ML20217L925
| ML20217L925 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217L918 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-98-08, 50-220-98-8, 50-410-98-08, 50-410-98-8, NUDOCS 9805040363 | |
| Download: ML20217L925 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1998008
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos:
50-220,50-410
License Nos:
Report Nos:
50-220/98-08,50-410/98-08
Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Location:
Oswego, New York
Dates:
April 6 21,1998
Inspectors:
Edward B. King, Physical Security inspector
Paul R. Frechette, Physical Security inspector
Approved by:
Gregory C. Smith, (Acting Chief)
Emergency Preparedness & Safeguards Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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ADOCK 05000220
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
NRC inspection Report Nos. 50-220/98-08 & 50-410/98-08
The purpose of this core security inspection was to assess the licensee's security force's
capability to protect the facility against radiological sabotage and to determine whether the
licensee's security program meets safeguards program commitments and regulatory
requirements.
- The licensee was conducting security and safeguards activities in a manner that
protected public health and safety in the areas of access authorization, alarm
stations, communications, and protected area access control of personnel and
packages. This portion of the program, as implemented, met the licensee's
commitments and NRC requirements.
.The licensee's security facilities and equipment in the areas of protected area
assessment aids and personnel search equipment were determined to be well
maintained and reliable and were able to meet the licensee's commitments and NRC
requirements.
The security force members (SFMs) adequately demonstrated that they have the
requisite knowledge necessary to effectively implement the duties and
responsibilities associated with their position. Security force personnel were being
trained in accordance with the requirements of the Plan and training documentation
was properly maintained and accurate.
The level of management support, in general, was adequate to ensure effective
implementation of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing -
levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
The inspectors concluded that the effectiveness of licensee management controls
relative to the administration of the security program was a weakness.
Management's less than aggressive actions to address and resolve the issues
associated with the improper control and storage of SGI resulted in two apparent
violations of NRC requirements. The first apparent violation was as a result of the
licensee's failure to properly control, store, and classify safeguards information
(SGI) and the second apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to
properly report the violation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.
The inspectors also determined that in 1996 and 1997, the licensee failed to
conduct unannounced drug and alcohol testing at an annual rate equal to at least
50% of the work force as required by 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2). However, the NRC has
determined to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a violation but willissue a
non-cited violation (NCV) based on the licensee's ability to satisfy the criteria
applicable to the issuance of a NCV.
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As an enhancement to the inspection, the UFSAR initiative, Section 5.3 of the Plan, titled
" Keys, Keycards, Locks, and Combinations" was reviewed. The inspectors determined, by
physical verification, discussions, and procedural reviews, that locks and keys were being
maintained as required in the Plan.
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Report Details
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Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
a.
Inspection Scone (81700)
Determine whether the conduct of security and safeguards activities rnet the
licensee's commitments in the NRC-approved security plan (the Plan) and NRC
regulatory requirements. The security program was inspected during the period of
April 6-21,1998. Areas inspected included: access authorization program; alarm
stations; communications; protected area access control of personnel and packages.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Access Authorization Proaram. The inspectors reviewed implementation of the
Access Authorization (AA) program to verify implementation was in accordance
with applicable regulatory requirements and Plan commitments. The review
included an evaluation of the effectiveness of the AA procedures, as implemented,
and an examination of AA records for 15 individuals. Records reviewed included
both persons who had been granted and had been denied access. The AA program,
as implemented, provided assurance that persons granted unescorted access did not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. Additionally,
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the inspectors verified by reviewing access denial records and applicable
procedures, that appropriate actions were taken when individuals were denied
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access or had their access terminated which included a formalized process that
allowed the individuals the right to appeal the licensee's decision.
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Alarm Stations. The inspectors observed operations of the Central Alarm Station
(CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and verified that the alarm stations
were equipped with appropriate alarms, surveillance and communications
capabilities. Interviews with the alarm station operators found them knowledgeable
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of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors also verified, through
observations and interviews, that the alarm stations were continuously manned,
independent and diverse so that no single act could remove the plants capability for
detecting a threat and calling for assistance and the alarm stations did not contain
any operational activities that could interfere with the execution of the detection,
assessment and response functions.
Communications. The inspectors verified, by document reviews and discussions
with alarm station operators, that the alarm stations were capable of maintaining
continuous intercommunications, communications with each security force member
(SFM) on duty, and were exercising communication methods with the local law
enforcement agencies as committed to in the Plan.
