ML20215F388
| ML20215F388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1986 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215F381 | List: |
| References | |
| CAL-86-12, NUDOCS 8610160184 | |
| Download: ML20215F388 (144) | |
Text
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT O
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O 8610160184 861003 PDR ADOCK 05000354 P PDR
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+ - - - - - - - . . -_ - - , - , - -.._,.,-,we ,-w-
INDEX
-s HOT LOSS OF POWER TEST N-- ITEM OBSERVATION H-1. SRV "P" DID NOT ARM AS DID SRV "H" ,
H-2. RCIC MINIMUM FLOW VALVE DID NOT OPEN DURING FLOW TRANSITION H-3. 120VAC UPS TROUBLE ALARM WAS IN DURING LOP TEST
-'r H-4. DIESEL FIRE PUMP HOUSE DOORS WERE LOCKED H-5. CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER ALARM WAS NUISANCE
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H-6. THE RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL MODE NOT COVERED BY PROCEDURE H-7. "B" RACS PUMP DID NOT AUTO-START H-8. FALSE FIRE INDICATED IN ROOM 5704 H-9. CIRCUIT BREAKER DID NOT TRIP ON CIRC WATER PUMPS AND -
AUX BOILER H-10. SACS PUMP "B" DID NOT START H-ll. "B" SERVICE H 2O SCREENWASH PUMP HOT BEARING INDICATION H-12. CIRC WATER PUMP / VALVE INDICATIONS H-13. DRYWELL FAN FAILED TO RE-START H-14. FRVS FANS FAILED TO RE-START H-15. "H" OR "K" SRV INDICATED OPEN WHEN IT WAS NOT H-16. "A" AND "B" DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED AND CLOSED H-17. TURBINE BUILDING CHILLED WATER PROBLEM H-18. NUMEROUS RODS FAILED TO INDICATE FULL IN H-19. OPERATOR COULD NOT DRIVE SRM'S OR IRM'S INTO CORE H-20. REACTOR BUILDING SUPPLY AND EXHAUST FANS DID NOT START ,
! H-21. POWER WAS LOST RSCS AND SRVPIS H-22. RACS PUMP LOST DURING LOP I
H-23. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR
() H-24. EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR "C" OUTPUT BREAKER FAILED TO AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE
_ - - - - _ , - _ . - - - , - , - . . . _ . . .-, ~ ,,,--...,,.__,y .--.-, , , -,- a w ,, - . - , - . . _ , - ~ .m- - _ -, , - . - . , .
INDEX i
~ COLD LOSS OF POWER TEST ;
ITEM OBSERVATION C- 1. - DRYWELL FAN (lGl-VH212) FAN FAILED TO START .
C-2. RACS "B" PROCESS START INHIBIT FAILED IN BAILEY
, C-3. RBVS FAILED TO MAINTAIN SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AT NEGATIVE PRESSURE s-C-4. 10K 100 HAD A GROUND FAULT C-5. SERVICE AIR ISOLATION KA HV-7595 HAS DUAL INDICATION C-6. "B" SACS LOOP HEAD TANK LEVEL INDICATION FAILED C-7. CONTROL ROOM RETURN AIR FAN BV'415 FAILED TO START i C-8. OUTSIDE AIR ISOL.' DAMPER HD 9588 AA DID NOT ISOLATE C-9. SERVICE WATER YARD DUMPS OPENED .
C-10. HI PRESSURE ALARM ON "B" SERVICE WATER LOOP ,
i C-ll. LI-R604 WIDE RANGE & R605 SHUTDOWN RANGE RX. WATER LEVEL FAILED O C-12.
CONTROL BLDG. HEATERS WERE DUSTY & CAUSED A BURNING ODOR WHEN PUT IN SERVICE
! C-13. 52-11001 NORM. FEED TO 10A 110 BUS FAILED W/ ALT. FEED CLOSING IN. (DURING RESTORATION)
I C-14. 52-10101 NORM. FEED TO 10A101 NORM. INFEED ENGERIZED BKR.
WHEN AUTO CLOSE/ BLOCK WAS DESELECTED l
C-15. "C" DIESEL FAILED TO INITIALLY DECREASE PER OPERATOR DEMAND (EVENTUALLY RESPONDED PER DEMAND)
C-16. RACS PUMPS - LOSS OF AMPERAGE INDICATION - ALL PUMPS, UNIT NORMAL PWR. RESTORED C-17. CRIDS - LOCAL PANEL DISPLAYS 4
0
H-1 CUPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER S OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION Low-Low set MSRV "P" did not initiate as did Low-Low set MSRV "H". During the LOP, the increase of reactor pressure was gradual. The result was that MSRV "H" .. ,
Low-Low Setpoint circuitry armed and opened the valve thus lowering reactor pressure before arming Low-Low Setpoint circuitry for MSRV "P". (cont. on page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE '
Operated as designed. Observer was not aware of valve setpoints.
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS This condition would not have been found during pre-operational testing because Main Steam / Reactor Pressure l was not available. Pre-operational testing confirmed that the circuitry conformed (continued on page 4).
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Nor.e required.
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HOP 3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
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VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
None required. However, instrument calibration and circuit verification was performed :
Procedures: IC-CC.BB 062(Q)
IC-CC.BB 063(O)
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IC-SC.BB 096(O) ii) Reference Documentation Hope Creek Generatino Station Technical Specs and prints 10855-N1-B21-1060-63 Sheet 1 through 12.
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
.:- equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
() Yes.
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Test procedures were satisfactorily completed.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No p D
HOPE CREEK
, NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER p
t OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION Both MSRV's have.the same arming pressure (1047 PSIG).
Circuit investigation revealed that the Reactor Pressure transmitter for MSRV "P" was set slightly higher (0.02MA) than sister MSRV "H", but within Design Tolerance.
(* 0.06MA) NOTE: 0.06MA=4.5 PSIG.
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HOP 3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER 3 OBSERVATION REPORT ,
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CONTINUATION SHEET N) .
i' Continued from Section IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/ SURVEILLANCE TESTS to the desion criteria.
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Existing surveillance requirement performs a " Channel Function Test" every 31 days and performs a " Channel .
Calibration" and " Logic System Functional Test" of the entire system at least once per 18 months.
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H-2 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION m BOT / COLD IDSS OF PONER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION The RCIC minimum flow valve,(1-BD-SV-F019), did not open when the RCIC operational mode was changed from
..m RPV water level control (RPV injection) to pressure control (CST to CST) during the loss of power test.
(Continued)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE .
Operated as designed. Observer was not familiar with operation of the valves.
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS The RCIC minimum flow valve (1-BD-SV-F019) functioned as designea during the preoperational/ surveillance tests.
I V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION a) Near Term: After the LOP test, a work order (86-09-12-091-1) was issued and valve 1-BD-SV-F019 was I
tested. The test verified (continued page 4) l l Page 1 of 4 O
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HOPE CREEK .
NUCLEAR GENERATLING STATION '
l HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALdATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Per W. O. 86-09-12-091-1 the valve functioned as .. ,,
designed.
ii) Reference Documentation W.O. 86-09-12-091-1 .
'iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
() equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
The W. O. 86-09-12-091-1 proved that the minimum flou valve (1-BD-SV-F019) operates as designed.
l VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No ___
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H2P3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER
- OBSERVATION REPORT l p/
(, CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION The RCIC minimum flow valve operated as designed. The RCIC operational mode was changed from water level control (RPV injection) to pressure control (CST to (CST by closing the RPV injection valve (1-BD-HV-F013) and opening the pump test return valve (1-BD-HV-F022).
~
System Engineering (P. Ayers) reported that he observed the operator open 1-BD-HV-F022 immediately after 1-BD-HV-F013 indicated closed. However, the valve closed indication occurs when the valve is approximately 2% open going closed. Since valve
()
1-BD-HV-F022 was immediately opened when the closed signal for 1-BD-HV-F013 was observed, Engineering believes that the RCIC pump flow never decreased to i
l the 90 GPM setpoint which is required to cause the minimum flow valve to open.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V that the minimum flow valve (l-BD-SV-F019) opened when a low flow signal (less than 90 GPM) and a high
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RCIC pump discharge pressure (greater than 125 PSIG) were inputted simultaneously to trip their respected units (E51-N651 and E51-N650). ,
Furthermore, the CRIDS data taken during bhe LOP test suggests that the flow did not reach 90 GPM.
Specifically, the shift log states that the change -
from RPV water level control to pressure control occurred at 2043. A RCIC low f' low alarm was received on CRIDS at 20:44 :3 6 (alarm setpoint is 250.0 GPM).
l
, However, at 20:45:06 (30 seconds later), flow indicated to be 480 GPM and prior to 20:44:36 the
%IC system was at full flow injecting to the RPV.
Tne above data indicates the flow did not fall below 90 GPM which is needed for the minimum flow valve to cpen.
Therefore RCIC operated properly.
b) Long Term: None. The minimum flow valve and the RCIC system worked properly, as designed.
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H-3 BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT G
I. OBSERVATION .
120VAC UPS trouble (D3-E3) constantly was observed during LOP test. The 120 VAC UPS trouble alarmed approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to LOP test, due to plant maintenance activities. (continued on page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Observer was not aware that alarm was up prior to LOP .
test.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
Os SURVEILLANCE TESTS System was in its normal configuration during pre-op and surveillance testing.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Work orders 8 609100332 and 8 609150909 were completed.
System was placed in back to normal configuration and the alarm cleared. -
Revise procedure for LOP to include check of alarms before the test.
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H3PE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION.
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT V
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
None (observed alarm cleared visually). ..,
ii) Reference Documentation None attached. -
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A i
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O 2 of 3 Page
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1 HDPE' CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O -
OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I was initiated '
approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to LOP test, due to plant maintenance activities. Plant Electrical
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maintenance was working on UPS (W/O 8609100332 &
869150909) system during this time period. Transfer switch 10N401 between IDC680 and IBD680 was out of configuration causing the alarm condition.
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H-4 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS O'/ POWER gD OBSERVATION REPORT (d
I. OBSERVATION Fire Pumn doorlock failed to operate when Site Pro-l tection personnel attempted to enter the diesel driven
. .w fire pump room. Prior to the LOP test, Site Protection (continued)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
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III. ROOT CAUSE Lock failed to operate.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS i
Lock was functional.
l V. _
NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Near Terms P.emoved lock cylinder.
Long Term: Work order 8605261018 initiated to replace lockset and repair door. Door will remain unlocked at the discretion of the Manager - Site-Protection.
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Page 1 of 3
l HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD LOSS OF POtfBR O OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe ectual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Not applicable ,..-
r s
- 11) Referent > Documentation Not applicable iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
Os equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Not applicable VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
Page 2 of 3
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
) CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I personnel were dispatched to the fire pump house _to monitor the diesel driven p re pump which automatically started upon loss of
.c offsite power. Upon arriving site protection personnel found master key would not unlock door to fire pump room. A faulty lock cylinder and the double door ~
latch (from inside were found to be the cause.) Site Protection personnel then used a K-tool to shear dead bolt and enter room. .
