ML18092B497

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S-C-E500-NSE-0675-R-1, Justification for Operation of All Three Units at Artificial Island at Increased Power During Hope Creek-Keeney Line Outage.
ML18092B497
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek, 05000000
Issue date: 04/03/1987
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
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References
NUDOCS 8704070332
Download: ML18092B497 (12)


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OPS~G S-C-E500-NSE-0675-R-l Page 1 of 7 Date* 4/3/87 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department TITLE: JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATION OF ALL THREE UNITS AT ARTIFICIAL ISLAND AT INCREASED POWER DURING THE HOPE CREEK - KEENEY LINE OUTAGE 1.0 PURPOSE This Safety Evaluation is being written to justify the operation of Salem Unit No. 1 and 2, and Hope Creek Unit 1 at a generating level in excess of that specified in the Rl Hope Creek Unit No. 1 Gen~rato~ Operating Guide (Re~erence 3.2) for an outage of the Hope Creek-Keeney 500KV trans-mission line.

2.0 SCOPE This Safety Evaluation is applicable to the operation of Salem

  • Unit No. 1, Salem Unit No. 2 and Hope Creek Unit No. i.:

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1

3.2 Hope Creek Unit No. 1 Generator Operating Guide (Report 36.86.2);

3;,3 Salem Nuclear Generating Station UFSAR (Section 8.2):

3.4 Hope Creek Generating Station FSAR (Section 8.2);

3.5 Salem and Hope Creek Generating Statioris' Technical Specifications .{Section 3/4.8);

3.6 Operating Instruction OI 7-B-04 dated 3/20/87; 3.7 PTI Report No. R7-87 Salem Nuclear Plant Undervoltage Study; 3.8 Long Term Outage of Hope Creek-Keeney Line Stability*

Simulations of Maximum Credible Disturbances, Letter Rl from J. G. Gill to c. A. McNeill, Jr. dated April 2, 1987.

3.9 500KV Stability Study, letter from J.D. Hebson, and F. J.

Renna to R. w. Skwarek, dated March 22~ 1987; 3.10 DCR lEC-2273; 3.11 ~SE&G Relay Test Manual, Section 10.E . I Rl ...

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(se/lgh3/10 EDD~7 FORM 1 REV 0-- lOSEPT~=-F* ".-J. ..

The Energy People(-87646763.32 870403 ---- ----"'

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95*21.68, 'tlOM* '2-s.:

  • ENCLOSURE 1

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Installation of Trip-A-Unit Protection Scheme Supplemental Information Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations . '

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Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311, and 50-354 April 3, 1987

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~age 2 of 7 S-C-ESOO-NSE-0675-R-l Date : 4I 3I 8 7 .

4.0 DISCUSSION On March l, 1987, a ship collided with a transmission line support structure located in the Delaware River and several towers supporting the Hope Creek-Keeney SOOKV transmission** Rl line were toppled. Damage resulted to several towers ~nd their underwater support structures. As a result, this line will experience an extensive outage (estimated time one year).

the Hope Creek FSAR identifies ~ fault on the Hop~ Creek-Keeney line as the limiting ciondition for PSE&G electrical bulk powei system stability considerations. As a result of the extended outage of this line, the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Units are being o~erated at a reduced electrical output in accordance with the Hope Creek Unit No. 1 Generator Operating Guide (Referenc~ 3.2). The operating guide was issued by PSE&G* System Planning in February 1986, and provides appropriate guidance to the Salem and Hope Creek Stations to assure that system and electric generator

  • Rl stability is maintained for all combinations of Unit operation and transmission line availability. The Guide indicates that, for three Unit operation, a reduction in generation is* required during a maintenance outage on either the Hope Creek-Keeney oi Salem-Deans SOOKV lines. These lines are limiting because they are the interface between the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations SOOKV systems and the PJM SOOKV system. With the extended outage of the Hope Creek-Keeney circuit, the loss of Salem-Deans line
  • becomes the limiting condition for the PSE&G bulk power system and electric generator stability corisideration.

