ML041530158

Minutes of Internal Meeting of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel

ML041530158
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/28/2004
From:	Grobe J Division Reactor Projects III
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Download: ML041530158 (17)

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May 28, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Davis-Besse Oversight Panel FROM: John A. Grobe, Chairman, Davis-Besse Oversight Panel /RA/

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF INTERNAL MEETING OF THE DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL The implementation of the IMC 0350 process for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was announced on April 29, 2002. An internal panel meeting was held on December 16, 2003. Attached for your information are the minutes from the internal meeting of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel, the approved RAM Closure Forms, and the Open Action Items List.

Attachments: As stated cc w/att: D. Weaver, OEDO J. Caldwell, RIII G. Grant, RIII S. Reynolds, DRP B. Clayton, EICS DB0350

DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML041530158.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII NAME RBaker/trn DPassehl CLipa JGrobe DATE 05/28/04 05/28/04 05/28/04 05/28/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

MEETING MINUTES: Internal IMC 0350 Oversight Panel Meeting Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DATE: December 16, 2003 TIME: 12:30 p.m. Central ATTENDEES:

J. Grobe W. Ruland S. Thomas C. Lipa A. Mendiola R. Baker M. Phillips J. Hopkins Agenda Items:

1. Brief Panel on RRATI Findings and Recommendation from Inspection Efforts to Date J. Grobe provided the Panel with an update from the RRATI team. The licensee continues a trend of not finding emergent issues requiring the RRATI to question items and thus lead the licensee to addressing concerns.

Additionally, discussions surrounding the data results from the November 2003 SCWE survey reveal two expressed themes; the management blames the staff, and the staff does not trust management.

J. Grobe informed the Panel that J. Caldwell has requested a briefing on current RRATI findings and the SCWE data results for himself, S. Collins, and J. Dyer today at 4:00 p.m. (CST).

2. Discuss/Approve Todays Agenda The Panel approved the agenda, but modified the order of presentations. THE APPROVED AGENDA REFLECTS THE ORDER LISTED IN THESE MINUTES.

3. Discuss Plant Status and Inspector Insights and Emergent Issues List S. Thomas led a discussion of plant status and inspector insights and emergent issues.

The plant is currently in Mode 5 with a bubble in the Pressurizer, protecting train #2.

The licensee will be performing CRDM position indication checks, and raising reactor coolant system pressure to vent reactor coolant pumps.

4. Discuss New/Potential Licensing Issues J. Hopkins briefed the Panel on the status of licensing issues. A teleconference with the licensee is scheduled for later today for final discussions on the Steam Generator inspection issues. The licensee is expected to submit the final responses to NRR tomorrow.

5. Brief Panel on Review Status of HPI Design Mod./Post Mod. Acceptance Testing A. Mendiola informed the Panel that the licensees final engineering evaluation of the test results obtained from the HPI pumps is expected to be submitted by 12/23/03. The Engineering Design Modification package review is complete. The Inspection Results memorandum will be drafted once the review of the licensees final engineering evaluation of the test results obtained from the HPI pumps is complete.

6. Discuss Allegations: 1) New; 2) Determine If Required to Be Resolved Prior to Restart; and; 3) Requested Extensions M. Phillips briefed the Panel on the status of open allegations. The only open allegation which needs to be resolved prior to restart is the EDG Square-D relays. The licensee is providing R. Daley with extensive additional testing results, which qualify the relays as acceptable, for review. R. Daley will brief the Panel on his evaluation of the test results.

7. Discuss RAM Closure Forms M. Phillips led a review of RAM closure items. THE RESTART ACTION MATRIX ITEMS THAT THE PANEL APPROVED FOR CLOSURE ARE ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.

8. Discuss Licensees Most Recent PIs C. Lipa led a review of the licensees most recent Performance Indicators (PIs). The Panel decided that S. Thomas will brief the Panel on those PIs which are not representative of the licensees performance due to the extended shutdown. For each of these Pis, the Panel will review enhanced inspection objectives, above baseline, for future inspection efforts.

10. Panel Review Restart Checklist Items 5.b, Systems Readiness for Restart and 5.c, Operations Readiness for Restart, for Remaining Closure Criteria The Panel discussed how the current RRATI assessment of the licensees operational readiness will impact closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.c, and how the unresolved CATI technical issues will impact closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.b. One of the technical issues, HPI pump minimum recirculation flow, will be included with the closure criteria for Restart Checklist Item 2.e.

