ML20198H857

Insp Rept 50-312/86-13 on 860310-0421.Violation noted:SA-516 Plate Matl Used in 1983 for New Containment Penetration Assemblies in Lieu of Forged Assemblies Specified in USAR

ML20198H857
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	05/15/1986
From:	Burdoin J, Miller L, Myers C, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198H800	List: ML20198H796 ML20198H813 ML20198H857
References
50-312-86-13, NUDOCS 8605300578
Download: ML20198H857 (8)

See also: IR 05000312/1986013

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No: 50-312/86-13

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Docket No. 50-312

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License No. DPR-54

{ Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

! P. O. Box 15830

! Sacramento, California 95813

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Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1

Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

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Inspection conducted:

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Inspectors: h G. P. , ting Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

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(T

h C.'J. rs, Resident Inspector

1. sin

Date Signed

n #rkc

) hK F. rdo n, Regional Inspector Date Signed

h/N3'G

j kL.' F iller, Chief Date Signed

j Reac ProjectsSection II

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! Summary:

l Inspection between March 10 to April 21, 1986 (Report 50-312/86-13)

Areas Inspected

This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors and in

part by a Regional Inspector, involved the areas of operational safety

{ verification, maintenance, surveillance, and follow up items. During this

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inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 61726, 62703, 62705, 71707, 92701,

92702 and 94702 were used.

Results

Of the areas inspected one apparent violation on reporting 10 CFR

50.59 changes was identified.

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8605300578 860516

PDR ADOCK 05000312

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

a. Licensee Personnel

G. Coward, Nuclear Plant Manager

J. McColligan, Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager

S. Redeker, Nuclear Operations Manager

• J. Shetler, Nuclear Scheduling Manager

D. Army, Nuclect Maintenance Manager

• B. Croley, Nuclear Technical Manager -

M. Price, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent

• J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support Superintendent

S. Crunk Incident Analysis Group Supervisor

J. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer

• F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintendent

L. Schwieger, Quality Department Manager

M. Hieronimos, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent

J. Jewett, Site QA Supervisor

• H. Canter, QA Operations Surveillence Supervisor

C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

B. Daniels, Electrical Engineering Supervisor

• R. Lawrence, Assistant to Department Manager

L. Fossom, I&C Maintenance Superintendent

• T. Tucker, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

• C Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

R. Miller, Chemistry Superintendent

D. Tipton, Outage Coordinator

• J. Williams, I6C Engineering Supervisor

• C. Stephenson, Principle Regulatory Compliance Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechancies, security and office personnel.

• Attended the Exit Meeting on April 22, 1986.

2. Operational Safety Verification

At the start of this report period the plant was in a cold shutdown

condition. The plant has been in this mode of operation since the

December 26, 1986 plant trip initiated by a loss of integrated control

system power.

During this period the inspectors observed control room operations,

verified proper control room staffing, reviewed applicable logs,

conducted discussions with the operations crews, reviewed selected

emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, verified proper removal frot

service of affected components, and verified the licensee's adherence to

limiting conditions for operations.

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Tours of the auxiliary, turbine, and reactor buildings and the general

site area were conducted to observe plant equipment condition, and to

verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need

of maintenance.

The inspectors reviewed portions of non-licensed operator logs, conducted

various discussions with the non-licensed operators and observed them

performing their assigned duties.

During tours of the facility, the inspectors entered radiologically

controlled areas. The inspectors verified compliance with the licensee's

radiation protection program. The inspectors discussed the radiation

work permit requirements and the radiological conditions of the work

areas with workers in the radiologically controlled areas. Also, the

inspectors verified proper clothing requirements and observed the method

of personal frisking when exiting radiological controlled areas. The

inspectors examined selected radiation protection instruments to verify

their operability and calibration.

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The licensee's adherence to the physical security plan was evaluated

daily during this period by observing the entry process, wearing of photo

identification badges by personnel, escorting of visitors, and security

compensatory measures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities for the systems and components listed i

below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in

accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or

standards, and the Technical Specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review: The limiting I

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed

prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were

accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were

implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

The following maintenance activities were observed:

Diesel Engine Fire Pump

The overhaul, inspection, and rework of the diesel engine driven

fire pump.

This work was required when the engine failed to start while

performing a surveillance procedure. The inspection revealed that

rainwater had entered the diesel engine through rusted areas in the

muffler. The water then filled the cylinders and turbocharger. The

licensee performed work on the engine, replaced the muffler and

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successfully ran the surveillance test. In addition, the licensee

added an inspection of the muffler in their eighteen month diesel

fire pump maintenance program. The licensee's work appeared to have

identified and corrected the cause of the engine's failure.

