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Category:INSPECTION REPORT
MONTHYEARIR 05000220/19990061999-09-14014 September 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-06 & 50-410/99-06 on 990620-0731.NCVs Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19990041999-06-21021 June 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-04 & 50-410/99-04 on 990328-0508.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19980151998-12-23023 December 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-15 & 50-410/98-15 on 980927-1121.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19980141998-10-26026 October 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-14 & 50-410/98-14 on 980816-0926.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Reviews of Licensee Activities in Functional Areas of Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support ML20217L9251998-04-28028 April 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-08 & 50-410/98-08 on 980406-21. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability to Protect Facility Against Radiological Sabotage & Compliance W/Safeguards Program Commitments IR 05000220/19940011994-01-24024 January 1994 Insp Repts 50-220/94-01 & 50-410/94-01 on 940103-07.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support, Protected Area Barriers,Detection Aids & Assessment Aids, & Protected Area & Isolation Zone Lighting IR 05000220/19930221993-12-22022 December 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-22 & 50-410/93-22 on 931004-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mov Program Commitments & Enhancments Identified During Team Inspection in June 1992 Were Reviewed for Progress IR 05000220/19930011993-11-12012 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930919-1030. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Major Components & Sys for Leakage,Alignment,Lubrication,Cooling Water Supply IR 05000220/19930231993-11-0505 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-23 & 50-410/93-22 on 931012-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Program Plans & Audits,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000220/19930241993-10-27027 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-24 & 50-410/93-23 on 931018-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Exams of Procedures, Representative Records,Interviews W/Personnel & Observations by Inspectors IR 05000220/19930191993-10-18018 October 1993 Insp Rept 50-220/93-19 on 930823-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Distribution Sys IR 05000220/19930121993-10-0606 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-12 & 50-410/93-12 on 930615-18 & 0712-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:930615-18 Emergency Preparedness Program & 930713 annual,full- Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise IR 05000220/19930181993-10-0101 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-18 & 50-410/93-18 on 930808-0918. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint & Surveillance Activities,Engineering & Plant Support, W/Regard to Radiological & Chemistry Controls & Security IR 05000220/19930131993-09-21021 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-13 & 50-410/93-13 on 930802-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Design Changes & Mods,Installation & Testing of Mods,Interface/Communication, QA & Technical Support,Wrs & LERs IR 05000220/19930151993-09-16016 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-15 & 50-410/93-15 on 930719-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Offsite Power Supply Sources for Plant & to Review Licensees Corrective Action on Previously Identified Insp Findings IR 05000220/19930161993-08-0404 August 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-16 & 50-410/93-16 on 930426-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Audits, Calibration of Effluent & Process Radiation Monitoring Sys, Air Cleaning Sys & Implementation of Previous Programs ML20056C1661993-03-12012 March 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930124-0227. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maintenance,Surveillance,Security & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification Activities IR 05000220/19880301988-11-16016 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-30 & 50-410/88-29 on 880926-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Procedures,Mgt Organization,Audits,Records & Repts,Testing & Maint,Barriers,Security Power Supply & Assessment Aids IR 05000220/19880091988-05-19019 May 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-09 & 50-410/88-09 on 880307-11 & 0404- 08.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Program Re First 10-yr Insp Interval & Augmented Exams Conducted by Licensee,Including Procedures IR 05000220/19870221987-12-0909 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-220/87-22 on 871019-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Design Change/Mods,Maint & Previously Identified Items IR 05000220/19870151987-09-14014 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/87-15 & 50-410/87-24 on 870803-07.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiochemical Measurements Program,Including Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Chemistry Mgt & Lab QC & Audits IR 05000410/19870051987-03-23023 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-05 on 870202-05.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Msiv Control & Electrical Power Supplies IR 05000410/19870071987-03-10010 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-07 on 870209-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical/Mechanical Testing,Pms & Repairs During Performance of Surveillance & Maint Activities IR 05000410/19870061987-03-10010 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-06 on 870210-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Results Review, Overall Power Ascension Test Program,Qa/Qc Interfaces, Independent Verifications & Facility Tours IR 05000410/19870031987-03-0606 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-03 on 870112-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Activities Re MSIV Problems IR 05000220/19870021987-02-17017 February 1987 Safety Insp Repts 50-220/87-02 & 50-410/87-04 on 870112-16. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Radiation Protection Program & Previously Identified Items. Weaknesses in ALARA Area Re Goal Setting & Mgt Noted ML20211A4671987-02-0606 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/86-26 & 50-410/86-65 on 861117-870104. Violations Noted:Ineffective Corrective Action for Scram Discharge Vol High Level Trip & Momentary Breach of Reactor Bldg Integrity While in Power Operating Mode ML20212L0421987-01-22022 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/86-17 & 50-410/86-61 on 860825-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Allegations Re Technical Issues.Apparent & Proposed Violations Identified & Will Be Discussed at Enforcement Conference IR 05000410/19860671987-01-0909 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/86-67 on 861201-05.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of MSIV Problems.Problem Re Seat Spool Packing Identified.No Judgement Could Be Made Re Actions Taken to Correct Ball Scoring Problem IR 05000410/19860681987-01-0606 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/86-68 on 861208-12.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Results Review, Overall Power Ascension Test Program,Power Ascension Test Procedure Review & Plant Tours & Meetings IR 05000220/19860271986-12-30030 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-27 & 50-410/86-66 on 861201-05.No Violations Noted.Majors Areas inspected:organization,self- Indentification/Correction of Deficiencies,Plant Water Chemistry Sys & Sampling/Measurements IR 05000410/19860641986-12-12012 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-64 on 861117-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Power Ascension Test Results Evaluation,Power Ascension Test Witnessing,Surveillance Procedure Review & Qa/Qc Interfaces IR 05000410/19860531986-12-11011 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-53 on 860922-26.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Util Activities Re MSIV Reported Problems & Background History,Including Procurement of New ball-type MSIVs IR 05000220/19860241986-12-0505 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-24 on 861103-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Maint Program & Associated Maint Activities IR 05000220/19860221986-12-0404 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-22 & 50-410/86-58 on 861027-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & 861029 Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML20214U9041986-12-0202 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-22 & 50-410/86-54 on 860929-1002.No Violations Noted.One Unresolved Item Identified Re off-hours Dose Assessment Capabilities.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program IR 05000410/19860601986-11-26026 November 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-60 on 861031-1105.