ML20198H857
| ML20198H857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Miller L, Myers C, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198H800 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-86-13, NUDOCS 8605300578 | |
| Download: ML20198H857 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1986013
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No: 50-312/86-13
Docket No.
50-312
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License No. DPR-54
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Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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P. O. Box 15830
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Sacramento, California 95813
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Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1
Inspection at: Herald, California
(Rancho Seco Site)
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Inspection conducted:
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Inspectors: h G. P.
ting Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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(T
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h C.'J.
rs, Resident Inspector
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hK F.
rdo n, Regional Inspector
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h/N3'G
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kL.' F
iller, Chief
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Reac
ProjectsSection II
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Summary:
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Inspection between March 10 to April 21, 1986 (Report 50-312/86-13)
Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors and in
part by a Regional Inspector, involved the areas of operational safety
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verification, maintenance, surveillance, and follow up items. During this
inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 61726, 62703, 62705, 71707, 92701,
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92702 and 94702 were used.
Results: Of the areas inspected one apparent violation on reporting 10 CFR
50.59 changes was identified.
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8605300578 860516
ADOCK 05000312
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Personnel
G. Coward, Nuclear Plant Manager
J. McColligan, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager
S. Redeker, Nuclear Operations Manager
- J. Shetler, Nuclear Scheduling Manager
D. Army, Nuclect Maintenance Manager
- B. Croley, Nuclear Technical Manager
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M. Price, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent
- J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support Superintendent
S. Crunk Incident Analysis Group Supervisor
J. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer
- F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintendent
L. Schwieger, Quality Department Manager
M. Hieronimos, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent
J. Jewett, Site QA Supervisor
- H. Canter, QA Operations Surveillence Supervisor
C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
B. Daniels, Electrical Engineering Supervisor
- R. Lawrence, Assistant to Department Manager
L. Fossom, I&C Maintenance Superintendent
- T. Tucker, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
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Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
R. Miller, Chemistry Superintendent
D. Tipton, Outage Coordinator
- J. Williams, I6C Engineering Supervisor
- C. Stephenson, Principle Regulatory Compliance Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechancies, security and office personnel.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on April 22, 1986.
2.
Operational Safety Verification
At the start of this report period the plant was in a cold shutdown
condition. The plant has been in this mode of operation since the
December 26, 1986 plant trip initiated by a loss of integrated control
system power.
During this period the inspectors observed control room operations,
verified proper control room staffing, reviewed applicable logs,
conducted discussions with the operations crews, reviewed selected
emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, verified proper removal frot
service of affected components, and verified the licensee's adherence to
limiting conditions for operations.
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Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, and reactor buildings and the general
site area were conducted to observe plant equipment condition, and to
verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need
of maintenance.
The inspectors reviewed portions of non-licensed operator logs, conducted
various discussions with the non-licensed operators and observed them
performing their assigned duties.
During tours of the facility, the inspectors entered radiologically
controlled areas. The inspectors verified compliance with the licensee's
radiation protection program. The inspectors discussed the radiation
work permit requirements and the radiological conditions of the work
areas with workers in the radiologically controlled areas. Also, the
inspectors verified proper clothing requirements and observed the method
of personal frisking when exiting radiological controlled areas. The
inspectors examined selected radiation protection instruments to verify
their operability and calibration.
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The licensee's adherence to the physical security plan was evaluated
daily during this period by observing the entry process, wearing of photo
identification badges by personnel, escorting of visitors, and security
compensatory measures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities for the systems and components listed
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below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or
standards, and the Technical Specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review: The limiting
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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed
prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were
implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Diesel Engine Fire Pump
The overhaul, inspection, and rework of the diesel engine driven
fire pump.
This work was required when the engine failed to start while
performing a surveillance procedure. The inspection revealed that
rainwater had entered the diesel engine through rusted areas in the
muffler. The water then filled the cylinders and turbocharger. The
licensee performed work on the engine, replaced the muffler and
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successfully ran the surveillance test.
In addition, the licensee
added an inspection of the muffler in their eighteen month diesel
fire pump maintenance program. The licensee's work appeared to have
identified and corrected the cause of the engine's failure.
4160 V Bus Over/Undervoltage Relay Work
On November 19, 1985 while performing monthly trip tests November
19, 1985 on overvoltage relays 459-1A and 459-2A for 4160 V Bus 4A2,
the relays were found to chatter when the trip test button was
depressed.