Protected Area (PA) Access Control of Personnel and Hand-Carried Packeaes. On
April 7,1998, the inspectors observed personnel and package search activities at
the Unit #1 and Unit #2 personnel access portals. The inspectors determined, by
observations, that positive controls were in place to ensure only authorized
individuals were granted access to the PA and that all personnel and hand carried
items entering the PA were properly searched.
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c.
Conclusions
The licensee was conducting security and safeguards activities in a manner that
protected public health and safety and that this portion of the program, as
implemented, met the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.
S2
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
Areas inspected were: PA assessment aids; and personnel search equipment.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Assessment Aids. On April 8,1998, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of
the assessment aids, by observing on closed circuit television (CCTV), a SFM
conducting a walkdown of the PA. The assessment aids had good picture quality
and excellent zone overlap. Additionally, to ensure Plan commitments are satisfied,
the licensee has procedures in place requiring the implementation of compensatory
measures in the event the alarm station operator is unable to properly assess the
cause of an alarm.
Personnel and Packaae Search Eauioment. The inspectors observed both the
routine use and the daily performance testing of the licensee's personnel and
package search equipment. The inspectors determined, by observations and
procedural reviews, that the search equipment performs in accordance with licensee
procedures and Plan commitments.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee's security facilities and equipment were determined to be well
maintained and reliable and were able to meet the licensee's commitments and NRC
requirements.
S3
Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
Areas inspected were: implementing procedures and security event logs,
b.
Observations and Findinas
Security Proaram Procedures. The inspectors verified that the procedures were
consistent with the Plan commitments, and were properly implemented. The
verification was accomplished by reviewing selected implementing procedures
associated with PA access control of personnel and packages and testing and
maintenance of personnel search equipment.
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Security Event Loas. The inspectors reviewed the Security Event Log for the
previous nine months. Based on this review and discussion with security
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management, it was determined that, in general, the licensee appropriately
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analyzed, tracked, resolved and documented safeguards events that the licensee
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determined did not require a report to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. However, as noted in
Section S8 of this report, the licensee failed to properly analyze and resolve issues
associated with the proper control of safeguards information.
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c.
Conclusions
Security and safeguards procedures were being properly implemented and Event
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Logs, except as noted in Section S8, were being properly maintained and effectively
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used to analyze, track, and resolve safeguards events.
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S4
Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
Area inspected was security staff requisite knowledge.
b.
Observations and Findinas
Security Force Reauisite Knowledae. The inspectors observed a number of SFM's
in the performance of their routine duties. These observations included alarm
station operations, personnel and package searches, and performance testing of the
personnel search equipment. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed SFMs and
based on the responses to the inspectors' questioning, determined that the SFMs
were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and duties, and could effectively carry
out their assignments.
c.
Conclusions
The SFMs adequately demonstrated that they have the requisite knowledge
necessary to effectively implement the duties and responsibilities associated with
their position.
S5
Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualifications (T&Q)
a.
Inspection Scooe (81700)
Areas inspected were security training and qualifications and training records.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
Security Trainina and Qualifications. On April 8,1998, the inspectors randomly
selected and reviewed T&Q records of 7 SFMs. Physical and requalification records
were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors. The results of the review
indicated that the security force was being trained in accordance with the approved
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T&Q plan. The inspectors held discussions with the security training staff and
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determined , based on a review of drill documentation and discussions with the
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security training department staff, that the security training department has
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conducted 44 drills associated with contingency response training since January 1,
1998. Additionally, management has allocated resources to increase on-shift
- training initiatives.
Trainina Records. The inspectors were able to verify, by reviewing training records,
that the records were properly maintained, accurate and reflected the current
qualifications of the SFMs.
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c.
Conclusions
Security force personnel were being trained in accordance with the requirements of
the Plan. Training documentation was properly maintained and accurate and the
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training provided by the training staff was effective.
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S6
Security Organization and Administration
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Inspection Scope (81700)
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Areas' inspected were management support, management effectiveness and staffing
levels,
b.
Observations and Findinos
Manaaement Support. The inspectors reviewed various program enhancements
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made since the last program inspection, which was conducted in September 1997.
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These enhancements included the procurement of a new X-ray machine to enhance
personnel package processing and the allocation of funding to increase on shift
training initiatives.
