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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML20046C2121993-07-30030 July 1993 LER 93-004-01:on 930301,confirmed That Channel D Axial Shape Index (Asi) Being Calculated in Reverse Since 921031-930301 Due to Drawing Discrepancies Associated W/Control Channel B. Temporary Mod 92-078 & Standing Order 0-25 Revised ML20046A8691993-07-26026 July 1993 LER 93-011-00:on 930624,experienced Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Load.Caused by Lack of Proper Job Planning,Lack of Formal Decision Making Process & Incomplete Communications.Training Will Be Provided to Operations personnel.W/930726 Ltr ML20045H2561993-07-12012 July 1993 LER 93-010-00:on 930611,1 of 14 Halon Cylinders Did Not Meet Min Pressure Acceptance Criteria Listed in Semiannual Switchgear Rooms Surveillance Test.Caused by Failure of Test to Include Necessary Steps.Cylinder recharged.W/930712 Ltr ML20045D7201993-06-22022 June 1993 LER 93-009-00:on 930524,apparent Spurious Signal from Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Caused Backup Charging Pumps to Automatically Start,Due to Deterioration of Wiring. Instrument Loop Calibration Will Be performed.W/930622 Ltr ML20045D3741993-06-21021 June 1993 LER 93-008-00:on 930520,determined That TS SR Not Satisfied for Stack Flow Indicator,Per Amend 137 Issued on 910307. Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail.Calibr & Functional Test Procedures developed.W/930621 Ltr ML20044H5261993-06-0101 June 1993 LER 93-007-00:on 930430,unplanned Emergency Generator Start & Rt Signal Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail,Labeling of Fuse Drawers,Caution Signs & Training. Labeling & Caution Signs upgraded.W/930601 Ltr ML20044G4941993-05-26026 May 1993 LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities ML20044B6711993-02-22022 February 1993 LER 93-002-00:on 930122,determined That Current SG LP Signal Block Reset Values Greater than Allowed Ts.Caused by Improper Design.Test Procedures Will Be Revised by 930917 to Specify Desired Value for Block function.W/930222 Ltr ML20024G6821991-04-19019 April 1991 LER 91-007-00:on 910320,480 Volt Circuit Breaker Coordination Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in Original Sys Design.Breaker/Fuse Coordination Study to Be Completed & Problems Will Be corrected.W/910419 Ltr ML20029C1591991-03-21021 March 1991 LER 91-004-00:on 910212,offsite Power Low Signal Outside Design Basis.Caused by Inadequate Mod Design at Time of Performance of Original Degraded Voltage Analysis. Engineering Analysis EA-FC-91-017 performed.W/910321 Ltr ML20029C1051991-03-18018 March 1991 LER 91-002-00:on 901209,ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal Generated by High Alarm on Process Radiation Monitor RM-062.Caused by Accumulation of Noncondensible Gases in Sample Piping.Valve Packing Leak repaired.W/910318 Ltr ML20029A2981991-02-0808 February 1991 LER 91-001-00:on 910109,determined That Containment Tendon Surveillances Performed in 1981 & 1985 Did Not Reflect Guidance in Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Testing Program Plan implemented.W/910208 Ltr ML20029A2971991-02-0606 February 1991 LER 90-022-02:on 900907,approx 460 Fire Barrier Penetration seals,60 Fire Dampers & 6 Fire Doors Declared Nonfunctional Per NRC Info Notice 88-004 Due to Lack of Documentation. Plant Outage Required to Implement Repairs/Replacements ML20028G9171990-09-28028 September 1990 LER 90-021-00:on 900829,inadvertent Reactor Protective Sys Actuation Occurred While Operator Changed Power Source. Caused by Operator Not Following Proper Procedures.Operator counseled.W/900928 Ltr ML20044B0131990-07-12012 July 1990 LER 90-018-00:on 900612,reactor Protective Sys (RPS) Trip Units for Axial Power Distribution Determined to Be Inoperable.Caused by Procedural Deficiencies.Procedure Revised & RPS Surveillance Tests reviewed.W/900712 