IR 05000321/1998007

Insp Repts 50-321/98-07 & 50-366/98-07 on 981101-1212.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20199F173
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/29/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199F137	List: IR 05000321/1998007 ML20199F133
References
50-321-98-07, 50-321-98-7, 50-366-98-07, 50-366-98-7, NUDOCS 9901210230
Download: ML20199F173 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  !

REGION li l

Docket Nos: 50-321,50-366  !

License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5

. Report Nos: 50-321/98-07, 50-366/98-07 l l

Lictensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

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Facility: E. l. Hatch Plant, Units 1 & 2 Locatio P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515 l

! Dates: November 1 through December 12,1998 l Inspectors: J. Munday, Senior Resident inspector

J. Canady, Resident inspector

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T. Fredette, Resident inspector

Approved by: P. Skinner, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2  ;

Division of Reactor Projects I

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r 9901210230 981229 PDR ADOCK 05000321

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O PDR l Enclosure

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-321/98-07, 50-366/98-07 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The repcrt covers a six-week period of resident inspectio Operations

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Operations preplanning, the prompt direction provided by operations supervision to decrease power, and the immediate response of the operating crew effectively mitigated a decreasing condenser vacuum transient that had the potential to cause a Unit 2 scram from a turbine trip that could have resulted from a low condenser vacuum condition (Section 01.3).

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The response to Residual Heat Removal Service Water and standby Plant Service  ;

Water system flow perturbations due to suspected flow blockage was appropriate. The

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root cause investigation was thorough and detailed and the results of the root cause investigation were logical. Management provided a focused attention to the issue r y resolution (Section O2.3).

Maintenance

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A Non-Cited Violation was identified for a missed Technical Specification Surveillance for a quarterly channel calibration of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitoring system. A lack of administrative controls resulted in an inappropriate surveillance frequency. The inspectors verified that the licensee's immediate corrective actions were timely and comprehensive. Long term corrective actions planned were to improve administrative controls for surveillance frequency changes (Section M3.2).

Plant Support

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Control room operators responded appropriately to plant transients and equipment failures as part of the emergency preparedness exercise. The exercise identified areas which have undergone improvements as well as those still needing improvement Event classifications, plant status, and follow-up activities were communicated and coordinated with the Technical Support Center. Initial notifications were prompt and operators responded using appropriate procedures. The exercise objectives were met (Section P4.1).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status l Unit 1 began the report period at 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). A planned power reduction to approximately 80% RTP was performed on November 22 for scram time testing and repairs on two scram pilot solenoid valves. Power was returned to 100% RTP the same day and the unit operated at this power level for the remainder of the report period, except for routine testing activitie Unit 2 began the report period in a refueling outage. A reactor startup commenced on November 7, and the generator was synchronized to the grid on November 9. The maximum power achieved during the power uprate testing was 98% RTP. This power level was l administratively identified as the Maximum Operating Power (MOP). Power was reduced to approximately 94% RTP on December 7 due to a partial loss of feedwater heating. Power was returned to MOP the same day following repair for the loss of feedwater heating problem. The unit operated at this power level for the remainder of the report period, except for routine testing activitie l l 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operat or.s. On November 23, the inspectors observed two Unit 2 control board operators perf am a shift turnover and identified no deficiencies. In general, the conduct of operations ms professional and safety-conscious. Specific events and observations are detailed in the sections belo .2 Unit 2 Drywell Closecut (71707)

The inspectors reviewed procedure 34GO-OPS-028-2S, "Drywell Closeout," Revision (Rev.) 7, Edition (Ed) 1, and accompanied operations and maintenance personnel into the Unit 2 drywell for a final walkdown prior to closeout in preparation for Uriit 2 startu The inspectors observed that all maintenance activities inside the drywell were complete except for some minor insulation restoration in the lower levels of the drywell. No deteriorated conditions of piping or equipment were observed. The inspectors observed both operations and maintenance personnel picking up loose trash and other foreign material during the walkdown. The inspectors verified that local valves associated with the "A" and "B" loops of the Core Spray systems were in their correct position.

