ML20052J063

LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested

ML20052J063
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/27/1982
From:	Core M OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20052J058	List: ML20052J057 ML20052J063
References
LER-82-009-03L, LER-82-9-3L, NUDOCS 8205240388
Download: ML20052J063 (4)

Text

NRC F 0F,4M 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1 in -

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l l l l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) i 6 7

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7 8 60 G1 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE EVENT OESCRIPTION ANO PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h l o QJ l During normal power operation, in the process of exchanging component cooling water l l O 13 l l heat exchangers, the associated outlet valves llCV-490B, HCV-491B and IICV-492B did notl I n 14 l l open. (llCV-491B opened partially.) The consequence of this event was that only one l

[o lsl l component cooling water heat exchanger was operational. Tech. Spec. 2.3(1)g. requiret lo in l l three of four CCW heat exchangers t.o be operable which may be modified to two of fourl F6TF1 I component cooling heat exchaneers operable for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> under Tech. l

[Ti]T] l Spec. 2.3(2)c. l 80 7 8 9 DE CODE $ BC E COMPONENT CODE SUB DE SU E O 9 l Wl B l@ y@ lB l@ l Vl Al Ll Vl El Xl@ W@ W @ 13 18 19 20 7 s 9 10 11 12 SEQUE NTI AL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION EVENT YE AR R E POR T NO. CODE TYPE N O.

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44 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h 11 lo j l An operator was di spatched to the 3 subiect valves and he manually tapped on the I actuator parts to all 3 valves. Valves llCV-490B and liGV-492B opened after the

[ TIT 1 I operator tapped on the actuator parts. However, itCV-491B opened only slightly. I Subsequently, llCV-491B, a Fisher Continental Model 7622 ten inch butterfly valve,

, 7 l was disassembled. No apparent problem was found with HCV-491B and it was re- l assembled, the packing loosened, and the valve tested for operation. All valves l i l a l L were evcled aeveral times and overated auccessfully- I li l41 l l 7 8 9 80 STA S  % POWER OTHER STATUS DIS O RY DISCOVE RY DE SCRiPTION y Wh l1 l 0 l 0 l@l NA l ] @l Operator ObservatiCn l CTIVITY CO TENT RELEASED OF RELE AsE AMOUNT OF ACTivlTY LOCATION OF RELEASE 7

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Pu8tisTY 82052403EM3 820511 NRC USE ONLY PDR 6

ADOCK 05000285 ,

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, NAME OF PREPARER Merl R. Core PHONE: {

LER No.82-009 omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285 l Attachment No. 1 Safety Analysis Technical Specification 2.3 governs the number of heat exchangers that can be inoperable. When that number is exceeded, Technical Speci-fication 2.0.1 applies. At the time of discovery, more than two heat exchangers were inoperable; thus, Technical Specification 2.0.1 was invoked and the plant operators commenced preparations to place the plant in hot shutdown within six hours. However, by immadistely dis-patching the auxiliary operator to investigate the problem, three of the four heat exchangers were returned to operable status within a few minutes of the incident.

Because the three heat exchangers were inoperable for a short duration, no significant safety problem occurred.

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LER No.82-009 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1

Docket No. 05000285 Attachment No. 2 Corrective Action .

Upon discovery by the operator that the three valves HCV-490B, HCV-491B and HCV-4928 would not open, the auxiliary operator was immediately dispatched to the valves to investigate the problem. The operator

" tapped" on various parts of the valve actuators and HCV-490B and HCV-4928 immediately opened. The outlet valves HCV-490B and 492B were then successfully operated and cycled several times. After verifying the operability of HCV-490B and HCV-492B, three component cooling water heat exchangers were then in service. HCV-491B was then disassembled to determine why the valve would not open. After disassembly, there was no apparent damage to the valve and no obvious reason for the valve not to operate. However, the suspected cause was due to binding between the valve stem and packing; therefore, the packing was adjusted, the valve reassembled and cycled several times successfully.

The two other valves (HCV-490B and 492B) were subsequently checked and packing was also adjusted. These valves were then cycled several additional times to ensure operability.

All of these valves are normally cycled two to three times each week. The valves will continue to be cycled as a normal plant operation when cycling component cooling water heat exchangers; thus, this will allow us to monitor these valves for future problems.

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LER No.82-009 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000.".85 Attachment No. 3 Failure Data This is the first instance, at the Fort Calhoun Station, of having three simultaneously inoperable component cooling water heat exchangers.

Additionally, the three valves that failed to open have not e:chibited a history of similar failures.

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