4160 V Bus Over/Undervoltage Relay Work

On November 19, 1985 while performing monthly trip tests November

19, 1985 on overvoltage relays 459-1A and 459-2A for 4160 V Bus 4A2,

the relays were found to chatter when the trip test button was

depressed. Subsequent occurences and further investigation

disclosed two additional problems: 1. The relay flag (target)

failed to rotate (operate) while functionally testing relay 459-2A ,

and 2. The difference in circuitry between the two models of the

relays required that the relay case be adapted to the particular

model relay it supported. However, reverse logic (energize or

de-energize to operate) between two models (211B or 211R) of

undervoltage relays precluded the interchange of standard plug-in

type relays in permanently installed mounting cases.

The immediate solution to the above problems was to replace the

questionable relays with spare relays. The lic ensee conferred with

the supplier (Brown Boveri, Inc.) of the relay < cencerning the

chattering and flag problems. Brown Boveri reco;nended

modifications to the relays as a long te rm solution for the

chattering and flag problems. The changes to correct the relay

chattering and flag problems required circuit changes on the relay

printed circuit board. The licensee purchased modification kits for

the twelve overvoltage relays involved. To solve the plug-in type

relay mounting case problem, the licensee purchased six new

replacement undervoltage relays (three as spares) to standardize on

one model (211R) relay. The modification kits were received on site

late in February,1986 and the six new - lays in late December,

1985. The licensee's present plans call for the installation of the

modification kits and new relays before the plant returns to power.

The licensee also initiated a 10CFR Part 21 to report the defective

aspects of the overvoltage relays.

The inspector examined the following documents associated with the

over/undervoltage relay problems and solutions:

1. NCR S-5206, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, chattering problem.

2. NCR S-5335, 4A2 Bus overvoltage relay, flag operation problem.

3. W/R #106930, 4A2 Bus overvoltage protection, erratic operation of

relays 4591A and 4592A.

4. W/R #109513, 459-2A relay flag problem.

5. W/R #109516, ITE 59D spare relay, defective flag reset switch.

6. P/0 RS77972, purchase six undervoltage relays (Model ITE-27).

7. P/O PS7797, provide report on defective components of ITE-27

relay

S/N3390,

8. P/0 GR82844, Purchase modification kits for ITE 59D and ITE 27

relays.

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9. Brown Boveri certificate of conformance for components contained

in modification kits.

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The inspector examined the dispositions and completion records for

the NCRs and work requests, and receiving records and certifications

associated with the purchase orders. The inspector also reviewed in

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detail the relay supplier's cerification-of components and

installation instruction for relay modification kits. The

documentation appeared to be in order and appropriate.

l No violations or deviations were identified.

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4. Monthly Surveillance Observation

Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed

i and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

these requirements. In addition, eddy current testing of the "A" Once

l Through Steam Generatior (OTSG) was reviewed.

The following items were considered during this review: testing was in

accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated;

limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of

the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with TS

and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the

individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or

engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data were in

agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any

i deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

! resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The following ourveillances were reviewed:

"A" Once through Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing,

l SP 201.03B Monthly Surveillance of Plant Fire Pumps and Power

! Supplies,

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SP 211.01D Monthly Control Room / Technical Support Center Emergency

Ventilation System Loop B Surveillance Test.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Management Meetings

! During this report period the NRC staff met with members of the licensee

j for a two day meeting, March 24-25, 1986. The meeting involved

i presentations and tcurs by the licensee concerning the findings and plant

I and organizational r:odifications which were planned in response to the

December 26, 1985 event. NRC staff members who attended the meeting

j included: Messrs. H. R. Denton, (Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

i Regulation), J. M. Taylor, (Director, Office of Inspection and

Enforcement), J. B. Martin, (Regional Administrator), and F. J. Miraglia,

(Director, Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Licensing-B).

6. Followup Items

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(CLOSED) Item I.C.1 "Short-Term Accident and Procedures Review -

. Inadequate Core Cooling / Transients and Accidents"

Section III.B.S.4,Section III.D Step 20.0/20.5, and Section I.C.C. Step

21.7 of the Abnormal Operating Transient Guidelines (ATOG) were not found

in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) during NRC inspection

50-312/85-21. The licensee committed to correct these items by

September 1, 1985. A review of operator training records during the same

inspection indicated that documentation on two operators was not

complete. The licensee committed to provide documentation on that

training by August 1, 1985.

The inspector reviewed the current revisions, dated February 15, 1986,

to the E0Ps in the above areas.

A comparison was made between the ATOG and the E0Ps; The E0Ps appeared

to contain the information set forth in the ATOG.

The inspector also reviewed the training records for twelve reactor

operators and senior reactor operators, to ascertain the documentation of

the ATOG and E0P training. All records reviewed were complete.

TMI item I.C.1 is closed.

