building Maximum Normal Area Operating Value llPCI pump room 1.0 RCIC pump room 1.0 CS-A pump room 1.0 CS-B pump room 1.0 CS-C pump room 1.0 CS-D pump room 1.0 RilR-A pump room 1.0 RilR-D neat 1.0 exchangor and pump room

(/ RilR-C heat 1.0 exchanger and pump room RilR-D pump room 1.0 CRD pump room 1.0 SACS-A heat 1.0 exchanger and pump room SACS-D heat 1.0 exchanger land pump room RACS pump and 1.0 llX Aronn 9-14 O

TABLE 9-2 Reactor Building Area Floor Water Levels and Temperatures Area Area Temp Floor Floor Wtr Lvl Temp Historical Values Area Wtr Lvl Historical Status Current -10 min -20 min -30 min Description Current -10 min -20 min -30 min Value Value Value Value and Room No. Status Status Status Status (DEGF) (DEGF) (DEGP) (DEGF)

CRD Pump Rm4202 Norm Norm Max Max 80 80 80 80 Norm No rm RACS Pump Rm4209 Norm Norm Norm Norm 82 81 80 80 HX Rm4211 Norm Norm Norm No rm 80 80 80 80 D HPCI Rm4111 Max Max I Norm Norm Norm Norm 120 115 110 105 V

I CS-A Rm4118 Norm Norm No rm Norm 82 82 80 78 S CS-C Rm4116 Norm No rm Norm Norm 80 80 82 82 I I RHR-A Rm4113 Norm Norm Norm Norm 82 82 80 80 4 RHR-C Rm4114 Norm Norm Norm Norm 80 80 82 82 I SACS-A&C Max Max Rm4309 Norm Norm, Norm Norm 100 100 100 100 D Max Max I RCIC Rm4110 Norm Norm Norm Norm 120 115 110 105 V

I CS-B Rm4104 Norm No rm Norm Norm 85 86 84 84 S CS-D Rm4105 Norm Norm Norm Norm 83 83 83 83 I

O RHR-B Rm4109 Norm Norm Norm Norm 90 90 90 90 N RHR-D Rm4117 Norm No rm Norm No rm 100 94 92 90

!! S ACS RM B&D Norm No rm Norm Norm 80 80 80 80 Rm4307

==

9-15 0

6__

9 5 O

4 o

d J

l k

j SECTION 10 1

1 4

REACTOR BUILDING 1

! AREA TEMPERATURE CONTROL i

i a

lO I

3 i

f l

i i

I i

i

.l O

l l

Control Function Parameter Reactor Building temperature i l

l Decision Functions (Are any] Reactor Building floor

, [wa te r) levels above Table 2 Column 1 (the maximum normal operating value] ?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Stept Entry Condition i

'l l 1 1

I NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-1 for the Irformation l Requirements; Information Processingt Infor- ,'

i mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function i

described above.

i I

1 i

i i

I i

4 I I i

l l

l I

r i I

! i t

! I 10 1 f

l (S) i 1

I i

I

.,n,, , , - ,,..,,-, - - , - - - - .. ,--~e-_ ,n - . , - - - , , -_ ._ ,g,-,w-m-,-m,,-..,-,--m-,,-,,-- -y,_.--,----- ,,,,,,m,., ,, ,-,

_J Control Function Parameter Reactor Building temperature Decision Function [Is] Reactor Building differential pressure [zerol inches !! 2 0?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-2 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

,c i <

W, -

10-2

> i k_ ./

4

T 1 l l

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature

, Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building local radiation l j monitor (in) alarm? l

OP-EO.ZZ

101 Revision: O Step: Entry Condition (

s 1

1 j NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9 3 for the j l' Information Requirements; Information

, l Processing; Information Processing Results; j l and Display Feature discussion for the i l Decision Function described above.

l l -

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i \

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lO 4

)

1 i

l r 4 -

i  !

! I 4

i 1  ;

I [

I 10 3 l1 O ,

i i, (

j i

l () Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature

{ Decision Function: [Is any) Reactor Building [ areal tempera-ture above Table 1, Column 1 [ Max. normal 3

operating temp.)?

