IR 05000220/1986022
| ML20214W964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1986 |
| From: | Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214W953 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-86-22-01, 50-220-86-22-1, 50-410-86-58, NUDOCS 8612100480 | |
| Download: ML20214W964 (7) | |
Text
.
O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-220/86-22 50-410/86-58 Docket Nos.
50-220; 50-410 License Nos. DPR-63;.NPF-54 Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 and Unit 2 Inspection At:
Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
October 27-29, 1986 Inspectors:
t2d Mg I
hN Jamef/Hawxhurst, E. P. Specialist date Team Leader, DRSS, Region I W. Cook, USNRC Sr. Resident Inspector NMP S. Merwin, Battelle M. Moeller, Battelle F. Victor, Battelle (Sonalyst)
M. Clausen, USNRC/ Technical Assistant, OCM J. Kaucher, USNRC/RI Project Engineer, DRP W. Schmidt, USNRC, Resident Inspector NMP 2 C. Marshall, USNRC, Resident Inspector NMP 1 Approved by:
Af
//
. g arus gC 1ef date
~
Em #gency Freparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 27-29, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-220/86-22 and 50-410/86-58).
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on October 29, 1986.
l Results: No violations were identified.
Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
kk N
O G
._
_
.
_
_
. - _ _ _. _.,,
_ _. _ _
_
_
.
.
DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on October 30, 1986.
W. C. Drews, Technical Superintendent (NMPC)
P. Volza, Supervisor Radiological Support E. Leach, Superintendent Chem / Rad Management T. Chwalek, Emergency Coordinator E. Kaish, JNC Director T. Perkins, General Superintendent, Nuclear Generation K. A. Dahlberg, Site Superintendent Maintenance W. Hansen, Manager of Nuclear QA Operation T. A. Peeling, Generation Specialist G. Burgess, Assistant Emergency Coordinator A. Anderson, Station Shift Supervisor K. Sweet, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent N. Goldych, Assistant Supervisor Training M. Hedrick, Training Supervisor T. Egan, NC&V Engineer A. L. Salem, Assistant Emergency Coordinator A.- Pinter, Site Licensing R. Zollitsch, Superintendent Training Nuclear The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Nine Mile Point Site partial-scale exercise (limited off-site partici-
'
pation) was conducted on October 29, 1986 from 7:30 AM until 3:30 PM.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities
Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives met with and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives and the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario, and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas necessary.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 28, 1986, and participated in the diccussion of emergency response actions expected
'
during the various phases of the scenario.
.
J
.
.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
-
unidentified leakage within the drywell (UNUSUAL EVENT);
-
seismic event of 0.080g's (ALERT);
a fire compromising a vital switch gear / safety system;
-
loss of coolant accident (GENERAL EMERGENCY);
-
hydrogen explosion, resulting in a release into the reactor
-
buildings;
-
a release to atmosphere through standby gas treatment systems; and,
-
recommendation of protective actions to state and county officials.
The above actions caused the activation of the licensee's emergency response facilities and permitted the state (to the extent necessary to support notification and assessment activities) to exercise its emergency plan.
i 2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, nine NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were observed:
-
Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events;
-
Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
-
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of i
pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping;
-
-
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; Provisions for in plant radiation protection;
-
-
Maintenance of site security and access control;
-
Performance of technical support; i
l
-
Performance of repair and corrective actions;
-
Assembly and accountability of personnel; and,
-
Management of accident recovery operations.
!
'
__
__
__
.
_,. -
_
_ _. _., _ _ _ _ _
.
.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the follow-ing actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of a strong emergency response capability.
-
Event classification was completed accurately and within a reasonable time from event recognition; Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities
-
was demonstrated by the respective facility managers;
-
Habitability surveys were routinely performed in all emergency response facilities;
-
Status boards in the Eniergency Operation Facility (EOF) were ade-quately maintained and updated in a timely manner; Emergency Response facility managers in the Technical Support Center
-
(TSC) and EOF conducted frequent briefings of their staff concerning plant conditions; and,
-
Initial protective action recommendations were prompt, conservative and based on plant conditions.
