IR 05000312/1986013

Insp Rept 50-312/86-13 on 860310-0421.Violation noted:SA-516 Plate Matl Used in 1983 for New Containment Penetration Assemblies in Lieu of Forged Assemblies Specified in USAR

ML20198H857
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	05/15/1986
From:	Burdoin J, Miller L, Myers C, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198H800	List: ML20198H796 ML20198H813 ML20198H857
References
50-312-86-13, NUDOCS 8605300578
Download: ML20198H857 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No: 50-312/86-13

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Docket N i License No. DPR-54

{ Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

! P. O. Box 15830

! Sacramento, California 95813 i

Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

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Inspection conducted:

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Inspectors: h G. , ting Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed i

(T h C.' rs, Resident Inspector

1. sin Date Signed n #rkc

) hK rdo n, Regional Inspector Date Signed h/N3'G j kL.' F iller, Chief Date Signed j Reac ProjectsSection II

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! Summary:

l Inspection between March 10 to April 21, 1986 (Report 50-312/86-13)

Areas Inspected

This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors and in part by a Regional Inspector, involved the areas of operational safety

{ verification, maintenance, surveillance, and follow up items. During this

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inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 61726, 62703, 62705, 71707, 92701, 92702 and 94702 were use ; Results: Of the areas inspected one apparent violation on reporting 10 CFR 50.59 changes was identifie i i

8605300578 860516

PDR ADOCK 05000312 G PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel G. Coward, Nuclear Plant Manager J. McColligan, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager S. Redeker, Nuclear Operations Manager

• J. Shetler, Nuclear Scheduling Manager D. Army, Nuclect Maintenance Manager

• B. Croley, Nuclear Technical Manager -

M. Price, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent

• J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support Superintendent S. Crunk Incident Analysis Group Supervisor J. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer

• F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintendent L. Schwieger, Quality Department Manager M. Hieronimos, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent J. Jewett, Site QA Supervisor

• H. Canter, QA Operations Surveillence Supervisor C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer B. Daniels, Electrical Engineering Supervisor

• R. Lawrence, Assistant to Department Manager L. Fossom, I&C Maintenance Superintendent

• T. Tucker, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

• C Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent R. Miller, Chemistry Superintendent D. Tipton, Outage Coordinator

• J. Williams, I6C Engineering Supervisor

• C. Stephenson, Principle Regulatory Compliance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechancies, security and office personne * Attended the Exit Meeting on April 22, 198 . Operational Safety Verification At the start of this report period the plant was in a cold shutdown condition. The plant has been in this mode of operation since the December 26, 1986 plant trip initiated by a loss of integrated control system powe During this period the inspectors observed control room operations, verified proper control room staffing, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with the operations crews, reviewed selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, verified proper removal frot service of affected components, and verified the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation _ _ _ _

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Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, and reactor buildings and the general site area were conducted to observe plant equipment condition, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors reviewed portions of non-licensed operator logs, conducted various discussions with the non-licensed operators and observed them performing their assigned dutie During tours of the facility, the inspectors entered radiologically controlled areas. The inspectors verified compliance with the licensee's radiation protection program. The inspectors discussed the radiation work permit requirements and the radiological conditions of the work areas with workers in the radiologically controlled areas. Also, the inspectors verified proper clothing requirements and observed the method of personal frisking when exiting radiological controlled areas. The inspectors examined selected radiation protection instruments to verify their operability and calibratio .

The licensee's adherence to the physical security plan was evaluated daily during this period by observing the entry process, wearing of photo identification badges by personnel, escorting of visitors, and security compensatory measure No violations or deviations were identifie l 3. Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities for the systems and components listed i below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specification l The following items were considered during this review: The limiting I conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente The following maintenance activities were observed:

Diesel Engine Fire Pump The overhaul, inspection, and rework of the diesel engine driven fire pum This work was required when the engine failed to start while performing a surveillance procedure. The inspection revealed that rainwater had entered the diesel engine through rusted areas in the muffler. The water then filled the cylinders and turbocharger. The licensee performed work on the engine, replaced the muffler and