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Initial Fuel Load Activities,Qa/Qc Interfaces,Independent Verifications & Calculations & Plant Tours & Meetings IR 05000410/19860621986-11-12012 November 1986 Initial OL Review Rept 50-410/86-62.Facility Constructed Per CPPR-112,FSAR & NRC Regulations & Util Ready to Safely Operate Facility IR 05000220/19860131986-10-21021 October 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-13 on 860910-19.Violations Identified: Failure to Control Measuring & Test Equipment,Failure to Control safety-related Maint Activities & Failure to Implement Surveillance Procedures IR 05000410/19860441986-09-0202 September 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal Rept 50-410/86-44 on 860804-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open Items from Insp Rept 50-410/86-23 IR 05000220/19860151986-08-19019 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-15 on 860728-0801.Violation Noted: Failure to Identify Radionuclide Fe-55 & Activity,Quantity & Total Activity on Radwaste Shipping Manifests IR 05000410/19860471986-08-19019 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-47 on 860804-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Surveillance Testing & Calibr Program,Calibr of safety-related Instruments & Measuring & Testing Equipment Control Program IR 05000410/19860381986-08-0707 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-38 on 860714-24.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings, Preoperational Test Results Evaluation Review & Power Ascension Test Program ML20205A4241986-08-0404 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-33 on 860630-0711.Deviation Noted: Failure to Review Results of Preliminary Test MD.0100.A03, Standby Diesel Generator Reliability Test IR 05000410/19860231986-07-10010 July 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal 50-410/86-23 on 860519-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Program,Including Organization, Administration & Procedures IR 05000410/19860051986-04-0202 April 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-05 on 860303-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational & Interim Surveillance & Preliminary Test Procedure Review & Qa/Qc Interface W/ Preoperational Test Program IR 05000410/19860071986-03-26026 March 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-07 on 860103 & 07 at S&W in Cherry Hill, Nj.Major Areas Inspected:Audit Results & Unresolved Corrective Action Items from Insp Rept 50-410/85-28 for Util Suppl to Engineering Assurance Audit 50 IR 05000220/19850131986-02-11011 February 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-220/85-13 on 860205.Major Areas Discussed:Findings Identified in Insp Rept 50-220/85-13 Re Program of Qualification of Electrical Equipment Per 10CFR50.49 IR 05000410/19850481986-01-24024 January 1986 Preoperational Security Program Insp Rept 50-410/85-48 on 851216-19.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Implementing Procedures for Receipt of Snm.Info Partially Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) IR 05000410/19850311985-12-31031 December 1985 Errata to Insp Rept 50-410/85-31,consisting of Flow Chart for Large Bore as-built Piping Review,Inadvertently Omitted from Section 3 of 851112 Transmittal 1999-09-14
[Table view] Category:NRC-GENERATED
MONTHYEARIR 05000220/19990061999-09-14014 September 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-06 & 50-410/99-06 on 990620-0731.NCVs Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19990041999-06-21021 June 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-04 & 50-410/99-04 on 990328-0508.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19980151998-12-23023 December 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-15 & 50-410/98-15 on 980927-1121.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000220/19980141998-10-26026 October 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-14 & 50-410/98-14 on 980816-0926.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Reviews of Licensee Activities in Functional Areas of Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support ML20217L9251998-04-28028 April 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-08 & 50-410/98-08 on 980406-21. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability to Protect Facility Against Radiological Sabotage & Compliance W/Safeguards Program Commitments IR 05000220/19940011994-01-24024 January 1994 Insp Repts 50-220/94-01 & 50-410/94-01 on 940103-07.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support, Protected Area Barriers,Detection Aids & Assessment Aids, & Protected Area & Isolation Zone Lighting IR 05000220/19930221993-12-22022 December 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-22 & 50-410/93-22 on 931004-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mov Program Commitments & Enhancments Identified During Team Inspection in June 1992 Were Reviewed for Progress IR 05000220/19930011993-11-12012 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930919-1030. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Major Components & Sys for Leakage,Alignment,Lubrication,Cooling Water Supply IR 05000220/19930231993-11-0505 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-23 & 50-410/93-22 on 931012-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Program Plans & Audits,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection & Assessment Aids IR 05000220/19930241993-10-27027 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-24 & 50-410/93-23 on 931018-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Exams of Procedures, Representative Records,Interviews W/Personnel & Observations by Inspectors IR 05000220/19930191993-10-18018 October 1993 Insp Rept 50-220/93-19 on 930823-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Distribution Sys IR 05000220/19930121993-10-0606 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-12 & 50-410/93-12 on 930615-18 & 0712-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:930615-18 Emergency Preparedness Program & 930713 annual,full- Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise IR 05000220/19930181993-10-0101 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-18 & 50-410/93-18 on 930808-0918. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint & Surveillance Activities,Engineering & Plant Support, W/Regard to Radiological & Chemistry Controls & Security IR 05000220/19930131993-09-21021 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-13 & 50-410/93-13 on 930802-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Design Changes & Mods,Installation & Testing of Mods,Interface/Communication, QA & Technical Support,Wrs & LERs IR 05000220/19930151993-09-16016 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-15 & 50-410/93-15 on 930719-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Offsite Power Supply Sources for Plant & to Review Licensees Corrective Action on Previously Identified Insp Findings IR 05000220/19930161993-08-0404 August 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-16 & 50-410/93-16 on 930426-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Audits, Calibration of Effluent & Process Radiation Monitoring Sys, Air Cleaning Sys & Implementation of Previous Programs ML20056C1661993-03-12012 March 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930124-0227. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maintenance,Surveillance,Security & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification Activities IR 05000220/19880301988-11-16016 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-30 & 50-410/88-29 on 880926-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Procedures,Mgt Organization,Audits,Records & Repts,Testing & Maint,Barriers,Security Power Supply & Assessment Aids IR 05000220/19880091988-05-19019 May 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-09 & 50-410/88-09 on 880307-11 & 0404- 08.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Program Re First 10-yr Insp Interval & Augmented Exams Conducted by Licensee,Including Procedures IR 05000220/19870221987-12-0909 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-220/87-22 on 871019-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Design Change/Mods,Maint & Previously Identified Items IR 05000220/19870151987-09-14014 September 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/87-15 & 50-410/87-24 on 870803-07.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Radiochemical Measurements Program,Including Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Chemistry Mgt & Lab QC & Audits IR 05000410/19870051987-03-23023 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-05 on 870202-05.