IR 05000410/1987007
| ML20204F196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1987 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204F083 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-87-07, 50-410-87-7, NUDOCS 8703260152 | |
| Download: ML20204F196 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-410/87-07 Docket No.
50-410
. License No. NPF-54_
Priority
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Category B
Licensee: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard, West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name: Nine Mile Point Unit No. 2 Inspection At: Scriba, New York Inspection Conducted:
February 9-13, 1987 Inspectors:
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A. Finkel, ' Lead Reactor Engineer date
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Approved by:
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N. Blumberg, Acting Chief /
date Operational Programs Section 08, DRS Inspection Summary: Unannounced Maintenance and Surveillance Inspection on February 9-13, 1987 (Report No. 50-410/87-07)
Areas Inspected: Electrical / Mechanical testing, PM's and repairs during the performance of surveillance and maintenance activities. The inspection was conducted on-site by one region based NRC inspector.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8703260152 870316
DR ADOCK 0500
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Details 1.0 Persons Contacted Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
- D. Barcomb, Unit Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- J. Conway, Power Ascention - Manager
- J. Drews, Technical Support
- G. Doyle, Quality Engineer
- L. Fraton, Audit Group Lead
- W. Hansen, Manager Nuclear Quality Assurance Operations
- M. Jones, Superintendent of Operations, Unit 2
- L. Lagoe, I and C Unit Supervisor
- T. Newman, Supervisor-0perational Quality Assurance Surveillance
- T. Perkins, General Superintendent
- A. Pinter, Site Licensing Engineer
- W. Yaeger, Manager of Engineering
- L. Wolf, Site Licensing Engineer, Unit 1 New York State Representatives
- P. Eddy, Site Representative
- P. MacEwan, New York State Representative United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Marschall, Resident Inspector
- W. Schmidt, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted other licensee technical and administrative personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting held on February 13, 1987.
2.0 Licensee Actions on Previous Open Items (0 pen) Item 86-09-31, Qualification of ADS accumulators,TMI Action Item II.K.3.28.
The licensee safety analysis report states that air or nitrogen accumulators for the automatic depressurization system (ADS)
valves are provided with sufficient capacity to cycle the valves open five times at design pressure. The General Electric (GE) analysis stated that the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) are designed to withstand a hostile environment and still perform their function for 100 days following an accident.
The licensee has written a surveillance procedure to test the accumulators on the ADS valves to verify that their leakage rate is within the design
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margin for.this system. The test began on February 13, 1987, but was not expected to be completed before February 14, 1987. This item remains open pending completion of the surveillance testings of the ADS valves.
3.0 Maintenance and Surveillance Testing 3.1 Scope of Inspection The inspector determined by direct observation of. licensee activities, whether maintenance and surveillance of safety related systems or components is being conducted in accordance with technical specification (TS) requirements.
3.2 Summary of Findings 3.2.1 Criteria The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for scheduling both maintenance and surveillance testing to determine if the management control system established was in conformance with licensee requirements, technical specifications (TS), licensee commitments, and industry guides and standards.
The. following maintenance and surveillance tests were selected from the issued weekly schedule and witnessed by the inspector.
Prior to and during the test witnessing, the inspector verified the following concerning surveil-lance procedures:
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Surveillance procedures conformed to TS requirements and proper review / approval signatures were obtained before testing began.
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Required administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained prior to test initiation.
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Test instrumentation used was within calibration dates and serial numbers were recorded on the test data sheets.
3.2.2 Tests Witnessed by Inspector The inspector witnessed the entire test and verified that the items being tested were left in an operating condition as described in the procedure.
The inspector also confirmed that the control room operators were notified that the test was completed and the equipment was returned to operational statu.
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The test results were reviewed and were within the procedure requirements. The inspector determined that the TS criteria were met.
In each of the tests witnessed by the inspecto,r, the test results were reviewed by the control room operators and signed.
The following tests were witnessed:
Monthly Functional Test of Suppression Pool Water Tempera-
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ture Indication Channels 2 CMS *TE67A-70A, Procedure No.
N2-ISP-CMS-M011 Revision 0, December 11, 1986. (TS Section 4.6.2.1.C.2).
Monthly Functional Test and Trip Unit Calibration of RCIC
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Suction Transfer on Condensate Storage Tank Level Low Instrument Channels, Procedure No. N2-ISP-ICS-M007, Revision 0,
October 25, 1986.
(T.S. Table 4.3.5.1-1.3)
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Monthly Functional Test of the Reactor Vessel Water Low Low Level 2 and the Reactor Vessel Low Low Low Water Level I Instrument Channels, Procedure No.
N2-ISP-ISC-M005, Revision 0, August 8, 1986.