In order to operate the three Units at or near design electrical generation level with the Hope Creek-Keeney circuit out of service, modifications tb the Salem Unit No. 1 generator protection circuitry will be made such that a loss .

of the Salem-Deans line will automatically trip the Salem Hl Unit No. 1 generator. This trip must take place within the maximum allowable clearing times established by the stability

  • analysis. To support this modification, the referenced Guide has been re-evaluated to address the following:

A) The impact of a loss of the ~alem~Deans circuit and subsequent loss of Salem Unit No. 1 on the operation of Salem Unit No. 2 .. and Hope Creek,.' Rl including the stability of the remaining sources of offsite power immediately following* this event.

B) The specif icati~n of new opei~iing guideline~ for a line outage condition whi)e the Hope Cr~ek-Keeney Rl line is out of service.

se/lgh3/10 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

Page 3 of 7 S-C-E500-NSE-0675-R-l Date: 4/3/87 5.0 WORK DESCRIPTION To provide the protection described above, the following tripping arrangement will be impl~mented (see Attachment 1):

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1. Salem Unit No. 1 Generator Regular Overall Differential Protection Multitrip will be actuated by any of the Rl following:

1.1 Salem-Deans line protection regular;

1. 2 Remote trip receiver;
1. 3 Salem-Deans line breakers (both 20X & 21X open);
1. 4 20X Breaker failure;
1. 5 21X Breaker failure.
2. Salem Unit No. 1 Generator Backup Overall Differential*

Protection Multitrip will be actuated by any of the Rl*

following:

2.1 Salem-Deans line protect ion- backup; 2.2 Remote trip receiver (same as 1. 2);

2.3  ::salern-ueans line breakers (both 20X and 21X open);

2.4 20X Breaker failure; 2.5 21X Breaker failure.*

Both multitrips will trip the generator breakers* lOX and 12X and will initiate breaker failure signals in the event one of these breakers does not open as required (existing design).

Disconnect Switches are provided in the relay room to allow .,

the monitorin~ of the scheme from t~e ~ontrol room and PSE&G *Rl Newark Load Dispatcher, and to permit the operators to disable this scheme when required. With the available

  • equipment maximum redundancy was achieved through:
1. Each regular and backup protection is fed.from separate Current and Potential Transformers;
2. Each regular and backup protection uses D.C. control power .

from different 12~V D.C. batteries;

  • se/lgh3/10 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 . 10SEPT81

Page_ 4 of 7 S-C-ESOO-NSE-0675-R-l Date: 4/3/87*

3. Each t~ipping condition will activate boih regular ~nd Rl backup channels;
4. Separate cables are being used for regular and backup trip signals.
5. The remote trip receiver will activate both regular and backup multitrip relays (separate contacts are being Rl used).

6.0 ANALYSIS Operation of the Salem-Deans cross trip scheme will be in accordance with Operating Instruction or 7-B-04, dated March 20, iga7 (Reference 3.6). As identified therein, the Rl cross trip scheme shall be armed at all times with the following exceptions:

  • A) Severe thunderstorm or lightning activity within 50 miles of Salem, New Freedom or Deans.

B) During severe winter storms with expected heavy icing.

C) Winds in excess of 50 mph as measured at either Rl Camden or Deans switching stations or at Artificial Isrand.

D) Whenever forest fires are reported in the vicinity of the Salem-Deans right-of-way.

E) Whenever required maintenance work is being performed.

Maintenance on the cross trip relays will be performed in accordance *with the existing PSE&G Reiay Test Manual, Section 10.E. Accordingly, the line- protection relays are checked at each refueling outage and the radio equipment (i.e. carrier signal, remote trip receiver, etc.) are Rl checked every 12 months.

Unit generation limits are also contained in the Operating Instruction. The applicable limits are summarized in Attachment 3.

se/lgh3/10 EDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

Page 5 of 7 S-C-ESOO-NSE-0675-R-l Date: 4/3/87 A ~tability analysis has been performed for the new PSE&G bulk power system configuration in order to establish continued compliance with GDC 17 (Reference 3.1). As previously discussed, the loss of the Salem-Deans SOOKV line represents the critical contingency with the Hope Creek-Keeney circuit out of service~ The analysis Rl simulated critical system faults and fault clearing in accordance with the Mid Atlantic Area Council (MAAC)

Reliability Principles for Planning Bulk Electric Supply Systems. A total of 15 cases (Reference 3.9) we~e simulated using the Electric Power Research Institute Transient-Mid Term Stability Program.