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H-5 COR2 CRggg WUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION -
Hydrogen Recombiner Alarm was a nuisance. When power was restored to the hydrogen recombiner (continued)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
f III. ROOT CAUSE The volume adjustment on the horn had not been adjusted '
to a criteria during the preoperational test program.
I V. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS -
The preoperational test did not test for the volume of the alarm. Surveillance test OP-ST.GS-005 does not test for the volume of the alarm. It had not been identified as a problem prior to the test being performed. Back panel alarm volumes were not addressed I
in the control room huma'n factors re',.'.ew.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS No fix required, the noise' level of the alarm was adjusted to a moderate level.
t Page 1 of 3
i HOPE CREEK NDCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT '
L.)
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
(No retest required) . -c ii) Reference Documentation ib) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
VII. IS THIS A F.EPORTABLE ITEM? No l
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l il HOPE CREEE NUCIEAR GENERATING STATION .
HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER f') OBSERVATION REPORT V ~
CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. panel, the annunciation horn on the panel sounded and was found to be objectionably loud. I s
The hydrogen recombiner panels in this observation are 1A/BC-633, which are located in the bach.of the
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main control room behind the " Horseshoe".
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H-6 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD EDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT O)
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I. OBSERVATION l
During the Loss of Power test on Thursday, September 11 1986, it was noted that the sequence needed to swap (Continued Page 3) -w l II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE _
Observance not familar with operators procedures and trainino.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS
() RCIC Preop gave step by step direction for all actions required to change operating modes. The operatino l
l procedure [OP-SO.BD-001(O)] was not used for specific l
step by step directions during the preop test program.
(Continued Page 3)
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Short term: On-the-spot change was issued for procedure OP-SO.BD-001(O) to provide instruction for chanoina the RCIC flow path from iniecting into the CST to iniecting into the RPV. The on-the-spot change also included instruction for changina the RCIC flow path from RPV injection to injecting into the CST.
Lonc term: The on-the-spot chance will be permanently incorporated into OP-SO.BD-001(O).
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BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,
"3 HOT / COLD IDSD OF POWER , ;
OBSERVATION REPORT >
l
. i O VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Non required ii) Reference Documentation OP-SO.BD-001(0) not attiched. . . . . .will provide upon request. -
lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
l VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No >
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Page 2 of 3 l
1 HHPE CRE2K NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER ,
OBSERVATION REPORT
,Q)
(_ -
CONTINUATION SHEET I Continued from Section I observation:
i RCIC from the pressure control mode (CST to CST) to l the water level control mode (vessel iniection) is
.w not covered by procedure. Upon review, the procedure was considered adequate, however an on-the-spot change was issued to include this system alignment as an enhancement.
Section IV Continued: Operation surveillance only .
operate RCIC in the CST to CST mode.
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,,_ HEPE C32EK. j; NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
_l' BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER i' OBSERVATION REPORT i.
I.. " OBSERVATION I It was observed during the Loss of Power (LOP) test of ,
1
- September 11, 1986 that 85 seconds into the LOP (continued on Page 3 of 3).
.w II. LEAD SPONSOR -
j III. ROOT CAUSE Procedure OP-AB.22-135(O) procedure was deficient in that the procedure that added the loading tables neglected to add the note that "B" RACS starts only if -
"A" RACS trips. -
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS
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l Acceptance criteria of preoperational tests clearly l stated to verify only RACS pump AP209 starts on LOP without LOCA, since this is system design. (Ref.
J-13-0, Sheet 6, FSAR Section 9.2.8.2, and DITS D3.ll).
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Revise procedure OP-AB.22-135 to clearly state that '
RACS pump BP209 will auto start only if RACS pump AP209 trips or fails to start during a LOP without
. -LOCA, and train operating personnel accordingly.
It should also be noted at this time that a design change package (DCP) is being developed to ensure that (continued)
Page 1 of 3 0
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HOP 3 CRIBE~
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION !!
HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER 1l OBSERVATION REPORT <'
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'i VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
In addition to the above observation, it was later determined that the operators should not have been able to start pump BP209 manually due to the Process Start Inhibit Switch (PSIS). This was confirmed during the cold LOP. See Cold LOP #2.
ii) Reference Documentation ,
N/A iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
O Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O Page 2 of 3 e -r _--- -- . _ _ __-- . . . - . . - -
-_.,....,-,._._._.__._.-__,--.--,__,% ,.-._ -_ m ,,m, . -- . - _ . . _ . . _.y., _,., - ,
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HOP 3 CREEK i NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD EDSS OF POWER I OBSERVATION REPORT !
CONTINUATION SHEET
(} )
Continued from section I. Reactor Auxiliaries -
Cooling System (RACS) pump AP209 started automatically and RACS pump BP209 failed to auto start. The control room operators, believing this condition to be
inconsistent with their understanding of the RACS operating procedure and procedure chart, proceeded to manually start BP209 and reported this observation -
as a problem during the initial test debriefing.
Contined from Section V. the Emergency Instrument Air Compressor will always have a sufficient supply of RACS cooling water during a LOP w/o LOCA. This DCP ( DCP-4-HMJ-8 6-12 5 6 ) will revise the existing RACS pump auto start logic on LOP w/o LOCA to a two (2) RACS pump auto start logic, as well as, the deletion of the Process Start Inhibit Signal (PSIS).
It is our intention to implement this ch'ange prior to the next authorized cold LOP Test. Once this DCP is imolemented Procedure OP-AB.22-135, as well as the RACS operating procedure, will be revised to reflect this new design. ,
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H-8 :.
BOPE CREEK i NUCLEAR GENERATIleG STATION !-
HOT / COLD EDSS OF POWER i OBSERVATION REPORT }
n)
I. OBSERVATION Falso fire alarm was indicated in the Diesel' Area HVAC Equipment Room (Room 5704).
II. LEAD SPONSOR -t x
III. ROOT CAUSE DCP 4-ECE-86-469 was not implemented in a timelv manner due to material delivery restraints.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/ .
SURVEILLANCE TESTS This problem was identified during preoperational/
, surveillance tests, and is addressed by Design Chance Package (DCP) 4-ECC-86-469.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION DCP 4-ECC-86-469 will modify the exhaust hoods on the 1
roof to prevent exhaust cases from enterina the Diesel Generator Building. The modifications include installation of a penetrhtion seal between the exhaust I
stacks and roof, cuttino vent holes in the hood sleeve below the seal to hilow ventilation of the shaft around the stacks, and modification of the exhaust hood cover plates.
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i HOPE CREEK 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER !
OBSERVATION REPORT (J) x-VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
After implementation of DCP 4-ECC-86-469, routine
.r*
surveillance tests of the diesel generators required by the Tqchnical Specification (Section 4.8.1.1.1) will ser,'e to test the effectivenens of the DCP modifications. Any exhaust leakage into the building will be further evaluated at that time.
ii) Reference Documentation ,
N/A lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
O Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? fBt l
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H-9 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION g Hor / COLD LOSS OF POWER
} OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION Breaker 52-50201 did not trip on undervoltage during Loss Of Power test.
II. LEAD S PONSOR - _
III. ROOT CAUSE None. Breaker worked fine when tested af ter the Loss Of Power test under the following conditions. 1) Under-voltage condition 2) Loss of Offsite power by (Cont.) -
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS -
N[5 Preoperational (PTP NB-1) and surveillance tests worked satisfactorily.
1 V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS None. No problems were discovered after inspection and operational verification of the normal supply circuit l breaker 52-50201 and the circuit breaker functioned as designed per referenced drawings listed in VI (ii).
O Page 1 of 3
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER p OBSERVATION REPORT V
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Retest of the incoming supply breaker 52-50201 to . ,.
4.16kv bus 10A502 was performed on 9/15/86 per work order 86-09-12-1003. Breaker worked as per design and no problems were discovered. Under Cold LOP this breaker performed satisfactory.
ii) Reference Documentation 10855-E-0001-0, 10855-E-0005-0, 10855-E-0100-1, (Cont.)
111) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
\s- Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes. Based on the tests performed listed in Section III, incoming supply breaker should have no problem in its performance when retested.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No Page 2 of 3
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF PONER b)
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OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from.Section III opening primary fuse drawer. 3) no voltage perturbations occurred when strip chart racorder was installed to monitor the DC
- control power to supply breaker.
Continued from Section VI 11 10855-E-Olll-0 Sht. 3, 10855-E-3050-0 Shts. 1 & 2, 10855-E-4100-1, 10855-J200(0)-114, 10855-J200(0)-1035 & 10855-E109-345 l
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H-10 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER
{')/
v OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION It was observed the SACS Pump B did not start from the sequencer on the first LOP. ,
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Based on available information, the apparent root cause of the reported failure of SACS Pump 1BP210 has not been determined.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS
() System performed correctly during preoperational/
surveillance tests. (BB-3) i j V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Work Order Number 86-09-14-014-8 was ge'erated n to troubleshoot the problem. A module in cabinet BC652 in i location 8-3-4 was determined to be defective and was replaced. Procedures utilized were IC-GP.ZZ-008 and IC-GP.ZZ-031. However, this defect could not have prevented the pump to start.
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BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER 4- OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Two functional tests were performed subsequent to the '
module replacement. The first simulation of an LOP signal via the available test switch at sequencer panel BC428. The second was the actual cold LOP. The equip-ment performed (pumps came on) per its intended design under both tests.
ii) Reference Documentation Work Order 486-09-14-014-8, J-ll-0, Shts. 4 & 5, J-105 Sht. 6, J200(0)-573-16 and J200(Q)-1239-ll.
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
The retests prove that the equipment will perform during LOP. During retest, the module was instrumented l
and reading recorded to prove that the circuit and pump operated per the intended design.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
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H-ll B!P3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER s OBSERVATION REPORT
)
J I. OBSERVATION Computer point A2493 indicated high bearing temperature on the B service water (cont'd)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Observer was not aware that alarm was up prior to LOP test. Operator did not issue a work order in a timely manner.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS This item would have been picked up during preop testing, but occurred afterwards due to corrective
- maintenance on the pump. Surveillance testing uses M&TE equipment (contact pyrometers) to measure bearing temperatures.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Work order 8609120074 repaired insulation.
I Revised procedure for LOP will log alarms prior to LOP and action will be taken to reduce nuisance alarms to assure timely operator response.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF PONER OBSERVATION REPORT u./
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test
~
boundary).
verified proper function of the computer point and thermocouple through an ambient temperature check.
1 ii) Reference Documentation Work order #8 609120074
'I'i i ) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify, Yes. The problem was corrective maintenance and was not related to the loss of offsite power test.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION f HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER t OBSERVATION REPORT k CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I Screenwash Pump (EP-BP507). Operator inspection indicated the pump was not running hot. The wiring insulation was w
damaged shorting the RTD temperature element. A review of the CRIDS alarm chronolog shows that the short first occurred at 6:30 p.m. on 9/5/8 6 (probes were installed earlier that day and teste'd satisfactorily at the' completion of pump maintenance).
A work order was written on 9/12 and has since been ,
completed to repair insulation.
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' HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
' HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION. .