3.1 Open Items The NRC team identified the following areas which could have degraded their response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for possible corrective action:
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-01; 50-410/86-58-01 IFI:
The station super-
-
intendent didn't maintain a written log or effectively utilize the control room communicator as specified by EAP-3.
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-02; 50-410/86-58-02 IFI: The SSS was
-
distracted by requests from TSC/OSC for verbal authorization of Padiation Work Permits.
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-03; 50-410/86-58-03 IFI:
The coordination
-
and flow of information between Control Room, TSC and EOF needs to be improved. As an example, the Control Room staff was ap-parently unaware of the hydrogen concentration build-up in containment pressure.
The EOF wasn't kept informed on rate of core water level drop and fuel damage estimates were delaye.
.
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-04; 50-410/86-58-04 IFI:
Notifications and
-
follow-up messages to the respective offsite agencies didn't always include the following:
a)
Enough accurate technical information for proper offsite response (alert notification was toocryptic);
b)
Verification of information (extraneous information was contained on a notification form concerning accountability);
c)
Clear identification of whether.the notification is for escalation or information purposes; and, d)
A tracking system to verify and log receipt of information (EPP-20 step 4.4.3.as not follooed)
-
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-05; 50-410/86-58-05 IFI: The licensee should evaluate the effectiveness of the Operations Support Center.
a)
The OSC was often very noisy, usually due to crowded conditions.
b)
Crowded conditions in the OSC led to confusion and poor communication in several instances.
Difficulties locating team members were not uncommon.
c)
The decision to instruct teams not to leave the OSC due to the required accountability procedures seriously affected damage assessment and repair operations.
d)
The team sent to investigate problems with both the LPCS and RHR pumps encountered many setbacks which seriously affected the teams ability to function properly.
For example, the inability to find protective clothing, even though such clothing was available.
-
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-06; 50-410/86-58-06 IFI: The actions by the county to recommend sheltering animals within five miles one hour after the state and licensee appeared to agree on an PAR to evacuate people from similar sections is an inconsistency that should be evaluated.
(0 pen) 50-220/86-22-07; 50-410/86-58-07 IFI: The
-
accountability of onsite personnel, accomplished within 30 minutes, resulted in 147 people identified as missing.
Search and rescue (location) of these people was accomplished in approximately an hour.
Two problems were noted that the licensee should address:
.
,
a)
training of individuals on the proper use of the computerized accountability system; and, b)
re-evaluation of the plant paging system, especially on Unit 2 side of plant.
In addition, the licensee agreed to re-demonstrate this capability after completing the appropriate corrective actions; during a subsequent drill.
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following open items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-220/85-19).
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, Open Items 85-19-01, 85-19-03 through 85-19-08 were not repeated and are closed.
Tne inspectors noted the following repeat finding in the control room and requested the licensee evaluate their capability to reconstruct events occurring during the exercise, this item will remain open pending further licensee action.
(0 pen) (50-220/85-19-02).
Control Room, and OSC logs for reconstructing the sequence of events which took place were not maintained during critical phases of the exercise.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on October 30, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The critique addressed the areas where improvements are needed.
However, the licensee's critique was somewhat ineffective in identifying specific weaknesses and deficiencies.
Instead narrative comments were provided reiterating parts of the exercise. The licensee indicated a written report was being provided to upper management detailing and clarifying the problem areas.
This report will also be reviewed by SORC.
Exit Meeting and NRC Evaluation Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1.
The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed of the previously identified exercise items that were adequately addressed. Although there were weaknesses identified, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their
--
-.
_ _ _ _. _ _
.-_.
.
. -
-
- __ -
..
_.
.
.. -
-.
.
.
Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measure for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged.the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified weaknesses following receipt of this report. At no time during this inspection did the in-spectors provide any written information to the licensee.
'
r J
i i
'
_..
,
.- - _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _.. _ _ _ _ _ _..
... _..
_,
- _ _
.., _ _. _ _. _
_ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _.
. _. _ _ _
.
.