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Msiv Control & Electrical Power Supplies IR 05000410/19870071987-03-10010 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-07 on 870209-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Electrical/Mechanical Testing,Pms & Repairs During Performance of Surveillance & Maint Activities IR 05000410/19870061987-03-10010 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-06 on 870210-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Results Review, Overall Power Ascension Test Program,Qa/Qc Interfaces, Independent Verifications & Facility Tours IR 05000410/19870031987-03-0606 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/87-03 on 870112-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Activities Re MSIV Problems IR 05000220/19870021987-02-17017 February 1987 Safety Insp Repts 50-220/87-02 & 50-410/87-04 on 870112-16. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Radiation Protection Program & Previously Identified Items. Weaknesses in ALARA Area Re Goal Setting & Mgt Noted ML20211A4671987-02-0606 February 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/86-26 & 50-410/86-65 on 861117-870104. Violations Noted:Ineffective Corrective Action for Scram Discharge Vol High Level Trip & Momentary Breach of Reactor Bldg Integrity While in Power Operating Mode ML20212L0421987-01-22022 January 1987 Insp Repts 50-220/86-17 & 50-410/86-61 on 860825-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Allegations Re Technical Issues.Apparent & Proposed Violations Identified & Will Be Discussed at Enforcement Conference IR 05000410/19860671987-01-0909 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/86-67 on 861201-05.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of MSIV Problems.Problem Re Seat Spool Packing Identified.No Judgement Could Be Made Re Actions Taken to Correct Ball Scoring Problem IR 05000410/19860681987-01-0606 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-410/86-68 on 861208-12.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Results Review, Overall Power Ascension Test Program,Power Ascension Test Procedure Review & Plant Tours & Meetings IR 05000220/19860271986-12-30030 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-27 & 50-410/86-66 on 861201-05.No Violations Noted.Majors Areas inspected:organization,self- Indentification/Correction of Deficiencies,Plant Water Chemistry Sys & Sampling/Measurements IR 05000410/19860641986-12-12012 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-64 on 861117-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Power Ascension Test Results Evaluation,Power Ascension Test Witnessing,Surveillance Procedure Review & Qa/Qc Interfaces IR 05000410/19860531986-12-11011 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-53 on 860922-26.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Util Activities Re MSIV Reported Problems & Background History,Including Procurement of New ball-type MSIVs IR 05000220/19860241986-12-0505 December 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-24 on 861103-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Maint Program & Associated Maint Activities IR 05000220/19860221986-12-0404 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-22 & 50-410/86-58 on 861027-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & 861029 Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML20214U9041986-12-0202 December 1986 Insp Repts 50-220/86-22 & 50-410/86-54 on 860929-1002.No Violations Noted.One Unresolved Item Identified Re off-hours Dose Assessment Capabilities.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Status of Emergency Preparedness Program IR 05000410/19860601986-11-26026 November 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-60 on 861031-1105.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Initial Fuel Load Activities,Qa/Qc Interfaces,Independent Verifications & Calculations & Plant Tours & Meetings IR 05000410/19860621986-11-12012 November 1986 Initial OL Review Rept 50-410/86-62.Facility Constructed Per CPPR-112,FSAR & NRC Regulations & Util Ready to Safely Operate Facility IR 05000220/19860131986-10-21021 October 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-13 on 860910-19.Violations Identified: Failure to Control Measuring & Test Equipment,Failure to Control safety-related Maint Activities & Failure to Implement Surveillance Procedures IR 05000410/19860441986-09-0202 September 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal Rept 50-410/86-44 on 860804-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open Items from Insp Rept 50-410/86-23 IR 05000220/19860151986-08-19019 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-220/86-15 on 860728-0801.Violation Noted: Failure to Identify Radionuclide Fe-55 & Activity,Quantity & Total Activity on Radwaste Shipping Manifests IR 05000410/19860471986-08-19019 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-47 on 860804-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tech Spec Surveillance Testing & Calibr Program,Calibr of safety-related Instruments & Measuring & Testing Equipment Control Program IR 05000410/19860381986-08-0707 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-38 on 860714-24.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings, Preoperational Test Results Evaluation Review & Power Ascension Test Program ML20205A4241986-08-0404 August 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-33 on 860630-0711.Deviation Noted: Failure to Review Results of Preliminary Test MD.0100.A03, Standby Diesel Generator Reliability Test IR 05000410/19860231986-07-10010 July 1986 Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal 50-410/86-23 on 860519-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Program,Including Organization, Administration & Procedures IR 05000410/19860051986-04-0202 April 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-05 on 860303-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational & Interim Surveillance & Preliminary Test Procedure Review & Qa/Qc Interface W/ Preoperational Test Program IR 05000410/19860071986-03-26026 March 1986 Insp Rept 50-410/86-07 on 860103 & 07 at S&W in Cherry Hill, Nj.Major Areas Inspected:Audit Results & Unresolved Corrective Action Items from Insp Rept 50-410/85-28 for Util Suppl to Engineering Assurance Audit 50 IR 05000220/19850131986-02-11011 February 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-220/85-13 on 860205.Major Areas Discussed:Findings Identified in Insp Rept 50-220/85-13 Re Program of Qualification of Electrical Equipment Per 10CFR50.49 IR 05000410/19850481986-01-24024 January 1986 Preoperational Security Program Insp Rept 50-410/85-48 on 851216-19.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Implementing Procedures for Receipt of Snm.Info Partially Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) IR 05000410/19850311985-12-31031 December 1985 Errata to Insp Rept 50-410/85-31,consisting of Flow Chart for Large Bore as-built Piping Review,Inadvertently Omitted from Section 3 of 851112 Transmittal 1999-09-14
[Table view] Category:TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
MONTHYEARPNO-I-99-046, on 991008,NMP,Unit 1 Declared Unusual Event,Due to Carbon Dioxide Discharge in Records Storage Room of Administration Bldg,Which Was Migrating Beyond Confines of Storage Room.Nrc Resident Inspector Staff Responded1999-10-0808 October 1999 PNO-I-99-046:on 991008,NMP,Unit 1 Declared Unusual Event,Due to Carbon Dioxide Discharge in Records Storage Room of Administration Bldg,Which Was Migrating Beyond Confines of Storage Room.Nrc Resident Inspector Staff Responded IR 05000220/19990061999-09-14014 September 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-06 & 50-410/99-06 on 990620-0731.NCVs Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support ML20196K6531999-06-29029 June 1999 Notice of Violation from NRC OI Investigation Conducted on 980701-1211.Violation Noted:For Approx Four Hours on 980616, with NMP1 at Full Power,Sro Assumed Assistant Shift Supervisor Position,Contrary to TS Requirements IR 05000220/19990041999-06-21021 June 1999 Insp Repts 50-220/99-04 & 50-410/99-04 on 990328-0508.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support PNO-I-99-023, on 990411,NMP Performed Insps That Identified Indications of Crack Growth Around Portion of One of Vertical Welds.Repair Mod for Shroud Vertical Welds Is Expected to Take Approx Five Days to Complete1999-05-12012 May 1999 PNO-I-99-023:on 990411,NMP Performed Insps That Identified Indications of Crack Growth Around Portion of One of Vertical Welds.Repair Mod for Shroud Vertical Welds Is Expected to Take Approx Five Days to Complete IR 05000220/19980151998-12-23023 December 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-15 & 50-410/98-15 on 980927-1121.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20196E5351998-11-19019 November 1998 Notice of Violation from Investigation on 980303-0930. Violation Noted:On 971224,individual Left Controls at NMP-2 Unattended for Six Minutes to Go Into Shift Supervisor Ofc, Area Not at Controls as Noted in NMPC UFSAR Figure 13.5-1 IR 05000220/19980141998-10-26026 October 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-14 & 50-410/98-14 on 980816-0926.