The Panel decided that closure of these Restart Checklist Items will be readdressed following evaluation of the RRATI and CATI inspection results, and that leads should be assigned to facilitate resolution of open issues.

NEW ACTION ITEM (227) - C. LIPA TO ASSIGN LEADS TO TAKE ACTIONS TO BRING OPEN RESTART CHECKLIST ITEMS TO PANEL, TO INCLUDE ACTIONS TO ENSURE PEOPLE ARE AVAILABLE TO BRIEF PANEL BASED ON LEAVE SCHEDULES.

11. Discuss Topics for Licensees Weekly Call C. Lipa led a discussion of specific issues to address with the licensee during the weekly call. Two topics for discussion were noted: 1) discuss the licensees intended resolution

for current hardware issues; 2) request the licensee to discuss the licensees proposed schedule for activities during the public exits on 12/19/03.

12. Discuss Communication Status A. Mendiola briefed the Panel on the status of communications issues. The Communications Team is scheduled to meet tomorrow to discuss dispositioning recently received correspondence, to include a new letter from Mr. Gurdziel, and the latest Ohio Citizens Action Group memo. The Panel will be briefed on these issues at the Panel meeting next Tuesday, 12/23/03.

The Panel also discussed recently received email responses from the request for staff issues on concerns which could impact restart. Two responses received concerned the Steam Generator inspection results, and the HPI pump cyclone separators operability.

The Panel decided that all staff concerns would be placed in a separate ADAMS package to ensure all concerns were addressed and retrievable.

NEW ACTION ITEM (228) - M. MITCHELL TO PLACE ALL EMAIL REQUESTS SENT THROUGHOUT AGENCY, RESPONSES RECEIVED, AND ISSUE RESOLUTIONS IN ADAMS PACKAGE FOR DOCUMENTATION.

13. Discuss Update Milestones and Commitments The Panel reviewed and discussed upcoming milestones and commitments.

14. Review Key Items Scheduled for Next Panel Meetings C. Lipa discussed key items scheduled for upcoming Panel meetings. The next Panel meeting will be tomorrow morning, 12/17/03, to receive an update on the RRATI team observations, and to receive a brief on the Management and Human Performance Phase III inspection results.

The Panel decided to add an additional line item to the Panel Process Plan to document J. Caldwells desire to meet with special inspection team leads for recent or ongoing special inspections.

NEW ACTION ITEM (229) - M. MITCHELL TO ADD A LINE ITEM TO PROCESS PLAN FOR RA INITIATIVE TO TALK WITH EACH INSPECTION TEAM LEAD FOR RECENT/ONGOING SPECIAL INSPECTIONS.

15. New Action Items Three new Action Items were added to the open action items list. THE UPDATED OPEN ACTION ITEMS LIST IS ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.

RAM Items Approved for Closure at Panel December 16, 2003 RAM Item No. - E-10 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 11/14/02 Author - Gurdziel Description of Issue - News article of 10/12/02 - Regards Comment on Reactor Vessel "Trailings" Restart Checklist Item: 5.d Description of Resolution - The licensee performed an evaluation of RPV deposits and concluded that lower head penetrations were not leaking. The NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed the evaluation and agreed with the licensees conclusion. In addition, the licensee performed a 7 day leak test at normal operating pressure with no leaks detected.

Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities is in NRC Inspection Report No.

50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - E-11 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 11/20/02 Author - Gurdziel Description of Issue - Wouldnt you think that a bare metal inspection should be done at pressure and not after pressure is lowered?

Restart Checklist Item: 5.d Description of Resolution - Boric acid in the RCS coolant leaves a recognizable deposit as demonstrated by plants such as Oconee (upper head) and South Texas Project (lower head).

In the case of Davis-Besse detailed examination of the heads after the pressure test, including comparison with photos taken before the seven day pressurization were evaluated for any indication of leakage (deposit). No leakage was identified. Entering the area at pressure presents an unnecessary hazard to personnel. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - E-12 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 11/26/02 Author - Gurdziel Description of Issue - It doesnt appear likely to me that the D-B operators actually do a primary coolant system visual inspection during hydro after each vessel reassembly.

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - Surveillance Test Procedure DB-PF-03010 RCS Leakage Test provides the guidance for performing the system leakage test as required by ASME Section XI.

