ML20138G487
| ML20138G487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1985 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138G467 | List: |
| References | |
| PSE-SE-Z-025, PSE-SE-Z-25, NUDOCS 8510250486 | |
| Download: ML20138G487 (5) | |
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY HOPE CREEK PROJECT SAFETY EVALUATION No. PS E-S E-z-0 2 5 TITLE:
SIFPLIFICATION OF TEST NUMBER 24, RELIEF VALVES OCT 151985 Date:
1.0 PUR POSE The purpose of this safety evaluation is to demonstrate that the proposed simplification of Test Number 24, Relief Valves, will not compromise the original objective of the test.
2.0 SCOPE The scope is to demonstrate that a reduction of valve actuations from testing during heatup and between Test Conditions 2 and 3 to testing at Test Condition 1 only i
will not compromise the guidelines stated in Regulatory Gu ide 1. 68 (Revision 2, August 1978), Appendix A, paragraphs 4.p and 5.t.
3.0 REFERENCES
1.
Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978 2.
General Electric Startup Test Specification, 23A4137, Revision 0 3.
Hope Creek Generating Station Draft Technical Specifications 4.
Hope Creek Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Chapter 14 4.0 DISCUSSION Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2, Augus t 1978), Appendix A, paragraph 4.p requires a demonstration of main steam relief valve operability at rated pressure during low power testing.
Paragraph 5.t requires that, at approximately 25% power, relief valve operability, response times, relieving capacities, setpoints, and reset pressures, as appropriate, be veritied if not performed earlier.
PSE-SE-z-025 1 of 3 gO250486851017 ADOCK 05000354 A
t The purpose of Test Number 24, Relief Valves, is to demonstrate the operability of the relief valves, i.e.,
that they can be opened and closed manually, that they reseat properly, and that there are no blockages in the relief valve piping.
This testing is currently planned to be performed at low (250-500 psig) pressure during heatup and at rated reactor pressure between Test Conditions 2 and 3.
It is proposed to delete the operability test at low pressure and between Test Conditions 2 and 3 and instead verify operability between 10% and 20% power at Test Condition 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.68 does not require a demonstration of relief valve operability at low pressure, only at rated pressure.
And although paragraph 4.p of Appendix A states that operability should be verified during low power testing (at less than 5% power), paragraph 5.t makes it clear that operability may be verified later in the startup test program if adequate justification exists and as long as operability is verified prior to exceeding 25% power.
Actuation of the relief valves at low pressure has been identified as a contributor to valve seat damage caused by the valves' reseating against abnormally low pressure (see INPO Newsletter of September 28, 1984).
Operation of the valves at low pressure, therefore, should be avoided whenever possible.
Furthermore, from an operational point of view, conducting the test at a steam flow greater than the capacity of a relief valve (typically 5-7%) will significantly enhance plant pressure control during the transient.
- Finally, protection from the effects of overpressure transients which may occur prior to relief valve operability testing will be assured through compliance with Technical Specification 4.5.1.d (See Attachment 1) which requires that all automatic depressurization system ( ADS) valves be manually opened within twelve hours of reaching a steam dome pressure of 100 psig.
The ADS valves by themselves provide sufficient relief capacity to mitigate the relatively mild overpressure transients which could occur at less than 20% power.
From the above discussion it is considered that adequate justification exists for deferring relief valve testing to Test Condition 1 (between 10% and 20% power).
This testing will meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68 regarding verification of relief valve operability.
PSE-SE-2-025 2 of 3
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5.0 CONCLUSION
Deferral of relief valve operability testing until Test Condition I will not adversely affect any safety systems or the safe operation of the plant so an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
No Technical Specifications changes are required.
6.0 DOCUMENTS GENERATED 5
None l
7.0 l<ECOMM EN DATIONS Revision to Hope Creek's FSAR and startup test procedures shall be made to reflect the changes in relief valve operability testing described above.
8.0 ATTACHMENTS Technical Specification 4.5.1.d 9.0 SIGNATURES Origi M -
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EMERGENCY CORE CCCLING SYSTEMS N-N N'
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems shall be demonstrated CPERABLE by:
a.
At least once per 31 days:
1.
For the core spray system, the LPCI system, and the HPCI system:
a)
Verifying by venting at the high point vents that the system piping from the pump disenarge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water.
b)
Verifying that each valve, manual, power operated or automatic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct
- position.
2.
For the HPCI system, verifying that the HPCI pump flow controller is in the correct position.
b.
Verifying that, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1.
The two core spray system pumos in each subsystem together develop a ficw of at least 6350 gpm against a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 1105 psi above suppression pool pressure.
2.
Each LPCI puso in each subsystem develops a flow o,f at least 10,000 gpm against a test ifne pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel to primary containment differential pressure of 1 20 psid.
3.
The HPCI pump develops a flow of at least 5600 gpm against a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 1000 psig when steam is being supolied to the turbine at 1000,
+20, -80 psig.**
c.
At least once per 13 months:
1.
For the core spray system the LPCI system, and the HPCI system, performing a system functional test wnich includes simulated auto-matic actuation of the system througnout its emergency operating sequence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position.
Actual injection of coolant into the reactor vessel may te excluded from *.his test.
"Exceot tnat an automatic valve capable of automatic return to its ECCS position when an ECCS signal is present may be in position for another mode of operation.
- The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.
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EMERGENC :0RE C00LI*.0 :" STEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.
For the HPCI system, verifying that:
a)
The system develops a flow of at least 5600 spm against a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of > 200 psig, when steam is being supplied to the turoine at 200 + 15, -0 psig.**
b)
The suction is automatically transferred from the condensate storage tans to the suppression chamber on a condensate storage tank water level - low signal and on a suppression chamcer - water level high signal.
3.
Perfoming a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the CSS, and LPCI systam discharge line " keep filled" alarm instrumentation.
4 Perfoming a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the CSS header AP instrumenta-tion and verifying the setpoint to be i the allowable value of 3.8 psid.
5.
Perfoming a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the LPCI header aP instrumen-tation and verifying the setpoint to be 1 the allowable value of 1.0 psid.
d.
For the ADS:
1.
At least once per 31 days, perfoming a CHANNEL FUNCT!ONAL TEST of the Primary Containment Instrument Gas System low-low pressure alarm system.
2.
At least once per 18 months:
a)
Perfoming a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence, but excluding actual valve actuation, b)
Manually opening each ADS valve when the reactor steam dome pressure is greater than or ecual to 100 psig"" and observing that either:
1)
The control valve or bypass valve position responds accordingly, or 2)
There is a corresponding cnange in the measured steam flow.
c)
Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the Primary Containment Instrument Gas System low-low pressure alarm system and verifying an alarm setpoint of 85 2 psig on decreasing pressure.
- The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicaole provided the survaillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.
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