05000285/LER-2006-001, Re Failure to Report Inoperable Containment Air Lock Valve Violates Technical Specifications

Re Failure to Report Inoperable Containment Air Lock Valve Violates Technical Specifications

ML061640265
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/07/2006
From:	Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LIC-06-0052 LER 06-001-00
Download: ML061640265 (5)

LER-2006-001, Re Failure to Report Inoperable Containment Air Lock Valve Violates Technical Specifications

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2852006001R00 - NRC Website

text

Omaha Public Power Distnct 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 June 7, 2006 LIC-06-0052 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl1-137 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-285 Licensee Event Report 2006-001 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2006-001, Revision 0, dated June 7, 2006. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 5 0.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely J A. Reinhart JAR/EPM/~epm Attachment INPO Records Center cIr 2:22 Employment with Equal Opportunity 4171

NRC'FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMP APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learn ed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means; used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the (See reverse for required number of information collection.

digits/characters for each block)

1. FACIITY NAME

2. DOCKET NUMBER

3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 4

4. TITLE Failure To Report Inoperable Containment Air Lock Valve Violates Technical Specifications

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEUNILRVFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEUMENTA REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 07 2006 2006 001 00 06 07 2006 05000

9. OPERATING

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

MODE[12.21()[

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[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C)

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El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in (if more space is required, use additional copies of (if mare space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Contributing Causes

1. Failure of the EO to display a questioning attitude towards a challenge to a fission product barrier

2. Failure of the RP Supervisor to verify' the assumption that operations management was aware of the equipment failure

3. Lack of adequate post job review of the completed activities

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The PAL door inner equalizing valve was repaired and tested to ensure operability. A step has been added to the procedure controlling access to containment at power for operations to inspect the equalizing valve on final egress. Additional corrective actions are being addressed by the corrective action system.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Even though the PAL was inoperable, one door remained capable of maintaining a fission product barrier. The outer door remained operable and locked closed from the final exit until repairs were complete. Therefore, containment integrity was maintained and there was no impact on the health and safety of the public

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There have not been any other instances of a similar nature that have occurred at the Fort Calhoun Station.

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