The NRC observed implementation of this procedure during the NOP test. Records review showed that vessel inspections per ASME Section XI, where the hydro requirements are specified, had been conducted as required. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - E-14 Closed: Y Date of E-Mail - 11/26/02 Author - Gurdziel Description of Issue - The NRC should look at the condition to be expected when weld stress relieving is not used.

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - Assuming that the stress relieving refers to the modification performed on the lower head penetrations, there was no indication of leakage after the NOP, therefore there is no reason at this time to pursue details of this old modification.

RAM Item No. - L-74 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 10/18/02 Author - Gurdziel (G-10)

Description of Issue - After reviewing the LLTF report, Mr. Gurdziel concluded that large nuclear operating companies can be unsafe if they provide bad direction or fail to provide good corrective direction. Such direction, or lack of it, may be propagated to all plants run by the organization. Specifically, with a QA organization at Davis-Besse that provides incompletely

reported information, shouldnt the NRC be inspecting the QA function for completeness in reporting at ALL other plants run by FENOC?

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - The corporate Quality Audit Program has undergone significant improvements as a result of reviews conducted after the head degradation event. The NRC has reviewed the licensees discovery efforts as well as program improvements (see inspection report numbers 50-346/2003-009 and 50-346/2003-023). The Reactor Oversight Process has been conducted at the other FENOC facilities. A component of that inspection program looks at licensees programs for problem identification and resolution. To date, there has been no indication that the issues at Davis-Besse extend to other FENOC facilities.

Reference Material - Inspection Reports 50-346/2002-011 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml031880844), 50-346/2003-009 (ADAMS Accession No. ml031880844) and 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No. ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - L-78 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 12/05/02 Author - Gurdziel (G-15)

Description of Issue - May be worthwhile to have a review done of the previously-done incore tube modification process with particular attention to the possibility of weld fracture at the bottom of the original weld (weld metals used and ability to resist boric accident, amount of heat to be deposited by welding, etc.).

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c Description of Resolution - The licensee conducted a 7 day test at normal operating pressures and temperatures designed to look for any leakage form the incore tubes. There was no indication of leakage after the NOP, therefore there is no reason at this time to pursue details of this old modification. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities associated with the NOP test is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - L-82 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 12/16/02 Author - Gurdziel (G-17)

Description of Issue - For the NOP/NOT test there should be a process to check for leaks while the reactor is pressurized - the concept of risk is not turned around when risk to a few workers is more important than risk to a larger number of people in Ohio.

Restart Checklist Item: N/A Description of Resolution - Although walkdowns were not performed over the entirety of the RCS system due to personnel safety considerations, several walkdowns of the RCS while at pressure were performed during the NOP leak test. As a result of these walkdowns, the licensee issued more than 150 CRs to address at pressure walkdown findings. In addition, the licensee looked for leaks after the pressure and temperature of the RCS was reduced. Since the RCS coolant contains a fairly high concentration of boric acid, any leak would be identified by the white powder-like deposit of boric acid residue. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities associated with the NOP test is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - L-92 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 02/10/03 Author - Lochbaum Description of Issue - Looking for leaks in all the wrong places - has the NRC confirmed that the companys NOP/NOT test wont once again miss leaks?

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c Description of Resolution - The NRC evaluated the licensees plans for and implementation of the NOP test and concluded that it provided reasonable assurance that there is no pressure boundary leakage of the RCS. In the past, licensees performed VT-2 inspections during RCS hydro to look for leakage. Because of plant-specific design characteristics, there has been no uniform way to perform effective visual examinations of the RPV head at PWR facilities. Some plants have the head insulation sufficiently offset from the RPV head to permit an effective visual examination. Other plants have the insulation offset from the head but in a contour matching that of the head, requiring special tooling and procedures to perform an effective visual examination. Still other plants have insulation directly adjacent to or attached to the RPV head, potentially requiring the removal of the insulation to permit an effective visual examination. As a result, the NRC has issued Bulletins 2002-001 and 2002-002 to address proper examinations of RPV heads such that the inspections look at the bare metal. This has not always been the case in the past. The licensee has appropriately revised its procedures to address the Bulletins requests. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities associated with the NOP test is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003, and included Mr. Lochbaum on distribution.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - L-107 Closed: Y Date of Letter - 07/31/03 Author - Gurdziel (G-25)

Description of Issue - FENOC methodology to look for leaks on the bottom head is inappropriate. My way is better.

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c Description of Resolution - The NRC evaluated the licensees plans for and implementation of the NOP test and concluded that it provided reasonable assurance that there is no pressure boundary leakage of the RCS.