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Reviews of Licensee Activities in Functional Areas of Operations,Engineering, Maint & Plant Support ML20248A8001998-05-20020 May 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980406-0409.Violation Noted:During Insp,Inspectors Determined That Licensee Failed to Properly Store,Control & Classify Safeguards Info ML20217L9251998-04-28028 April 1998 Insp Repts 50-220/98-08 & 50-410/98-08 on 980406-21. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability to Protect Facility Against Radiological Sabotage & Compliance W/Safeguards Program Commitments ML20199B8601998-01-22022 January 1998 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $55,000.Violation Noted:On 970925,package Containing Metal Samples Removed from Unit 1 Emergency Cooling Tube Sheet Was Sent to Listed Company,Not on List ML20198R4391997-11-0505 November 1997 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000.Violations Noted:Listed non-safety Related SSCs Were Not Included in 10CFR50.65 Monitoring Program ML20137U8501997-04-10010 April 1997 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $200,000.Violation Noted:As of 961105,measures Were Not Established to Assure Condition Adverse to Quality Are Promptly Identified & Corrected IR 05000220/19940011994-01-24024 January 1994 Insp Repts 50-220/94-01 & 50-410/94-01 on 940103-07.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support, Protected Area Barriers,Detection Aids & Assessment Aids, & Protected Area & Isolation Zone Lighting IR 05000220/19930221993-12-22022 December 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-22 & 50-410/93-22 on 931004-20.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mov Program Commitments & Enhancments Identified During Team Inspection in June 1992 Were Reviewed for Progress IR 05000220/19930011993-11-12012 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930919-1030. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Major Components & Sys for Leakage,Alignment,Lubrication,Cooling Water Supply IR 05000220/19930231993-11-0505 November 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-23 & 50-410/93-22 on 931012-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Program Plans & Audits,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection & Assessment Aids PNO-I-93-058, on 931027,licensee Discovered Two Broken 100 Milliliter Vials of Yellow Powder (Believed to Be Yellowcake) at Corporate Ofc in Syracuse,Ny.No Personnel Contaminated.State of Ny Notified1993-10-28028 October 1993 PNO-I-93-058:on 931027,licensee Discovered Two Broken 100 Milliliter Vials of Yellow Powder (Believed to Be Yellowcake) at Corporate Ofc in Syracuse,Ny.No Personnel Contaminated.State of Ny Notified IR 05000220/19930241993-10-27027 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-24 & 50-410/93-23 on 931018-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Exams of Procedures, Representative Records,Interviews W/Personnel & Observations by Inspectors IR 05000220/19930191993-10-18018 October 1993 Insp Rept 50-220/93-19 on 930823-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Electrical Distribution Sys ML20057G3271993-10-12012 October 1993 Notice of Violation from Insp on 930808-0918.Violation Noted:On 930803,inspector Discovered Individual That Required Escort in Protected Area W/O Escort for Approx 25 Minutes IR 05000220/19930121993-10-0606 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-12 & 50-410/93-12 on 930615-18 & 0712-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas inspected:930615-18 Emergency Preparedness Program & 930713 annual,full- Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise IR 05000220/19930181993-10-0101 October 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-18 & 50-410/93-18 on 930808-0918. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint & Surveillance Activities,Engineering & Plant Support, W/Regard to Radiological & Chemistry Controls & Security IR 05000220/19930131993-09-21021 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-13 & 50-410/93-13 on 930802-06.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Design Changes & Mods,Installation & Testing of Mods,Interface/Communication, QA & Technical Support,Wrs & LERs IR 05000220/19930151993-09-16016 September 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-15 & 50-410/93-15 on 930719-23.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Offsite Power Supply Sources for Plant & to Review Licensees Corrective Action on Previously Identified Insp Findings IR 05000220/19930161993-08-0404 August 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-16 & 50-410/93-16 on 930426-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Audits, Calibration of Effluent & Process Radiation Monitoring Sys, Air Cleaning Sys & Implementation of Previous Programs ML20056C1641993-03-23023 March 1993 Notice of Violation from Insp on 930124-0227.Violation Noted:I&C Technicians Performing N1-ISP-032-004 Failed to Correctly Perform Procedural Steps 7.2.1-7.2.5 Resulting in Automatic Reactor Scram Due to False High Neutron Flux ML20056C1661993-03-12012 March 1993 Insp Repts 50-220/93-01 & 50-410/93-01 on 930124-0227. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maintenance,Surveillance,Security & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification Activities PNO-I-90-092, on 901010,condensate Spill Occurred in Bldg. Caused by Malfunctioning Valve in Lineup for Transfer of New Resin from Mixing Tank to Condensate Demineralizer Bed. Excess Water Pumped Out sub-basement1990-10-11011 October 1990 PNO-I-90-092:on 901010,condensate Spill Occurred in Bldg. Caused by Malfunctioning Valve in Lineup for Transfer of New Resin from Mixing Tank to Condensate Demineralizer Bed. Excess Water Pumped Out sub-basement PNO-I-90-061, on 900806,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor Due to High Vibration on Main Turbine Bearing.Caused by Blank Flange Left in Oil Supply Line to Bearing.Resident Inspectors Following Licensee Actions1990-08-0707 August 1990 PNO-I-90-061:on 900806,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor Due to High Vibration on Main Turbine Bearing.Caused by Blank Flange Left in Oil Supply Line to Bearing.Resident Inspectors Following Licensee Actions IR 05000220/19890991990-08-0101 August 1990 Final SALP Repts 50-220/89-99 & 50-410/89-99 for Mar 1989 - Feb 1990 PNO-I-90-059, on 900730,plant Shut Down Due to Excessive RCS Leakage.Util Will Repair Plant Electromatic Relief Valves Found to Be Leaking During Startup.State of Ny Has Been Informed1990-07-30030 July 1990 PNO-I-90-059:on 900730,plant Shut Down Due to Excessive RCS Leakage.Util Will Repair Plant Electromatic Relief Valves Found to Be Leaking During Startup.State of Ny Has Been Informed PNO-I-90-057, on 900727,restart Authorized for Facility. Util Agreed to Perform Self Assessments of Performance & Inform NRC Restart Assessment Panel of Self Assessment Results1990-07-27027 July 1990 PNO-I-90-057:on 900727,restart Authorized for Facility. Util Agreed to Perform Self Assessments of Performance & Inform NRC Restart Assessment Panel of Self Assessment Results PNO-I-89-072A, on 890828,augmented Insp Team Exit Meeting Subsequent Press Conference Held at Plant Re Licensee Use of sub-basement for Storage of Solid & Liquid Radwaste.Two Violations Noted1989-08-29029 August 1989 PNO-I-89-072A:on 890828,augmented Insp Team Exit Meeting Subsequent Press Conference Held at Plant Re Licensee Use of sub-basement for Storage of Solid & Liquid Radwaste.Two Violations Noted ML20247D5991989-05-0202 May 1989 Investigation Rept 89-02 Re Misconduct of Ofc of Investigations Deputy Director,Ra Fortuna.Finding of No Misconduct or Dereliction of Duty Recommended IR 05000220/19880301988-11-16016 November 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-30 & 50-410/88-29 on 880926-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan & Procedures,Mgt Organization,Audits,Records & Repts,Testing & Maint,Barriers,Security Power Supply & Assessment Aids IR 05000220/19860991988-07-0101 July 1988 Amended SALP Repts 50-220/86-99 & 50-410/87-99 for Nov 1986 - Feb 1988 & Feb 1987 - Feb 1988,respectively. Licensee Has Shown Limited Success W/Initiatives to Improve Previously Identified Weaknesses ML20155F4171988-06-10010 June 1988 Notice of Violation from Insp on 880404-08.Violation Noted: Site Procedures CBI-SC 1,Rev 0 & NES-8042433,Rev 3 Did Not Establish Adequate Controls Over Nondestructive Testing Process for Making Precision Thickness Measurements IR 05000220/19880091988-05-19019 May 1988 Insp Repts 50-220/88-09 & 50-410/88-09 on 880307-11 & 0404- 08.