IR 05000220/2020001
ML20122A200 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Nine Mile Point ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/04/2020 |
From: | Erin Carfang Division Reactor Projects I |
To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
References | |
IR 2020001 | |
Download: ML20122A200 (22) | |
Text
May 4, 2020
SUBJECT:
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2020001 AND 05000410/2020001 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07201036/2020001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. On April 22, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Peter Orphanos, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Erin E. Carfang
Erin E. Carfang, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000220 and 05000410 License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000220, 05000410, and 07201036
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000220/2020001, 05000410/2020001, and
07201036/2020001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0039
I-2020-001-0134
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:
G. Stock, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Dolecki, Resident Inspector
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector
J. Brand, Reactor Inspector
J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Love, Transportation and Storage Safety Inspector
J. Nicholson, Senior Health Physicist
R. Rolph, Health Physicist
J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Replace Degraded Direct Current (DC) Motor Brushes on Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Led to Failure to Close Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000220/2020001-01 Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152 A self-revealed Green Finding and associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when Exelon failed to correct a condition adverse to quality in 2017 which led to the failure of Unit 1 emergency cooling (EC) steam isolation valve IV-39-08R to close when called upon for system isolation.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 remained at or near rated thermal power throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On January 17, 2020, reactor power was reduced to 80 percent to perform a rod pattern adjustment. Operators restored power to 100 percent on January 18, 2020. On January 24, 2020, Unit 2 began end of cycle coastdown which continued until March 4, 2020. On March 4, 2020, Unit 2 operators inserted a manual scram due to a significant electro-hydraulic control system leak and entered their planned refueling outage, which had been scheduled to begin March 9, 2020. Unit 2 remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week during which they conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to reschedule the inspection to a later date.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather for a blizzard warning on February 27, 2020.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 containment spray 121 on January 13, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 instrument air system on February 10, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 Division II shutdown cooling on March 9, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 spent fuel pool cooling on March 11, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 Division II emergency diesel generator on March 27, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2 turbine building, condenser, fire area 50, on March 10, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 turbine building, feedwater heater bays, fire area 50, on March 10, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 normal switchgear building, east switchgear room, fire area 79, on March 18, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 control building, remote shutdown room 'A', fire area 17, on March 18, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 18, 2020.
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 2 residual heat removal heat exchanger 2RHS*E1A
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities during the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 N2R17 refueling outage from March 10, 2020, to March 15, 2020:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
- Automated phased array of the N2A recirculation nozzle to pipe dissimilar metal weld (2R17-APR-01)
- Manual ultrasonic test of the N2E recirculation nozzle inner radius 2RPV-ACX (R-08)
- Manual ultrasonic test of the N2E recirculation nozzle to reactor vessel shell weld 2RPV-KA-07 (R-11)
- Magnetic particle test of reactor core isolation cooling piping integral attachment 21-CS-57-08-FW302 (ISI-MT-20-004)
- IWE/IWL inspection (VT3) of suppression chamber exterior concrete wall on 215 level (ISI-VT-20-188)
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 1 operations personnel during main turbine emergency governor trip testing and reactor building emergency ventilation initiation testing on March 2, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 licensed operator performance in the control room during a manual reactor scram on March 4, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a Unit 1 simulator evaluation that included an electrical fault on a safety related power board, a reactor building closed loop cooling system leak inside the drywell, and a failure to scram with an unisolable reactor water cleanup system leak on January 28, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 simulator training on a new digital feedwater level control modification on February 11, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, October 1, 2017 - September 30, 2019, reviewed on February 7, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 103 air start system on March 2, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk during a 115-kilovolt Line 1 outage to support an emergent grid repair on January 14, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 elevated risk during an emergent main turbine electro-hydraulic pressure regulator filter replacement and pressure regulator swap on January 29, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 emergent work on the 'C' instrument air compressor on February 10, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 