ML20151Q914

Insp Rept 50-298/88-20 on 880601-0704.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observations.Esf Walkdown,Ie Bulletin 88-005 Followup,Radiological Protection & Security

ML20151Q914
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	07/15/1988
From:	Bennett W, Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151Q908	List: ML20151Q904 ML20151Q911 ML20151Q914
References
50-298-88-20, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8808110328
Download: ML20151Q914 (8)

See also: IR 05000298/1988020

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APPENDIX-B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

-REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/88-20 License: DPR-46

Docket: 50-298

Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

P. O. Box 499

Columbus, NE 68601

Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: June 1-July 4, 1988

Inspector: 7 ///P .

W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector - Date

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Approved: M [-

L. Constable, Chief, Project C, Division of

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Date

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Reactor Projects

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Inspection Summary-

Inspection Conducted June 1 through July 4, 1983 (Report 50-298/88-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety

verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, ESF walkdown,

IE Bulletin-88-05 followup, radiological protection, and security.

Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified (failure

to post a fire watch, paragraph 4; failure to perform adequate valve lineup,

paragraph 5; and failure to use adequate test instrumentation, paragraph 5).

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DETAILS

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NPPi

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• G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations

J. M. Meacham, Technical Support, Senior Manager

• H T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager

• G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager

• R. Brungardt, Operations Manager

• J. Flaherty, Plant Engineering Supervisor

• L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• G. R. Smith, Licensing Supervisor

• R. D. Black, Operations Supervisor

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the

inspection period,

• Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on July 7, 1988,

2. Plant Status

Cycle 12 refueling outage was completed during this inspection period.

The outage was extended due to problems with tudine stationary blading

and core dummy fuel assemblies, and seismic concerns regarding safety

system supports. Criticality was achieved on June 17, 1988, following NRC

review of a Justification for Interic Operation (JIO) regarding the safety

system supports. The plant was Unchronized to the grid on June 18, 1988.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(0 pen) Open Item 298/8814-03: Large Backlog of DRNs in Control Room - This

item concerned thr. large backlog of Drawing Revision Notices (DRNs) to be

incorporated ints as-built drawings.

Prior to reactor startup, the licensee modified its drawing control

system. A?1 interim drawings and DRNs applicable to a certain as-built

drawing are placed together so that operators are required to look in

only one place to find all changes to a particul.ar drawing. The SRI

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' considers this an improvement, but the backlog of DRNs is still a problem.

This item is still open.

Diesel Sequential Loading -

(Closed)UnresolvedItem 298/8636-01:

This item concerned the adequacy of the diesel sequential loading

procedure.

The licensee, in letter NLS8700633 dated December 4,1987, specified that a

diesel generator (DG) startup time of 16 seconds from receipt of the DG

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initiation signal is adequate for Cooper Nuclear Station configuration -and

. committed to revise Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.4.3 to include the

specific acceptance criterion. In a memorandum to the SRI, dated

December 21,1987,- the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

and recommended

concurred that the licensee's

closure of 298/8636-01. response

The SRI reviewedwas satisfactory' Sequential Loading

SP 6.3.4.3,

of Emergency Diesel Generators," Revision 24, dated May 19, 1988, and

verified that the 16 second acceptance criteria was included in the

procedure.

This item is closed.

4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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[ The SRI observed operational activities throughout the inspection period.

Control room activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled.

Proper control room staffing was maintained. Discussions with operators

determined that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the

importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. The SRI observed '

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selected shift turnover meetings and noted that information concerning

plant status was properly communicated to the oncoming operators.

On June 17, 1988, the SRI observed a reactor startup following the

Cycle 12 refueling outage which commenced on March 5, 1988. All

conditionsandrequirementsforstartupwereproperlymetanddocumented

. in General Operatin Technical Specification

Pre-StartupChecks,gProcedure(G0P)2.1.1.2

Revision 7, dated December 10, 1987. The mode switch

was placed in the startup position at 2:24 a.m. and criticality was

achieved at 4:20 a.m. The startup was conducted in a controlled,

cautious, professional manner in accordance with GOP 2.1.1, "Cold Startup

Procedure," Revision 52, dated June 2, 1988. A second licensed operator

verified all rod movement during the startup as required.

Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm

operability of plant equipment. The SRI performed a walkdown of the  :

Standby Gas Treatment System. Results of this walkdown are documented in .

paragraph 7 of this report.