Observation At Concurrent indication of full open, I
full close, and open mid indicatina lichts on control switch DA-HS-2152D when valve HV-2152D is fully open. "~
Observation B No start enable indication on switches DA-HS-2156C1 and D1 even thouch pumps CP501 and DP501 were runninc.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Observation At Root cause has been definitively established to be a cam follower type of limit switch
~'
(NAMCO EA-700) that did not reset properly during the hot LOP.
Observation B Root Cause was random failure of the
" Start Enable" indicating lights for pumps CP501 and DP501.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Observations A and B: Preoperational testing properly tested out all aspects of the control switch, valve function, and indication lichts. Surveillance testina
- N/A for non-Tech Spec. components.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Observation A In order to ensure that the Bailey components are not at fault, the input from the CEC (Continued)
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HOP 3 CRIEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER
(' OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Observation A": Later - will be completed during the LOP test.
Observation B N/A
- 11) Reference Documentation ,
Observation As TE-SU.ZZ-313(O). Observation B N/A.
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
()
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Observation At Later - will be completed during the .
LOP test.
I VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No N/A for both observation A and B.
I
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l HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER
~N OBSERVATION REPORT (V CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V. i NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE '
ACTION l Multiplexer cabinet (1BC676) will be instrumented at various points. This will be included in the LOP retest (TE-SU.22-313(O) scheduled for 10/1/86.
In addition, an observer will be stationed at the circulatino water pumphouse. It is also recommended that the reliability of these types of limit switches, in this application, be investicated further.
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ObserYation B Indicating lichts have been replacedt more O frequent lamp testino will be routinely performed.
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H-13 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER (3 OBSERVATION REPORT k)
I. OBSERVATION Drywell fan ICIV212 failed to restart
.c II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE This was an error in observation. It was idlV212 that failed to start and was identified in Shutdown LOP observation #1. .
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS System function per design during preop and surveil-lance testing.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Near term: Extensive retesting did not duplicate the problem. Fan started satisfactorily on retest.
Long term N/A i
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
With the control switch in auto and the fan running, s a bus failure signal was simulated in Bailey and the fan tripped. Simulated a process start inhibit and sequence start and the fan restarted per design. -
ii) Reference Documentation Work Order #86-09-14-023-7 iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes. The test simulated LOP and the fan tripped and i
restarted per design. The fan also worked without any
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problems on the shutdown LOP test.
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I VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No t
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H-14 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O BOT / COLD LOSS OF PONER
-(V OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION FRVS fans failed to auto start following the LOP.
System functioned per design. FRVS is not designed to ,.
auto start following a Loss of Power. The LOP abnormal procedure was in error since it incorrectly identified that FRVS should start following a LOP.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Procedure and training deficiency.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS N/A 1
l V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION NEAR TERM Revise OP-AB.ZZ-135(Q) to add note deleted from Rev. 1. When Rev. 2 was issued, note states that i
LONG TERM Change simulator to reflect as designed condition.
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HOP 3 CREZK i NUCLEAR GENERATIr3G STATION l HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER l fJ OBSERVATION REPORT l VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test i boundary).
N/A - No retest required. ..
ii) Reference Documentation FRVS Recirc. Logic H-83-0 Sheet 4r J-105-0, Sheets 4, 6 8,10 FRVS Vent Logic H-84-0 Sheet 3r J-105-0, Sheet 4 d iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A - System functioned per design. No problems were found.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
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H-15 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O NOT/ COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
- I. OBSERVATION ^
Whenever "H"_or "K" MSRV was opened, MSRV "P" Acoustic Monitor indicated the valve was open, when in fact it was not.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE i "P" MSRV Acoustic accelerometer was found to be inoperative.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS During previous tests (preoperational/ surveillance) the system was operable. Preoperational testina demonstrated that the Acoustic Monitors and circuitry were operable. Existing surveillance requirennts perform a ' Channel Function Test' every 31 days and a
" Channel Calibration" at least once per 18 months.
V., NEAR E LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Replaced the "P" MSRV sensor and verified the circuit was operable.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable)
- i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
The acoustic sensor was replaced and the circuit was ,,
verified through procedure IC-CC.AB-041(O).
ii) Reference Documentation IC-CC.AB-041(O) 111) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
- equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
() Yes. Test procedures were satisfactorily completed.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? pio e
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H-16 H3PE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION "A" and "B" diesel generators transferred to droop mode automatically once the offsite power restored. (Cont.)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
s III. ROOT CAUSE Procedure deficiency. Operator not provided with sufficient information in procedure.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS During the performance of PTP-BB3, this observation was documented in SDR KJ-1416 as a potential design problem by tha S/U engineer. The engineering review dis-positioned this as not a design problem. Therefore no further action was considered necessary. (Continued)
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION In the near term, the DG monthly surveillance (OP.ST.
KJ001 thru 004) procedure has been revised to require the operator to push the isochronous button to reset the droop /isochronous circuit. OP.22.AB-135 has bqen revised to provide guidance if during the LOP it is necessary to shift the diesel generator to Isochronous.
In the long term, a design chan,qe request ( DCR 8 6-1250 )
has been issued to consider a design change so that the governor control circuit will go into droop only when
() manually selected.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER T OBSERVATION REPORT i
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VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe er,tual retest performed (Include test boundary).
None -
- 11) Reference Documentation Drawings M18(O)354-7 and M18(O)366-12 iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Not applicable VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O, OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I The diesel generator worked as per design. A memory circuit contact in the droop /isochronous circuit that caused the diesel to .,
go to the droop mode once the LOP signal is reset.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER ,
OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section IV During the initial performance of 18 month surveillance testing on 'B' diesel generator, problem was encountered in meeting n
the required frequency 58.8 thru 61.2 Hz associated with single load rejection test. Investigation of the governor control circuit revealed the governor was in droop instead of being in isochronous due to the sequence of breaker operations required for this test.
A retest of this diesel verified the investigation .
results. Later, 18 month surveillance testing of the
. D ' diesel incorporated steps in the procedure to assure isochronous mode prior to LOP /LOCA testing.
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l H-17 BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION NOT/ COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT l
I. OBSERVATION After restoration of o$fsite power & while attempting to re-establish Turbine Buildino Chilled Water, the ..
(Continued on Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR - _
III. ROOT CAUSE For the four observations in Section I:
Item 1 & 2 - Loss of instrument air prevented restart of chillers. Item 3-Equipment Failure Item 4-Inadequate ,
procedural cuideline for chiller restart after LOP.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
l SURVEILLANCE TESTS Preoperational testina verified that the chillers would start usina a normal startino procedure.
Attempts to recover chilled water post-LOP, were made prior to re-establishing support systems.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Near T'erm: Operator cuidance for restoration of chilled water has been included in the " Loss of Offsite Power" procedure.
Loose Allen Screws were reinstalled & tichtened.
Instrument air will be verified > 80 PSIG prior to start.
Lono Term: Recheck Observation Item 3 with Vendor.
Page 1 of 4
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
(]S VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
i) Descr'ibe actual retest performed (Include test boundary). '
Subsequent to the Hot Lop, cuidance was provided to the operators regarding chiller restoration. Utilizing this cuidance, the chillers were successfully restarted .
after the Cold LOP. '-
ii) Reference Documentation M-0623, OP-AB.ZZ-135(O)
[ iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
\ equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes. After re-establishing the necessary support systems (instrument air, TACS), the chillers started per design, during Cold LOP restoration.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? NO O
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, BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER 0- OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I Observations following observations were made: 1. Two of the four chiller discharge valves had dual indication. .
- 2. Chiller " Safety" Circuit Complete" lights were present, but chillers would not start.
1
- 3. DKill chiller started but never loaded. .
l 4. AKill chiller started but tripped on overload.
Discussion: 1. Chiller discharae valves 1GB-HV-9503 A, B, C& D failed to OPEN position, per design on the LOP. When Non-lE power was restored, the two valves which initially closed prior to'the LOP, tried to reclose. Insufficient Instrument Air prevented the valves from closino fully, thus dual indication.
- 2. Chiller " Safety Circuit Complete" light was present after the operator depressed the chiller "ON" pushbutton. At this period of time, the chiller circuitry is only concerned about internal chiller parameters. After the ST. ART pushbutton is depressed, l the chiller circuitry is concerned about chiller parameters plus chilled water flow (evaporator i flow). Durino restoration of Non-lE power after the LOP, it was noted in item #1 i
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80PE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT f}
a CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I Observation:
that all four discharge valves were either full or partially open. This condition prevented the chillers from starting due to low evaporator flow.
Normal operation is only three of four discharge valves (HV-9503A, B, C, or D) open.
- 3. DKill chiller started but did not load.
Investication found the two allen screws which secure the guide vane actuator sprocket to the guide vane ,
actuator motor shaft were loose. This condition allowed the guide vane actuator shaft to move trying to load, but the cuide vane would not open due to l sprocket slippage.
- 4. AKill chiller started but tripped on overload.
The chiller tripped due to no TACS Flow. When AKlli chiller was started, TACS had not yet been re-established. In trying to chill system water, the AKill chiller loaded up immediately and continued to increase lodding, and over amped before a high condenser safety switch tripped the chiller on high condenser pressure. The " Loss of Offsite Power" procedure did not address restartino of chillers after a lop.
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H-18 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER (d) u OBSERVATICM REPORT I. OBSERVATION 17 rods were observed not to indicate FULL IN on the Full Core Display. However, the operators verified that the rods were in by selecting each rod and checking the Four Rod Display for "00" (Continued) indication.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Equipment failure brought about by inadequate ven' dor
.=-
GE material control.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS The Probe Data Processor Card which was successfully tested during the preoperational test program was subsequently replaced due to a failure of the card.
The faulty GE supplied replacement card was function-ally ratested via the FULL CORE DISPLAY which is adequate retesting for non-O components. Additionally, there is no surveillance specifically required to test the Probe Data Processor Programming.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Near Term: The Probe Data Processor Card with the O proper PROM (continued on page 4) ,
Page 1 of 4
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT ,
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test i
boundary).
Using a Nuclear System Test Simulator (NSTS), the probe contacts for FULL IN were simulated. At that time, FULL IN indication was verified for the control
, rods. e-
- 11) Reference Documentation Work Order No. 86-09-16-124-2 i .
O ~iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument / ,
equipment will perform a.' required during a Hot /
! Cold Loss of Power? Jus ify.
Yes, the preoperational test proved the functionality of the RPIS by simulating rod position. The retest of the replaced equipment also ensures RPIS functionality by again simulating rod position.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No 1
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER O)
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OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I indication. It was determined that the PROM that interprets reed switch data for FULL IN indication was not the proper part as specified by the design drawings. This PROM is part of the Probe Data Processor Card, in the RPIS panel. Thus, the RPIS did not supply the FULL IN to indication on the FULL CORE DISPLAY.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION m HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V was installed.
Subsequently, a functional test simulating reed switch positions was succesfully performed. Additionally, ,,
a more frequent FULL CORE DISPLAY Lamp test will be performed.
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i j H-19 HOPE CREEK s '
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION m
BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION Operator could not drive SRM/IRM into core.
. .c II. LEAD SPONSOR -
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III. ROOT CAUSE Failure to logically follow through on an implied FSAR committment.
IV.
REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/ -
SURVEILLANCE TESTS N/A V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
No near term is required.
l Upon issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, the BWR Owner's Group developed a' position statement on the NRC requirement for a Category I source range monitor.
This 1982 position included a suggestion that the industry would explore four methods of improving the the system but meeting only Category 2 variable quality and that the Category I was not necessary. The (Cont.)
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IESS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
None
ii) Reference Documentation DCP #4-ECE-86-964; FSAR -
i i) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF PONER O. . OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V four methods included:
- 1. Upgrading two monitor hardware (SRMs) and leave them partially inserted during norme:1 operation.
s
- 2. Replace two SRMs with new monitors and drive systems.
- 3. Install additional " fixed" detectors in the IRM
& LPRM strings.
- 4. Install out-of-core detectors.
Subsequently, several industry initiatives were begun to further develop suitable detectors. As indicated in the Hope Creek SER Supplement 2, the applicant intends to follow industry developments and install a Category 1 variable at a later date.
Duting FSAR review by the NRC, the I&C branch reviewed the neutron detector power supply and required it be removed'from RPS and placed on UPS. No requirement for the drives was imposed at the cime by the NRC.
There is no instance of an FSAR commitment regarding the Neutron Monitoring System being incorrectly (cont) l l
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD TASS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
, CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V reflected in the existing design. In light of the discussions with the NRC, however, relating to the use of SLC, and as an enhancement to operator interface under loss of power, a modification to place the drives on a backup power source has been initiated. This modification is .
documented in DCP (4-ECE-86-964 which is presently being developed.
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H-20 BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s
I HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION Reactor Building supply and exhaust fans did not start.
Two of three RBVS exhaust fans A/B/CV301 did start 19 .,_
seconds after diesel breaker closure and two of three supply fans A/B/CVH300 started 25 sec. (Cont on Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR - _
III. ROOT CAUSE -
Administrative oversight in that DCP 4-HMM-86-669 was not issued and implemented prior to LOP.
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS SDR ZZ-0901 was prepared during preoperational testing to identify RBVS and Radwaste HVAC systems as having shut-off dampers and control instrumentation on Non-IE power sources not backed by diesels. '(Cont. on Page 4) l V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION DCP 687 Rev. 3 was implemented to correct problem.
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All open DCRs and DCPs which have not been implemented should be reviewed for licensing basis.
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HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary). '
The RBVS system was retested during the cold LOP '
following installation of DCP 687 Rev. 3. When the fans started, the dampers opened and the RBVS system operated in accordance with design until instrument air pressure dropped.
I 11) Reference Documentation DCR 4-HMM-86-669 and DCP 687 Rev. 3 O iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipmen't will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
l Yes. RBVS System was retested during the cold LOP i
l following installation of DCP 687 Rev. 3 and it performed satisfactorly until instrument air pressure dropped.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE _ ITEM? No.
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BOPE. CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUhTION SHEET Continued from Section I after diesel breaker closure. The fans tripped on low flow because of the following two reasons: w First, the supply containment isolation damper 1GR-HD-9370A and exhaust containment isolation damper i 1GR-HD-9414A did not open. These dampers are designed to fail close on a loss of oower or air prescure. These dampers are powered by IE power from
. C Channel. The C Channel was not energized during I
the first minutes into the LOP test when the fans.
weite started by their sequence start signals.
t O Second, the RBVS fan suction and discharge I
i dampers did not open because they are powered from f Non-IE sources that are not diesel backed. These 1
dampers are designed to fail closed on loss of power or air pressure.
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BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET l
Continued'from Section IV This problem was not corrected prior to the Hot Loss Of Power test. The following is a' chronological sequence of events leading up to final resolution of this problem.
12/16/85 SDR 22-0901 initiated 1/6/86 DCP 687 Rev. O was issued to co nect the dampers to the sane diesel backed power source as their associated fans. -
4 1/17/86 SDR ZZ-0901A identified DCP 687 Rev. O as i .. providing diesel backed power to dampers
( from a single channel whereas the fans are powered from all four channels.
l
- 2/13/86 DCP 687 Rev. I was issued to construction I
-- to provide the dampers with diesel backed l
power from all four channels.
2/28/86 GH and GR systems were turned over.
3/17/86 Received relays.
3/28/86 Received solenoid valves. All materials On-Site.
5/20/86 DCR 4-HMM-86-669 was issued to track work completion to issue DCP 687.
O Page 4 of 5
.y.m-m-- , ,.,,w-, p. -,--.,u-,-%m w--.y- -- -w-c-ye ,,w.---w---w-m m..m= e._mtmmw-.__m----
[
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
('
\
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section IV 5/23/86 DCP 687 Rev. 2 was issued to conform with SEI 4.2.
5/30/86 SDR ZZ-0901A was closed.
5/30/86 DCR 4-HMM-86-669 was changed from Mode 2 to Mode 1. -
6/6/86 System Engineering determined r'stest requirements were missing from DCP 687 Rev. 2. ,
8/7/86 DCR was changed from Mode 1 to Mode 6.
8/25/86 Off-Site Safety Review submitted their comments on the Safety Evaluation for DCP 687 Rev. 2.
9/11/86 DCP 687 Rev. 3 was issued to incorporate
-~
retest requirements and revised Safety l
Evaluation.
9/11/86 Hot LOP conducted.
9/15/86 DCP 687 Rev. 3 was SORC approved.
9/17/86 Installation of RBVS portion of DCP 687
. was complete. Radwaste portion was deferred.
9/19/86 Cold LOP conducted and RBVS performed satisfactorly.
O Page 5 of 5
H-21a HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION r~ HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER
( OBSERVATION REPORT -
OBSERVATION I.
Power to the SRV Position Indication System (SRVPIS) or Acoustic Monitor was lost during the LOP test.
(continued on page 3.)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
, III. ROOT CAUSE The root cause was failure to implement FSAR commitment into the design. ,
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS At the time of the preop test, the system was not on UPS power by design. There is no surveillance test to observe a LOP to this system.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION l
A. Short Term - A Design Change (DCP 4-EME-86-963) has been implemented to chance the power feed for the SRVPIS panel to a non-lE UPS. This DCP was succes-sfully tested durinQ the subsequent cold LOP test.
l (continued on page 4)
Page 1,of 7 0
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
After DCP 4-ECE-86-963 was implemented, the operability of the SRVPIS during a LOP was tested, durinq the cold LOP. The SRVPIS was monitored durina the test and it did not experience a loss of power.
ii) Reference Document'ation Detailed Testing Specification for DCP-4-ECE-86-963 and -
the cold LOP.
! iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes, the SRVPIS power was maintained during the cold LOP.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? Yes i j This is a condition outside of the design basis of the l plant (10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Other references l FSAR Table 7.5-1, Page 11 of 23 and Technical Specification 3.4.2.1, Action Statement C.
i s
Page 2 of 7 i
.__._.____.__...__.___.___.___._...________._.__.....,__,._..._._____.__.1,
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET 9
Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION 4
This was evidenced by all indicating lamps showing open and was per design. The SRVPIS control cabinet was powered s from a Non-lE distribution panel which is de-energized during LOP. Loss of power resulted by fail safe design in all indication reading open. The indicating lamps are powered by UPS.
Review of the FSAR showed that this system was required to '
be on UPS power. .
Alter ate indication by SRV tailpipe temperature was available (powered by UPS) in the control room.
l ?
Power supply was designed to be normal non-lE power. It should have been designed to be non-lE UPS. (Continued on page 4)
Page 3,of 7
i i
i HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION I- HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION l On September 11, 1986, a loss of offsite power test was ;
conducted which revealed, among other things, a loss of power to the Acoustic Monitoring System used for a backup position indication of the main steam safety relief valves.
The FSAR Table 7.5-1 identifies uninterruptible power supply (UPS) as the power supply for the valve position indication whereas the actual design provided for a non-UPS source.
~
[~}
N/
As a result of the discrepancy, a complete check was made of the entire FSAR Table 7.5-1 to verify that the power supply infcimation is correct for each displayed parameter.
The results 6-f the check showed that in addition to the contradiction in power supply information for the safety relief valve position indication, similar contradiction existed with displayed parameter LI-R605-B21 and TR-R605-Ell. The necessary Design Change Packages have been prepared to provide the required UPS power supplies to these items.
=
s Page 4 of 7
l HOPE CREEK '
NUCT. EAR GENERATING STATION m HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION In addition, two parameters, main condenser pressure indication and radwaste tank level indication, that are '
considered category 3 parameters by Regulatory Guide 1.97, '
Revision 2 were found to have stated in error that UPS power supplies were employed. Since there is go requirement for UPS, the FSAR will be chanced at a future time.
A review of the findings indicates that the cause of the oversichts in the table was attributable to a set of circumstances regarding the coordination of Non-lE power supply assignments of controls systems discipline devices.
In general, coordination between controls system and electrical disciplines for such assianments was through Design Installation and Test Documents, interdiscipline memoranda, or the routing of vendor or Sechtcl desi.an documents. In the case of IE devices, additional extensive design controls existed in the power supply assignment to ensure the proper power supply and division power supply P
Page s of 2
([])
.__ . - - - - __ _ __ _x
BOPE CREEK
. NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Contir.ued from Section I. OBSERVATION and division power supply assionments. InThe case of these Non-1E (FSAR Table 7.5-1) paramsters Bechtel has not been s able to locate any such coordination documents. Where assionments were not specifically stated for Non-lE devices, the electrical discipline cenerally feed power from a conveniently located Non-lE source.
Bechtel is continuino its review of other Non-lE controls system devices where an intent or committment to employ UPS may have been overlooked.
i 4
.e + - -- --.a , .-
--.--.m- ,
Page 6 of 7 l
)
- j
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O
' OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Nuclear Systems Engineering and Bechtel are presently reviewing other systems listed in the FSAR as requiring UPS power to verify compliance to Regulatory Guide commit-tments.
Long Term - None O
H-21b HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION- -
Power was lost to Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS).
It was reported that RSCS was lost durino the LOP based on loss of indication on the RSCS Display (continued)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE RSCS functioned per its design and does not come on after a LOP.
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Not applicable - See III above.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Short Term - HCGS procedure OP-AB-ZZ-135(Q) Step 4.15 was revised to reflect a loss of the RSCS display on a LOP. It states that the NSSS computer, CRIDS, or the 4-rod display should be used to determine rod position.
Page _1 of _3
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
None applicable. ..
e
- 11) Reference Documentation None applicable.
'lii) Does this retest prove thLt the instrument /
Os equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? o N_o_
O Page 2 of 3_
-HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O ~
OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION lamps in the- control room. The desian drawings indicate that the RSCS Display is separately powered from Non-lE r.
normal power.
The RSCS computer panel, however, is powered ~from UPS and
- was functional during the LOP. The RSCS Disp 1~ay is required to function during startup to provide operator input for rod sequence and substitute position (if .
required). Tha display acts as an aid in determining rod l status.
O The system functioned per design.
l e
.p Page 3_ of 3, O
1 I
_. _.____.....-__._______._.__..____._______.____.____.__..____._______i_
H-22 BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION p HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER (j OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION The RACS pumps were tripped during the LOP test due to the low water level in the RACS head tank.