elevated risk during a planned reactor cavity flood up on March 8, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 elevated risk during planned control rod drive mechanism replacements on March 13, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 elevated risk during planned reactor cavity draindown on March 24, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 recirculation flow control valve 'A' due to a blown fuse on a hydraulic pressure unit on January 2, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 standby gas treatment system due to air leaks identified during pneumatic supply and accumulator leak rate testing on January 13, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 station battery 11 due to a ground on February 6, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 core spray check valves due to elevated temperatures on February 20, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 'A' spent fuel pool cooling pump due to decreasing oil level on February 24, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 'B' residual heat removal pump following loss of shutdown cooling on March 9, 2020
- (7) Unit 2 jet pumps 1 and 5 due to degradation caused by foreign material lodged in the inlet mixer nozzles on March 23, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Permanent Modification: Unit 2 Engineering Change Package ECP-18-000691, Remove Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation Pump Auto Trip Low Speed Transfer on Differential Temperature
- (2) Permanent Modification: Unit 2 Engineering Change Package ECP-19-000301, Upgrade Unit 2 MSIV [main steam isolation valve] Internals
- (3) Permanent Modification: Unit 2 Engineering Change Package ECP-18-000373, Diesel Generator Governor Replacement
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Unit 2 'C' instrument air compressor following motor replacement on March 1, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 'E' service water strainer following maintenance on March 3, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 'A' source range detector following replacement on March 9, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 control room ventilation system following system maintenance on March 24, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 Refueling Outage N2R17 activities from March 4, 2020 through March 31, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) N2-OSP-EGS-M@001, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test Division II, on February 13, 2020
- (2) N2-OSP-EGS-R007, Operating Cycle Diesel Generator Simulated Loss of Offsite Power Division III, on February 26, 2020
- (3) N2-OSP-RMC-R001, Mode Switch Shutdown Position Rod Block Channel Functional Test, on March 12, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) N1-ST-Q8A, Liquid Poison Pump 11 and Check Valve Operability Test, on January 13, 2020
- (2) N2-OSP-SLS-R001, Standby Liquid Control Manual Initiate Actuation and ASME XI Pressure Test, on March 16, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) N2-OSP-MSS-003, Main Steam Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test (Inboard Static Head of Water), on March 9, 2020
- (2) N2-OSP-CNT-008, Local Leak Rate Testing of Drywell to Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker, on March 19, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency preparedness drill on February 11, 2020.
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) A Unit 1 simulator evaluation which included a reactor building closed loop cooling system leak inside the drywell, a failure to scram with an unisolable reactor water cleanup system leak, and ultimately the declaration of a Site Area Emergency on January 28,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) Undervessel control rod drive maintenance. Dose gradient from head to chest.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:
(1)
- Unit 2 north drywell entrance
- Unit 2 traversing incore probe (TIP) room (Very High Radiation Area)
- Unit 2 'A' reactor water cleanup pump room
- Unit 2 'B' reactor water cleanup pump room
- Unit 2 drywell equipment drain tank pump room
- Unit 2 drywell floor drain tank pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building drain pump room
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019)
===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees response to a Unit 2 manual reactor scram following a turbine electro-hydraulic control fluid leak on March 4, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the licensees response to a Unit 2 loss of shutdown cooling on March 5,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60854.1 - Preoperational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation at Operating Plants
Preoperational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation at Operating Plants===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Exelons performance during NRC-observed pre-operational dry run activities that were performed in order to fulfill requirements in the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1032, Amendment 1, Condition 9. The inspectors observed dry run activities on March 16-17, 2020. Specifically, the inspectors observed or reviewed the following activities:
- Closure welding of a multipurpose canister mock-up including lid to shell, port covers, and closure ring
- Non-destructive weld evaluations including visual and penetrant testing
- Simulated radiological field surveys and radiation protection coverage of welding activities
- A recording of PCI Energy Services LLC welding personnel cutting open a welded canister mock-up, removing the port covers and lid, that was witnessed by NRC personnel
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Replace Degraded Direct Current (DC) Motor Brushes on Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Led to Failure to Close Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity
Green NCV 05000220/2020001-01 Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71152 A self-revealed Green Finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when Exelon failed to correct a condition adverse to quality in 2017 which led to the failure of Unit 1 emergency cooling (EC) steam isolation valve IV-39-08R to close when called upon for system isolation.