Revision:

OP-EO.22: 103 O steg: Entry Condition i l

t I

i NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-4 for the i l Inf ormation Requirements; In f o rmation l i Processing; Information Processing Results l l and Display Feature discussion for the i Decision Function described above.

l l 1  :

j I i

I a I i

I r

f I l i

i t

1 i

1 r 10-4  !

!l  !

f I

t

Control Function Parameter Reactor Building temperature Decision Functiont If at any time Reactor Building HVAC exhaust exceeds 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc, ...

OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: 0 Stept RB-1 I _

NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-5 for the l ll Information Requirements; Information Processing; Information Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 10-5 O

) Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: If at any time Reactor Building HVAC isolates...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Stept RB-2 NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-6 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

0 10-6 J

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: ...and exhaust radiation level is less than 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc, ...

OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: O Step RB-2 8 _

'1 NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-7 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-H mation Processing Results; and Display l Feature discussion for the Decision Function l described above.

I O

10-7 0

l 1

?

Y2 Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building Temperature Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building [ area]

temperature above Table 1 Column 1 (the maximum normal operating temp.]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: RB/T-2 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area temperature - current values Information Processing:

1. Determine if any area's current temperature exceeds the respective maximum normal operating temperature value listed in Table 10-1.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current temperature relative to the respective maximum normal operating temperature value listed in Table 10-1.

> Display Features

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area temperature with a color code change relative to the area's maximum normal operating tempe ra tu re (see Table 9-2, Page 9-15, Reactor Building i Temperature and Floor Water Levels) .

i l

10-8

. _ . - - - ._ __. , -- .=. . _ .

4 Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: Can area temperatures be maintained below Table 1 Column 2 [ maximum safe operating value]?

O P-EO . Z Z

103 Revision: O Step: RB/T-4 4 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area temperatures - current values 1

Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current temperature to the respective maximum normal operating temperature value I

listed in Table 10-1.

1 Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current temperature relative to the respective maximum normal operating temperature

() value listed in Table 10-1.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the status of each Reactor Building area temperature with a color code change when the temperature is at or above 115'F (see Table 9-2).

i

}

l l

I I

l I

I i 10-9 f

I L - - _- . , - . . , _ _ _ - _ _ - _ . - - . _ - . - . - . . _ _ _ _ .

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: Before any area temperature reaches Table 1 Column 2 (the maximum safe operating temp],...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/T-6 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area temperature - current values Information Processing:

I

1. Compare each area's current temperature to the respective maximum normal operating temperature value listed in Table 10-1.

Information Processing Results:  ;

1. Status of each area's current temperature relative to the respective maximum normal operating temperature value listed in Table 10-1.

() Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area temperature with a color code change relative to the area's maximum normal operating temperature (see Table 9-2, Page 9-15, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Levels) .

10-10 0

. . . ~ . . .

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: [Is] any primary system discharging to 1

~

the area?

. OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: 0 Stept RB/T-7 I

4 5

4 NOTE: See Section 9, page 9-10 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-j mation Processing Results; and Display ,

i Feature discussion for the Decision Function l described above.

s l

4 4

i i

i i

i i

1

{

l t

i i

10-11 l

r~

k_' Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: [Is] the temperature in more than one area above Table 1, Column 2 [the maximum safe operating value]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Re vision: 0 Step: RB/T-8 and -16 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area temperature - current values Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current temperature value to the respective maximum safe operating value listed in Table 10-1.

i Information Processing Results: i

1. Status of each area's current temperature value relative to the respective maximum safe operating value listed in Table 10-1.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the value of each Reactor Building area temperature with a color code change relative to the area's maximum normal operating value (see Table 9-2, Page 9-15, Reactor Building Temperature and Floor Water Levels) .

i 10-12 (2)

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: Is temperature going up in adjacent areas?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/T-9 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area temperatures - current values

2. Reactor Building area temperatures - historical values Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current temperature value to the respective adjacent area's current temperature value.