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Program Re First 10-yr Insp Interval & Augmented Exams Conducted by Licensee,Including Procedures PNO-I-88-010, on 880120,reactor Scrammed from 42% Power Based on Low Reactor Vessel Water Level.Caused by Equipment Operator Error.Nrc Dispatched Augmented Insp Team to Site to Review Generic Safety Implications of Event1988-01-21021 January 1988 PNO-I-88-010:on 880120,reactor Scrammed from 42% Power Based on Low Reactor Vessel Water Level.Caused by Equipment Operator Error.Nrc Dispatched Augmented Insp Team to Site to Review Generic Safety Implications of Event PNO-I-88-009, on 880120,unusual Event Declared as Result of Worker Injured After Stepping Through Hole in Grating Between Reactor Vessel Flange & Refueling Cavity Floor.No Contamination Involved1988-01-21021 January 1988 PNO-I-88-009:on 880120,unusual Event Declared as Result of Worker Injured After Stepping Through Hole in Grating Between Reactor Vessel Flange & Refueling Cavity Floor.No Contamination Involved PNO-I-88-007, on 880115,present Unplanned Outage to Inspect & Repair Feedwater Sys Components & Supports Extended for Approx 3 Wks to Perform Insp of Bushings in Reactor Vessel Flange Which Hold 6-inch Diameter Reactor Vessel Head Studs1988-01-19019 January 1988 PNO-I-88-007:on 880115,present Unplanned Outage to Inspect & Repair Feedwater Sys Components & Supports Extended for Approx 3 Wks to Perform Insp of Bushings in Reactor Vessel Flange Which Hold 6-inch Diameter Reactor Vessel Head Studs PNO-I-87-120, on 871226,reactor Scram Occurred from Approx 25% Power Due to Turbine Trip on Low Condenser Vacuum Caused by Crack in Condenser Pipe Penetration.Pentration Seal Weld Repaired1987-12-29029 December 1987 PNO-I-87-120:on 871226,reactor Scram Occurred from Approx 25% Power Due to Turbine Trip on Low Condenser Vacuum Caused by Crack in Condenser Pipe Penetration.Pentration Seal Weld Repaired PNO-I-87-117, on 871219,reactor Manually Scrammed After Mechanical Vibrations from Turbine Bldg Felt in Control Room.Caused by Feedwater Control Valve Stem Separation from Disc.Outage Dependent on Availability of Repair Parts1987-12-21021 December 1987 PNO-I-87-117:on 871219,reactor Manually Scrammed After Mechanical Vibrations from Turbine Bldg Felt in Control Room.Caused by Feedwater Control Valve Stem Separation from Disc.Outage Dependent on Availability of Repair Parts PNO-I-87-114, on 871207,reactor Scrammed from Approx 96% Power Due to Low Reactor Vessel Water Level.Caused by Malfunction of Feedwater Control Valves 13A & 13B.Preventive & Corrective Maint Underway1987-12-10010 December 1987 PNO-I-87-114:on 871207,reactor Scrammed from Approx 96% Power Due to Low Reactor Vessel Water Level.Caused by Malfunction of Feedwater Control Valves 13A & 13B.Preventive & Corrective Maint Underway IR 05000220/19870221987-12-0909 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-220/87-22 on 871019-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Design Change/Mods,Maint & Previously Identified Items PNO-I-87-113, on 871128,condensate Storage Tank Ruptured Spilling Over 260,000 Gallons Nonradioactive Demineralized Water.Caused by Break in Seam Between Tank Sidewall & Floor. Vendor Onsite Inspecting Cause.Plant in Cold Shutdown1987-12-0202 December 1987 PNO-I-87-113:on 871128,condensate Storage Tank Ruptured Spilling Over 260,000 Gallons Nonradioactive Demineralized Water.Caused by Break in Seam Between Tank Sidewall & Floor. Vendor Onsite Inspecting Cause.Plant in Cold Shutdown PNO-I-87-096, on 871016,plant Scrammed on High Neutron Flux from 89% Power During Testing Causing Main Steam Pressure Oscillations Triggering APRM High Flux Scram.Crd Stub Tube Leakage Identified.Hydrostatic Tests Performed1987-10-19019 October 1987 PNO-I-87-096:on 871016,plant Scrammed on High Neutron Flux from 89% Power During Testing Causing Main Steam Pressure Oscillations Triggering APRM High Flux Scram.Crd Stub Tube Leakage Identified.Hydrostatic Tests Performed IR 05000220/19870161987-10-15015 October 1987 Exam Rept 50-220/87-16OL on 870804-06.Exam Results:All Three Senior Reactor Operator Candidates Passed Written & Operating Exams.Exam Key Encl IR 05000410/19870181987-10-0101 October 1987 Requalification & Replacement Exam Rept 50-410/87-18OL on 870707-07.Exam Results:Two of Four Senior Reactor Operator Candidates & Three of Four Reactor Operator Candidates Passed Exam.Exams Encl 1999-09-14
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
REPORT NO /93-15 50-410/93-15 DOCKET NO LICENSE NO DPR-63 NPF-69 1. ICENSEE: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation FACILITY NAME: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 INSPECTION AT: Salina Meadows, and Scriba, New York, INSPECTION DATES: July 19-23,1992 INSPECTOR: 1 , f*C f /[ h
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R. Bhatia, R'eactor Enginyr, Electrical 'Date Section, Engineering Branch, DRS APPROVED BY: /A _ /6 #3
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7 Engineering Branch, DRSRuland, Chief, ElectricafSfdfion, Area inspected: This was an announced inspection to assess the reliability of the offsite power supply sources for the Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 and to review the licensee's corrective action on previously identified inspection findings on Unit Rcuhs: No violations or deviations were identified. The offsite power supply sources for both the units were found to be adequate and reliable. Of four unresolved items reviewed pertaining to Unit 1, three items were closed. The other unresolved item was update These items are discussed in sections 2.0 and PDR ADOCK 05000220 G PDR:
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DETAILS PURPOSE The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy / reliability of the licensee's offsite power supply sources for the Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 Station. In addition, the effects of a postulated fire in the cable spreading room area or cable tunnels were evaluated with respect to offsite power supply availability. The inspection also included the review and verification of the licensee's corrective actions for previously identified NRC findings during the 1991 Electrical Distribution Systems Functional Inspection (EDSFI) for the Nine Mile Point Unit .0 OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY Itackground During the past several years, six events had occurred that had resulted in a partial or complete loss of offsite power. In all cases, one or both of the 115 kV offsite power supply lines to the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 station were lost, while the unit was either operating at power or under shutoown conditions. The NRC is concerned that every time a loss of an offsite power is experienced by the station, it results in a challenge to the safety equipment, operational personnel and causes an unnecessary risk to plant safety. The review of these documented Licensee Event Reports (LERs) revealed that four out of the six events had occurred within the last two years. This inspection was conducted to focus on the circumstances surrounding the above loss of power events and the licensee's corrective actions taken or planned to enhance the overall reliability of the offsite power supply to the Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2. In addition, the effect of the Appendix R fire in each unit's cable spreading room area scenario was evaluated with respect to offsite power availabilit .2 Ilrief Description of the Events On December 26,1988, a current transformer exploded in the offsite Scriba substation which disabled the only 115 kV offsite power supply line available to the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2). At that time, the plant was already shutdown and the other offsite power supply line 5 was out of service for maintenance. On May 21,1991, NMP2 experienced an actuation of several engineered safety feature systems (ESFs) due to a loss of one of the two offsite power supply lines. During this event, the supply line 5 was lost when breakers opened in the Scriba substation as a result of cable damage caused by excavation work ongoing in the Scriba substation. The cause of the event was considered to be improper communication between various departments and lack of adequate documentation for the ongoing work. The third event occurred on March 23, 1992, when human error resulted in tripping both the offsite power supply lines, while the plant was operating at 100% powe During this event, numerous ESFs system also actuated and control room annunciation was lost; as a result, the licensee declared a site emergency. The root cause of this event was determined to be inadequate work practice. The event occurred due to an inadvertent action
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3 l by th : relay technicians, followed by operator error in attempting to supply the unit auxiliary i
load frem the offsite power supply line 5 using cross ties with line 6. This attempt failed due to a failure to recognize the reset requirement of the tripped relay and resulted in the loss of the remaining offsite line. Again, on July 28,1992, line 6 was lost to Unit 2, when the R60 circuit breaker tripped in the Scriba substation due to a loss of hydraulic pressure. This trip was attributed to the 115 kV R60 hydraulic pump failure. Another event occurred on September 25,1992, offsite power supply line 5 feeder was lost to Unit 2, when a contractors's crane boom came too close to the offsite feeder resulting in an arc from the line j through the crane to the ground, which tripped line 5. In all the above cases, required i engineered safeguard systems actuated, the plant was stabilized, and emergency diesel !