(CLOSED) 83-22-01 -

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This item addressed the inspector's concerns regarding an increased trend

in containment leakage as indicated by the 1983 containment integrated

leakage rate test (CILRT). As noted in the report, the leakage rates

based on the Total Time and Mass Point techniques used in 1977 and in

1983 showed an increase in the leakage rate, however, the rates were

within the acceptance criteria. The licensee agrees that the trend

exists, and has taken action to improve their local leak rate testing

program (an important factor in the total containment leakage). The next

CILRT is planned for the next (cycle 8) refueling outage. The inspector

will review the results of the next CILRT and at that time a comparison

will be performed of the past leakage values to determine whether the

licensee's corrective action has been effective. This item is closed.

(83-22-01).

No violations or deviations were identified. l

(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 85-31-02 " Weaknesses in the licensee's program

for reporting 10CFR 50.59 modifications."

In a previous inspection 85-31, the inspector noted that the licensee

exhibited weaknesses in the area of reporting modifications pursuant to

10CFR 50.59.

The inspector reviewed recent monthly reports submitted to the NRC.

These were the only reports detailing changes which the licensee submits

routinely to the NRC. In the section of " Summary of Changes in

Accordance with 10CFR 50.59 (b)" the inspector noted several changes that

were not reported within a year of the modification being implemented.

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nor had a tabulation of the changes been submitted within the monthly

report as required by the Technical Specifications. For example, in 1983

containment penetration assemblies were modified to provide the ability

to install a hydrogen recombiner after an accident. The new containment

penetration assemblies were fabricated of SA-516 plate material, as

opposed to the forged assemblies described in the Updated Safety Analysis

Report (USAR). A 10CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation of the change was

performed on May 13, 1983, and found that the alternate design was

acceptable, llowever, this change was not reported in the licensee's

Monthly Report to the NRC until April 14, 1986, nor was any summary of

the Safety Evaluation transmitted.

In addition, the descriptions of the changes which were eventually

submitted did not include the required summary safety evaluation. The

descriptions were generally a review of the change, which did not include

an evaluation showing that the change did not involve an unreviewed

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safety question, as required by 10 CFR 50.59b. This is a violation of 10

CFR 50.59b and Technical Specification 6.9.3. (50-312/86-13-01).

The licensee, recently, has taken steps to improve the timeliness of the

10CFR 50.59 report, but a backlog of 10CFR 50.59 changes that have been

completed and have not yet been reported existed at the end of this

inspection.

Unresolved item 85-31-02 appears to be a violation of 10CFR 50.59

requirements (86-13-01), and therefore, 85-31-02 will be closed, and

replaced by the new item number for tracking purposes.

7. Review of Occurrence Description Reports (ODRs)

The inspector reviewed various licensee generated ODRs. One ODR dated

February 2, 1986 discussed four valves that were found when hanging a

clearance on the pegging steam system; these valves uere not on the

associated piping drawing.

One of the corrective actions the licensee performed due to the October

2, 1985 cooldown event was to walkdown sixteen important to safety and

non-safety related systems and identify any configuration problems; for

instance, valves in the plant system but not on the piping drawings for

the system. The program was controlled by the " Action List" from the

October 2,1985 transient, which provided for the processing of findings

from the system walkdowns. The process was as follows: 1) develop a

list of systems to walkdown, 2) to walkdown the systems to identify

valves not on prints, 3) to prepare NCRs on findings, revise procedures

as necessary, and 4) to update plant drawings.

Contrary to the above criteria the four bypass valves had been identified

during the walkdowns but an NCR was not generated or disponitioned on i

these valves, and the plant drawin8s were not revised to reficct the

as-found condition of the plant system. Additionally, the licensee

committed in a letter dated November 15, 1985 to the NRC that the

drawings would be revised by April 1, 1986 and this had not been

completed at the end of this report period.

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The inspector notified a licensee representative of these concerns.

Subsequently, the licensee performed a quality assurance surveillance and

found that the four valves had not been identified on the plant system

drawings. Additionally, the surveillance identified thirteen other

valves that had not been included on the plant drawings. A licensee

representative committed to review the inspector's findings and present a

program to address the concerns. This item is open (86-13-02), pending

the licensee's further review of this incident, a more generic review of

the actions taken subsequent to the sixteen system walkdowns, and

verification that the findings have been appropriately incorporated into

the configuration control system.

8. Plant Review Committee (PRC) Activities

The inspector attended two PRC meetings during this report period to

verify, on a sample basis, that the PRC is performing their required

reviews. The inspector observed a review of a special test procedure

written to provide the assurance that the present station batteries are

capable of performing their function required for a cold shutdown

condition if called upon. The review consisted of a determination that

the test was not an unreviewed safety question, r.or an unreviewed

Technical Specification Change, nor a change to the facility as described

in the Safety Analysis Report. The inspector concurred with the above

review and found the PRC's actions to be appropriate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Exit Meeting

The resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on

April 22, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection activities as

given in this report, were summarized at the meeting.

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