2. Determine temperature trend (increasing / decreasing) with respect to adjacent areas.

Information Processing Results:

1. Identification of each area's current temperature value relative to the respective adjacent area's current temperature value.

2. Identification of which Reactor Building areas have increasing temperature trends.

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of each area's current temperature and three previous values (at 10-minute intervals)

(see Table 9-2, Page 9-15, Reactor Building Area Floor Water Levels and Temperatures).

10-13 O

v

=.

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: Is a fire in progress?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/T-12 The SPDS parameter set need not contain the information needed to develop display features to support this step in the EOP.

The existence of a fire in the plant is detected by the Fire Detection System (System KC). The Hope Creek Fire Brigade will keep the Control Room Operator's apprised of the situation. The Fire Brigade will assess the exact extent of a fire, if it is under control or not, and if it is out. The Control Room will be notified accordingly.

C~'i) l l

l l

l 10-14

i Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: Is the fire under control?

OP-EO.2Z: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/T-13 I

NOTE: See Section 10, Page 10-14 for the Information l Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-l mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

10-15 O .

l

l

! i l

O(_/ Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building temperature Decision Function: When the fire is out,...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: RB/T-13 I

NOTE: See Section 10, Page 10-14 for the Information L Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function l described above.

I t

i 4

i

[

10-16 O

TABLE 10-1 f)

(_/ -

REACTOR BUILDING AREA TEMPERATURE ALARM VALUES (Table 1) (Table 2)

Reactor (Column 1) (Cloumn 2)

Building Temperature Maximum Normal Maximum Safe Area Element / Monitor Operating Value Operating Value

("F) (*F)

HPCI pump room 1-BJ-TE-2322 115' 250' RCIC pump room 1-BD-TE-2323 115' 250' CS-A pump room 1-BE-TE-2329 115* 140' CS-B pump room 1-BE-TE-2324 115' 140*

CS-C pump room 1-BE-TE-2336 115* 140' CS-D pump room 1-BE-TE-2331 115' 140' RHR-A pump room 1-BC-TE-2378 115' 140' RHR-B heat 1-BC-TE-2375 115' 140*

exchanger and pump room

_)' RHR-C heat 1-BC-TE-2374 115* 140' exchanger and pump room RHR-D pump room 1-BC-TE-2350 115' 140' CRD pump room 1-BF-TE-2384 115' 140' SACS-A heat 1-EG-TE-2385 115* 140*

exchanger and pump room SACS-B heat l'-EG-TE-2 3 8 6 115* 140' exchanger and pump room RACS pump and [ Late r] 115' 140' HX Area room 10-17 l

I

g .---,..+J _a m 2.n_m 4-a_ -A4. __.-a., _ - a a2._m _ a 4 .-.. .__ ..a .-. .A . - - _ -,e M

O j I

i SECTION 11 4

4 I REACTOR BUILDING RADIATION LEVEL CONTROL i

O L

f f

d

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1 1, I c  :

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I l

i I

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r

_. ,. -..-,- - - - _ , c.-.n.,,-, , . , . , , - -- - . _ _ _ - - - .__ , _ - -- - - _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ - -____

I control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Are any] Reactor Building floor

[ water] levels above Table 2 Column 1

[the maximum safe operating temp],...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry Condition NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-1 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O i,

4 I

I 11-1 O

i l

k

(s

( Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Is] Reactor Building differential pressure 0 [zero] inches H 2 07 O P-EO . Z Z : 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-2 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

T 11-2 O

1 1

l l

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building local radiation monitor [in] alarm?

O P-EO . Z Z : 103 Revision: 0 Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-3 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

4 s

O l

l 2

l l

l i

l 11-3

(:)

Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building [ area]

temperature above Table 1 Column 1

[ Max. normal operating temp]?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: O Step: Entry condition NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-4 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

t O

11-4 O

l .

i O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level i Decision Function: If at any time Reactor Building HVAC exhaust exceeds 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc, ...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-1 h

NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-5 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

I 4

i I

f 4

11-5 1

( )

\/ Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: (If] at any time Reactor Building HVAC isolates...