Boric acid in the RCS coolant leaves a recognizable deposit as demonstrated by plants such as Oconee (upper head) and South Texas Project (lower head). In the case of Davis-Besse detailed examination of the heads after the pressure test, including comparison with photos taken before the seven day pressurization were evaluated for any indication of leakage (deposit). No leakage was found. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities associated with the NOP test is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - SUP-16 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Evaluate the effectiveness of audits and assessments performed by the quality assurance group, line organizations, and external organizations.

Restart Checklist Item: 3.c Description of Resolution - This inspection area was addressed by performance of the Programs Phase I and II inspections and the Corrective Action Team Inspection. Based on the results of those inspections both the Corrective Action Program and Quality Audit Program were reviewed and determined to be acceptable Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-346/2002-011 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml031880844), 50-346/2003-009 (ADAMS Accession No. ml031880844), 50-346/2003-010 (scheduled to be issued during December 2003) and 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - SUP-18 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Review of Licensee Control Systems for Identifying, Assessing, and Correcting Performance Deficiencies: Evaluate whether licensee performance goals are congruent with those corrective actions needed to address the documented performance issues.

Description of Resolution - This inspection area was addressed by performance of the Head Replacement Inspection, Extent of Condition Phase I and II Inspections, Programs Phase I and II inspections and the Corrective Action Team Inspection. Issues were also reviewed.

Additionally, the licensees building blocks described in their Return to Service Plan were inspected and found acceptable. This included the Program Compliance, Management and Human Performance, System Health, Reactor Head Resolution, Containment Extent of Condition, and Restart Test Program. Based on the results of those inspections both the Corrective Action Program and Quality Audit Program were reviewed and determined to be acceptable Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-346/2002-007 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml023370100), 50-346/2002-009 (ADAMS Accession No. ml022560237), 50-346/2002-011 (ADAMS Accession No. ml031880844), 50-346/2002-012 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml023370132), 50-346/2002-014 (ADAMS Accession No. ml0030630314), 50-346/2002-015 (ADAMS Accession No. ml030380037), 50-346/2002-018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml032050528), 50-346/2003-009 (ADAMS Accession No. ml031880844), 346/2003-010 (scheduled to be issued during December 2003) and 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - LER-07 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Review and Evaluate Leakage from Incore Monitoring Instrumentation LER Description of Resolution - The NRC evaluated the licensees implementation of the NOP test and concluded that it provided reasonable assurance that there is no pressure boundary leakage of the RCS. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - LER-20 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Inoperability of Containment Spray Pump (CSP) #1 due to the supply breaker tripping/opening upon a start or close signal. The breaker did close and then immediately tripped. Other similar breakers with similar loadings may be susceptible to similar tripping.

Description of Resolution -. The licensee determined that the cause of the trip was a malfunction in the ground fault function in the solid state trip device associated with the supply breaker for CSP 1. After determining that the ground fault trip was not required, the licensee processed a design change and removed the fault sensing circuit from containment spray pump 1 (Inspection Report No. 05000346/2003018). The licensee determined that the problem potentially involves all General Electric 480 V Model AK-25 metal clad circuit breakers with ground fault sensing and that the probability of a false ground fault trip increases with load. The licensee identified that CSP 2 is susceptible to potential false ground fault tripping and that 4 breakers that feed MCCs may have loadings similar to that seen by the CSP 1 breaker. The CSPs are the largest single 480 starting load with the plant. The licensee has accomplished a design change and removed the ground fault function of the CSP 2 supply breaker (CR 03-07794CA5). The licensee also reviewed the need for immediate action on the MCC breakers (CR03-10376). The licensee concluded that there was no history indicating an issue with ground fault false trips, that inrush current profiles seen by these MCC breakers was different from that seen by the CSP breakers, and that the MCC breakers are not susceptible to the type of trips experienced by the CSP breakers.

The licensee did not identify why the condition occurred at this time although one offsite expert suggested that trip device electronic drift might be responsible (Root Cause Analysis for CR 03-07794). The actions taken by the licensee resolve and correct the issue addressed in the LER.

The LER will be dispositioned in Inspection Report 05000346/2003025 which covers the inspection period to December 27, 2003.

Reference Material - Licensee Event Report No. 50-346/2003-011, NRC Inspection Report No. 05000346/2003018 (ADAMS Accession No. ml033080433); Condition Report (CR) 03-07794; and CR 03-10376.

