05000285/LER-2004-001, Regarding Failure to Perform a Leakage Test Due to Lack of Understanding of Performance Design
| ML042680476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/2004 |
| From: | Bannister D Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-04-0099 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML042680476 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 2852004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
.
Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 September 24,2004 LIC-04-0099 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2004-001 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2004-001, Revision 0, dated September 24,2004.
This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). If you should have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely, Manager - Fort Calhoun Station D JB/EPM/epm Attachment C:
INPO Records Center Employment with Equal Opportunity
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM APPROVED BY OMB. NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 3. PAGE 1 OF 4 (See reverse for required number of digitslcharacters for each block)
- 1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station
,4. TITLE
- 5. EVENT DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 07 29 2004
- 9. OPERATING MODE Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOINPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer. O f k e of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not displav a currently valid OMB control
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER YEAR NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 2004 - 001 -
00 09 24 2004 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFRS: (Check a// that apply) number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is hot requlred to respond to, the information collectton
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME Glen Miller (402) 533-7359 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) MANU-REPORTABLE MANU-REPORTABLE TO EPlX
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPlX
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
[XI NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
While investigating the requirements for the Type B Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) for the fuel transfer tube, it was discovered that the sleeve for the transfer tube, M-100, had not been tested as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J an(
Technical Specification 3.5 (3) (iv). Records cannot be found to determine if the test has been performed as required since initial construction.
The lack of understanding of the design features of penetration M-100, coupled with the reasonable conclusion that M-100 is similar to the equipment hatch, led to a comfort level with the testing program and, consequently, lack of a proper test had never been questioned.
The M-100 sleeve was subsequently tested satisfactorily. Similar penetrations were reviewed to ensure that this problem had not occurred at any other plant locations. No similar situations occurred.
0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(I) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.36(c)(I )MA) 0 50.36(c)(I )(ii)(A) 0 50.36(~)(2) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 73.71(a)(4) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 OTHER NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
RC FORM 366A
- - 2001 )
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I 05000285 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2
OF 4
FACILITY NAME (1)
I I DOCKET(2) I LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) ort Calhoun Nuclear Station I
2004 001 00 ARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
IACKGROUND:
ort Calhoun Station (FCS) is a two loop Combustion Engineering design Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). The
- actor coolant system and associated equipment are located inside a cylindrical containment building. The auxiliary uilding (which contains the spent fuel pool) is adjacent to the containment building. Adjacent to the spent fuel pool
- the new fuel storage area. A penetration between the containment and auxiliary buildings, M-100, referred to as ie fuel transfer tube, runs between the buildings allowing new and spent fuel to be transferred to the reactor vessel r to the spent fuel pool.
JHRONOLOGY:
November 1972:
April 1973:
April 13, 1973:
April 21, 1973:
May 28, 1982:
April 30, 1984:
The pre-operational Type A test was performed. In the documentation for that test, it was noted that the test for the Fuel Transfer Tube concluded that the leak rate was 82.0 cc/min at 0 psig and 70 F. There is no mention of how the test was conducted, but judging from a leak rate of only 82.0 cc/min, it is concluded that, the test must have been a Type B test conducted on M-1 00.
Penetrations were installed and tested.
A hand written status report stated that The Equipment Hatch and Flange on the Fuel Transfer Tube (FH-1 l)(M-100) will require testing after they are installed.
From a hand written list of penetrations, it appears that a test of the Transfer Tube was conducted. However, it is identified as FH-1 on the list. There is no mention of how the test was conducted.
Franklin Research Center, under contract to the NRC, issued a report on the adequacy of the OPPD testing program in accordance with Appendix J. (Appendix J did not exist when the plant was designed).
The report does not bring the method of testing M-100 into question.
A procedure change was made to ST-CONT-2, F.4 to identify the correct test connection for the fuel transfer tube blank flange. This is the first documented instance of identifying that the test was performed on M-1 00.
FACILITY NAME (1)
Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station On July 29,2004, a review of the reportability of this event was completed. This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 5 0.73 (a)( 2)( i)(B).
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 05000285 3
OF 4
2004 001 00 I CoNCLUS1oN:
An analysis was conducted to determine why, throughout the history of the station, the sleeve for M-100 had not been tested under the LLRT process. Although no documentation could be found to positively determine the root cause of this event, it appears that the method of testing the transfer tube (M-1 00) has been consistent since it was installed in 1973. The process used has been documented in different ways over the years, but the method used appears to be the same since the original test on April 2 1, 1973. There are only two other mechanical penetrations that use a seal similar to the fuel transfer tube; the Equipment Hatch and the PAL door assembly. It appears, from the existing documentation, that these three penetrations were all tested in the same manner in 1973 : by pressurizing between the seals, and that practice has continued since 1973.
A review of the original FSAR figure reveals that the test connection for the sleeve is clearly visible. There is no evidence that could be found to determine why the lack of a sleeve test for this penetration had ever been evaluated.
Due to the age of this issue (about 30 years) and unavailability of personnel from the construction period, a conventional analysis was not possible. After reviewing the available documentation and interviewing personnel currently familiar with leak rate testing, it was determined that the lack of knowledge or understanding of the design features of penetration M-100, coupled with the conclusion that M-100 is similar to the equipment hatch, led to a comfort level with the testing program and, consequently, lack of a proper test.
(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (1 7)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
On September 2,2004, following discovery of this oversight, a Type B test was performed on the M-1 00 seal. The test was completed satisfactorily. The leak rate was very low, nearly the same as the pre-installation test result. The integrity of the penetration has not changed over the life of the plant. Therefore, this event has little if any impact on the health and safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The Type B M-100 sleeve test was completed on September 2,2004, successfully. A review was conducted to determine if other similar conditions existed. There were no similar conditions. Other corrective actions are documented in the corrective actions system.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE:
This event did not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
LER 2003-001, documented a similar event were an ASME inservice test was not performed as required.