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-2 NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-6 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 11-6 O

.. - _ - - . . . . - - _ - .. .. . - _ _ _ . . ..__ - _=. . _ -

I a

Control Function Parameter Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: ...and exhaust radiation level is less than 3 x 10-2 uCi/ce, ...

OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-2 i

NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-7 for the Information i

Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function i

described above.

I i

I l

O i ,

) [

i 4 r i

! l T

i i i I f i

l i

i 11-7 l

l 1

l

[

I

-n .n,.- . . - - - ,,. _ ,,-. - - ,--,-.-- - .-...--,--,,---,_ - - _ , - - - . . - - . ,,.,--,- - - -. -.,.,- - - , ,--- -

r~'s

( l

'/ Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building local radiation monitor [in] alarm?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB-2 Information Requirements:

1. Reactor Building area radiation levels - current values

2. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation levels - current values Information Processing:

1. Compare each area's current radiation level to the respective radiation alarm vaules listed in TABLE 11-1.

2. Compare the current HVAC exhaust radiation level to the HVAC exhaust radiation monitor alarm value listed in l'~) Table 11-1.

\.)

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of each area's current radiation level relative to the respective radiation monitor alarm values listed in TABLE 11-1.

2. Status of the current HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to the HVAC exhaust radiation monitor alarm level value listed in TABLE 11-1.

11-8

l ) Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: [Is any] Reactor Building local radiation monitor [in] alarm?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/R-2 Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of the status of each Reactor Building area radiation level with a color code change relative to the area's radiation monitor alarm level.

RADIATION AREA (MR/HR)

PERSONNEL AIRLOCK 2.5 MOTOR EQPT HATCH 2.5 OPEN EQPT HATCH 2.5 EQUIPMENT AIRLOCK 2.5

() SPENT FUEL EQPT RX CLEANUP EQPT 2.5 2.5 SPENT FUEL STOR 2.5 SAFEGUARD INST RM 2.5 SAMPLE STATIOM 2.5

2. Digital presentation of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level (whenever the system is running), with a color code change of the displayed value when the radiation level is at or above 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc (see Section 9, Pages 9-5, Display Feature #1).

11-9 0

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level

. Decision Function: Is any primary system discharging to the area?

OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/R-4 NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-10 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 11-10 0

O Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: Before any area estimated dose, for required area entry reaches 25 rem ...

OP-EO.22: 103 Revision: O Step: RB/R-5 The SPDS parameter set does not contain the necessary information needed to develop display features to support this step in the EOP.

This information will be determined by Radiation Protection, and the control room operators would be advised accordingly.

O 1

l 11-11 O

I Control Function Parameter: Reactor Building radiation level Decision Function: Is estimated dose for required area entry greater than 25 rems? l OP-EO.ZZ: 103 Revision: 0 Step: RB/R-6 and -8 1

NOTE: See Section 11, page 11-11 for the Information Requirements; Information Processin~g; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

I i, O .

(

k 1

l I .

i i

t i

i l

c 11-12 i l

TABLE 11-1 RADIATION MONITOR ALARM LEVELS Reactor Building Radiation Radiation Monitor

' Area Monitor __

Alarn Level (mR/l.r )

Personnel Airlock I-SD-RE-6600 [Later]

Motor Equipment I-SD-RE-6601 [Later]

Hatch Open Equipment I-SD-RE-6602 [Later)

Hatch Equipment Airlock I-SD-RE-6605 [Later)

Spent Fuel Pool- I-SD-RE-6603 [Later]

Equipment Reactor Water I-SD-RE-6606 [Later]

Cleanup Room Spent Fuel Storage I-SE-RE-6607 [Later]

Safeguard Instrument I-SD-RE-6604 [Later]

Room Sample Station I-SD-RE-6635 [Later]

Exhaust Location Reactor Building I-SD-RE-4857 A,B,C [Later]

HVAC 11-13 O

. I

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l l

I ) I l

l l

I i

1 t

t i

SECTION 12

\

I I

OFF-SITE j RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL  !

l I ,

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l.  !