Manaaement Effectiveness. The inspectors reviewed the management -
organizational structure and reporting chain. The Manager Nuclear Security's
position in the organizational structure provides a means for making senior
management aware of programmatic needs. However, the inspectors questioned
the involvement of senior management concerning the actions taken to address an
event associated with the storage and control of safeguards information.
Staffina Levels. The inspectors verified that the total number of trained SFMs
immediately available on shift meets the requirements specified in the Plan.
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Conclusions
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The level of management support, in general, was adequate to ensure effective
implemente+i'an of the security program, and was evidenced by adequate staffing
' levels and the allocations of resources to support programmatic needs.
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S7
Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (81700)
Areas inspected were: problem analyses, corrective actions and effectiveness of
management controls,
b.
Observations and Findinas
Problem Analyses. The inspectors reviewed data derived from the security
department's self-assessment program. Potential weaknesses were being properly
identified, tracked, and trended.
Corrective Actions. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions implemented by the
licensee in response to the self-assessment program. The corrective actions were
effective, evidence by a reduction in personnel performance issues and luggable
safeguards events.
Effectiveness of Manaaement Controls. The inspectors verified, by documentation
reviews, that the licensee has programs in place for identifying, analyzing and
resolving problems. They include the performance of annual audits, a departmental
self-assessment program and the use of industry data such as violations of
regulatory requirements identified by the NRC at other facilities, as a criterion for
self-assessment. However, a review of the licensee's actions taken to address and
resolve the issues associated with the improper control and storage of SGI discloseci
that an evaluation of the significance of the event was not properly conducted, the
event was not reported to the NRC as required and the actions taken to resolve the
issues were not aggressive.
c.
Conclusions
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The review of the licensee's prcblem analysis, corrective actions and effectiveness
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of management controls was identified as a weakness as a result of thn less than
aggressive actions taken to address and resolve the issues associated with the
improper control of SGl.
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S8
Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues
a.
Insoection Scope (81700)
Areas inspected were control of safeguards information (SGI) and fitness-for-duty
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(FFD).
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b.
,Qhservations and Findinas
Control of Safeauards Information. Based on a licensee's deviation event report
(DER), which the inspectors obtained from the NRC resident inspectors, the
inspectors determined that the licensee f ailed to protect and' control safeguards
information in accordance with (IAW) regulatory requirements and licensee
procedures. Specifically, on January 24,1998, licensee records personnel found 7
boxes in the records management vault, located outside the PA, which contained
SGl. The vault is not an approved SGI storage facility nor were the personnel
working in the vault authorized access to SGl. On January 26,1998, licensee
records personnel reported the findings to security, at which time security retrieved
the boxes and determined, based on an initial review of the contents, that the
boxes contained packages generated from modifications to various security-related
systems. Security also noted that some of the information classified as SGI was-
not SGI while other information that was not classified as SGI should have been
classified as SGl. Since January 26,1998, until the time of the inspection,
security nad only completed a final review of the documents contained in 4 of the 7
boxes. The possibility exists that additional security-related modification packages
dating from 1981 to the present, that contain SGI, may be stored in the records
management vault. Additionally, as of the inspection,11 weeks after the event
was initially identified, the licenstee has not implemented any corrective actions tg
resolve the concerns, designate the vault as a SGI repository or authorize the
personnel that work in the vault to have access to SGl. The licensee's failure to
properly control, store and classify SGIis a violation of the NRC-approved Plan and
- licensee implementing procedures. (eel 50-220/98-08-01and 50-410/98-08-01)
Additionally, the licensee's failure to properly evaluate the significance of the event,
resulted in the licensee not properly reporting the event under the requirements of
10 CFR 73.71. The licensee failure to properly report the event is a violation of
regulatory requirements. (eel 50-220/98-08-02and 50-410/98-08-02)
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Fitness-for-Dutv.' The inspectors reviewed corrective actions implemented by the
licensee in response a DER, generated March 13,1998, associated with the
licensee's failure to conduct FFD testing at an annual rate equal to at least 50% of
. the workforce. Specifically, the licensee's FFD random testing program is
composed of two rendom selection testing pools, one composed of contractor
personnel and the other composed of licensee employees. In 1995, the NRC
reduced the annual testing rate from 100% of plant population to 50%. The
licensee continued to test contractor personnel at a rate of 100% but reduced the
testing rate for licensee employees to 50%. However, when the licensee started to
compile the testing data associated with the random selection programs, in
preparation of the submission of the semiannual FFD Performance Data Report as
required by 10 CFR 26.71(d), it was determined that licensee employees were not
being tested at a rate equal to at least 50% of the workforce. Based on additional
programmatic evaluations by the FFD department staff, the licensee discovered that
the FFD program had not satisfied the 50% testing rate for licensee employees, for
- the years 1996 and 1997. To address the concerns, the licensee implemented
. immediate corrective actions. During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the
licensee's corrective actions and concluded that actions taken by the licensee to
address the programmatic weakness, was timely and appeared effective.