Subsequent occurences and further investigation
disclosed two additional problems:
1. The relay flag (target)
failed to rotate (operate) while functionally testing relay 459-2A ,
and 2. The difference in circuitry between the two models of the
relays required that the relay case be adapted to the particular
model relay it supported. However, reverse logic (energize or
de-energize to operate) between two models (211B or 211R) of
undervoltage relays precluded the interchange of standard plug-in
type relays in permanently installed mounting cases.
The immediate solution to the above problems was to replace the
questionable relays with spare relays. The lic ensee conferred with
the supplier (Brown Boveri, Inc.) of the relay < cencerning the
chattering and flag problems. Brown Boveri reco;nended
modifications to the relays as a long te rm solution for the
chattering and flag problems. The changes to correct the relay
chattering and flag problems required circuit changes on the relay
printed circuit board. The licensee purchased modification kits for
the twelve overvoltage relays involved. To solve the plug-in type
relay mounting case problem, the licensee purchased six new
replacement undervoltage relays (three as spares) to standardize on
one model (211R) relay. The modification kits were received on site
late in February,1986 and the six new - lays in late December,
1985. The licensee's present plans call for the installation of the
modification kits and new relays before the plant returns to power.
The licensee also initiated a 10CFR Part 21 to report the defective
aspects of the overvoltage relays.
The inspector examined the following documents associated with the
over/undervoltage relay problems and solutions:
1. NCR S-5206, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, chattering problem.
2. NCR S-5335, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, flag operation problem.
3. W/R #106930, 4A2 Bus overvoltage protection, erratic operation of
relays 4591A and 4592A.
4. W/R #109513, 459-2A relay flag problem.
5. W/R #109516, ITE 59D spare relay, defective flag reset switch.
6. P/0 RS77972, purchase six undervoltage relays (Model ITE-27).
7. P/O PS7797, provide report on defective components of ITE-27
relay
S/N3390,
8. P/0 GR82844, Purchase modification kits for ITE 59D and ITE 27
relays.
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9. Brown Boveri certificate of conformance for components contained
in modification kits.
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The inspector examined the dispositions and completion records for
the NCRs and work requests, and receiving records and certifications
associated with the purchase orders. The inspector also reviewed in
detail the relay supplier's cerification-of components and
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installation instruction for relay modification kits. The
documentation appeared to be in order and appropriate.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed
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and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
these requirements. In addition, eddy current testing of the "A" Once
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Through Steam Generatior (OTSG) was reviewed.
The following items were considered during this review:
testing was in
accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated;
limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of
the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with TS
and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or
engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data were in
agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any
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deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The following ourveillances were reviewed:
"A" Once through Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing,
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SP 201.03B Monthly Surveillance of Plant Fire Pumps and Power
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Supplies,
SP 211.01D Monthly Control Room / Technical Support Center Emergency
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Ventilation System Loop B Surveillance Test.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Management Meetings
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During this report period the NRC staff met with members of the licensee
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for a two day meeting, March 24-25, 1986. The meeting involved
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presentations and tcurs by the licensee concerning the findings and plant
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and organizational r:odifications which were planned in response to the
December 26, 1985 event. NRC staff members who attended the meeting
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included: Messrs. H. R. Denton, (Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
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Regulation),
J. M. Taylor, (Director, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement), J. B. Martin, (Regional Administrator), and F. J. Miraglia,
(Director, Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Licensing-B).
6.
Followup Items
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(CLOSED) Item I.C.1 "Short-Term Accident and Procedures Review -
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Inadequate Core Cooling / Transients and Accidents"
Section III.B.S.4,Section III.D Step 20.0/20.5, and Section I.C.C. Step
21.7 of the Abnormal Operating Transient Guidelines (ATOG) were not found
in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) during NRC inspection
50-312/85-21. The licensee committed to correct these items by
September 1, 1985. A review of operator training records during the same
inspection indicated that documentation on two operators was not
complete. The licensee committed to provide documentation on that
training by August 1, 1985.
The inspector reviewed the current revisions, dated February 15, 1986,
to the E0Ps in the above areas.
A comparison was made between the ATOG and the E0Ps; The E0Ps appeared
to contain the information set forth in the ATOG.
The inspector also reviewed the training records for twelve reactor
operators and senior reactor operators, to ascertain the documentation of
the ATOG and E0P training. All records reviewed were complete.
TMI item I.C.1 is closed.