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I

(

i  ;

i 1

r l

l l

l l

l l

i l

i l

t t

O ,

f I

I

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g Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: [Does) sample analysis of gaseous effluent from all vents total indicate a release rate that equals or exceeds either of the following:

5.0 x 105 uCi/sec NOBLE GAS OR 2.11x10 2 uCi/sec IODINE?

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Stept Entry Condition Information Requirements :

1. Noble gas and iodine release rates from each of the following effluent vent pathways - current values North plant South plant FRVS vent g-) Information Processing:

V 1. Determine the total noble gas release frem all pathways.

2. Determine the total iodine release from all pathways.

3. Compare the noble gas release rate (total) to 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec.

4 Compare the iodine release rate (total) to 2.11x102 uCi/sec.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of noble gas release rate relative to 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec.

2. Status of the current value of iodine release rate relative to 2.llx102 uCi/sec.

12-1 0

Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: [Does] sample analysis of gaseous effluent from all vents total indicate a release rate that equals or exceeds either of the following:

5.0 x 105 uCi/sec NOBLE GAS OR 2.lix10 2 uCi/sec IODINE?

(continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: Entry Condition t

Display Features:

1. Tabular presentation of noble gas and iodine release rate information, with a color code change of the total value when the respective limit is equaled or exceeded.

RELEASE RATES RELEASE PATHS GAS (UC/S) IODINE (UC/S)

NORTH PLANT 375.3E+2 8.7E+2

(~T SOUTH PLANT 1500.OE+2 10.3E+2

(_) FRVS VENT 22.7E+2 0.lE+2 TOTAL 1898.0E+2 19.lE+2

2. Color code change of the OFF-SITE GAS block of the CFPM when the value of noble gas release rate (total) equals or exceeds 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec.

GAS 7.1E+5 UC/S

3. Color code change of the OFF-SITE IODINE block of the CFPM when the value of iodine release rate (total) equals or exceeds 2.lix102 uCi/sec.

IODINE 1.53E+3

/S

(} 12-2

p)

?

\- Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: [Have] valid atmospheric units alarms (been] received from RMS and the total of all vent RMS readings indicate a release rate that equals or exceeds either of the following:

5.0 x 105 uCi/sec NOBLE GAS OR 2.11x102 uCi/sec IODINE?

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: Entry Condition Information Requirements:

1. Noble gas and iodine release rates from each of the following effluent vent pathways - current values North plant South plant FRVS vent

() Information Processing:

1. Determine the total noble gas release from all pathways.

2. Determine the total iodine release from all pathways.

3. Compare the noble gas release rate (total) to 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec.

4. Compare the iodine release rate (total) to 2.11x102 uCi/sec.

Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current value of noble gas release rate relative to 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec.

2. Status of the current value of iodine release rate relative to 2.11x102 uCi/sec.

12-3

O Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: [Have] valid atmopspheric units alarm (been] received from RMS and the total of all vent RMS readings indicate a release rate that equals or exceeds either of the following 5.0 x 105 uCi/sec NOBLE GAS OR 2

2.lix10 - Ci/sec IODINE?

(Continued)

O P-EO . Z Z : 104 Revision: 1 Step: Entry Condition Display Features:

1

1. Tabular presentation of noble gas and iodine release rate information, with a color code change of the total value when the respective limit is equaled or exceeded (see Page 12-2, Display Feature #1).

(~ 2. Color code change of the OFF-SITE GAS block of the CFPM when the value of ngble gas release rate (total) equals or exceeds 5.0 x 103 uCi/sec (see Page 12-2, Display Feature #2).

. 3. Color code change of the OFF-SITE IODINE block of the CFPM when the value of iodine release rate (total) equals or exceeds 2.lix102 uCi/sec (see Page 12-2, Display Feature #3).

12-4

Control Function Parameter

Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Is testing source of release?

)

O P-EO . Z Z : 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-1 1

i The SPDS parameter set need not contain the information

, needed to develop display features to support this step in the EOP.

Radiation Protection and the Senior Nuclear Shif t Supervisor will be aware of tests being conducted using radioactive

, sources, and they can determine if testing is the source of the release.