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The inspectors identified an unsecured stack of temporary steel coser plates stored on the 114 foot (') level of the drywell against the wall of the subpile room. The inspectors reviewed engineering documentation and confirmed that leaving the steel plates in the drywell during operation was acceptabl The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively implemented plant procedures for the final drywell closecut activities. This was evidenced by the removal of trash and other material and the conduct of a detailed walkthrough by Operations and Maintenance personne .3 Unit 2 Startup. Power Ascension. and Extended Power Ucrate Testina Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed various portions of the reactor startup, power ascension and extended power uprate testing on Unit 2 following the refueling outage. The inspectors also reviewed the procedures relevant to the observed activities and held discussions with operations, engineering, and chemistry personne Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed various portions of the reactor startup including initial control rod withdrawal to criticality, heatup, and power ascension. The inspectors observed reactor engineering personnel support of operations by obtaining thermal data, operating the Traversing incore Probes (TIP) system, and making required adjustments to the Neutron Monitoring system. The inspectors were informed that 98% RTP (2708 Megawatt Thermal ( MWT)) was the maximum expected power to be obtained during the current phase of power ascension testing due to existing limitations of the number four turbine stop valv On November 20, the inspectors observed the operating crew effectively respond to a decreasing condenser vacuum condition. As part of the heatup rate testing, selected cooling tower fans were being removed from service. As a result, the condsaser cooling capability was reduced and vacuum began decreasing. Prior to the test activity, the operating crew discussed the possibility that vacuum could decrease and operations supervision directed that power be decreased if a decreasing vacuum condition occurred. Reactor power was reduced to about 72% RTP and the heat rate testing was terminated. Unit power was increased to 97% RTP upon recovery from the vacuum decrease transien Conclusions Operations preplanning, the prompt direction provided by operations supervision to decrease power, and the immediate response of the operating crew effectively mitigated a decreasing condenser vacuum transient that had the potential to cause a Unit 2 scram from a turbine trip that could have resulted from a low condenser vacuum conditio .. .

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I O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment '

02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the Plant Service Water (PSW) system to assess material condition, system and component alignment, and normal system operating parameters. Equipment operability, material condition, system and component alignment, and operating parameters were acceptable. The inspectors identified no substantive concerns as a result of the walkdow !

l 02.2 Unit 2 Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanuo (RWCU) Durina Heat Exchanaer Maintenance ;

(93702)(92901)(92903) l On November 1, while draining water from an RWCU heat exchanger, a system isolation occurred due to a high differential flow condition. The outboard sueJon isolation valve, 2G31-F004, closed as required; however, the inboard isolation valve,2G31-F001, did not. The licensee could not initially explain why the 2G31-F001 valve did not close and elected to report the even Engineering personnel reviewed the logic circuit and determined that the high differential flow isolation signal was provided to the valves via different circuits. The high flow setpoint for the 2G31-F001 was slightly higher than the setpoint for the 2G31-F004 valve. The licensee reviewed system operating data and concluded that the differential i flow did not meet the conditions required by the 2G31-F001 valve to isolat l I

, The inspectors reviewed the applicable electrical logic diagrams and discussed the l occurrence with the RWCU system engineer. The inspectors concluded that the engineers review was thorough and detailed and that the overall assessment of the valves performance was acceptable.

l O2.3 Debris in intake Structure Affectina Unit 2 Shutdown Coolina Inspection Scope (71707) (37551)

The inspectors monitored the licensee's response to indications of clogging of the Unit 2

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Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) and standby PSW pumps.

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l Findinas and Observations i

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On November 3, several flow and pressure perturbations on the Unit 2 RHRSW and standby PSW systems were received. The RHRSW loop was operating in the shutdown i cooling mode at the time of this problem. The standby PSW pump normally supplies

} cooling water to Diesel Generator 18 and was also in service at the time of the proble The operators observed a decreasing flow and discharge pressure on the running j RHRSW pump. Another pump was started and the first secured, with similar results.

l Additionally, the standby PSW pump discharge pressure decreased. After several pump i