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successfully ran the surveillance test. In addition, the licensee added an inspection of the muffler in their eighteen month diesel fire pump maintenance program. The licensee's work appeared to have identified and corrected the cause of the engine's failur V Bus Over/Undervoltage Relay Work On November 19, 1985 while performing monthly trip tests November 19, 1985 on overvoltage relays 459-1A and 459-2A for 4160 V Bus 4A2, the relays were found to chatter when the trip test button was depresse Subsequent occurences and further investigation disclosed two additional problems: 1. The relay flag (target)

failed to rotate (operate) while functionally testing relay 459-2A ,

and 2. The difference in circuitry between the two models of the relays required that the relay case be adapted to the particular model relay it supported. However, reverse logic (energize or de-energize to operate) between two models (211B or 211R) of undervoltage relays precluded the interchange of standard plug-in type relays in permanently installed mounting case The immediate solution to the above problems was to replace the questionable relays with spare relays. The lic ensee conferred with the supplier (Brown Boveri, Inc.) of the relay < cencerning the chattering and flag problems. Brown Boveri reco;nended modifications to the relays as a long te rm solution for the chattering and flag problems. The changes to correct the relay chattering and flag problems required circuit changes on the relay printed circuit board. The licensee purchased modification kits for the twelve overvoltage relays involved. To solve the plug-in type relay mounting case problem, the licensee purchased six new replacement undervoltage relays (three as spares) to standardize on one model (211R) relay. The modification kits were received on site late in February,1986 and the six new - lays in late December, 1985. The licensee's present plans call for the installation of the modification kits and new relays before the plant returns to powe The licensee also initiated a 10CFR Part 21 to report the defective aspects of the overvoltage relay The inspector examined the following documents associated with the over/undervoltage relay problems and solutions:

1. NCR S-5206, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, chattering proble . NCR S-5335, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, flag operation proble . W/R #106930, 4A2 Bus overvoltage protection, erratic operation of relays 4591A and 4592 . W/R #109513, 459-2A relay flag proble . W/R #109516, ITE 59D spare relay, defective flag reset switc . P/0 RS77972, purchase six undervoltage relays (Model ITE-27).

7. P/O PS7797, provide report on defective components of ITE-27 relay S/N3390, 8. P/0 GR82844, Purchase modification kits for ITE 59D and ITE 27 relay __. . -

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9. Brown Boveri certificate of conformance for components contained in modification kits.

i The inspector examined the dispositions and completion records for

the NCRs and work requests, and receiving records and certifications associated with the purchase orders. The inspector also reviewed in

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detail the relay supplier's cerification-of components and installation instruction for relay modification kits. The documentation appeared to be in order and appropriate.

l No violations or deviations were identified.

J 4. Monthly Surveillance Observation Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed i and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with these requirements. In addition, eddy current testing of the "A" Once l Through Steam Generatior (OTSG) was reviewe The following items were considered during this review: testing was in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data were in agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any i deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

! resolved by appropriate management personne The following ourveillances were reviewed:

"A" Once through Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing, l SP 201.03B Monthly Surveillance of Plant Fire Pumps and Power

! Supplies,

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SP 211.01D Monthly Control Room / Technical Support Center Emergency Ventilation System Loop B Surveillance Test.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Management Meetings

! During this report period the NRC staff met with members of the licensee j for a two day meeting, March 24-25, 1986. The meeting involved i presentations and tcurs by the licensee concerning the findings and plant I and organizational r:odifications which were planned in response to the December 26, 1985 event. NRC staff members who attended the meeting j included: Messrs. H. R. Denton, (Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor i Regulation), J. M. Taylor, (Director, Office of Inspection and

Enforcement), J. B. Martin, (Regional Administrator), and F. J. Miraglia, (Director, Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Licensing-B).

6. Followup Items

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(CLOSED) Item I.C.1 "Short-Term Accident and Procedures Review -

. Inadequate Core Cooling / Transients and Accidents"Section III.B.S.4,Section III.D Step 20.0/20.5, and Section I.C.C. Step 21.7 of the Abnormal Operating Transient Guidelines (ATOG) were not found in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) during NRC inspection 50-312/85-21. The licensee committed to correct these items by September 1, 1985. A review of operator training records during the same inspection indicated that documentation on two operators was not complete. The licensee committed to provide documentation on that training by August 1, 198 The inspector reviewed the current revisions, dated February 15, 1986, to the E0Ps in the above area A comparison was made between the ATOG and the E0Ps; The E0Ps appeared to contain the information set forth in the ATO The inspector also reviewed the training records for twelve reactor operators and senior reactor operators, to ascertain the documentation of the ATOG and E0P training. All records reviewed were complet TMI item I.C.1 is close (CLOSED) 83-22-01 -

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This item addressed the inspector's concerns regarding an increased trend in containment leakage as indicated by the 1983 containment integrated leakage rate test (CILRT). As noted in the report, the leakage rates based on the Total Time and Mass Point techniques used in 1977 and in 1983 showed an increase in the leakage rate, however, the rates were within the acceptance criteria. The licensee agrees that the trend exists, and has taken action to improve their local leak rate testing program (an important factor in the total containment leakage). The next CILRT is planned for the next (cycle 8) refueling outage. The inspector will review the results of the next CILRT and at that time a comparison will be performed of the past leakage values to determine whether the licensee's corrective action has been effective. This item is close (83-22-01).

