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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data LIC-99-0096, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 LIC-99-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20216E6431999-08-26026 August 1999 Rev 19 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R1961999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20216E6361999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 18 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R2081999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 LIC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20210P5461999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 0,Vols 1-5 of Fort Calhoun Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, to Be Conducted on 990810. Pages 2-20 & 2-40 in Vol 2 & Page 4-1 in Vol 4 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20195B4581999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to CE NPSD-683, Development of RCS Pressure & Temp Limits Rept for Removal of P-T Limits & LTOP Requirements from Ts ML20207H7401999-05-31031 May 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for May 1999 LIC-99-0053, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 11999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20195B4521999-05-17017 May 1999 Technical Data Book TDB-IX, RCS Pressure - Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History LIC-99-0047, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20195E8621999-04-30030 April 1999 Performance Indicators, for Apr 1999 ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20210J4331999-03-31031 March 1999 Changes,Tests, & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval for Period 981101-990331.With USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 ML20206G2641999-03-31031 March 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for Mar 1999 LIC-99-0034, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20205J8181999-02-28028 February 1999 Performance Indicators, for Feb 1999 LIC-99-0025, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20207F3291999-01-31031 January 1999 FCS Performance Indicators for Jan 1999 ML20203B0991998-12-31031 December 1998 Performance Indicators for Dec 1998 LIC-99-0026, 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with LIC-99-0003, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20196G2251998-12-18018 December 1998 Rev 2 to EA-FC-90-082, Potential Over-Pressurization of Containment Penetration Piping Following Main Steam Line Break in Containment ML20198M3141998-11-30030 November 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Nov 1998 LIC-98-0172, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With LIC-98-0160, Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated1998-11-25025 November 1998 Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated ML20203B0721998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 6 to HI-92828, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion ML20196E4981998-10-31031 October 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Oct 1998 ML20196G2441998-10-31031 October 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval. with USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 LIC-98-0154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 LIC-98-0136, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4261998-09-30030 September 1998 Performance Indicators for Sept 1998 ML20154A1251998-08-31031 August 1998 Performance Indicators, Rept for Aug 1998 LIC-98-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20238F7231998-08-17017 August 1998 Owner'S Rept for Isis ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency 1999-09-30
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L-Omaha Public Power District p August.1j 1990 444 South 16th Street Mall
- , ;. - LIC-90-0605 Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 - '
402/636-2000
~
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn Document Control Desk p ' Mail Station P1-137. i
-Washington, DC 20555
References:
- 1. Docket No. 50-285-ls 2. Licensee' Event Report 90-07, March 30,_ 1990-(LIC-90-253)
- 3. Licensee Event Report 90-07, Rev. 1, April 23, 1990_(LIC-90-0343)
- 4. Letter from OPPD (W. G. Gates) to NRC (Document Control Desk) dated July 6, 1990 (LIC-90-0417).
Gentlemen:
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 90-07, Revision 2 for the l_ -Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 90-07, Revision 2 dated July 27, 1990. .In previous-revisions of this. report, erroneous information was inadvertantly provided on.the status of :)
.the Turbine' Building spectra-_ submittal. Appropriate steps, !
including initiation of a Quality Assurance Corrective Action Report, have been taken to prevent recurrence of this problem.
H This" revision provides corrected and updated information-denoted
.by vertical lines in.the margins.
-If you should have any questions, please contact me.
i Sincerely, M d.
W. G.-Gates
' Division Manager 3 Nuclear-Operations
'WGG/tcm Attachment c:' R.-D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator A.'Bournia, NRC Project Manager R..P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center American Nuclear Insurers 9008070067 900801 E 6 5124 PDR ADOCK 05000285
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8 ACILITY NAME tu ~DOCKtY NunestR its rasu a Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 01510 l o I o 121815 1lOFl015 TITLt #41 Main Feedwater and Main Steam Piping Outside Desion Basis EVENT DAf t all LER NUMe8R les REPORT DAf t (71 OTHER F ACILITIES INVOLVED 106 MONTM Dav vt Asi vtAR Se q i46
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ASSTRACT funer to #d00 aperes e e , speewanneevey Armen senere spece rysevarma Apes / (16l A seismic analysis of the Main Feedwater and Main Steam piping outside containment has shown that several supports would be overloaded during a scismic event on the non-safety related portion of the feedwater piping (classified as Seismic Class I),
and on both the non-safety related and safety related. Main Steam piping. An evaluation.was performed to determine what effect overloading these supports would have on the piping system, conservatively assuming a gross failure of the overloaded supports. Design basis support and piping allowables would be exceeded, and stresses in the Feedwater piping result in the postulation of a previously unanalyzed High Energy Line Breake The corrective _ actions include modification to the piping supports, implementation of a Safety Analysis for Operability, establishment of design criteria for the seismic Class II piping and the Turbine Building spectra, and restoration of the systems to updated design basis conditions.