On June 22, 1988, during a routine plant tour, the SRI noted that the

access door to the critical switchgear room was propped open with

temporary ventilation installed. A security guard was properly stationed

monitoring access to the critical switch gear room. The SRI also noted

that door H300, entry to the control corridor, was tied open. Door H300

is required by CNS Procedure 0.16, "Control of Fire Doors," Revision 6,

, dated May 26, 1988, to have a fire watch when it is obstructed from

closing securely. The SRI asked the guard for the critical switchgear

room if he was acting as a fire watch for door H300. The guard responded

that he was only watching the access for the critical switchgear room.

When the SRI notified the control room that the H300 door was oprn with no

fire watch, the snift supervisor immediately ordered the door to be

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closed. The failure to have a fire watch stationed with door H300 tied

open is an apparent violation (298/8820-01) of CNS Procedure 0.16.

No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

The SRI observed and/or reviewed the performance of Surveillance Procedure

(SP) 6.3.4.3, "Sequential Loading of Emergency Diesel Generators";

SP 6.4.3.1, "HPCI Turbine Overspeed Functional Test"; and SP 6.3.1.1,

"Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Test."

. SP 6.3.4.3, "Sequential Loading of Emergency Diesel Generators,"

Revision 24, dated May 19, 1988: This surveillance was perfonned to

meet TS requirements to demonstrate load shedding and sequencing on a

simulated loss of offsite power. The SRI observed the diesel

generator No. 2 test performance on June 9, 1988. The test was

performed by qualified individuals in a professional manner. The

control room supervisor briefed all involved individuals ensuring

that they knew their functions during the test and that they were

aware of what indications to expect during the test. Test results

were reviewed and verified to be acceptable per the procedure.

During the performance of the test, the core spray (CS) and residual

heat removal (RHR) injection valves opened causing a reactor vessel

level increase of greater than 100 inches. The valve lineup for the

test required that the valves be closed and deenergized; however, the

valves were, in fact, closed, but energized. When the test signal

was applied the CS and RHR pumps started, the CS and RHR injection

valves opened, and water was injected into the reactor vessel. The

failure to perform an adequate valve lineup is an apparent

violation (298/8820-02). The SRI considers that the root cause of

the violation was an inadequate procedure in that the format for the

valve lineup was confusing, requiring the operator to perform two

actions in one step of the valve lineup. The licensee has issued

Revision 25 to SP 6.3.4.3, changing the format of the valve lineup to

require one initial for valve positioning, and one initial for power

status. In addition, due to some confusion that was evidenced during

the performance of SP 6.3.4.3, the licensee committed to review the

conduct of all complex surveillance procedures (those requiring more

than one shift to perform) to attempt to reduce any confusion that

may occur during performance of these tests.

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SP 6.4.3.1, "HPCI Turbine Overspeed Functional Test," Revision 13,

dated February 25, 1988: This surveillance was perfonned to

demonstrate operability of the overspeed trip on the High Pressure

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Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine. The SRI observed and reviewed

portions of the surveillance on June 7,1988. The SRI noted that a

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Simpson 260 Multimeter had not been used as required by Step 7.7 of

the procedure. In addition, various portions of the recovery portion

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prior to completion of steps 8.1.35.5 through 8.1.37. Neither the

use of a Fluke Multimeter vice a Simpson Multimeter or the

completion of steps out of sequence was authorized in the procedure.

A temporary change notice had not been processed. This is a similar

occurrence to that documented as NRC Violation (298/8814-01).

Corrective actions for this violation have not been completed at this

time. This occurrence will be reviewed during a subsequent

inspection to verify corrective actions for Violation 50-298/8814-01.

The SRI considers that the above actions did not adversely affect the

performance of the surveillance.

. SP 6.3.1.1, "Primary Containment Local Leak Rate Tests," Revision 22,

dated February 25, 1988: This test was performed to verify that TS

allowable leakage was not exceeded. The SRI reviewed the data for

the 58 psi drywell personnel airlock test performed on April 14,

1988, and the 3 psi drywell personnel airlock tests performed on

June 15, 1988, and June 18, 1988. All calculations were reviewed and

results were within the acceptance criteria of TS and the procedure.

The SRI noted that for the 3 psi test, a pressure drop of .01 would

cause the test to fail. The SRI questioned the licensee concerning

the accuracy and readability of the gauge used, and was informed that

the gauge was accurate to .05 psi with readability of .05 psi.