-c In the event of LOP, RACS is inter-tied to the chilled water system to provide cooling water to the drywell chillers. This is accomplished by (Cont. on Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE -
Design deficiency.
O' IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS During the preoperational testing for the verification of the sequencer operation and RACS flow verification to the drywell, the manually operated flow balancing l
valves LED-V110, Vill, Vll2, & Vll3 (Cont. on Page 4) l j V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
( A permanent design change,has been issued, implemented I
and retested through the DCP #4-EMJ-86-962 which cor-l rects this problem. In this DCP the diesel sequencing.
time for the valves HV9530 Al, A3, B1 and B3 has been l changed from 85 sec. to 13 secs. These valves now fully close in about 72 secs. af ter the LOP signal and
() therefore close the flow path to the chilled water head tank before the RACS pump start and (Cont. on Page 5)
Page 1 of 5
- . - . _ _ - . _ - - _ - _ . - . . . . - . . _ , ..- - _. _ - ..- - _-- - .- L
l HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Per the DCP 4-EMJ-86-962 retest was performed to verify that on a LOP signal valves HV9530 Al, A3, B1 and B3 began to close after 13 seconds and 85 seconds after the LOP signal pump AP209 started and valves HV9530 A2, A4, B2 and B4 began to open. This retest was also performed during the " Cold LOP" on 9/19/86.
ii) Reference Documentation ,
DCP 4-EMJ-86-962 lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
("N equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
\ ,) Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
The retests per the DCP and per the " Cold LOP" verify that the RACS inter-tie to the drywell chiller will be accomplished such that the valves HV9530 Al, A3, B1, and B3 close before the pump AP209 (Cont. on Page 6 )
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No 1
O I Page 2 of 5-
l HOPE CREEK RUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O .
OBSERVATION REPORT COEFFINUATION SHEET '
Continued from Section I opening the intertie valves HV9530 A2, A4, B2, and B4 and closing the valves NV9530 Al, A3, Bl and B3. Upon receiving LOP .,
signal all these valves were sequenced on diesel in 85 secs. E they respectively began to open or close.
Time required to fully open or fully close these _
valves is approx. 59 secs.; RACS pump AP209 was also sequenced on diesel 85 secs. after the LOP signal and it started. Therefore, during the time period between the 85th sec. and 144th sec. the flow path to
_ the chilled water system head tank was still not fully closed and the RACS pump was running. This caused the water to flow to the chilled water system head tank (the least resistance path) and caused it to overflow. The RACS head tank lost its water
_ inventory and the water level reduced to the low low level which caused the RACS pump to trip.
O Page 3 of 5
__. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . __ S
BOP 3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF PONER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section IV which are respectively located upstream of the valves HV9530 A2, A4, B2 and B4 were initially closed (Reference PTP-ED-1). These valves were opened after the sequencer closed the _,
valves HV9530 Al, A3, B1 & B3, opened the valves HV9530 A2, A4, B2, B4 and started the pump AP209. ,
Therefore, the problem of exposina the'5 hilled water head tank to the RACS due to overlapping of the valves opening during the stroking time could not be ,
detected.
Also during integrated ECCS LOP Test (BB-3),
/)
NJ the procedure included to verify only that the RACS pump starts and the Reactor Building isolation valves HV2598 and HV2599 close on LOP. The initial test
_ results were not conicusive because the RACs pump failed to start. Retests were done later per the chance notices (CN-ll & OTS-15) to verify specifically that the RACS pumps start on sequencer start signal l
in a proper time, and remain runnino. However, a pre-l requisite to the retest was the alianment of RACS valves and switches per the operatino procedure.
Because the RACS pumps and RACS to chilled water ,
cross-over valves utilize the same signal it is O
l Page 4 of _5_
HOP 3 CREEK- l NUCLEAO GENERATING STATION '
BOT / COLD 1058 OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SBEET 4 G(3 ..
Continued from Section IV reasonable to assume a flow path was established from RACS to chilled water.
Continued from Section V the valves HV9530 A2, A4, ^
B2 and B4 open. This chance therefore ensures that the RACS will not be alioned to the chilled water head t3nk durina the valve stroking which would prevent the loss of water from the RACS head tank to the chilled water head tank and tripping of the RACS pumps due to the low low RACS head tank level.
O
\ .)
Continued from Section VI iii starts and valves HV9530 A2, A4, B2 and B4 begin to open. This will prevent the drainace of the RACS head tank and hence tripping of the RACS pump on the low low RACS head
~
tank level.
l D
I Page 5 of 5
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H-23 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER l OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION Loss of Instrument Air during Hot LOP. RACS water pumps tripped on low low head tank level which caused
~
the Emergency Air Comoressor to trip 9 seconds after
~
(Continued Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Design deficiency (see RACS item 4H-22).
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS The preoperational testing of instrument Air System demonstrated that the Emergency Air Compressor trips on loss of RACS System as per design. The Instrument Air System does not address loss of RACS System on low head (Continued) l V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION -
Since the Emergency Air Compressor trip on loss of RACS water is as per desi'an, no corrective action was required.
O Page 1 of 3
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF PONER OBSERVATION REPORT l
l
~
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
No retest of Instrument Air System was required. The '
retest of the RACS System & its cross-tie with chilled water system was performed to demonstrate proper system function by simulating a LOP signal.
ii) Reference Documentation DCP-962 -
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
The retest does not apply to Instrument Air System.
The RACS System pump trip on low tank level has been fixed thus making the RACS System Pump available subsequent to a LOP VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
Page 2 of 3 i
,o
1 1
HOPE CREEK j NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIGN j~
HOT / COLD EDSS OF PONER t-OBSERVATION REPORT ,
V CONTINUATION SHEET Continued.from Section I Observation (Continued):
it's start due to lack of cooling water for RACS.
For RACS Water System trip details refer to RACS Pump lost during LOP (Item #H-22).
Section IV Continued: tank level. For further ,
details refer to RACS pump loss during LOP.
I 1
O Page 3 of 1
- - - - - - --- ----- - - - ^ -.
r H-24 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION i O T:
i<
BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
.fsi:J
~
I., OBSERVATION The "C" EDG output breaker 52-40307 failed to auto- i matically close to power the 10A403 bus. Breaker
]
- 52-40307 failed to close because of a failed Bailey Solid State Loaic Module, 1-4-5 in CC652. This module is within the control circuit for Main Feeder Breaker _
. 52-40308. The failure of locic input 97 on this module 4
affected the module's "procram (continued) l II. LEAD SPONSOR III. ddOT CAUSE i Equipment failure.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPENATIONAL/
f SpRVEILLANCE TESTS component failure post - preoperational test and post surveillance.
l V. NEAR & LOtlG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Loaic module 1-4-5 was replaced and retested satisfactorily. Upon further investication a second failed logic module was found, 1-3-5 in CC652. This module is within the control circuit for Main Feeder i
() Breaker 52-40301, which like 52-40308 would (continued) l Page 1 of 4
- ,m_ . , ,
HOPE CREEK l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LDSS OF POWER 1 OBSERVATION REPORT .
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
- 1) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Both the system pre-operational test procedure, and eubsequent surveillance procedures were performed _
successfully, indicating that the logic modules in question were functional at that point in time. The logic module failures have apparently occ'u'rred since those tests were performed.
ii) Reference Documentation .
E-006-1 sht. 1, J200(O)-590-12, J200(O)-582-10, J200(O)
-596-13, J200(O)-591-ll, J200(O)-2991(123A)-3, J200(01
( -2991(123)-2, and J200(O)-584-10.
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Ygs. Modules have had all logic tested. Cold LOP test verified functionality of modules.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
Page 2 of 4
,,,-,,,-,,_--_..,w..w.- -re.o__-.__.n-.. . - - . , . ~ , , . , - - - , - , - - - . , - , -
I HOPE CREEE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER A OBSERVATION REPORT V CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION select", causina the module's programmable chip (FPLA) to ignore an input buffer signal. This input buffer signal
^
should have initiated an " auto close permit" signal from this locic module which would have closed the 52-40307 breaker.
O G
e Page .3 of 4-
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER s OBSERVATION REPORT
. CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V. NEAR TERM & LONG TERM FIX initiate an " auto close permit" sianal to close the 52-40307 breaker. Which Feeder Breaker initiates this
.s "close" sianal is dependant upon initial breaker configuration. Module 1-3-5 was found to have a failed output buffer #7 which similarly would have prevented the initiation of an " auto close permit" signal to 52-40307, this time however from the 52-40301 control circuit. This logic module was likewise replaced and retested
' ~
satisfactorily.
O l
() Page 4 of 4
C-1 ,
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
() HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT '
I. OBSERVATION Drywell fan 1Gl-VH212 fan failed to start. A Bailey Module 12-6-2 in panel LAC 653 was misaligned with its card connector on one pin connection, and the signal was not reaching the module.
II. LEAD SPONSOR III. ROOT CAUSE Misinstallation -
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Problem was due to a misalignment of a Bailey card connector. Fan started per design in the preop and surveillance testing.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The contact within the connector was realioned to its oriainal shape. The Bailey card was reinstalled and the contact connection was verified.
IC-GP.22-031(O) will be revised to include pin inspection.
Page 1 of 2
4 t
HOPE CREEK '
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER i
} OBSERVATION REPORT g ,
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Simulated a LOP, PSIS, and sequence start for each of ..
the 16 drywell fans on both channels, exercised each low flow switch with each functioning per design.
ii) Reference Documentation Work Order #86-09-20-004-3 -
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
O equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes, because retest simulated a LOP and the 16 dry-well fans did restart following the simulated LOP signal.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No i
O Page 2 of 2 l
- m.
l l
C-2 l lI BOP 3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION :1 HOT / COLD EDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
(_- '
I. OBSERVATION -
Upon completion of LOP test RACS pump BF209 was started manually. PSIS signal did not inhibit pump
.~
from starting. Technician performed work per TPR-RLC-(Continued Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Tpchnician error in implementing change.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Pre-operational Loss of Power testing did not include testing of RACS Pump BP209 for PSIS signal to verify
- pump would not start. RACS is a Non-lE system. A surveillance is not required.
l V.
NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIOM Review work performed against GCR-J-256 and check staple jumper configuration against current prints.
O Page 1 of 3 l
._.. .- -_.-, - _. .- .. - -..- _-. - -. ._------2,
a i
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER b) q r_
OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
- 1. Ensure 24 VDC to input 1 pin 19 & input 5 pin 5 of ^
module 8-3-4 in 1BC653. Simulate signal if required.
- 2. If B RACS Pump 1B-P 209, is initially running, it should continue to run. If B RACS Pump, IB-P209 is not initially runnino, it should fail to start.
- 3. Ensure input LED is energized, by Bus Power Failure (Continued on Page 3)
- 11) Reference Documentation SCR-J-256, J-200(O)-622-13, TPR-RLC-0308
[li) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
( equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A This is not part of the LOP surveillance j VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l
l l
\
O Page 2 of 3 l
l l ..
HOPE CREIK l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER A OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I Observation (Continued) 0308 humidity modification. It appears as though the technician overlooked SCR-J-256 against J200(0)-
^
622-13.