Description:
Safety-related MOVs control fluid flow in plant systems and licensees rely on the operability of certain MOVs to satisfy technical specification requirements. Degraded DC motor brush-to-commutator contact can affect the ability of safety-related MOVs to perform their safety function. Specifically, inadequate contact between the brushes and commutator can result in excessively high resistance that can prevent the actuator from moving the valve (i.e., perform the safety function).
The Unit 1 emergency cooling system safety-related MOVs close, to isolate the line, in the event of a steam line break to maintain barrier integrity. In April 2017, Exelon generated IR 03993689 due to the failure of the emergency cooling system steam outlet isolation valve, IV-39-08R, to close while performing a surveillance test. Investigation of IV-39-08R determined the failure was a result of the DC motor brushes' inadequate contact with the commutator due to corrosion buildup on the brush holders, which prevented the brushes from maintaining contact as they continued to wear. The brush holders were cleaned and the existing brushes were reinstalled. In October 2019, IV-39-08R failed to close after a fault in the analog trip system resulted in a system isolation signal, which closes steam isolation valves IV-39-08R and IV-39-10R. Valve IV-39-10R successfully isolated, however IV-39-08R failed to close as required. Exelon generated IR 04292465 to document the failure. Investigation into the 2019 failure to isolate found excessive carbon dust buildup on the brush holders which restricted brush movement and limited brush contact. Excessive carbon dust buildup is indicative of uneven wear on the motor brushes. Exelon determined that the failure in 2017 had hardened the contact surface of the brushes. The existing brushes were reused after the 2017 failure and the hardened contact surface led to uneven wear and the excessive carbon dust buildup.
Corrective Actions: Exelon generated IR 04292465 in October 2019 when IV-39-08R failed to close during the isolation of emergency condenser loop 12. Corrective actions included replacing the motor brushes with new brushes and cleaning the commutator and brush holders. Other actions included performing an extent of condition review and creating work orders to replace the DC motor and brush holders on safety-related valves based on observed conditions in the next 2 years or next outage.
Corrective Action References: IRs 03993689, 04292465, 04292868, and 04301820
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that in April 2017, Exelon failed to replace defective DC motor brushes for a safety-related MOV, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, that was reasonably within Exelons ability to foresee and correct and therefore a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensees failure to replace defective DC motor brushes for IV-39-08R in emergency condenser loop 12 resulted in the valve not being able to close (safety function) in October 2019 when called upon for a system isolation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. As a result, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation),and heat removal components.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. A failure on IV 39-08R in April 2017 led to uneven brush wear and hardening of the brush contact surface in the DC motor. An inspection was done on the brushes and commutator after the failure which did not identify significant degradation, however failures such as the one in April 2017 are known to lead to degraded brush condition. The decision was made to reuse the existing brushes and in October 2019, IV-39-08R failed to close due to inadequate brush contact which was the result of reusing the degraded brushes.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions requires that, in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, Exelon failed to establish measures that assure conditions adverse to quality are corrected when the defective DC motor brushes on IV-39-08R, a safety-related MOV, were reused following the failure to isolate during surveillance testing in April 2017.