generators automatically started and supplied powe j
, Station Electrical System Design !
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The offsite power supply is designed to be a reliable power supply for the plant electrical distribution system to provide adequate power during startup, normal operation, and
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emergency-shutdow .3.1 Unit 1 Design i
The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 main generator output is tied onto the grid via two 345 kV line Line 9 connects to the Scriba substation, approximately 0.41 miles from the site, and line 8 connects with the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) cross state bulk power transmission system via the Clay station. During normal plant operations, unit non-class 1E auxiliaries loads are powered by the main generator via the unit service transformer. During plant startup, shutdown, and abnormal operating conditions, the station auxiliaries are supplied from the 115 kV offsite power supply system via the plant reserve transformer The safety class lE loads are supplied at all times from the 115 kV lines 1 and 4 which are not supplied from the Scriba substation 115 kV system. The simplified power supply arrangement is shown in Figure .3.2 Unit 2 Design The Nine Mile Point 2 main generator output is tied onto the 345 kV scriba substation, and the Scriba substation is further connected with two transmission lines to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation cross state connection link. During normal plant operation, the plant auxiliaries loads are supplied (via a step-down transformer) from the generator outpu However, three 4.16 kV emergency buses are supplied from the two independent 115 kV offsite supply lines 5 and 6 from the Scriba substation. During plant startup and abnormal conditions, all loads (the unit auxiliary and emergency buses) are powered from the above two sources via two reserve transformers from the above two 115 kV lines of the Scriba substation, A simple arrangement of both units and the Scriba substation is shown in Figure _ . _ _
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2.3.3 The Scriba Substation Design
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The Scriba substation utilizes a breaker and a half scheme. The 345 kV buses in the 345 kV transmission lines are connected to the Unit 1 Unit 2 and two 345 kV transmission lines which feed onto the NMPC cross state power grid system. Two transformers (step-down voltage from 345/115 kV), located on diagonally opposite corners, provide two offsite power ,
sources to NMP2. A simplified diagram depicting the general arrangement and other l equipment associated with the Scriba substation is shown in Figure l Offsite Power Supply Assessment ]
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the assessment performed by the independent ,
safety engineering group (ISEG) of all the above events. The ISEG assessment concluded l that a lack of communication among various nuclear and non-nuclear departments was the main cause of the above events. To resolve this concern, a management meeting was held on December 3,1992, in which both units plant management and all other applicable nuclear {
and non-nuclear departments reviewed jointly the previous LOOP events to evaluate the necessary corrective actions required to minimize the recurrence of offsite line losses. Per discussion with the licensee staff and review of the meeting minutes, the inspector determined that in this meeting an overview of Unit 2's electrical distribution system and the plant impact of the loss of either 115 kV supply circuit were thoroughly discussed. All departments staff members were briefed on the importance and the consequences of the loss of either of the offsite power sources. Emphasis on strong communication among all groups was promote An overall design review of the Scriba station was performed by the applicable design engineering departments to further enhance equipment reliability. The licensee decided to 1 replace the four Scriba substation 115 kV breakers as soon as possible, since they were a direct cause of the LOOP in two events. These four breakers are an older design and are required to have minimum SF6, hydraulic, and nitrogen pressures for all modes of operatio In addition, it was also recognized that, with two breakers in series per source, any
- maintenance problem / outage on any one of the breakers would result in a partial loss of offsite power to NMP2. The licensee also decided that until these breakers were replaced, 1 routine monitoring of the existing breakers would be done by the plant maintenance and other departments. In addition, a contingency plan was developed that would allow bypass of one of the two breakers if necessar The review of the 345 kV Scriba substation breaker design feature revealed that the 345 kV breakers were more reliable than the 115 kV breakers. The 345 kV breakers do not trip under low SF6, hydraulic, and nitrogen pressure conditions because they are equipped with a bkeking design feature.
