ML20206Q473
| ML20206Q473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206Q451 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-97-05, GL-97-5, NUDOCS 9905190137 | |
| Download: ML20206Q473 (3) | |
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4 UNITED STATES p
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066 4001
.....,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION LICENSEE RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 95-07. " PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES" PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Pressure locking and thermal binding represent potential common-cause failure mechanisms that can render redundant safety systems incapable of performing their safety functions. The identification of susceptible valves and the determination of when the phenomena might occur req 0 ires a thorough knowledge of components, systems, and plant operations. Pressure locking occurs in flexible-wedge and double-disk gate valves when fluid becomes pressurized inside the valve bonnet and the actuator is not capable of overcoming the additional thrust requirements resulting from the differential pressure created across both valve disks by the pressurized fluid in the valve bonnet. Thermal binding is generally associated with a wedge gate valve that is closed while the system is hot and then is allowed to cool before an attempt is made to open the valve.
Pressure locking or thermal binding occurs as a result of the valve design characteristics (wedge and valve body configuration, flexibility, and material thermal coefficients) when the valve is subjected to specific pressures and temperatures during various mades of plant operation. Operating experience indicates that these situations were not always considered in many plants as part of the design basis for valves.
2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Part 50 (Appendix A, General Design Criteria 1 and 4) of Title 10 of the pode of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and plant licensing safety analyses require or commit (or both) that licensees design and test safety related components and systems to provide adequate assurance that those systems can perform their safety functions. Other individual criteria in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to specific systems, in accordance with those regulations and licensing commitments, and under the additional provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix B, Criterion XVI), licensees are expected to act to ensure that safety related power-operated gate valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their required safety functions.
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On August 17,1995, the NRC lasued Generic Letter (GL) 95 07, ' Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take certain actions to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing bases of the facility. GL 95-07 requested that each licensee, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the GL, (1) evaluate the operational j
configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves in its plant to identify valves that i
are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, and (2) perform further analyses and take needed corrective actions (or justify longer schedules) to ensure that the susceptible valves, identified in (1) above, are capable of performing their intended safety functions under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. In addition, GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the GL, provide to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a summary description of (1) the susceptibility evaluation used to determine that valves are or are not susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, (2) the results of the susceptibility evaluation, including a listing of the susceptible valves identified, and (3) the corrective actions, or other dispositioning, for the valves identified as susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The NRC issued GL 95-07 as a " compliance backfit" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(l) because modification may be necessary to bring facilities into compliance with the rules of the Commission referenced a' ove.
o in a letter dated February 13,1996, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G or the licensee) submitted its180-day response to GL 95-07 for Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS). The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submlttal and requested additional information In a letter dated May 17,1996, in a letter dated July 10,1996, the licensee provided the j
additionalinformation.
I 3.0 STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Scope of Licensee's Review GL 95-07 requested that licensees evaluate the operational configurations of safety related power-operated gate valves in their plants to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure
. locking or thermal binding. The PSE&G submittals dated February 13, and May 17,1996, described the scope of valves evaluated in response to GL 95-07. The NRC staff has reviewed the scope of the licensee's susceptibility evaluation performed in response to GL 95-07 for HCGS and found it complete and acceptable.
Normally open, safety related power-operated gate valves which are ek> sed for test or surveillance but must retum to the open position were evaluated within the scope of GL 95-07 except in the instances when the system / train is declared inoperable in accordance with technical specifications. The staff finds the criteria for determining the scope of power-operated valves for GL 95-07 are consistent with the staff's acceptance of the scope of motor-operated valves associated with GL 89-10, " Safety Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,"
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' 3.2 Corrective Actions GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days, perform funher analyses as appropriate, and take appropriate corrective actions (or justify longer schedules), to ensure that the susceptible valves identified are capable of performing their intended safety function under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. The licensee's submittals discussed proposed corrective actions to address potential pressure-locking and thermal-binding problems. The staff's evaluation of the licensee's actions is discussed in the following paragraphs:
a.
The licensee stated that the following valves have been modified to eliminate the potential for pressure locking:
1BCHV F017NB/C/D Low Pressure Coolant Injection isolation 1BDHV-F013 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling injection Isolation 1BEHV-F005NB Core Spray injection isolation 1BJHV-F006 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Discharge to Core Spray isolation 1BJHV F042 HPCI Pump Suction, Suppression Pool isolation 1BJHV-8278
'HPCI Discharge to Feedwater isolation The staff finds that physical modification to valves susceptible to pressure locking is an appropriate corrective action to ensure operability of the valves and is thus acceptable.
j b.
The licensee stated that all flexible and solid wedge gate valves in the scope of l
GL 95-07 were evaluated for thermal binding. When evaluating whether valves were susceptible to thermal binding, the licensee assumed that thermal binding l
would not occur below specific temperature thresholds, Operating conditions for the HPCI turbine steam admission valve,1FDHV F001, exceeded these temperature thresholds. However, the licensee stated that operational experience demonstrates that the valve is not susceptible to thermal binding. The screening criteria used by the licensee appear to provide a reasonable approach to identify those valves that might be susceptible to thermal binding. Until more definitive i
' industry criteria are developed, the staff concludes that the licensee's actions to
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address thermal binding of gate valves are acceptable.
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has performed appropriate evaluations of the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves to identify valves at HCGS that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. In addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has taken appropriate corrective actions to ensure that these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee has adequately addressed the requested actions discussed in GL 95-07.
Principal Contributor: S. Tingen Date: May 14, 1999