This resulted in emergency condenser steam isolation valve, IV-39-08R, failing to close in October 2019.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Peter Orphanos, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 14, 2020, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection inspection results to Mr. Michael Faivus, Senior Manager of Engineering Programs, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection results to Mr. Michael Cazzolli, Senior Manager Dry Cask Storage, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the Radiation Hazards and Exposure Control inspection results to Mr. Michael Gray, Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60854.1
Miscellaneous
Certificate of
Compliance
(CoC) No. 1032
HI-STORM Flood/Wind (FW) Multipurpose Canister (MPC)
Storage System
Amendment
Procedures
PI-CNSTR-OP-
HLTC-H-01
Closure Welding of Holtec Multi-Purpose Canisters-HI-
STORM 100, HI-STAR100, HI-STORM FW & UMAX
Systems
Rev 4
Miscellaneous
OP-AA-108-111-
1001
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
017
Procedures
N1-OP-64
Meteorological Monitoring
01900
N2-OP-102
Meteorological Monitoring
2500
N2-SOP-90
Natural Events
00800
Corrective Action
Documents
03950231
04059302
288111
04325279
04325282
Drawings
019-001
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Instrument & Service Air
Fundamental
01.00
C-18012-C
Reactor Containment Spray System P&I Diagram
PID 104A
Piping and Instruction Diagram Standby Diesel Generator
System
PID 104C
Piping and Instruction Diagram Standby Diesel Generator
System
PID 104D
Piping and Instruction Diagram Jacket Water Standby Diesel
Generator System
PID 104E
Piping and Instruction Diagram Lube Oil Standby Diesel
Generator System
PID 104F
Piping and Instruction Diagram Fuel Oil Standby Diesel
Generator System
PID-31A, E, and F
Residual Heat Removal System Piping & Instrumentation
Diagram
26, 21, & 16
PID-38A and C
Fuel Pool Cooling & Clean Up Piping & Instrumentation
& 15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Diagram
Miscellaneous
Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance
June 16,
1993
Inadequate Control of Reactor Coolant System during
Shutdown
December 8,
1993
Partial Bypass of Shutdown Cooling Flow from the Reactor
Vessel
January 18,
1996
Procedures
N2-OP-100A
Standby Diesel Generators
2800
N2-OP-19
Instrument and Service Air System
2800
Fire Plans
N2-FPI-PFP-0201
Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plans
Miscellaneous
3, Fire Drill Scenario, Unit 2 Turbine Building
Elevation 277' West Switchgear Room
February 18,
20
3, Fire Drill Scenario, Unit 1 Turbine Building
Elevation 261' PB 152C
February 19,
20
Procedures
N2-FPI-PFP-0201
Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plans
Fire Drill Performance
TQ-AA-224-F020
Course Attendance Sheet
Miscellaneous
2RHS*E1A
Heat Exchanger Inspection Report
March 16,
20
Procedures
GL [Generic Letter] 89-13 Program Implementing Procedure
Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection Guide
Work Orders
C93672353
71111.08G Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
26616
71111.11Q Procedures
N1-OP-10
Reactor Building Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System
03000
N1-PM-Q7
Quarterly Main Turbine Testing and Generator Core Monitor
Testing
00500
Corrective Action
Documents
04061009
04068720
04085429
04085431
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Maintenance Rule 18-10 - Periodic (a)(3) Assessment
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Implementation Per NEI 18-10
Work Orders
C93283487
Corrective Action
Documents
04313524
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04310225
Miscellaneous
ECP-18-000086,
PV Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Implementation at
Nine Mile Point Unit 2
N2-FHP-003
Refueling Manual
2000
Procedures
N1-OP-31
Tandem Compound Reheat Turbine
200
N2-OSP-LOG-
D001
Daily Checks Log
2500
N2-PM-082
RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] Flood Up/Draindown
015T1
N2-PM-082
RPV Flood Up / Draindown
01600
Integrated Risk Management
2
Integrated Risk Management
2
OP-NM-108-117
Protected Equipment Program at Nine Mile Point
0500
OU-NM-103-101
Shutdown Safety Management Program
00500
On-Line Work Control Process
29
Corrective Action
Documents
2011075
2017465
291360
299129
299670
04301070
04301071
04305757
04306009
04320370
04324166
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04328823
Drawings
PID-31A
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal
System
Miscellaneous
25VDCDISTSYS
25VDC Distribution System Analysis