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Per discussion with the licensee's applicable nuclear and non-nuclear staff of the Scriba substation, the inspector noted that all of the applicable design documentation to replace the 115 kV breaker were being prepared and progressing on schedule. The new SF6 power circuit breakers design is simple and considered to be more reliable. The inspector also noted that new breakers and other required equipment parts to replace them had been
- procured and were available at the site. Based on the current schedule, the licensee plans to replace the breakers during the fall 1993 Unit 2 refueling outag The licensee's central regional control (CRC) department (non-nuclear) added detailed guidelines in the operating instructions procedure on April 22,1993, to reflect the impact of offsite power sources on NMP2 plant safety and established guidelines for communications, work planning, access control, inspections, and equipment failure response involving the Scriba substation and its perimeter. The procedure directed that the NMP2 shift supervisor and the station maintenance staff be fully informed of all Scriba substation related activities by other departments. Additionally, all Scriba substation maintenance, relay and corrective actions activities are required to be performed under the plant work control process. The inspector reviewed sample relay testing activities recently completed and found that they were being performed in accordance with the revised established plant guidelines and procedur Based on discussions with the licensee's staff and a review of the relevant training documentation, the inspector determined that the licensee had adequately trained the nuclear and non-nuclear staff to understand the need and importance of the NMP2 offsite power supply sources. Several administrative plant and non-nuclear administrative and operating procedures had been revised and established which provided detailed guidance to control the work in the Scriba substation and periphery area of the station. The station and substation 1
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relay surveillance and maintenance activities are now coordinated with the plant maintenance department even though it is performed by the dedicated plant non-nuclear department. All other work in the vicinity of the plant and the switchyard is planned and reviewed by the applicable plant staff and, as details warrant, a safety evaluation and PORC approval is obtained prior to initiation. Per procedure, the station shift supervisor and CRC shift j supervisor share all information pertaining to the switchyard activities, alarms received, i switching information and maintenance requirements. The inspector reviewed a sample of maintenance work orders, replacement breakers design activities documentation, and 1 substation logs for monitoring the other activities performed in the Scriba switchyard during l
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the June and July 1993 period and identified no deficiencies in following the established guidelines by all department staff member To improve the reliability of the existing 115 kV breakers, the CRC staff was routinely monitoring the 1ey equipment associated with the function of the breakers. Adequate corrective measures such as replacement of the compressor motor parts and other miscellaneous measures were taken in a timely manner. In addition, per discussion with
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plant maintenance, shift supervisor and non-nuclear staff personnel, the inspector determined that the relevant information pertaining to the equipment maintenance, and other activities associated with the substation were being shared and that the staff was well aware of the impact of offsite power sources failure on the NMP2 safe operatio The inspector performed a walkdown of the Scriba substation and found that the 115 kV breakers were equipped with a time meter to monitor compressor total running time. This time was being monitored to assure that SF6, Nitrogen and hydraulic pressures were adequate for operation. In addition, the new breakers and associated parts were on site for the replacement of the 115 kV breakers. The review of the switchyard entry log and ;
procedures used for work in the substation reflected the updated requirement l i
I Appendix R Fire impact on Offsite Power I
The inspector reviewed the effects of a postulated fire on the offsite power supply for the Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in fire areas 10 and 11. These areas correspond to the control room ;
and the cable spreading room fire zones. Unit I does not rely on the offsite or onsite l emergency diesel generators to safely shut down the plant following a fire postulated in these areas. Instead, the reactor is cooled down and stabilized via the emergency cooling 1 condenser system. The inspector reviewed the applicable special operating procedures and !
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verified the assumptions of the Appendix R analysi In the event of a fire at Unit 2, safe shutdown is achieved by several diverse means 1 depending upon the location of the fire, the availability of electrical power, and the components rendered inoperable. A fire event coincident with a LOOP is considered the l l
most limiting scenario and represents a " worst case" as evaluated in the licensee's Appendix R analysis. However, based on the inspector's walkdown and review of design drawings, the inspector noted that the Unit 2 does not have a single cable spreading room for the control room. Engineered safety systems in various plant areas were routed separately up to the control room and entered from the opposite side via two separate cable tunnels. Based on the analysis, either division I or division 11 portions of the auxiliaries and support systems would always be available. The licensee's analysis had not taken credit for offsite power, but relied on an available emergency diesel generator to support plant safe shutdow Based on the above review, the inspector concluded that in either unit no specific affect exists on the offsite power availability under the above fire scenario .6 Conclusion Based on the licensee's corrective actions taken to control adequately the work activities, design review of the substation, and improved communication among all departments associated with the plant and Scriba substation, the inspector concluded that the Nine Mile Units 1 and 2 offsite power sources were reasonably reliable. Unit 2 offsite power reliability will be further enhanced once the scheduled, four 115 kV breaker replacement is complete .
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7 FOLLOWUP OF PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED FINDINGS (UNIT 1) (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-220/91-80-013 regarding the design voltages of 575 volt motors During the previous EDSFI inspection, the team determined that approximately thirty safety- )'
related motors with design voltage rating of 575 V might not have sufficient terminal voltage under plant degraded voltage conditions. At the conclusion of the EDSFI inspection, adequate evaluation to demonstrate the acceptability was not available. The licensee
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committed to provide adequate documentation for the acceptability of these motors to demonstrate their intended design function During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's completed degraded voltage calculation (ELMSSAC-DEGVOLT-STUDY, Rev. 0). The calculation considered the data '
from the worst-case scenario assuming a unit trip concurrent with a LOCA. The licensee then determined the minimum plant voltages for the 4.16 kV buses and other lower level voltage powerboards. Further evaluation was made by utilizing the minimum available grid voltage of 115 kV and then calculating the mmimum motor voltages available. The inspector noted that the various 600 volt powerboard voltages determined ranged from 51 to 526.2 volts. A review of the 575 volt motors (connected on various powerboards)
revealed that all safety-related motors had sufficient voltage (above 90%) except four motors. These four motors were fed from powerboard 1671 and the terminal voltages calculated varied from 513.3 to 511.7 volts. Per discussion with the licensee, the inspector determined that the control room circulating fan motor 11, rated at 15 horsepower, required only 10.1 HP. Based on the system requirement and under the degraded voltage condition, the licensee assumed that these motors would draw only 11.09 amperes compared to 14.68 )
full load rated amperes. The licensee had previously evaluated the degraded voltage issue j for these three motors (chilled water circulating pump 11 and compressor motors 111 '
l and 112) and had concluded that these motors were capable of operating between 495 and 605 volts. Based on the above, the licensee had concluded that all safety-related 575 volt design motors would have suf6cient voltage under the minimum grid voltage conditio The inspector confirmed that the licensee had considered the applicable input data in their i
degraded voltage study (minimum grid voltage of 115 kV and the maximum loading condition). The sample review of the selected motors input data identified no concern One discrepancy was identified in the motor data assumed in the above assessment. During the walkdown verification of the motor data, the inspector determined that the operating current for the control room circulating fan 11 was 11.5 amperes versus 11.0 amperes assumed in the calculation. To resolve the concern, the licensee reevaluated motor load ;
requirements assuming the degraded voltage condition and determined that the increase !
remained within motor full load capability such that the motor could still perform its intended design function under this condition. This item is close . . . . . _ - _ . _ ._
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8 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-220/91-80-009 regarding the inadequate cable j penetration protection calculation During the EDSF1, the team was concerned that an adequate calculation or study was not
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available to demonstrate the adequacy of all containment penetrations. The review of the interim study available at that time determined that three, 600 volt penetration types were not fully protected from all fault conditions. At that time, the licensee performed an operability assessment and concluded that there was a reasonable assurance that the penetrations were protected despite a minor overlapping coordination condition. The licensee initiated an ;
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action plan to review all penetrations and implement actions accordingly. Subsequent to the EDSFI, the licensee found some additional molded case circuit breakers with similar overlapping conditions. The licensee committed to complete a comprehensive study or calculation to assure the adequacy of all electrical penetration protection including the verification of the 5 kV penetrations mechanical capabilities assumptions made in the interim calculatio During this inspection, the inspector noted that the licensee had replaced sesen molded case circuit breakers of General Electric Type THEF with Type THED to resolve the concerns on the 600 volt penetrations and other breakers. A selected sample review of the coordination curves revealed that the circuits were adequately coordinated for electrical protection. In addition, the licensee had completed a detailed analysis in calculation (E34-DRYWELL-PEN PROT) for all penetrations.