Section VI (Continued): Retest Evaluation signal,
~
at input 5 of logic module 8-3-4 in 1B-C 653.
Return equipment to initial configuration.
D J
O-Page 3 of 3
C-3 COP 2 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER
/ OBSERVATION REPORT N_.)\ .
I. OBSERVATION I RBVS failed to maintain secondary containment at negative pressure. RBVS started in accordance with
~
design during the Cold LOP. The Reactor Building pressure stabilized at a negative 0.20" w.g. on 1GU-PDR-9426A and a neg. 0.30" w.g. on (Cont on Pg. 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE ,
Operated as designed but impacted by instrument air loss.
O IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Instrument air availability was a prerequisite for preoperational testing of the RBVS System, likewise, l
l instrument air is required for RBVS operation.
l .
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION RBVS functioned per design, thus no corrective action is required.
,O Page 1 of 3
HOP 3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Retest instrument air system to verify it can maintain design air pressure at RBVS dampers.
ii) Reference Documentation None -
lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes, failure of RBVS system was due to a loss of instrument air.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
V Page 2 of 3
_ _ . _ . _ - , _ ,_,_.-___,._-m. _ _ .- ,-. ..._ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _,__ _ _ . . . _ _ _ ._m
HIPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER :
OBSERVATION REPORT t
%j) CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I -
1GU-PDR-9426B. These pressures ~were maintained for approximately 18 minutes into the test. At this
^
point, the instrument air pressures decayed enough to allow RBVS dampers to close, thereby causing the RBVS fans to trip on low flow. During this LOP test, instrument air pressure decayed to 38 psig af ter 13 minutes and 15 psig after 21 minutes. Per the containment isolation damper supplier, the minimum pressure to hold these dampers open is 55 psig and at 33 psig these dampers will be fully closed. There-
.=..
fore, the failure of the RBVS system resulted from a
)
lack of instrument air.
i i
l l
($) -
Page 3 of 3 GWR kiv l
l <
C- 4 ,
COP 3 CREEK ,
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD LOSS OF POWER ,
OBSERVATION REPORT v
I. OBSERhATION Loss of Instrument Air during cold LOP. The Em'ergency Air Compressor tripped due to no RACS water supply.
Per design, the RACS water line-up is to be
~
accomplished manually (Cont. Pg. 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR - _
III. ROOT CAUSE Design, Procedure & training deficiencies. Impacted by equipment problem of HV 7595.(Service Air Supply Valve) .
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Th5'preoperational test for Instrument Air was run with O Compressor cooling water supply from fire protection system as RACS was not available. The closing of the Reactor Building isolation valves HV-2598 (Cont. Pg 5)
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTED ACTIONS Near term 1) Align Instrument Air Dryers to normal
! line-up so that only one tower will purge & repair Air Service Supply Valve SV-7595 so that service air demand is isolated during a lop test. 2) Decrease the time required to establish RACS water supply to Emergency Air Compressor manually, right after LOP. In order to accomplish that expeditiously upon LOP, the waste evaporators condensers HB-OAE-303 & HB-OBE-303 shall be
()
1 isolated & tagged out on a short term basis as they are l not required to be in operation till Dec. (Cont. Pg. 6) l Page 1 of 7 i -
BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION p) COLD IASS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary.-) .
The Iollowing test was run to demonstrate that the
- Emergency Air Compressor design capacity of 500 CFM is adcquate, if the compressor started on 85 psig header pressure and did not trip due to lack of RAGS water '
supply. During this test, only one drier was lined up as required per design. The service air (Cont. Pg. 7) ii) Reference Documentation None O iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Eot/
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes. If the RACS water supply is established upon LOP j as described under Item V, Near Term Fix, the Emergency ,
Air Compressor will continue operation without tripping l
and maintain header pressure higher than*85 psig.
l VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l
lO Page 2 of 7
t BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT O_/
s CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I Procedure OP-AB.ZZ-135(Q).
The RACS vater supply was not established fast enough, i.e., before the instrument air header m
pressure decreased to 85 psig, thus resulting in the emergency air compressor start and it's subsequent trip after 9 seconds due to lack of RACS.
It took approx. 20 minutes for the cperators to manually isolate Radwaste Equipment such as Waste Evaporator Condensers (HB-OAE 703, HB-OBE 303) and .
Feed Gas Coolers (HA-10E306, HA-OOE306). The isola-tion of this eqt ipment is required to prevent run-out
() of the RACS pump.
The following is the equipment line-up and brief description of the various tests performed to date:
- 1. HOT LOP. A) The operation had both dryers (all four towers as each drier has two towers) lined up as opposed to normal design requireme'nt of one drier (2 towers) to be in operation. This resulted in extra loss of 80 CFM, as two towers were contin-uously purging as opposed to one. B) The service air isolation valve HV-7595 was hung up but not noticed.
This resulted in loss of air to service air system.
(cont.)
O Page 3 of 7 l
00PE CREZK i' NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD IDSS OF POWER
( OBSERVATION REPORT '
\ CONTINUATION SBEET Continued from Section I C) RACS water tripped due to low tank level. D) The test was aborted after six minutes into the test. __
~
- 2. COLD LOP. A) For this test, both driers were lined up (only one required per design), thus resulting in loss of 80CFM due to purging of 1 extra tower as described in Item 1. B) On LOP service air compressor tripped but the service air supply isola _ ,
tion valves showed dual indication. It was noticed &
recorded. The non-closure of this valve resulted in
() premature degradation of service area receivers.
App. 3 min. into the test, the Emerg. Air Compressor C) started and tripped after 9 seconds as the RACS water supply to compressor were not established yet. The RACS water supply is designed to be establiched manually. By the time RACS supply was established to Emergency Compressor, the Compressor could not be I
. l started upon manual initiation. This was due to Compressor intercooler safety start pressure switch IPS-7669. This switch is Air Compressor safety, to i I
prevent restart before compressor unloading. (Cont.)
l 1
()
Page 4 of 7
COPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD LOSS OF PONRR OBSERVATION REPORT I CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section i At the time of the test however, the non restart of the Compressor was attri,buted to ground fault which was rulled out by later investigations and testing. '
Continued from Section IV and HV-2599 was tested in PTP-BB-3. The Service Air Compressors are non-IE, they did not loose power during pre-op. Therefore, the degradation of service air was not seen and start of Emergency Air Compressor was not required.
l O Page 5 of 7 i
'T C'
HOPE CREEK j NDCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD LOSS OF POWER j OBSERVATION REPORT O CONTINUATION S8EET 4 Continued from Section V The operation pro'edures c
shall be modified to include opening of valve HV-2598 and 2599 and closing of valves HV-2577 and HV-7712 Al
.s manually from Control Room right after LOP. This would establish RACS water supply to Emergency compressor without RACS water pump run-out and in-time before the Instrument Air Header pressure decreased to 85 psig, thus requiring Emergency Air Compressor start. The Emerg. Air Compressor start .
shall be made contingent upon RACS water being avail-able for Emergency Air Compressor when the instrument
() header pressure decayed to 85 psig.
i Long Term: A. Removing of closure signal to valves HV-2591_and HV-2599 upon LOP and to keep the valves open.
, B. Upon receiving a LOP signal, close following four valves; HV-2582, Al, HV2582 A2, HV-2577 and HV-7712 Al or instead of items A & B, move the RACS supply for the Emergency Air Compressor upstream of valves HV-2598 and HV-2599. C. Stop Air Dryer Purge when all Compressors are stopped. Permit auto purging when emergency compressor is operating.
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HOPE CREEK '
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COLD IDSS OF PUNER j O OBSERVATION REPORT '
7- CONTINUATION SHERT i
Continued from Section VI compressor was tripped and simultaneously, the service air supply valve HV-7595 was closed. The pressure was then allowed to s
decay. It took approx. 4 min. for the pressure to decay to 85 psig and the Emergency Air Compressor then started automatically. The header pressure was then maintained above 85 psig. This proves comp'ressor capacity is adequate. The RACS water supply was established to the compresser before the test. .
+
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Page 7 of _7_
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, C-5
- HOPE CREEK ;
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 4 HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER i O .
~
OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION -
Service air i' solation valve HV-7595 had dual indication in the control room. The valve manual override was found engaged - preventing complete valve closure.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
~
III. ROOT CAUSE Deficient valve line up.for this type of valve.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Pre-operational test verified proper stroke and operation There are no surveillances associated with this valve l V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION .
Near Term - The manual override was repositioned and the valve verified to operate properly. Identify all similar valves and ensure override fully disengaaed.
Lona Term - Uparade.the operators valve trainina course to. include this type of "out of position" condition can be identified.
O Page 1 of 2
i HOPE CRZEK !,
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION _,
HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER '
OBSERVATION REPORT t VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Valve operation was retested by the Control Room after +- I the manual override was reset.
ii) Reference Documentation
() iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Full valve travel was verified VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l Page 2 of _2_
% . - _ , - - - - --w- - +-- - --- '-
I C-6 BOPE CREEK l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER 1 OBSERVATION REPORT '
I. OBSERVATION Failure of SACS Loop "B" Head Tank Level / Transmitter j In the course of performing the loss of power test (LOP) indication of low "B" loop head tank level was provided by computer point A2089. Level transmitter (Continued on Page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Operated as designed. Poor human factors design.
.T..
( IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS This concern was not identified during pre-op/
surveillance testing because Non-lE off-site power was not removed. During the recent power ascension tests, however all off-site power was shed. Additionally, (Continued Page 4)
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS This concern was identified due to the inconsistencies betwean the "A" SACS Loop Head Tank level indication
. and the "B" SACS Loop Head Tank level indication. The power supply for the "A" SACS instr 6 ment EG-LT-2480A is i fed into the SACS Control Panel LAC 201, from a 120V, source that is fed from a motor control center backad
( by the standby "A' Diesel Generator. Therefore, (Continued on Page 3)
Page 1 of 4 i _ -_.
HOPE CRE"K NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD [ DSS OF POWER
, OBSERVATION REPORT h s-VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) .
- 1) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
No retest is required. System functioned in s -
accordance with approved design.
ii) Reference Documentation M-ll-1, J-ll-1, J-4011-1, J-201(O)-5(3)
- iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Not applicable.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? NO O
Page 2 of 4 T *'
l 3
HOPE CREEK j NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
- HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER !
OBSERVATION REPORT O 4 1;
??
CONTINUATION SHEET j
Continued from Section I EG-LT-2'4 80 B , the' sianal
! ~
4 input to computer point A2089, responded in accordance with the approved desian. This transmitter is fed from SACS control panel 1BC201, with NON-lE 120 VAC i
off-site power. The 120 VAC power to this panel was NON-lE and was lost when off-site power was removed.
Section V (Continued): duri'na a LOP, the 120V source is restored upon load pick-up by the diesel generator. Loop B Head Tank instrument EG-LT- .
2480B however, receives its 120V power at SACS Control Panel 1BC201 from a motor control center that is fed
() from an offsite power source. Therefore durina a LOP the instrument loses power and fails indicatina an empty head tank. In both cases, the tank level jastrument performs a NON-lE function which is to provide an analoa signal (computer point A2089 for '
SACS "R" Loop) to the CRIDS computer. However, j should the operator call up this computer point on a l l
- LOP, some contradictory information could be provided. i Our intention therefore is to issue and implement a '
- station desian chance to obtain consistency betweem loops to improve human factors. 1AC201 is physically more conviently supplied by the diesel backed non-lE O
Page 3 of 4 l
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION j HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER.