Procedures
N1-OP-47A
25 VDC Power System
200
N2-ISP-GTS-
R@001
Standby Gas Treatment System Pneumatic
Supply/Accumulator Leak Rate Test
00600
N2-OP-29
Reactor Recirculation System
03000
N2-OP-31
LINEUPS, Residual Heat Removal System - Lineups
00300
N2-OP-61B
01700
N2-OSP-RCS-
R004
Recirc Flow Control Valve Operability Test
00600
N2-SOP-08
Unplanned Power Changes
013T1
2
Work Orders
C93479858
C93614049
Corrective Action
Documents
04148579
04318072
04327204
04328107
Drawings
20014193
26" MSIV Cover and Internals Rockwell Mod Nine Mile
Point, Unit 2
Engineering
Changes
18-000373
Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Replacement
ECP-18-000691
Remove Unit 2 Reactor Recirculation Pump Auto Trip Low
Speed Transfer on Differential Temperature
ECP-19-000301
Procedures
8003015-P1
Governor Modification Installation Procedure
Exelon 50.59 Review Process
011
50.59 Evaluation Form
007
Work Orders
C93673566
C93691143
C93696744
Corrective Action
04318729
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
04320006
04324847
04325930
Procedures
Administrative Requirements for Inservice Testing
013
Conduct of Troubleshooting
N1-MPM-210-552
Control Room Ventilation System
00800
N2-IMP-NMS-
R008
IRM/SRM Detector/Cable Connector Maintenance and
Testing
Completed
on March 8,
20
N2-IPM-NMS-
@002
Source Range Monitor (SRM) Discriminator Curve Testing
Completed
on March 8,
20
N2-ISP-NMS-
Q@108
Source Range Monitor Channel Calibration
Completed
on March 8,
20
N2-ISP-NMS-
W@008
Source Range Monitor and Rod Block Trip Channel
Functional Test
Completed
on March 9,
20
Work Orders
C93664635
C93675612
C93687770
C93691963
Procedures
Administrative Requirements for Inservice Testing
013
N1-ST-Q8A
Liquid Poison 11 Pump and Check Valve Operability Test
1500
N2-OSP-CNT-008
Local Leak Rate Testing of Drywell to Suppression Chamber
Vacuum Breaker
00000
N2-OSP-EGS-
M@001
Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test
- Division I and II
200
N2-OSP-EGS-
R007
Operating Cycle Diesel Generator Simulated Loss of Offsite
Power Division III
00900
N2-OSP-MSS-
003
Main Steam Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test (Inboard Static
Head of Water)
00100
N2-OSP-RMC-
R001
Mode Switch Shutdown Position Rod Block Channel
Functional Test
00400
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
N2-OSP-SLS-
R001
Standby Liquid Control Manual Initiate Actuation and ASME
XI Pressure Test
00800
Surveillance Program Requirements
Work Orders
C93672632
C93672682
Corrective Action
Documents
034100009
271600
2720052
274185
274187
284643
290635
04304586
043100014
Procedures
NISP-RP-004
Posting and Labeling
Revision 1
NISP-RP-005
Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) Key Control
Revision 1
NISP-RP-007
Control of Radioactive Material (RAM)
Revision 1
Radiological Posting, Labeling, and Marking Standard
Revision 16
Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls
Revision 6
Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) Key Control
Revision 37
RP-AA-503-F-01
Unconditional Release Instructions using the Small Articles
Monitor (SAM)
Revision 4
Radiation
Surveys
NMP-2-20-00502 Drywell 261' General Area Air Sample
3/9/2020 @
0330
NMP-2-20-00502 Drywell 261' General Area Air Sample
3/9/2020 @
1815
NMP-2-20-00502 Drywell 261' General Area Air Sample
3/10/2020 @
25
NMP-2-20-00502 Drywell 261' South General Area Air
Sample
3/9/2020 @
0345
20-066071
Drywell Under Vessel
3/6/2020 @
1000
20-066177
Drywell 261' General Area Air Sample RWP 503
3/8/2020 @
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0815
20-067186
Reactor Building 353' Refuel Floor
3/15/2020 @
0717
20-067495
Unit 2 Drywell Under Vessel
3/17/2020 @
2037
20-067550
Reactor Building 353' Refuel Floor
3/18/2020 @
1500
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
NM-2-20-00506
Drywell Scaffolding Activities
1/1/2020
NM-2-20-00513
Drywell Control Rod Drive (CRD) Exchange
1/1/2020
NM-2-20-00518
Drywell In Service Inspections (ISI) Activities
1/1/2020
NM-2-20-00901
Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
1/1/2020
NM-2-20-00902
Refuel Floor Support Activities
1/1/2020
NM-2-20-00903
Reactor Cavity Work Platform
1/1/2020
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
233592
239884
290993
293947
Miscellaneous
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Corrective Action
Documents
04323670
04324166
04324195
04325119
04325198
Drawings
PID-23B
Turbine Hydraulic Oil System
Procedures
N2-OP-31
Residual Heat Removal System
03600
N2-SOP-101C
Reactor Scram
01400
N2-SOP-101D
Rapid Power Reduction
01100
N2-SOP-31
Loss of Shutdown Cooling
00601