l The inspector reviewed the study and concluded that all penetrations were adequately protected with the exception of some fuse-disconnect circuits used for welding receptacles in the drywell area. These circuits lacked electrical overload protection and were used only during the plant shutdown condition, if welding were required. To address this concern, the licensee assured that all circuits were left in the open position during normal plant operatio Per discussion with the licensee, no discrepancies were found at the time of verification. To l l
prevent these circuits from misuse, the licensee also had initiated procedure changes to add l such instructions in their operating procedure (N1-OP-43). To address the 5 kV penetration i mechanical capabilities, the licensee had obtained manufacturer data and confirmed that the i applicable penetrations had adequate mechanical capabilitie Based on the adequate protection determined for all penetrations and additional corrective actions taken by the licensee to resolve the above concerns, this item is close .3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-220/91-80-012 regarding the fast bus transfer scheme The EDSFI team was concerned that, during a fast bus transfer, the non-class 1E loads on the powerboards might impose degraded condition on the safety boards PB102 and PB10 The licensee committed to resolve this concern by performing a bus transfer study and/or test to demonstrate the transfer scheme adequac l
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The licensee completed a bus transfer simulation study, documented in NMP1 calculation No. 4.16KVAV-BUS-XFER and Sargent and Lundy report No. SL-4812. The inspector reviewed the study and noted that the licensee had simulated fast bus transfer effects on class 1E and non-class lE motors assuming normal fast transfer (no fault) and also with faul Two simulation cases performed assumed the heaviest full load winter loading conditions and full winter load conditions plus the LOCA condition. The fast transfer fault considered was a three phase to ground fault on the secondary of the station service transformer to cause the maximum reduction in motor speeds before bus transfe The licensee concluded that there were no adverse effects on the class 1E system during a fast bus transfer under the worst-case conditions. However, the study concluded in two scenarios that non-class lE motors might experience stresses higher than the recommended industry guidelines (ANSI C50.41) for polyphase induction motors. To assure the integrity of these motors, a separate study was performed by the manufacturer of these motors (General Electric), which concluded that the 4 kV motors installed at Nine Mile Point One station could withstand the expected stresses under the plant installed condition The inspector reviewed the input data, assumptions and minimum grid voltage and determined them to be adequate. The dead bus time (5.2 cycles) and minimum grid voltage (112 kV) considered during the transfer were found to conform to the manufacturer's published circuit breaker data and installed plant conditions. The licensee concluded that all class 1E motors could start and accelerate following a fast bus transfer. The calculated transient currents were below the value of overcurrent relays on the safety-related powerboards and the reserve transformers trip point. Transient voltages on class 1E buses recovered sufficiently to preclude transfer to the onsite power sources. The study also concluded that in two cases: (1) a fast bus transfer with winter full load, and (2) a fast bus transfer with winter full load plus LOCA, the stress on the nonsafety-related motors would be higher than the guidelines recommended by ANSI standard C50.41 for polyphase induction motors. This ANSI standard suggests that the resultant vectorial volts / hertz (V/Hz)
between the motor residual and the incoming source at the instant the transfer should not exceed 1.33 per unit. Based on this study, the licensee demonstrated this value to be approximately 1.62 v/HZ. As discussed above, the licensee's original motor manufacturer's performed a fast transfer analysis on the typical smallest selected vertical and horizontal type motor and demonstrated that these motors could withstand produced stresses by the transient current and torque load under the above determined resultant 1.62 volts / hertz. The inspector's selected sample review of the above documentation revealed no concern Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's calculations and test results, the inspector concluded that the licensee had adequately demonstrated that the class IE motors and the non-class 1E motors could withstand a fast bus transfer under the worst-case loading conditions; this item is close c
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10 (Open) Unresolved Item 50-220/91-80-008 pertaining to the EDGs transient study The EDSFI team reviewed the EDG surveillance test results and preliminary voltage transient analysis study, and noted that the voltage dip resulting from the initial starting of the class lE loads might be as high as 40 percent. Based on the review of the above documentation, it was determined that input data to the transient voltage analysis and its certain assumptions needed further verification to assure adequate EDG voltage di During this inspection, the inspector noted that the licensee had completed the EDG dynamic study (4.16KVAC-DG-DS, Revision 0), on January 25, 1992. In this revision of the study, the computer simulation determined the capability of EDGs by applying load as per the LOCA sequence coincident with LOOP scenario. Based on the review of this study, the -
inspector noted that the licensee's study (completed jointly by ABB Impell and Power Technology, Inc.) had modeled the EDG (generator) based on the last refueling (R2) test data. The study concluded that the EDGs were capable to start and accelerate the required motors without stalling during a loss of offsite power and a design basis accident. However, the study results revealed that even though the EDGs were capable of handling the above loads, in the first sequence step load block and the manual addition of load of the containment spray raw water pump, the minimum voltage might be marginal (70% of nominal voltage). Based on the marginal results obtained in above two cases and the test data used to verify and validate the EDG model, it appears that the model may not reflect the similar transients results considering the filter function developed by the transducers in the testing circuit. The licensee committed to verify the above computer models and results by performing additional studies and testing. Per discussion with the licensee, the inspector determined that the licensee had completed the additional tests and obtained the additional generator and motor data using a digital system for further evaluation of the above EDGs dynamic analysi Based on the above concerns in the study, this item remains open pending verification and final revision of the licensee's EDGs transient dynamic study and verification of the computer mode .0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS Unresolved items are matters about which additional information is necessary in order to determine whether they are acceptable or they constitute a violation. Several unresolved items are discussed in detail under Section 3.0 and .0 EXIT MEETING The inspector met with the licensee's personnel denoted in Section 1.0 of this report at the conclusion of the inspection period on July 23,1993. At that time, the scope of the inspection and the inspection results were summarized. At no time during the inspection was written material given to the license c
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ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED Niagara MpJiawk Power Corocration J.Brady Engineer, Electrical Design-Unit 1 ,
J. Bunyan Project Management-Unit 2 B. Crandall System Engineering-Unit 2 R. Dean Lead System Engineer, Unit 2 D. Go(xiney Ixad Electrical Design-Unit 1 D. Greege Manager, Licensing J. Kirkpatrick Electrical Maint. Engineer-Unit 2 L. Klowsowski General Supervisor, Nuclear Design-Unit 1 H. Kodali Engineer, Electrical Design-Unit 1 A. Julika Supervisor, Electrical Design Unit 2 T. McMalton Supervisor, Electrical Design - Unit 1 A. Pinter Site Licensing Engineer L. Vavra MATS Inc. Unit 2 R. Murray Operation Planner, Operation - Unit 2
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D. Hughes Supervisor, Relay and Control, Power Delivery S. Dudy Electrical Maintenance Supervisor - Unit 2 K. Fisher Electrical Maintenance Supervisor - Unit 1 M. Conway Shift Supervisor, Operation - Unit 2 i
A. Raju Electrical Engineer, Electrical Design - Unit 2 C. Polidore Manager, Regional Control T. Flynn Regional Operator, Regional Control i
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