CD . CONTINUATION SHEET i P
Continued from Section V MCC and 1BC201 is in closer proximity to the off-site power MCC.
Section IV: verification of this computer point was not required for LOP pre-op test. DCR 4-HME-86-1262 ,
issued to power 1BC201 from a reliable power source.
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Page 4 of 4
C-7 HUPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION ,
Control Room return air fan BV 415 failed to start following the Cold LOP. The problem was found to be a ,
defective time delay module on Bailey Card 4-10-14 in -' l panel DC 652.
II. LEAD SPONSOR - _
III. ROOT CAUSE Component failure of Bailey Card. ,
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS
~
Problem was due to a component failure - Component i functioned properly during preop & surveillance testing and Hot LOP test.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Bailey Card 4-10-4 in panel DC 652 was replaced and the problem was cleared.
l -
Page 1 of 2
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I l HUP 3. CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Simulated a LOP and a sequence start signal in the .
Bailey logic for the BV 415 fan. The fan tripped and restarted per design for a LOP.
ii) Reference Documentation
- Work Order 486-09-20-012-4 _
iii.) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
(')s
(, Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes, retest simulated a LOP and the fan operated per design.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No Page 2 of 2
BDPE CREEK l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION }'
j BOT / COLD I4SS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT l.
I. . OBSERVATION During cold loss of power testing, HD9588AA pilot light did'not indicate outside air isolation. (System GK)
> Valve functioned acceptably during past testing.
Subsequent valve testing was acceptable.
II. LEAD SPONSOR - .
III. ROOT CAUSE None. Dampers functioned properly during hot LOP, subsequent testing, cold LOP I and cold LOP II.
1 IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
()
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Not applicable. Valve operated properly during all i
tests.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS None. Damper HD9588AA is on a lE UPS power supply and all LOP tests did not cause damper isolation. Control room isolation did not occur during any LOP test as verified by review of CRI'DS. Closure of control room isolation dampers occurred 15 minutes (cold LOP I) to 18 minutes (hot LOP) into the test, after alarms for low instrument air supply pressure occurred.
Page 1 of 2
l l
l HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT 4
VI . - RETEST' EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
j
- 1) Describe . actual retest performed (Include test l boundary). i Valve HD9588AA was exercised by simulating a loss of power to the UPS powered radiation monitoring system as l well as as a high radiation event. The damper fully l
isolated in each instance. Isolation was verified locally by actuator movement and remotely in the Control Room.
ii) Reference Documentation Work Order 8609200116 iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
s_/ equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
No. Damper isolation will not occur during hot / cold LOP. This testing verified damper isolation operation.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O
e*
O Page 2 of 2
C-9 ?
CSPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l'
i BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER -
I p- OBSERVATION REPORT 4
\d . .L a a% y L '
u:
I I. OBSERVATION -
Service Water yard dump valv's e opened. Upon initiat' ion of four service water pumps, the system's yard dump
~
valves opened relieving service water into the yard for approximately one minute. System pressures operated as designed above setpoint of yard dump valves during .
~
simultaneous initiation of f'uro service water pumps.
This event should be expected during (Cont Pg 3)
II. LEAD SPOMSOR -
i III. ROOT CAUSE Operated as designed
)
l IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
i SURVEILLANCE TESTS Yard dump valves were tested to relieve at pressures equivalent to 8 psig at centerline of valves. The system functioned as designed and tested.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTI0E ACTIONS Work Orders have been completed to verify calibration of the yard dump valve's pressure transmitters (86092 10014) and to verify proper operation (860920426).
A strip chart recorder under test conditions will be put on the transmitters to determine the feasibility of adding a time delay to prevent nuisance actuations.
Page 1 of 3
__ _ _ _ i
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) -
i) Describe actual ret est performed (Include test boundary).
Not Applicable.
s ii) Reference Documentation -
M-10-1, Sht. 2 111) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
T equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Not Applicable.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l
O Page 2 of 3
'i HGPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IASS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT O ly7 CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I a LOP as explained below, . ,
and doesn't sacrifice the system's design intent. The function of the yard dump valve is to maintain
.s service water flow in the case of a partial plug-up of the non-seismic makeup line to the cooling tower.
A partial plug-up has been calculated to be equiva-lent to 8 PSIG at the centerline of the valve which is instrumented by 3 pressure transmitters in the service water header. A signal from 2 will give it's ,
yard dump valve a signal to open. Likewise, a full plug-up of the line is protected by a rupture disk designed to open at 60 PSIG. As shown on P&ID M-10-1
(
Sht. 2, this arrangement is provided for both loops of service water.
During a LOP, vacuum breaker valves on each ser-vice water loop admit air into the sustem downstream of the SACS Heat Exchangers (See attar..ed sketch) for waterhammer protection. When the servica water pumps sequence on, there is enough system resistance to allow the yard dumps to open due to the now entrapped air. With the valves open, the air is quickly-expelled from the system and the pressure signal for yard dump operation is removed.
Page 3 of 3 s
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C-10 -
HOPE CREEK l
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT '
I. OBSERVATION Failure of Service Water Loop "B" Pressure Transmitter Computer point D5529 supplied from the Non-lE pressure transmitter / pressure switch EA-PT-2014B/EA-PSH-20148
located in 1BC201 did not clear durina the LOP test.
This was inconsistent with what was observed in service water loop "A". During the LOP test instrument EA-PSH _
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
(Continued Page 3)
III. ROOT CAUSE Operated as designed.
Poor human factors desian.
O IV.
REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS j Thij concern was not identified durina pre-op/
surveillance testino because Non-lE of f-site power was not removed. During the recent power ascension tests, however, all off-site power was shed. Additionally V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i This concern was identified due to the inconsistencies between the "A" service water loop pressure switch /
transmitter EA-pSH-201A and the loop "B" service water loop EA-PSH-2018. The power supply for the "A" service water device is 120VAC power to panel 1AC201 from a O (Continued Page 3)
Page 1 of 4 1
i
- - - . - , - , . - - . - - - - , - - , . , - _ . - . .,_.n--...-n----.-c,--- .,e, - , , , - - , ~ , , . , , - , _ . , , , _ _ - - , - -
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' HOPO CREEK -i NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER !
r' s OBSERVATION REPORT ,
h
_,: j .
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) '
i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
No retest required. Device functioned in accordance .%
with approved desian.
ii) Reference Documentation M-10-1, J-10-1, J-4010-1, J-201(O)-5(3) iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Not applicable.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O Page 2 of 4
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i BOP 3 CRSEE
[
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER :
O c.
,M~ .
OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET
~
Continued from Section I -2014B respon'ded in accordance with approved desian. This device is powered by a 120V source backed by off-site power.
.s Therefore, durina a lop the device fails open and' provides a hiah pressure alarm. The mirror imace ;
i device EA-PSH-201A for the service water "A" loop is , {
located in panel 1AC201 and is fed by a non-lE 120V source from an MCC that is supplied by the "A" Diesel Generator durino a LOP. -
Section V (Continued): diesel backed motor control center. Because of this, durino a LOP, the 120V
() source is restored upon load pick-up by the diesel generator. Loop "B" pressure device, however, is powered from a 120V supply to 1BC201 from an off-site power backed motor control center. Because of this configuration, on a LOP, the "B" instrument failed and indicated a hiah pressure parameter. Both devices provide computer point input only (PT-2014B to computer point D5529). Should the operator call up infarmation for the "B" loop device durino a LOP, contradictory information could be obtained. It is therefore our intention to revise the design such O
Page 3 of 4
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BOP 3 CREEK !
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER j n OBSERVATION REPORT
- CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V, '
that there is consistency between loops to improve human factors. This is not a case of desian
.g.'
deficiency, it was simply more convient to power the the 1AC201 device from the diesel backed MCC and the 1BC201 device from the off-site power backed MCC. '
DCR 4-HME-86-1262 will provide a reliable power supply for 19C201.
Section IV Continued: verification of this computer -
oint was not required for the LOP pre-op test.
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O Page 4 of 4 l
l
C-ll HOPO CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ;
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT
\_/
I. OBSERVATION .
Level indicators LI-R605-B21 and LI-R604-B21 lost power during the cold loss of power (LOP) test. (Continued)
II. LEAD SPONSOR - -s III. ROOT CAUSE Failure to implement an FSAR commitment for LI-R605- -
B21.
IV.
REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONALf SURVEILLANCE TESTS
. . . .,Since loss of power to Non-lE buses was not done
[D V
during pre-op test BB-3, failure of above indicators was not observed at that item.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION LI-R605-B21 and TR-R605-Ell have been provided with Non
-lE UPS power supply. This design chance is prepared and issued under DCR-4-EME-86-967. LI-R604-B21 level indicator does not require any desian modification since the wide rance level indication of reactor water level is still available during a LOP to the control
~
room operators from LR-R623A&B-B21 and LI/LR-3682A&B-I B21 monitors, which are fed from lE power source.
1 Page 1,of 3, O
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION '
HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER ~
s OBSERVATION REPORT ,
a.
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
~
. i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Not applicable.
ii) Reference Documentation I) HCGS FSAR - Table 7.5-1 II) 10855-N1-C71-1020-6 (6)
III) 10855-N1-C71-1020-6 (25)
IV) 10855-N1-Ell-1040-383 (7) ,
V) DCR-4-EME-86-967 VI) 10855-N1-B21-1090-62 (10).
() VII) 10855-N1-B21-1090-62 (12)
VIII) 10855-N1-B21-1090-62 (14) iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
_ Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Design modification for LI-R605-B21 will ensure its operability during hot / cold LOP.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? Yes This is a condition outside of the design of the plant O Page 2 of 3
HOPE CREEK '
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER
, CD """""^ " """ "'
CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION Level indicator L'I-R605-B21 was provided with Non-lE power supply instead of Non-lE UPS power supply as per FSAR
~
Table 7.5-1. Level Indicator LI-R604 (wide rance) is powered via RPS Bus 'A' which by design & FSAR Table 7.5-1 identifies power supply to be from RPS. Therefore, the design and installation is in accordance with the design committments. See attachment for further summary of investigation of Displayed Parameters Important to Safety. -
O e
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l i HOPS CREEK ll 4
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION }
/]
( ,/ jn HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT j
-T'u:
? ATTACHMENT
. .! - - j?
On September 11, 1986, a loss of offsite power test was conducted which revealed, among other thinas, a loss of !
.s 1 power to the Acoustic Monitoring System used for a backup l position indication of the main steam safety relief valves.
The FSAR Table 7.5-1 identifies uninterruptible power supply (UPS) as the power supply for the valve position indication whereas the actual design provided for a non-UPS source.
As a result of the discrepancy, a complete check was made
() of the entire PSAR Table 7.5-1 to verify that the power supply information is correct for each displayed parameter.