Failure to use adequate test instrumentation is en apparent

violation (298/8820-03). When informed of the gauge problem, the

licensee repeated the 3 psi airtest utilizing a digital pressure

monitor accurate to .0025 psi. The SRI witnessed this test on

July 1, 1988. The test was performed by a qualified engineer in

accordance with the procedure. All test equipment was verified to be

in calibration and test results were within the acceptance criteria

of the procedure and TS. The SRI further reviewed the licensee's

calculations and verified that the acceptance criteria of the

procedure met the requirements of the NRC approved exemption to

Appendix J of 10 CFR 50.

No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The SRI observed the performance of General Operating Procedure

(GOP) 2.1.14, "ASME Class 1-N System Leakage Test," Revision 20, dated

April 22,1988. This test was performed in conjunction with Maintenance

Procedure 7.0.8, "Pressure Testing," to verify reactor vessel and

connected system integrity and to verify integrity of various systems and

components upon which maintenance had been performed. The SRI observed

the start of GOP 2.1.14 on June 5,1988. For the test, the reactor

recirculation pumps are required to be run to mair.tain reactor

temperature. When the reactor recirculation pump motor generator (MG)

sets were started they immediately tripped. Maintenance Work ,

Request 88-2787 was issued to troubleshoot and repair the MG sets. The

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problem was determined to be reverse polarity applied to the loss-of-field

relays which caused the MG sets to trip. The problem was 1dentified and

repaired by maintenance personnel.

The SRI observed the performance of GOP 2.1.14 on June 7,1988. The SRI

perforned an inspection of containment at test pressure to verify findings

of the licensee during the test. All leakage identified was properly

documented and evaluated by the licensee, and repairs were made as

required.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

7. Engineered Safety (ESF) Feature Walkdown (71710)

The SRI performed an independent walkdown of the Standby Gas Treatment

(SGT) System. The inspection was performed to verify operability, to

confirm that licensee system lineup procedures match plant drawings and

the as-built configuration, and to identify equipment conditions or items

that might degrade system performance. This system was chosen because it

is designed to mitigate contamination release in the event of a

loss-of-coolant accident.

The SRI utili ed System Operating Procedure (SOP) 2.2.73A, "Standby Gas

Trcatment System Valve Checklist," Revision 0, dated February 25, 1988, in

performing the system walkdown. During the walkdown, minor discrepancies

concerning cables in the system were identified. The licensee was

notified of the cable discrepancies and initiated actions to correct them.

The SRI compared the valve checklist to an as-built drawing

Burns & Roe 2037 "SGT and Off Gas Filters." No discrepancies were noted,

to other violations or deviations were identified in this area.

8. NRC Bulletin 88-05 (92701)

Piping Supplies,

This bulletin concerns nonconforming material supplied by(WJM). In

Ir;corporated (PSI) and West Jersey Manufacturing Company

accordance with the bulletin, the licensee determined that four flanges

supplied by WJM were installed in the plant.

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Two of the flanges are in nonsafety-related systems and, thus, no

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bulletin-related action is required.

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One flange is located in the scram discharge volume. The licensee is

making preparations to test the flange for hardness and chemical

composition. The bulletin requires reporting of testing results

within 30 days of receipt of Supplement I to the bulletin, dated

June 15, 1988.

One flange is locatt.d in the reactor head spray. This flange is

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inaccessible during power operations. In accordance with the ,

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bulletin,

operation. theThi!

lir.nsee performed

Justification for anContinuedanalysisOperation justifying (JCO) was

given to the NRf on June 24, 1988. The SR1 and Region IV personnel

reviewed the JC(., and no discrepancies were identified.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

9. Radiological Protection Observajions (71709).

4 The SRI verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological

protection program were implemented in conformance with facility policies,

procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation work permits contained

appropriate information to ensure that work cculd be performed in a safe

and controlled manner. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly

posted and controlled. High radiation areas were properly established and

controlled during reactor startup'and power ascension. Radiation monitors

were utilized to check for contamination.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

10. Security (71881)

The SRI observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle,

personnel, and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and .

controlled or escorted in the protected area IPA). The licensee continued

implementation of the security equipment upg ade during this inspection

period. The SRI conducted site tours to ensure hat compensatory measures

were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or the

security upgrade. The PA barrier had adequate illumination and the

isolation zones were free of transient material.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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11. Exit Interview (30703)

An exit interview was conducted on July 7,1988, with licensee

4; representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the

SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.

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