The following types of faults were simulated:

A) Three phase faults with normal clearing.

B) Single phase~to-ground faults with delayed clearing.

Rl Selected cases were run for comparison purposes using the Philadelphia Electric Company Transient Stability Program (TRANSTAB).

The analysis identified the critical contingency as a single phase-to-ground fault on the Salem section *2 bus. The.

case simulated a stuck breaker such that one of the breakers failed to operate. Under these circumstances, clearing of the fault is delayed until the backup protection can act to isolate the fault *. The analysis demonstrates that the remaining Artificial Island generators are stable and will Rl not trip as a result of the transient. The PSE&G bulk power system also *remains stable.

An analysis has also been performed (Reference 3.8) which assumes a three phase fault on the Salem-Deans line and the failure of the cross-trip scheme at a maximum Island generating capacity of 3424 MW (gross). Under this _

scenario, the result 6f the failure to trip Salem Unit No.

1 *is that the three Island generators fall out of Rl synchronism and their generator out-of-step protection removes them from the system. Following the trip, power to the Island is supplied from the PSE&G 230KV system inter-connection at New Freedom Switching Station via the Salem-New Freedom and the Hope Creek-New Freedom-SOOKV circuits. The case demonstrat~s that the PJM and the *PSE&G

. system remains stable following the transient disturbance.

se/lgh3/10 EtiD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10SEPT81

Page 6 of 7 .

S-C-ESOO-NSE-0675-R-l Date: 4/3/87 Additionally, the minimum calculated steady state voltage at the SOOKV level (Reference 3.8) following this transient, exceeds the SOSKV which was assumed in the Salem Under-vol tage Study (Reference 3.7). That study demonstrated that acceptable vof tage would be maintained at the 4160 volt vital buses following a LOCA on one Salem Unit and an orderly shutdown of the second Salem Unit, assumin~ an initial system voltage of SOSKV.

7.0 CONCLUSION

S Operation of the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations .

with the Hope Creek-Keeney SOOKV circuit out of service for an extended period represents a change to the facilities as described in their respective Safety Analysis Reports.

Based on the analyses and administrative controls described in Section 6.0, the following conclusions can be drawn:

A) The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evalua~ed. are not*

increased. The Salem-Deans cross trip modification does not alter any safety related equipment nor does it prevent any safety system or component from

  • performing its intended function. The cross trip scheme provides only for a trip of the Salem Unit No. 1 generator. The subsequent plant events (i.e.

turbine trip and *reactor ~rip) a~e expected

  • operational occurrences and therefore within the design basis. The remaining Units and the PSE&G bulk power system have been demonstrated to be stable following such a transient. *For all cases evaluated (Reference 3.8, 3.9), power remains available from a reliable offsite source as required by GDC 17.

B) The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analyses Reports is not created. The rnodif ication to the Salem Unit No. 1 generator protective circuitry does not alter or affect the function of any safety related equipment.

Additionally, the modification does not ied~ce in any manner, the availability of the offsite power sources.

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~age 7 of 7 S-C-E500-NSE-0675-R-l Date: 4/3/87 C) The margin of safety as identified in the Stations**

Technical Specifications (Reference 3.5) has not

.been reduced. During the extended outage of the Hope Creek-Keeney line, each Station is provided with the required two sources of offsite power (Attachment 2). Upon a loss of the Salem-Deans Rl circuit and the subsequent loss of Salem Unit No. l; each Station is still provided with the required two sources of offsite power. In the unlikely event that the cro~s ~rip fails, the St~tions are pro~ided with a stablu 3ourde of offsite power as required by GDC 17.