The results of the check showed that in addition to the contradiction in power supply information for the safety j relief valve position indication, similar contradiction l existed with displayed parameter LI-R605-B21 and TR-R605-l l Ell. The necessary Design Change Packages have been prepared to provide the required UPS power supplies to these items.
i i
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BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER l
.y OBSERVATION REPORT
. . . ,1 4; ATTACHNENT
<_.3 j .
li
, 4 4
In addition, two parameters, main condenser pressure ~
.i indication and radwaste tank level indication, that are considered Catecory 3 parameters by Reculatory Guide 1.97,
Revision 2 were found to have stated in error that non-lE UPS power supplies were employed. Since there-is no .
~
requirement for UPS, the FSAR will be changed at a future time.
A review of the findings indicates that the cause of the cversichts in the table was attributable to a set of
~
I
( ) circumstances regarding the coordination of Non-lE power supply assignments of controls systems discipline devices.
In general, coordination between controls system and i
l electrical disciplines for such assianments was through design installation and test documents, interdiscipline memoranda, or the routino of vendor or Bechtel desian documents. In the case of IE devices, additional extensive desian controls existed in the power supply assignment to ensure the proper power supply and division power supply O
ii O
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BOPE CREEK l'
l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION .
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER '
OBSERVATION REPORT ,
.' ATTACHMENT I assignments. In case of these Non-lE(FSAR Table 7.5-1) parameters Bechtel has not been able to locate any such coordination documents. Where assignments were not ~
specifically stated for Non-lE devices, the electrical discipline generally feed power from a conveniently located Non-lE source. , . .
Bechtel is continuing its review of other Non-lE controls s
j;systemdeviceswhereanintentorcommittmenttoemploy ,
a .
i gy may have been overlooked.
O iii O
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C-12 80P3 CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O ,
OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION. ,
Control Room heaters were dusty and caused a burning odor when placed in service.
~
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE ,,
Dust accumulation on electric heaters.
() REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
IV.
SURVEILLANCE TESTS N/A - this condition is normal for heaters which have not operated for a time.
M/A - not a surveillance test.
l -
i V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION '
None 4
Page 1 of 2 O
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{ . c,
i HOPE CREEK l
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT {
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) .
i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
N/A - Heater elements were visually inspected after the
.s shutdown LOP test and were found to be relatively clean
- no further work or retesting required.
ii) Reference Documentation N/A - No work order initiated - elements were ,
physically inspected by system engineer following the test.
()
lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
No retest warranted. Heaters operated during test.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No, e
O Page 2 of 2
C-13 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION.
Alternate 7.2KV supply infeed breaker (52-11008) to bus 10A110 enercized when offsite ocwer was restored.
.s II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE Trip light on Bezel did not flash to indicate breaker trip.
IV.
O, REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS During the NA-01 pre-op, this function was tested; no problems were found.
! V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Near Term - Thoubleshooting is in process to reverify loaic in cabinet LAC 653 for correct operation. If l everythina proves acceptable, perform loss of power on i
bus 10A110. Operating procedures review is in process to assure " Trip Acknowledge" action is adequately descrioed.
O Page 1 of 2 l
HOPE CRE!K -l NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER l OBSERVATION REPORT t
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) ,
i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Component test in processt to be followed by a bus loss of power re-test.
ii) Reference Documentation ,
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument / ,
'~~
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
O Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes. The retest will simulate the full loss of power.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? NJ Page 2 of 2 i
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w w w-,w-,-.em,, +w---w --w-r,,wus e .-ve em wee ge w w ww--P, e w #a.re, -e=-+-+s- - ,
i C-14 }
HOPE CREEK j NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION j j
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT ~
sd" I. OBSERVATION '
Infeed Circuit Breaker 52-10101 to bus 10A101 energized when auto block close was deselected. (See continuation sheet for further details.) *'
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE ,-
Indeterminate.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
O SUP.VEILLANCE TESTS This function was tested by the preop tests and all components performed satisfactorily.
l l
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Near Term - Troubleshooting is in process to reverify logic in cabinet 1DC653 for correct operation. If everythina proves acceptable, perform loss of power on bus 10A101. Operating procedures review is in process to assure " trip acknowledae" action is adequately desceibed.
Page l_ of 3 l
HOPE' CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER
/~'\ OBSERVATION REPORT
- C/
VI. RETEST EVALf1ATION (If Applicable) ,
i) Descri.be actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
In process, on a component level. This will be m
followed by a complete bus loss of power test.
l
~
ii) Reference Documentation .
iii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
() equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
Yes, it will simulate the full loss of power.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? lio 9
3 D N
~.
t HOPO CRE!K j NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION s NOT/ COLD LOSS OF POWER '
q OBSERVATION REPORT
.fQ 2 CONTINUATION SHEET
{
hjH -
Continued from Section I. OBSERVATIONS -
Sequence of Events:
- 1. Protest line up-normal supply breaker (10101) was closed and the alternate supply breaker open.
- 2. LOP initiated.
- 3. Circuit breaker 10101 trips on undervoltage.
- 4. The trip light for the circuit breaker will flash.
- 5. The operator will acknowledge this by pushina the trip button and flashing will stop. This action also .
prevents closing of alternate supply breaker by ,
removing the permit to close signal. __
- 6. Offsite power restored.
)
- 7. Normal infeed breaker reclosed.
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Page 3 of 3 1
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C-15 jl HOPE CREEK ,
NUCLEAR GENE'tATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT ,
i.
I. OBSERVATION During the restoration of 'C' DG, the generator failed to initially decrease per operator demand. The bezel connector probably worked loose due to improper j tightening at the time of installation or improper insertion of the R2 module into its housing.
i II. LEAD SPCNSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE .
l Failure to properly tighten bezel connector. -
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS O If this problem had occurred during performance of PTP 1
or surveillance testing, it would have been brought to j operator attention immediately because of the function l
! of the module.
V. NEAR & LONG TEP'l CORRECTIVE ACTION
. ~
Work order 86-09-20-013-2 has been implemented to tighten this connector.
Work Order issued to verify tightness of all R2 module bezel connectors.
O Page 1 of 2 s
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I HOP.2 CREEK !
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l BOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER I OBSERVATION REPORT 3 L n'- i g - +
~
VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable)
- 1) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
As part of the W.O. stated in Itam V, the operation was .s.
. checked at the logic input and found to be satisfactory.
ii) Referonce Documentation W. O. 86-09-20-013-1. .
l gm ~111) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
(' equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
Cold Loss of Power? Justify, Yes. See Item VI for retest.
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No l
l Page 2 of 2
,e+..,+n--- .n ~, - - , - , , , , - - - - - -- . - - ,-,
C-16 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION '
^
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O OBSERVATION REPORT N.) ,.
I. OBSERVATION -
RACS pump amperage meter did not function during the loss of power test. The RACS pumps, which supplies coolina water to various plant equipment, is controlled and operated from the MAIN CONTROL ROOM PANEL. One of the (continued on page 3)
II. LEAD SPONSOR - '-
III. ROOT CAUSE .
Operated as designed. Poor human factors design.
)
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS The amperage meter for the RACS pump is non-safety re+ated and for "information only". This meter would not be required to be tested by Preop or Surveillance under LOP conditions. The indication that is required under normal and LOP ooeration is the i.lluminated (continued on page 4).
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION A) Short Term - the Control Room operators have been instructed that there will be no indication on the RACS pump amperage meters during a LOP. (continued on page 5)
Page 1 of 5
- - .- - - - , , -.,,,--,,---,-.,n, . - . _ - - - , . , - - - , .-,._-,,,,-,,- , ye, - ---..-_.,-,-.-.,w --,,..-,,---.,-r--,e ,, +. ,. , , . . --
-i BOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENBRATING STATION -
,' l HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER j O OBSERVATION REPORT j.
G
-, il
,y. . ,
4l VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) . j i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test bounda'ry).
None
~
ii) Reference Documentation .
Ncne lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
O Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
N/A O
VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM? No O P.. 1 ., s 6
, _ . _ . . . , . . ..,-.---------.,---,-----m.-.-n-- - - - - ,--------+----------e- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - " ~ ~ ~ - - ' ' ' ' - ' ' '
r HOPR CREIK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD LOSS OF PONER !
OBSERVATION REPORT y CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section I. OBSERVATION
" operating indications" that is supplied to the control room operators is an amperage meter for each pump. This
.s meter indicates how many amps the pumps are.usina durino normal plant operation. These amp meters are never stated as being required for normal plant operation or LOP, per documentst FSAR, DITS (Desion Installation Technical Specifications), or Technical Specifications. These meters were installed for "information only" and operated as per ,
design. The indicators the Control Room operators use to determine if the pumps are runnino is the illuminated
() START /STOP controls located on the Control Room Panel.
These " START" and "STOP" illuminated indicators as powered by non-1E uninterrupted power supplies (UPS). The power supply for the transducer, that supplies the signal to the amperage meter, is non-lE. DCR required.
S 9
O Page 3 of 5 N.-
HOPE CRB2K p.
p NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER O .
OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continu[sd from Section IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/ SURVEILLANCE TESTS
" START /STOP", located on the MAIN CONTROL PANEL. These were tested and found to function properly.
O Page 4 of 5 O .
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I L
ts HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION i <
HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER l i
OBSERVATION REPORT d CONTINUATION SHEET :
Continued from Section V. NEAR TERM & LONG TERM FIX B) Long Term - A Design Change Request has been issued to supply non-lE reliable power to the amperace meters as ,
a plant betterment item.
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C-17 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
"'}
yf HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT I. OBSERVATION
" ALARMS TO CHRONOLOG" message appeared in the alarm section of the CRTs.
II. LEAD SPONSOR -
III. ROOT CAUSE
- a. Operated per design. Alarms are directed to chronology during times of high alarm activity.
- b. Contact Chatter of 15 digital points. Caused by low voltage setpoints for 10 points being set too close to normal operating voltage.
- c. RPS Optical Isolator outputs to CRIDS go to reset
(
condition upon loss of power to the Isolators.
IV. REASON WHY NOT IDENTIFIED DURING PREOPERATIONAL/
SURVEILLANCE TESTS Operated per design.
V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION Near Term: 1) work orders issued to investigate contact chatter of 5 digital points; other 10 digital points are addressed in FO-TE-0361 for potential setpoint change which would eliminate the nuisance alarms. (Continued on page 3)
Page 1 of 3
)
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_ . . - __ .m _ . _ _
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION HOT / COLD IDSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT VI. RETEST EVALUATION (If Applicable) i) Describe actual retest performed (Include test boundary).
Not applicable.
4 ii) Reference Documentation lii) Does this retest prove that the instrument /
equipment will perform as required during a Hot /
O Cold Loss of Power? Justify.
i VII. IS THIS A REPORTABLE ITEM 7 No Page 2 ef 3
- _ . . -.- - . . . , , _ . . . . . .2 - _,
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION g
") HOT / COLD LOSS OF POWER OBSERVATION REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET Continued from Section V. NEAR & LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION
(FO-TE-0333 and DCR 4-HME-86-1214). This will eliminate the nuisance alarms, and does~not represent any impact or operability restraint to any safety system.
O l
P l Page 3 of 3 1
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