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Additionally, the FFD department was in the process of developing a new procedure
that will provide additional guidance for individuals utilizing the random selection
process. The licensee stated that the new procedure would be implemented by
September 1,-1998.
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The inspectors determined, that the licensee failure to conduct unannounced drug
and alcohol tests in a statistically random and unpredictable manner, so that all
persons in the population subject to testing would have an equal probability of being
selected and tested'and that random FFD testing be conducted at an annual rate
equal to at least 50% of the workforce is a violation of 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2).
However, the NRC has determined to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a
violation but will issue a non-cited violation (NCV) based on the licensee's ability to
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satisfy the criteria applicable to the issuance of a NCV as follows: (1) The event
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was licensee identified, (2) not a violation that could reasonably be expected to
have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violation, (3)
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the corrective actions were timely and effective, and (4) it was not a willful
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violation. (NCV 50-220/98-08-03and 50-410/98-08-03)
c.
Conclusions
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The inspectors cencluded that the effectiveness of licensee management controls
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relative to the administratiori of the security program was a weaknees.
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Management's less than aggressive actions to address and resolve the issues
associated with the improper control and storage of SGI resulted in two apparent-
violations of NRC requirements. The first apparent violation was as a result of the.
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licensee's failure to properly control, store, and classify safeguards information
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(SGI)'and the second apparent violation was as a result of the licensee's failure to
properly report the violation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.
The inspectors also deterrained that in 1996 and 1997, the licensee failed to
conduct unannounced drug and alcohcl testing at an annual rate equal to at least
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50% of the work force as required by 10 CFR 26.24(a)(2). However, the NRC has
determined to exercise discretion and refrain from issuing a violation but willissue a
non-cited violation (NCV) based on the licensee's ability to satisfy the criteria
applicable to the issuance of a NCV.
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Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on
April 9,1998. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection wsre reviewed, and
the preliminary findings were presented. The. licensee acknowledged the preliminary
' inspection findings.
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Review of Updated Final Sofety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
. A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR
description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices,
procedures, and parameters to the UFSAR description. Since the UFSAR does not
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specifically include security program requirements, the inspectors compared licensee
activities to the NRC-approved physical security plan, which is the applicable document.
While performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed
Section 5.3 of the Plan, titled " Keys, Keycards, Locks, and Combinations". The inspectors
determined, by physical verifications, discussions with security force members, and
procedural reviews, that keys, keycards, and locks were being controlled and maintained
as required in the Plan.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONNEL CONTACTED
L!CENSEE PERSONNEL
C. Terry, Vice-President Nuclear Safety and Support
K. Dahlberg, Plant Manager, Unit #2
H. Christenson, Manager Nuclear Security
N. Sterio, Acting Supervisor, Nuclear Support
D. Pollic, Nuclear Security Specialist
R. Holliday, Chief Technician, Security Instrumentation and Control
- 8. Menikheim, Supervisor, Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) and Medical
B. Boismenu, FFD Specialist
G. Darestein, Security investigator
F. McCarthy, Security Investigator
J. Swenszkowski, Manager Employee Concerns
D. Pierce, Nuclear Security Specialist
R. Franssen, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Support
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J. Dilk, Nuclear Security Specialist
B. Byrne, General Supervisor-Nuclear Security Operations
K. Peake, Central Maintenance Supervisor
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - REGION I
B. Norris, Senior Resident inspector
R. Skokowski, Resident inspector
T. Beltz, Resident inspector
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
SFM
security force member
safeguards information
the Plan
NRC-approved physical security plan
protected area
T&C
training and qualification
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central alarm system
secondary alarm system
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
DER
deficiency event report
closed circuit television
fitness-for-duty
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