1 I

i

!. O h

4 I

f i

I i

i 12-5 l

l -

j .

Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Is radwaste area source of release? ,

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step:- RR-3

, ,3 ( i 1

's t i

~ '

The SPDS parameter set does not contain the necossary information needed to develop display features'to support /

this step in the EOP. ,

Radiation Protection and the Radwaste Control Room operators ,

will be able to access the location of a radioactive release '

in the radwaste system. They will r.lert the control room operators of any releases in this aiea. / ,

1,: ,

E T L g 4 N O

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+ ,

4

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- = -

. i 2-6 0 .

o J

Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release

- Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be main-tained below ALERT level?

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-6 Information Requirements :

1. Total Noble gas release rates from all pathways -

current value

2. Total noble gas release rate from all pathways -

historical values

3. Total iodine release rate from all pathways - current value

'l

4. Total iodine release rate from all pathways - historical values

5. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level - current

,: l; 9 p -

value

6. Reactor Building (exhaust] flowrate - current value

,t 7. See "Information Requirements" section and "Information

a. Processing" section on Page 12-1

, [< Information Processing:

<l.e Compare the current value of noble gas release rate (total) to the associated ALERT action level value f (5.0 x 105 uCi/sec).

J

2. Detarmine the noble gas release rate trend (increasing /

. decreasing).

3. Compare the current value of iodine release rate (total) to the associated ALERT level value (2.11x10 2 uCi/sec).

! 4. Determine the iodine release rate trend (increasing /

t decreasing).

5. Determine the status of the Reactor Building HVAC system

, (running or not running, as indicated by system

,. [ exhaust] flowrate).

6. Compare the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

12-7

('-/- Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Dec'ision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be nain-tained below ALERT level?

i OP-EO.22: 104 Revision: 'l Step: RR-6 Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the~ current and historical values of noble gas release rate relative to the associated ALERT action level value (5.0 x 105 uCi/sec).

2. Status of the current and historical values of iodine release rate relative to the associated ALERT action level value (2.11x102 uCi/sec).

5 3. Reactor Building HVAC system status (running or not

running).

l

4. Status of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

1 Display Features:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous

- i ;'

values of noble. gas release rate.

GAS 5.3E+5 UC/S M 7.80E+5

- 7. 00E+5

/ / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / --

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

l

+ + + + + + 5.00E+5

-20 -15 -10 -5 -1 0 t

MINUTES l

l O

h

O Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be maintained below ALERT level?

OP-EO-ZZ: 104 Revisions: 1 Step: RR-6 Display Features:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of noble gas release rate.

IODINE 1.33E+3 UC/S b 1.58E+3

- 1. 5 0E+3 1.40E+3

/ / / / / / / /

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / --

/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

+ + + + -

+ 1.30E+3

-20 -15 -10 -5 -1 0

3. Digital presentation of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level (whenever the system is running), with a color code of the displayed value when the radiation level is at or above 3 X 10-2 uCi/cc (see Section 9, Page 9-5, Display Feature #1).

12-9 1

i

\' Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be main-tained below ALERT level? (Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-6 Display Features: (Continued) a

4. Tabular presentation of the radioactivity release rate from Reactor Building HVAC exhaust.

REACTOR BUILDING HVAC EXHAUST RAD LEVEL 3.2E-2 UC/CC FLOW .3E+2 CC/S RELEASE RATE 9.6E+0 UC/S

5. Tabular presentation of the noble gas and iodine release rate margin to the ALERT level; MARGIN TO ACTION values

() color coded consistent with the current value of the parameter relative to the ALERT value.

ACTION MARGIN TO ACTION LEVEL -

GAS (UC/S) IODINE (UC/S)

ALERT 1.00E+5 0.12E+5 i 12-10 l

m -m--,,-----m.,4 y-yw-,- - - - .r -

1 L

( )' Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Is any primary system discharging out-side the Primary Containment and the Reactor Building?

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-8 NOTE: See Section 9, Page 9-10 for the Information Requirements; Information Processing; Infor-mation Processing Results; and Display

(

Feature discussion for the Decision Function described above.