RAM Item No. - LER-21 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine 1 due to Governor Adjustment/Inadequate Response Time. On September 23, 2003, with the plant in mode 3, auxiliary feedwater pump 1 was being tested to verify that the pump would come to rated speed in the time required by the plants existing analyses. The pump was originally declared operable but because of the non-inclusion of time required for instrument response in the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System, the pump operability decision was reversed with subsequent testing revealing issues with the governor valve linkage and operability of associated steam traps. The subsequent testing also indicated variability in response time with test timing from the previous test.

Description of Resolution -. The licensee initially determined that the governor valve linkage misadjustments was the cause of slow turbine response. The need to revise the initial operability call was because of unclear wording in the test procedure. The governor valve linkage was removed and reassembled using an approved procedure, DB-MM-09098; AFPT Governor Maintenance; Revision 04 as reported in Inspection Report 05000346/2003018.

Additionally the test procedures addressing AFW pump response time testing, DP-SP-03157 and DP-OP-3166, were revised to specifically include instrument response time in comparing results to acceptance criteria (CR03-07975CA10).

In the LER the licensee stated that the final conclusion was that the AFW pump did not meet acceptance criteria due to moisture in the steam line due to 2 performance degraded steam traps in the AFW pump steam supply piping. The licensee reworked the 2 traps plus others or inspected them (Root Cause Analysis Report for CR 2003-0795, Report Date November 18, 2003 and CR03-07975CA15) including the five traps mentioned in the LER. The licensee has also initiated a corrective action (CR03-07975CA19) to initiate PMs to address the periodic inspection and repair of AFW pump steam traps. The action has a due date of March 20, 2004.

The actions taken by the licensee should resolve the issue addressed in the LER and in Inspection Report 05000346/2003018. The LER will be dispositioned in Inspection Report 05000346/2003025 which covers the inspection period to December 27, 2003..

Reference Material - Licensee Event Report No. 50-346/2003-012 and NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-018 (ADAMS Accession No. ml033080433).

RAM Item No. - URI-12 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Potential leakage at the reactor vessel in-core penetration tubes Description of Resolution - The NRC evaluated the licensees implementation of the NOP test and concluded that it provided reasonable assurance that there is no pressure boundary leakage of the RCS. Documentation of the NRCs review of the licensees activities is in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023, which was issued on December 5, 2003.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033421074).

RAM Item No. - NCV-25 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Technical Specification 3.5.2 - Inadequate Final Containment Inspection.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this issue was the failure to adequately identify and remove loose debris from the containment building prior to determining that containment was ready to support plant operation in Mode 3. The inspectors reviewed the immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee to remove the material and found them to be adequate. The inspectors also reviewed a new procedure, DB-OP-03013, Containment Daily Inspections and Containment Closeout Inspection, Revision 00. This procedure was developed to, in part, provide guidance for the conduct of containment closeout inspections. The inspectors determined that, if implemented correctly, the procedure should significantly improve the thoroughness of inspections required to identify loose material in containment.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033080433).

RAM Item No. - NCV-26 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Procedure for Testing the Response Time of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 Turbine Did Not Adequately Describe the Acceptance Criteria for Successful Completion of the Test.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this issue was the failure to incorporate the proper acceptance criteria into a procedure that is used to determine the operability of a safety related component. The inspectors reviewed the revisions to surveillance procedures DB-SP-03157, AFP 1 Response Time Test, Revision 6, and DB-SP-03166, AFP 2 Response Time Test, Revision 05. These procedure revisions provided clear guidance on the required pump performance to demonstrate operability.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033080433).

RAM Item No. - NCV-27 Closed: Y Description of Issue - Control Room Staff Did Not Adequately Monitor and Control Reactor Coolant System Pressure Which Resulted in CF1B Opening Unexpectedly.

Description of Resolution - This was a performance issue because preventing the automatic actuation of CF1B was reasonably within the licensees ability to control and actuation could have been prevented. The licensee did classify this event as a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality and performed a root cause analysis to determine the causes of this event. From this report, several corrective actions were assigned to CR 03-07746, Inadvertent Opening of CF1B. Specific corrective actions that addressed fundamental watch standing weaknesses included; revising operator training to highlight the auto-opening features of CF1A/1B, discussing with the operating crews how not monitoring SFAS channel 3 pressure indications contributed to the opening of CF1B, and to utilize training to emphasize the concept of using an operating envelope when maneuvering the plant. When successfully completed and implemented, these corrective actions should reduce the chances of recurrence of this event and improve general watch standing performance.