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swaps for the RHRSW system the perturbations stopped. Although the unit PSW pumps share the same intake structure they were not affected. The inspectors observed that the RHRSW and standby PSW pumps take suction form a slightly different location in the intake structure than the unit PSW pumps. Additionally, the standby PSW pump is smaller in size and capacity than the RHRSW and unit PSW pump The licensee subsequently removed some debris from the discharge strainer of the RHRSW pumps. In addition, divers surveyed the intake pit and found only a small amount of debris in the area of the pumps suction. The licensee initiated a significant occurrence report (SOR) to determine the root cause and implement corrective actio Although the root cause determination had not been completed at the close of this report period, the licensee concluded that the most likely cause of the flow perturbations was debris being drawn into the pump suction. The licensee proposed that the problem was not observed on the larger PSW pumps because they have a larger suction and were capable of passing the debris to the discharge strainers where it was collecte Subsequently, the collection of leaves were drawn into the RHRSW pumps which have a smaller suction bell and a lower flow rate. The leaves were not able to pass through the pump and restricted flow. When the A and C RHRSW pumps were swapped the leaves were transferred from one operating pump to the other. Multiple starts and stops resulted in the leaves being dispersed into smaller clumps until they were small enough to pass through the pumps. The licensee was stillinvestigating how the leaves passed through the traveling scree The inspectors reviewed the system operating data, piping diagrams, and performed a system walkdown. No deficiencies were identified. In addition, the inspectors attended a Plant Review Board meeting which proposed short term corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the proposed corrective actions and applicable safety evaluation and noted no inconsistencies or discrepancies with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Examples of short term corrective actions included inspection and cleaning of the pump suction pit, establishing a frequency for starting and stopping the pumps, and increased frequency of inspection and rotation of the pump suction area traveling screens to clear debris. Long term corrective actions may include possible system modifications to prevent debris from entering the pump suction area. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's root cause determination was acceptabl Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's response to RHRSW and standby PSW system flow perturbations were appropriate. The root cause was thorough and detailed and the results of the root cause investigation were logical. Management provided a focused attention to the issue for resolutio .__ _ . _-_ -. . . - . .. -- _ _ .. . - . - _ - _ .

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O2.4 Cold Weather Checks and Freeze Protection (71707) (71714) (62707)

The inspectors verified the licensee had completed implementation of Preventive Maintenance Procedure 52PM-MEL-005-0S, " Cold Weather Checks," Rev. 9, Ed.1. The procedure ensured that the systems which provide cold weather protection for various l systems were operational. The inspectors vanfied that those items previously identified by the licensee as defective, had been repaired. in addition, the inspectors walked down portions of the freeze protection systems throughout the plant and verified that the j systems were in operation. The inspectors reviewed electrical drawings for the heat i

tracing associated with the PSW system and no deficiencies were identified.

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for response to cold weather. The inspectors determined that additional checks of plant equipment are required to be made when the outside temperature is expected to drop below 40 degrees F. These checks are to be performed by Operations personnel and are delineated in Department Instruction DI-OPS-36-0989N, " Cold Weather Checks," Rev.10.

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l The inspectors concluded that the licensee had effectively implemented the applicable j

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elements of the cold weather checks and freeze protection procedures. Procedures ,

included compensatory measures to be completed for cold weather condition l 11. Maintenance l

l M1 Conduct of Maintenance l

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M1.1 General Comments (62707)

l The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance work order activities l and found that the work was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. Work j packages were present and documentation was complete. Workers were  ;

knowledgeable of the work scope and precautions to be used in performing task Radiation protection and safety measures were exercised where appropriate.

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M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation ( M3.1 Surveillance Activities (61726)

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The inspectors observed all or portions of selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical l Specification (TS) surveillance activities. The inspectors observed that procedures were l

correctly used; supervisors provided necessary direction and oversight; and procedure and TS acceptance criteria were met. No deficiencies were identified.

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l l 7 l l l M3.2 Missed TS Surveillance on Unit 2 l Inspection Scope (61726) (62707)

The inspectors reviewed Surveillance procedure 57SV-CAL-008-2S, " Reactor Bldg Vent Radiation & ARM System," Rev. 5, Ed 2, and TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.6.2.3, for performance of channel calibration at a frequency of 92 days. Additionally, discussions were held with licensee's maintenance, engineering, and licensing support personne Observations and Findinas l