(T.S. Tables 4.3.2.1-1.a.1 and 4.3.2.1-1.a.2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.3 Plant Transformer Inspection 3.3.1 Scope of Inspection The inspector reviewed the licensee's inspection program for their transformers to determine if they have a program of inspection and maintenance for large transformers whose failure could cause challenges to or interaction with safety systems.
3.3.2 Summary of Findings The inspector selected the Station Service Transformer (SST) to perform the inspection of methods and programs used by the licensee to determine the overall operational cnaracteristics of the transformer.
The SST is a General Electric type 2STX-XNSI with tap changes and has the following capacity rating:
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KVA Rating 100,000 055*c KVA Rating 112,000 065 c Windings 24900-13800/7970/13000/7970 Electrical maintenance personnel, on a daily basis inspect the SST per procedure N2-EPM-DI-8, dated July 1985.
The following readings were verified by the inspection on February 19, 1986, during the daily inspection of the transformer yard:
Winding Temperature
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Transformer Oil Temperature
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Transformer Oil Level
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Pressure Relief Operations
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Bushing Oil Level
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Tap Changing Oil Level
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Cooling Fans Operating
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Oil Pump
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The Meter and Test organization performs Doble insulation testing on the transformers and any major work.
The everyday maintenance of the transformer is performed by the electrical maintenance organization at the site.
In addition to the recording of data on the above listed items, the electrical maintenance personnel perform a daily clean area inspection of the transformer area and a general inspection of the physical parts of the transformers for damage due to the environmental condition.
The water spray fire protection part of the system is tested as part of the fire protection program.
The main-tenance personnel inspect for water dripping at the nozzles of the fire spray system since this is a dry system and should not have water at that point in the system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.4 Battery Rooms During a surveillance inspection of the battery room for Division I, II and III batteries, the inspector noted corrosion on various cells of the divisions batteries. The licensee had already identified the condition on their Problem Report No. 06497 dated January 25, 1987.
The maintenance personnel have applied a coating of NO-0X-Id
"A" grease as recommended in Gould procedure MAE-935, August 1,1980. A representative from Gould has been working with the licensee to resolve the corrosion problem. During the inspection of the battery system, the inspector determined that the present corrosion would not
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prevent the battery system from performing its safety related function and that the weekly inspections of the battery system should provide assurance that the battery system should remain functional.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.0 Gould J10 MSS Control Relays
~ As a result of failure of a J10 relay to operate during the testing of the MSIV system, licensee inspected all other J10 relays. As of February 13, 1987, the licensee had identified 16 cracked J10 Gould Relays.
The inspector witnessed the inspection of MSS *IPNL 90 A,B,C & D where approximately 200 J10 relays are installed.
The 16 cracked J10 relays were mounted onto a plate during installation of the panels at the site.
It appears from the preliminary failure analysis performed by the licensee that misaligned mounting holes in the mounting bracket caused the attaching screw to stress the relay thus cracking the casing.
Foreign
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material entering the cracked case shorted out the AC coil of the relay (
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thus blowing the circuit protective fuse.
During this inspection the j
licensee was in the process of correcting the J10 relay mounting bracket and replacing the 16 cracked relays with stock relays.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.0 Quality Assurance Surveillance Program The Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Group has implemented a series of program changes to increase the effectiveness of their site activities in resolving NRC concerns identified in NRC Inspection Reports 410/86-17 and 86-61.
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These changes include the following:
Surveillance scheduling is now providing random selection of work
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activities rather than repetitive monitoring of repeated tests or maintenance functions.
The ambiguity of the term " verify" has been addressed on surveillance
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checklist attributes. Specific actions taken to verify (i.e. verify by observation of work in process) have been described. The licensee now requires more observations of work in process that reviewing data after the fact.
The licensee has given additional training to their surveillance
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inspectors in the area of " Observation Techniques".
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The computer based Surveillance Management System presently used at
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Unit 2 is being expanded to include Unit 1.
This system employs a Probability Risk Assessment analyses and a training guide manual for conducting the surveillance function.
The training of the Unit 1 surveillance personnel in the computer system csage gives the licensee a larger staff of surveillance personnel to intermix between sites and provides for a common method of performing surveillance type inspections.
The licensee stated that a decrease of nearly 20% in test result
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reviews performed by the surveillance group at Unit 2 enabled a corresponding increase in surveillance work activity monitoring during the startup phase with no apparent increase in test result errors.
The maintenance and surveillance inspections that the inspector witnessed (listed in paragraph 3.2) had an increased presence of QA surveillance personnel during the surveillance testing than had been observed in previous NRC site inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee management representatives (see section 1.0 for attendees) at an exit meeting on February 13, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the
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inspector.