No violations or deviations were identifie l (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 85-31-02 " Weaknesses in the licensee's program for reporting 10CFR 50.59 modifications."

In a previous inspection 85-31, the inspector noted that the licensee exhibited weaknesses in the area of reporting modifications pursuant to 10CFR 50.5 The inspector reviewed recent monthly reports submitted to the NR These were the only reports detailing changes which the licensee submits routinely to the NRC. In the section of " Summary of Changes in Accordance with 10CFR 50.59 (b)" the inspector noted several changes that were not reported within a year of the modification being implemente ___ ______ ___ __

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nor had a tabulation of the changes been submitted within the monthly report as required by the Technical Specifications. For example, in 1983 containment penetration assemblies were modified to provide the ability to install a hydrogen recombiner after an accident. The new containment penetration assemblies were fabricated of SA-516 plate material, as opposed to the forged assemblies described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). A 10CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation of the change was performed on May 13, 1983, and found that the alternate design was acceptable, llowever, this change was not reported in the licensee's Monthly Report to the NRC until April 14, 1986, nor was any summary of the Safety Evaluation transmitte In addition, the descriptions of the changes which were eventually submitted did not include the required summary safety evaluation. The descriptions were generally a review of the change, which did not include an evaluation showing that the change did not involve an unreviewed

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safety question, as required by 10 CFR 50.59b. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50.59b and Technical Specification 6.9.3. (50-312/86-13-01).

The licensee, recently, has taken steps to improve the timeliness of the 10CFR 50.59 report, but a backlog of 10CFR 50.59 changes that have been completed and have not yet been reported existed at the end of this inspectio Unresolved item 85-31-02 appears to be a violation of 10CFR 50.59 requirements (86-13-01), and therefore, 85-31-02 will be closed, and replaced by the new item number for tracking purpose . Review of Occurrence Description Reports (ODRs)

The inspector reviewed various licensee generated ODRs. One ODR dated February 2, 1986 discussed four valves that were found when hanging a clearance on the pegging steam system; these valves uere not on the associated piping drawin One of the corrective actions the licensee performed due to the October 2, 1985 cooldown event was to walkdown sixteen important to safety and non-safety related systems and identify any configuration problems; for instance, valves in the plant system but not on the piping drawings for the system. The program was controlled by the " Action List" from the October 2,1985 transient, which provided for the processing of findings from the system walkdowns. The process was as follows: 1) develop a list of systems to walkdown, 2) to walkdown the systems to identify valves not on prints, 3) to prepare NCRs on findings, revise procedures as necessary, and 4) to update plant drawing Contrary to the above criteria the four bypass valves had been identified during the walkdowns but an NCR was not generated or disponitioned on i these valves, and the plant drawin8s were not revised to reficct the as-found condition of the plant system. Additionally, the licensee committed in a letter dated November 15, 1985 to the NRC that the drawings would be revised by April 1, 1986 and this had not been completed at the end of this report perio _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

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The inspector notified a licensee representative of these concern Subsequently, the licensee performed a quality assurance surveillance and found that the four valves had not been identified on the plant system drawings. Additionally, the surveillance identified thirteen other valves that had not been included on the plant drawings. A licensee representative committed to review the inspector's findings and present a program to address the concerns. This item is open (86-13-02), pending the licensee's further review of this incident, a more generic review of the actions taken subsequent to the sixteen system walkdowns, and verification that the findings have been appropriately incorporated into the configuration control syste . Plant Review Committee (PRC) Activities The inspector attended two PRC meetings during this report period to verify, on a sample basis, that the PRC is performing their required reviews. The inspector observed a review of a special test procedure written to provide the assurance that the present station batteries are capable of performing their function required for a cold shutdown condition if called upon. The review consisted of a determination that the test was not an unreviewed safety question, r.or an unreviewed Technical Specification Change, nor a change to the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report. The inspector concurred with the above review and found the PRC's actions to be appropriat No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Meeting The resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on April 22, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection activities as given in this report, were summarized at the meetin _ _ - _ _ _ _ _