On November 17, the licensee discovered that the channel calibration for the reactor building exhaust radiation monitors was not being performed quarterly as required by TS SR 3.3.6.2.3. The surveillance frequency was not revised when the improved TS's were implemented. The licensee determined that the change request necessary to make the revision had been initiated but had not been processed. The change request process did not include a review or verification to ensure completion of the appropriate paperwor The licensee's immediate corrective actions for the problem included the successful performance of the channel calibration within two hours of the discovery that the surveillance was missed and updating and revising the surveillance scheduling database. These immediate corrective actions were verified by the inspector l Long term corrective actions included the implementation of administrative controls for i the surveillance scheduling database that will provide a means of ensuring that revision requests, once initiated, will be tracked until dispositioned. The licensee also verified a number of similar, more restrictive surveillances affected by the improved TS implementation to ensure the surveillance frequency was correct. No deficiencies were identifie The inspectors performed a review of integrated inspection reports and Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the past two years. The inspectors did not identify any previous similar missed TS event during the review whereby the corrective actions would have reasonably prevented the occurrence of this even This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. It is identified as NCV 50-366/98-07-01, Missed Technical Specification Surveillance for Unit 2 Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor Conclusions I

l An NCV was identified for a missed TS surveillance for a quarterly channel calibration of

the Unit 2 Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitoring system. A lack of administrative controls resulted in an inappropriate surveillance frequency. The

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inspectors verified that the licensee's immediate corrective actions were timely and comprehensive. Long term corrective actions planned were to improve administrative controls for surveillance frequency change Ill. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-321. 366/97-07-02: Resolution of Concerns With Respect to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, Pending Subsequent Review of Licensee Submittalin Response to Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-4 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's April,1998 response related to the incorporation ,

of the A-46 Generic implementation Procedure (GIP) as the seismic licensing basis for I new and replacement equipment at Plant Hatch, for equipment not specifically covered by the GIP. Although the licensee had revised the UFSAR prior to receiving a Plant i Hatch-specific safety evaluation for GlP application, the inspectors determined that the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation performed to support the revision was sufficient to determine that no unreviewed safety questions existed in the licensee's application of the GIP. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee had not implemented the GIP methodology for an l actual plant modification. Further guidance was provided by NRC in June,1998 regarding the application of the GlP methodology in plant licensing base Subsequently, a Plant Hatch-specific safety evaluation report (SER) was issued in September,1998 to allow use of the GIP for new and replacement equipmen Additionally, the inspectors determined that the licensee's intent to defer revising the UFSAR until receipt of a plant-specific SER supporting GIP application did not constitute a formallicensing commitment. Therefore, no deviation or violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors determined that the licensee's approach to this issue was appropriat IV. Plant Support P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 Emeraency Preparedness (EP) Exercise (71750)

On December 3, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's EP exercise. The inspectors monitored selected activities in the Operat;ons Support Center (OSC) and the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). The EP scenario challenged operators and EP drill participants to the extent that an Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency were declared. The Technical Support Center (TSC), OSC, and EOF were staffed and activated within the required time and in accordance with applicable procedures. The inspectors observed that command and control and status board updates were

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appropriste. The inspectors also concluded that the TSC staff members were effective in their analysis of plant conditions and the implementation of protective action i

recommendations. A site evacuation was correctly declared and personnel accountability was completed within the required tim The inspectors observed and evaluated operator actions from the simulated control room. Control room operators responded appropriately to plant transients and equipment failures as part of the exercise. The exercise identified areas which have undergone improvements as well as those still needing improvements. Event l classifications, plant status, and follow-up activities were communicated and coordinated with the TSC. Initial notifications were prompt, and operators responded using appropriate procedures. The inspectors concluded that the EP exercise objectives were

! me S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S The inspectors toured the protected area and observed that the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion nor disrepair. Badge issuance was observed, as was the process for escorting of visitors. Vehicles were searched, escorted and secured as described in the applicable procedures. The inspectors concluded that the areas of security inspected met the requirements of the security plan and applicable procedure V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

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the conclusion of the inspection on December 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the i i findings presente I r

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection !

should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Anderson, J., Unit Superintendent Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Curtis, S., Unit Superintendent Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager Fornel, P., Plant Modifications & Maintenance Support Manager Fraser, O., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Googe, M., Performance Team Manager

, Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

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Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

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Madison, D., Operations Manager Moore, C., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager l Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant i

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, '

chemistry / radiation, and corporate personne INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED j IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations

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IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance i

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IP 92903: Followup - Engineering IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors I

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l ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED l l

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Closed

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50-366/98-07-01 NCV Missed Technical Specification Surveillance for Unit '

2 Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitors (Section M3.2).

50-321, 366/97-07-02 URI Resolution of Concerns With Respect to GL 87-02, Pending Subsequent Review of Licensee Submittals in Response to Unresolved Safety issue (USl) A-46 (Section E8.1).

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