Reference Material - NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/2003-018 (ADAMS Accession No.

ml033080433).

December 16, 2003 DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 197 Develop a communication J. Stang 6/24-Lead changed; 08/21-Lead plan with restart Qs and changed; 09/30-Discussed, list of Q & As As. (06/17) is being gathered for review and forwarding to RA; 10/14-Discussed, J.

Shea is compiling the list of Q & As for review by the Panel and results will be forwarded to the RA; 10/21-Brainstorming session to occur 10/23 to final presentation to Panel; 11/20- The list of Q&As will be inserted to the Comm Plan today; 12/15-Discussed, Plan is with Panel Chairman.

208 Evaluate the need to call M. Phillips 10/14-Investigation is still ongoing.

back CI regarding Allegation RIII-2002-A-0177 (D-B) after the OI Investigation is complete (08/21) 212 Determine whether the J. Stang 10/14-Discussed, Set of bullets still under Communication Team has development; item will be discussed at received all electronic and next Panel meeting on 10/16; 11/04 -

written correspondence Discussed, J. Stang is adding to Comm.

from external sources. If Matrix; 11/20-Only remaining is the there is reasonable documented criteria for proof of confidence that the reasonable confidence; 12/15-Discussed, Communication Team has all inputs received from panel members-all the correspondence closure memo to document then develop a set of completeness confidence in draft and will bullets explaining why go to Panel next week.

there is reasonable confidence. (09/23) 216 Submit a TIA which J. Lara 10/14-The TIA has been submitted to the addresses issues and Branch Chief for review; 10/21-The TIA is questions related to the with A. Mendiola; 10/28-Held telephone licensees 1991 10 CFR conversation yesterday for obtaining Appendix R exemption information; 11/18-TIA is being revised to request regarding document the question to NRR in a Alternative Shutdown formal manner so that NRR may (ASD) regulations. (10/02) document an answer in a formal manner if this is a safety concern; 12/15-Discussed, final revision with Panel Chairman to forward to NRR this week.

December 16, 2003 DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 217 Review and document the S. Thomas 10/14-Discussed, This review is ongoing acceptability of the and will be documented in Inspection licensees withdrawal of Report 03-22; 12/15-Discussed, issue the single safety group of address in IR 03-22 which will be issued control rods to provide a next week-brief and closure next week.

prompt trip response source of negative reactivity. The review will be documented in a resident inspection report.

(10/09) 219 Brief Jim Caldwell on how S. Thomas 10/28-Brief will include research Immediate Action information on Exelon approach; 11/20-Maintenance issue was NRC is reviewing a copy of the licensees resolved. He would like to revised procedure; 12/15-Discussed, see the revised FENOC rep met with SRI 12/14 to review procedure. (10/21) new procedure.

220 Develop inspection plan D. Passehl 11/20-The plan is being developed and requirements which supplemented from baseline include review of post requirements; 12/15-Discussed, draft restart security program plan in final.

effectiveness. (10/28) 221 Research use of a Quick D. Passehl 11/20-Awaiting information from STP, Look letter which and Millstone restart documents-will formalizes preliminary update the Panel at 11-25-03 meeting; inspection results prior to 12/15-Discussed, working.

final report being issued to address urgent Restart decision issues. (10/28) 224 Rewrite the proposed IN D. Hills 12/15-Discussed, D. Hills is working.

on TSP to be generic and reflect attainable plant conditions and what information should be disseminated to the industry concerning Boric Acid Corrosion Control Programs (12/09) 225 Send out the newest C. Lipa 12/09-Newest revision is in final and will revision of the Restart be brought to Panel for review 12/12; Comm Plan for Panel 12/15-Discussed, in final and will go to review (12/09) Panel 12/23.

December 16, 2003 DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL OPEN ACTION ITEM LIST Item Action Item (Date Assigned to Comments Number generated) 227 Leads take actions to See Punchlist (NEW bring open Restart ITEM) Checklist items to Panel, to include actions to resolve closure and people to brief Panel based on leave schedules. (12/16) 228 Place all Email requests M. Mitchell (NEW sent throughout Agency, ITEM) responses received, and issue resolutions in ADAMS package for documentation. (12/16) 229 Add line item to Process M. Mitchell (NEW Plan for RA initiative to ITEM) talk with each Inspection Team Lead for recent/ongoing special inspections. (12/16)