O 12-11 0

i I

1

\

Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be main-tained below GENERAL EMERGENCY level?

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-10 The SPDS parameter set need not contain the information needed to develop display features to support this step in the EOP.

The definition of a GENERAL EMERGENCY is contained in O P-EO . Z Z-10 4 ( O ) as Note: 1.

The operators, with the assistance of Radiation Protection, .

will be able to make this decision based on the conditions in the plant during an abnormal or emergency event.

Note 1.c.3 (RMS readings from the plant vents), however, can be implemented as an SPDS parameter. See pages 12-13 to 12-15 for a discussion of this parameter.

O 12-12

4 -

Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release

~

Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate be main-I tained below GENERAL EMERGENCY level? i 4

i O P-EO . Z Z : 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-10 I

i Information Requirements:

1. Total noble gas release rates from all pathways -

current value

2. Total noble gas release rate from all pathways -

historical values

3. Total iodine release rate from all pathways - current

< value

4. Total iodine release rate f rom all pathways - historical values

5. Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level - current l value

6. Reactor Building (exhaust) flowrate - current value

7. See "Information Requirements" section and "Information Processing" section on Page 12-1 1

Information Processing:

i

1. Compare the current value of noble gas release rate (total) to the associated GENERAL EMERGENCY action level .

.l value (7.01x106 uCi/sec).

2. Determine the noble gas release rate trend (increasing /

decreasing).

3. Compare the current value of iodine release rate (total)

to the aqsociated GENERAL EMERGENCY level value

(5.24x103 uCi/sec).

i 4. Determine the iodine release rate trend (increasing /

I decreasing).

5. Determine the status of the Reactor Building HVAC system (running or not running, as indicated by system (exhaust) flowrate).

j 6. Compare the current value of Reactgr Building HVAC exhaust radiation level to 3 x 10- uCi/cc.

i i 12-13 i

4 i

n . - - , . - - - . ... _ . - . . _ . _ - . , , , - , - . . - - - . - - , - , , . - - - - - - - - _ - - _. ..,,,- - . . _ - _ . . .

O' Control Function Parameter: Of f-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Can radioactivity release rate he nain-tained below GENERAL EMERGENCY level?

(continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step RR-10 Information Processing Results:

1. Status of the current and historical values of noble gas release rate relative to the associated GENERAL EMERGENCY action level value (7.0lx106 uCi/sec).

2. Status of the current and historical values of iodine release rate relative to the associated GENERAL EMERGENCY action level value (5.24x103 uCi/sec).

3. Reactor Building HVAC system status (running or not running).

4. Status of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level relative to 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc.

() Display Features:

1. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of noble gas release ra te (see Page 12-8, Display Feature #1).

2. History bar graph depicting the current and previous values of iodine release rate (see Page 12-9, Display Feature #2).

3. Display presentation of the current value of Reactor Building HVAC exhaust radiation level (whenever the system is running), with a color code change of the displayed value when the radiation level is at or above 3 x 10-2 uCi/cc (see Section 9, Page 9-5, Display Feature #1).

12-14 O

i 1

t A

~s Control Function Parameter: Off-site radioactivity release Decision Function: Can radioactivity release ra te be ma i n-tained below GENERAL EMERGENCY level?

(Continued)

OP-EO.ZZ: 104 Revision: 1 Step: RR-10 Display Features: (Continued)

4. Tabular presentation of the radioactivity release rate from Reactor Building HVAC exhaust (see Page 12-10, Display Feature #4 ) .

) REACTOR BUILDING HVAC EXHAUST RAD LEVEL 3.2E-2 UC/CC FLOW .3E+2 CC/S RELEASE RATE 9.6E+0 UC/S 1

5. Tabular presentation of the noble gas and iodine release rate margin to the General Emergency level; MARGIN TO ACTION values color coded consistent with the cu rrent value of the parameter relative to the GENERAL FMERGENCY value. -

ACTION MARGIN TO ACTION LEVEL GAS (UC/S) IODINE (UC/S)

EMERG 1.00E+5 0.12E+5 12-15

-