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012 012 0F 0 15 iixtw - ., m e w m..,nn The Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) designates certain piping as Seismic Class 1. The piping so designated must be designed to withstand the effects of a
" Design Basis Earthquake" per the criteria established in Appendix F of the USAR. The design basis document for Main Feedwater defines design code for the piping in the Auxiliary Building as United States of America Standard (USAS) B31.7 from the containment penetration to the isolation valve and USAS B31.1 for the remainder of the piping in the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings. Appendix F Section F.1.3.d.3 of the USAR specifically defines the feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building upstream of the isolation valves as Seismic Class II and the piping downstream of the isolation valve as Class I. A recent records search performed by Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), however, has found licensing correspondence that defines all the feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building as Seismic Class I.
Appendix "M" of the USAR defines what piping outside of containment is high energy and how it has been analyzed. The Main Foodwater and Main Steam piping are defined as high energy and were analyzed for High Energy Line Break (HELB) considerations.
OPPD created a new analysis of the feedwater piping and supports as part of the design basis reconstitution effort and document update for a temporary modification (TM-89-M-019). This analysis was based on the USAR definition of the feedwater piping upstream of the isolation valves as being Seismic Class II. The temporary modification installed a support at the feedwater regulating valve during 1989. The recent reanalysis of the piping and supports for the temporary modification was performed to current standards.
The reanalysis revealed loads on several " class II" supports that exceed their design capacity. Follow up work was initated to demonstrate that the failure of these class II supports would not impact the safety function the feedwater piping. It was determined that the resultant increase in pipe stress due to the elimination of these supports from the stress analysis created an unanalyzed high energy line break location. A design basis search was also performed at this time, which revealed the licensing correspondence defining all the feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building as Seismic Class I.
At 1130, on February 28, 1990, the piping and supports were determined to be outside the plant design basis as specified in the licensing correspondence defining the piping and supports as Seismic Class I. Additionally, the piping and supports were determined to be outside the design basis as specified in the USAR Appendix M for high energy line break locations. At this time the plant was in a planned shutdown for a refueling outage and the NRC Form 308A Wi9)
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0l 2 0l 3 OF 0l5 TEXT f# anwe apose er soeuned, we oJetourW N#C Form acid W (1h system was not required for operation. Subsequently a "four hour" report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (1) .
Further review identified a similar concern on the Main Steam (MS) system piping because of similarity to the Main Feedwater piping.
The: primary loadings on the MS system would be a combination of Design Basis Earthquake and relief valve discharge forces. l Engineering evaluation confirmed that the MS pipe stress'and support allowables were outside the USAR Appendix F design basis.
However, no unbounded HELB postulations for the MS system were identified. A determination of reportability was made on March j 22, 1990 while the plant was still shutdown for a refueling outage I in Mode S. A "four hour" notification was made to NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (1) .
The. configuration of the Main Feedwater and Main Steam piping and I supports in the Auxiliary Building has not been significantly changed from original construction. Although the original
-Architect / Engineer (A/E) had seismically analyzed the piping in the Auxiliary Building, it was done using a static analysis method ;
and it is unclear what criteria were used to account for anchor '
movements and boundary load from the Turbine Building. The j Feedwater and Main Steam piping systems were reanalyzed by a different contracted engineering firm as part of the HELB work performed for Appendix M of the USAR. It appears that the scope of-this work was limited to predicting pipe break locations only
- l. _and did not include qualification of the supports for the l- resultant loads. As part of the 79-02 and 79-14 work, the existing isometrics and support drawings were reviewed against ;
as-built conditions. OPPD concluded that there was sufficient -,
agreement between as-built and as-designed to indicate the piping l was properly constructed and no reanalysis was required.
1 The primary cause of this condition is attributed to design deilriency: failure of the original A/E to consider loads induced '
on the piping from the non-seismic portion of the system. Why l this was not done cannot be determined due to insufficient "
l documentation of design practices used by the A/E during original L construction.
A factor which impeded earlier discovery of this condition is the conflicting information contained in the USAR. Prior to Bulletins !
79-02 and 79-14 and up until the determination of this event, the
! design basis of the USAS B31.1 Feedwater piping and supports was j considered to be Seismic Class II and non-safety related. This l Interpretation was based on Appendix F section F.1.3.d.3 which l specifically defines the Feedwater piping in the Auxiliary i Building upstream of the isolation valves as Seismic Class II.
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.The Seismic Class II portion of the system had no defined licensing basis.
OPPD contracted an independent consulting firm to determine the impact those overloaded supports could have on the safety related Seismic Class I portion of the Feedwater piping. During this review a concern was raised as to the seismic classification of the B31.1 portion of the Feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building.