Based on the above and upon implementation of OI 7-B-04 and the installation of the Salem-Deans cross trip scheme, operation of the Salem Unit No *. 1 and No. 2 and Hope Creek Stations at a total Island generating level of 3162 MW does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. Rl Appropriate changes to the Salem and Hope Creek Safety Analysis Reports shall be processed during the next update cycles. No changes are required to the Salem or Hope Creek Technical Specifications.

8.0 SIGNATURES 4/3/i1 4/3/B7 Date Date

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Hea~G 4/~/s1 ID~te Manager - _

Plant Engineering se/lgh3/10 gDD-7 FORM 1 REV 0 10S~~T81

ATTACHMENT 1 *

  • 500KV POWER SYSTEM STABILITY ARTIFICIAL ISLAND SALEM - DEANS LINE - - - - ------REMOTE TRIP RECEIVER PROTECTION REGULAR BREAKER FAILURE 20X _ ___.

NO. 1 GEN.

TRIP 1 4 - - - BREAKERS 2rax & 21X REGULAR (BOTH OPEN>

BREAKER FAILURE 21X -

SALEM - DEANS LINE PROTECTION BACK-UP 1, 1, BREAKER FAILURE 22X -

NO. 1 GEN.

TRIP - BREAKERS 20X & 21X

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BACK-UP <BOTH OPEN>

BREAKER FAIL URE 21X --

31X 21X llX 5"37 @ 5024 HOPE CREEK NEW FREEDOM 5021

@ DEANS rnx 20X 12X CD G2 Gl

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  • Hope Creek Salem SAFETY Salem EVAL~ATION S~SOO-NSE-0675, ATTA~NT 2 .

Hope Creek Salem REV., 1 Offsite Power Sources Keeney Deans New Freedom New Freedom Hope Creek Salem Hope Creek x x x x x 3 3

- x x x x 3 2

- - x x x 2 2

- x - x x 2 2

- x x - x 2 1 A

- x x x - 2 1 A

- - - x x 1 A

1 A

- - x - x 1 A

1 A

-. - x x - 1 1 A A I

- x - - x 1 A

1 A

- x - x - 1 . 1 A A

- x x - - 2 -

SD Symbols:

X = Line in Service

= Line in Outage A - Action Statement SD*= Shutdown se-lgh3/l O ..

  • ATTACHMENT 3 SALEM AND HOPE CREEK GENERATING LIMITS DURING THE HOPE CREEK KEENEY LINE OUTAGE Three Unit OJ2eration Condition Salem 1 Salem 2 Ho12e Creek Cross Trip Available* 1162 MW 1000 MW 1000 MW Cross Trip Unavailable 790 MW 790 MW 750 MW Maintenance Outage Of Any(l,3) 650 MW 650 MW 650 MW One 500 KV Line Salem Unit No. 1 Out of Service Condition Salem 1 Salem 2 Ho12e Creek Cross Trip Unavailable( 2 )

N/A 1020 MW 950 MW Maintenance Outage Of Any(l,3) N/A 880 MW 825 MW One 500 KV Line Salem Unit No. 2 Out of Service Condition Salem 1 Salem 2 Ho12e Creek Cross Trip Unavailable( 2 ) 1020 MW N/A 950 MW Maintenance Outage Of Any(l,3) 880 MW N/A 825 MW One 500 KV Line Ho12e Creek Unit No. 1 Out of Service Condition Salem 1 Salem 2 Ho12e Creek*

Cross Trip Unavailable( 2 ) 980 MW 980 MW N/A Maintenance Outage Of Any(l,3) 850 MW 850 MW N/A*

One 500 KV Line

  • 1
  • Notes 1)

ATTACHMENT 3 CONTINUED During a maintenance outage on either the Salem - Hope Creek or Hope.Creek - New Freedom 500 KV lines, Hope Creek will enter the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement.

2) During two unit operation, the Salem - Deans cross trip protection will be disabled.
3) Routine maintenance on all 500 and 230 KV lines will be
  • restricted when the cross trip protection is armed.

Emergency outages of a 500 KV line will require a reduction in generation. Emergency outages at the 230 KV level due not require a re~uction in generation .

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