(CLOSED) 83-22-01
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This item addressed the inspector's concerns regarding an increased trend
in containment leakage as indicated by the 1983 containment integrated
leakage rate test (CILRT). As noted in the report, the leakage rates
based on the Total Time and Mass Point techniques used in 1977 and in
1983 showed an increase in the leakage rate, however, the rates were
within the acceptance criteria. The licensee agrees that the trend
exists, and has taken action to improve their local leak rate testing
program (an important factor in the total containment leakage). The next
CILRT is planned for the next (cycle 8) refueling outage. The inspector
will review the results of the next CILRT and at that time a comparison
will be performed of the past leakage values to determine whether the
licensee's corrective action has been effective. This item is closed.
(83-22-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 85-31-02 " Weaknesses in the licensee's program
for reporting 10CFR 50.59 modifications."
In a previous inspection 85-31, the inspector noted that the licensee
exhibited weaknesses in the area of reporting modifications pursuant to
The inspector reviewed recent monthly reports submitted to the NRC.
These were the only reports detailing changes which the licensee submits
routinely to the NRC.
In the section of " Summary of Changes in
Accordance with 10CFR 50.59 (b)" the inspector noted several changes that
were not reported within a year of the modification being implemented.
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nor had a tabulation of the changes been submitted within the monthly
report as required by the Technical Specifications. For example, in 1983
containment penetration assemblies were modified to provide the ability
to install a hydrogen recombiner after an accident. The new containment
penetration assemblies were fabricated of SA-516 plate material, as
opposed to the forged assemblies described in the Updated Safety Analysis
Report (USAR). A 10CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation of the change was
performed on May 13, 1983, and found that the alternate design was
acceptable, llowever, this change was not reported in the licensee's
Monthly Report to the NRC until April 14, 1986, nor was any summary of
the Safety Evaluation transmitted.
In addition, the descriptions of the changes which were eventually
submitted did not include the required summary safety evaluation. The
descriptions were generally a review of the change, which did not include
an evaluation showing that the change did not involve an unreviewed
safety question, as required by 10 CFR 50.59b. This is a violation of 10
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CFR 50.59b and Technical Specification 6.9.3. (50-312/86-13-01).
The licensee, recently, has taken steps to improve the timeliness of the
10CFR 50.59 report, but a backlog of 10CFR 50.59 changes that have been
completed and have not yet been reported existed at the end of this
inspection.
Unresolved item 85-31-02 appears to be a violation of 10CFR 50.59
requirements (86-13-01), and therefore, 85-31-02 will be closed, and
replaced by the new item number for tracking purposes.
7.
Review of Occurrence Description Reports (ODRs)
The inspector reviewed various licensee generated ODRs. One ODR dated
February 2, 1986 discussed four valves that were found when hanging a
clearance on the pegging steam system; these valves uere not on the
associated piping drawing.
One of the corrective actions the licensee performed due to the October
2, 1985 cooldown event was to walkdown sixteen important to safety and
non-safety related systems and identify any configuration problems; for
instance, valves in the plant system but not on the piping drawings for
the system. The program was controlled by the " Action List" from the
October 2,1985 transient, which provided for the processing of findings
from the system walkdowns. The process was as follows:
1) develop a
list of systems to walkdown, 2) to walkdown the systems to identify
valves not on prints, 3) to prepare NCRs on findings, revise procedures
as necessary, and 4) to update plant drawings.
Contrary to the above criteria the four bypass valves had been identified
during the walkdowns but an NCR was not generated or disponitioned on
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these valves, and the plant drawin8s were not revised to reficct the
as-found condition of the plant system. Additionally, the licensee
committed in a letter dated November 15, 1985 to the NRC that the
drawings would be revised by April 1, 1986 and this had not been
completed at the end of this report period.
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The inspector notified a licensee representative of these concerns.
Subsequently, the licensee performed a quality assurance surveillance and
found that the four valves had not been identified on the plant system
drawings. Additionally, the surveillance identified thirteen other
valves that had not been included on the plant drawings. A licensee
representative committed to review the inspector's findings and present a
program to address the concerns. This item is open (86-13-02), pending
the licensee's further review of this incident, a more generic review of
the actions taken subsequent to the sixteen system walkdowns, and
verification that the findings have been appropriately incorporated into
the configuration control system.
8.
Plant Review Committee (PRC) Activities
The inspector attended two PRC meetings during this report period to
verify, on a sample basis, that the PRC is performing their required
reviews. The inspector observed a review of a special test procedure
written to provide the assurance that the present station batteries are
capable of performing their function required for a cold shutdown
condition if called upon. The review consisted of a determination that
the test was not an unreviewed safety question, r.or an unreviewed
Technical Specification Change, nor a change to the facility as described
in the Safety Analysis Report. The inspector concurred with the above
review and found the PRC's actions to be appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Meeting
The resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on
April 22, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection activities as
given in this report, were summarized at the meeting.
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