Appendix F Section F.2.2.2 of the USAR for Seismic Class I criteria states that B31.1 piping in the Auxiliary Building
" received the same attention with regard to selection of hangers and restraints as the B31.7 piping. Seismic stresses were combined with longitudinal stresses due to pressure, weight, and other sustained loads". These statements are conflicting for the Foodwater piping upstream of the isolation valves. OPPD performed a search of the design basis records and discovered that a "USNRC Safety Evaluation...Regarding the Potential for Flooding, from postulated Ruptures of Noncategory I (Seismic) Systems" acknowledged the Feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building as being Seismic Class I. This seismic design requirement for the B31.1 Feedwater piping in the Auxiliary Building made the overloaded supports a reportable condition since they are now outside the Seismic class I design basis defined in Appendix F of the USAR.
OPPD requested the independent consulting firm to continue the analysis of the piping to determine the impact of the support failures on the system. The contractor's approach was to perform the piping analysis and review support capacities to determine what supports exceeded operability criteria. These supports were removed from the model and the analysis was rerun. After several iterations it was determined that, although some of the supports still exceeded their design capacity, they would not fail, and the piping would not exceed operability limits. However, at this point the threshold stress for consideration of High Energy Line Break (HELB) criteria was exceeded in a location,not previously analyzed in USAR Appendix M, Section M.3.2/ Attachment B.
Attachment B of Appendix M defines the break locations previously considered in the USAR.
The Feedwater piping is routed out of the Containment Building through the Auxiliary Building and ends in the Turbine Building.
The seismic class II piping in the "5Irbine Building must be seismically analyzed to determine ' loads transmitted back to the Seismic Class I piping and sucports in the Auxiliary Building.
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- require the use of a response spectra for components located in i that building.- The Fort Calhoun Station USAR does not contain a response spectra for the Turbine Building. Seismic response spectra plots for the Turbine Building were submitted to the NRC by OPPD in a letter (LIC-90-0417) dated July 6, 1990. Final resolution-of this problem will require NRC acceptance of the Turbine Building spectra.
It was determined that corrective modifications to all affected l
Main Feedwater and Main Steam supports could not be accomplished due to the time and resource constraints of the 1990 refueling-outage and the lack of an approved design basis for the non-safety related Main Steam and Feedwater piping. The following short term ;
L corrective actions were therefore implemented prior to start-up from the outage:
u (1) Safety Analysis for Operability (SAO) 90-04 for the piping l and supports was approved and implemented. The SAO established interim acceptable criteria for plant operation-until appropriate long term criteria can be established. .
1 (2) Piping supports were modified (under MR-FC-89-45) to meet operability requirements defined in the SAO, and to eliminate potential for any new break locations.
Long term corrective actions include:
g (1) Clarification of the USAR concerning the seismic design I
requirements for the Main'Feedwater and Main Steam piping l
outside containment.
1: ,
(2) Modification of piping supports as required to comply with the design basis updates noted above. This is presently scheduled for the 1991 refueling outage.
(3) Initiate review of seismic classification of systems identified in "USNRC Safety Evaluation...Regarding the L Potential for Flooding, from Postulated Ruptures of I Noncategory I (Seismic) Systems".
This event is similar to the event reported in LER 90-03 as it l describes conditions outside design basis due to design
- deficiencies by the original A/E. Generic corrective actions noted in that LER will also apply for this event. LER 89-21 also concerned design deficiencies by contracted companies.
i NRC Fe,m 3e6A (s.89)
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05000285/LER-1990-007 | LER 90-007-02:on 900228,determined That Main Feedwater & Main Steam Piping Outside Design Basis.Caused by Design Deficiency & Failure of Engineer to Consider Loads Induced on Piping.Piping Supports modified.W/900801 Ltr | | 05000285/LER-1990-010 | LER 90-010-01:on 900327,unplanned Attempted Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Occurred While Plant in Refueling Shutdown.Caused by Low Air Pressure in Diesel Start Sys. Instructions Re auto-start Signals changed.W/900703 Ltr | | 05000285/LER-1990-020, Forwards LER 90-020,Rev 1,updating Status of Corrective Actions & Including Other Minor Editorial Changes.Mod Request Initiated to Replace or Upgrade DG Voltage Regulator Due to Lack of Spare Parts Availability Not Required | Forwards LER 90-020,Rev 1,updating Status of Corrective Actions & Including Other Minor Editorial Changes.Mod Request Initiated to Replace or Upgrade DG Voltage Regulator Due to Lack of Spare Parts Availability Not Required | | 05000285/LER-1990-022, Advises That Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Walkdowns Complete,Per 890202 & 900831 Commitments.Drawing & Procedure Change Program Ongoing & Will Be Addressed as Part of Actions to LER-90-022 | Advises That Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Walkdowns Complete,Per 890202 & 900831 Commitments.Drawing & Procedure Change Program Ongoing & Will Be Addressed as Part of Actions to LER-90-022 | |
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