Ltr ML20043F6301990-06-11011 June 1990 LER 90-016-00:on 900511,accident Scenarios Identified by Which Auxiliary Feedwater Piping from Discharge of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Can Be Overpressurized.Caused by Design deficiency.W/900611 Ltr ML20043F2441990-06-0707 June 1990 LER 90-015-00:on 900507,PORV Variable Setpoints Used for Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Determined to Be Nonconservative for PORV Opening Time.Caused by Design Deficiency.Tech Spec Amend prepared.W/900607 Ltr ML20043C0991990-05-29029 May 1990 LER 90-014-00:on 900427,investigation Revealed That Component Cooling Water Piping to Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Coolers Could Be Targets of High Energy Line Break.Safety Analysis for Operability completed.W/900529 Ltr ML20042G7211990-05-10010 May 1990 LER 90-011-00:on 900402,inadvertent Actuation of Pressurizer Pressure Low Signal Occurred While Performing Calibr Procedure.Caused by Inappropriate Action by Technician Involved.Validation of Procedures reviewed.W/900510 Ltr ML20042E6871990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-007-01:on 900228,determined That Several Supports Would Be Overloaded During Seismic Event on Nonsafety Related & safety-related Main Steam Piping.Caused by Design Deficiency.Piping Supports modified.W/900423 Ltr ML20042E6861990-04-23023 April 1990 LER 90-009-00:on 900316,potential Overpressurization of Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Could Have Occurred During Thermal Expansion of Process Fluid Between Closed Valved. Caused by Design deficiencies.W/900423 Ltr ML20012E7641990-03-26026 March 1990 LER 90-005-00:on 900223,determined That Spent Fuel Pool Area Charcoal Filtration Unit VA-66 Was Outside Design Basis. Caused by Insufficient Airflow Into Unit.Affected Updated SAR Analysis Will Be updated.W/900326 Ltr ML20012D0121990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-004-00:on 900217,lift Pressures for 6 of 10 Main Steam Safety Valves Found Outside Acceptance Criteria. Caused by Overly Restrictive Operability Criteria.Valves Recalibr & License Amend Submitted to NRC.W/900319 Ltr ML20012D0101990-03-19019 March 1990 LER 90-003-00:on 900216,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Outside Normal Stress Limits of ASME Code & Design Basis Specified in Updated Sar.Caused by Design Deficiency.Valve Operators Will Be inspected.W/900319 Ltr ML20012B6361990-03-0909 March 1990 LER 89-017-01:on 890624,internal Valve Component from Check Valve Found Lying on Pump Discharge Vane.Repair or Replacement of Valve Internals Could Not Be Accomplished within Time Requirement of Tech Spec.W/900309 Ltr ML20006E1041990-02-0909 February 1990 LER 90-001-00:on 900108,fire Barrier for Wall Between Auxiliary Bldg Rooms 26 & 34 Breached But Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Not Established.Caused by Lack of Sufficient Training for Shift Supervisors.Standing Order revised.W/900209 Ltr ML20011E2691990-02-0505 February 1990 LER 89-024-00:on 891221,determined That Containment Spray Pumps & Suction Header Piping Not Constructed for Use as Backup to LPSI Sys for Shutdown Cooling.Caused by Inadequate Review of Assumptions.Firewatch established.W/900205 Ltr ML20011E2271990-02-0101 February 1990 LER 89-021-00:on 891010,util Informed by C-E of Potential Nonconservative Setpoint in Reactor Protection Sys Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Unit.Caused by Error in Incorporating Transient Setpoint analyses.W/900201 Ltr ML20005F7151990-01-10010 January 1990 LER 89-023-00:on 891211,hourly Firewatch Patrol Entered Posted High Radiation Area W/O Meeting Entry Requirements for Area.Briefings on High Radiation Entry Requirements Held for Personnel W/Assigned dosimetry.W/900110 Ltr ML19354D6381989-12-20020 December 1989 LER 89-022-00:on 890805,change to Surveillance Procedure ST-CEA-1 Became Effective Which Would Have Made Both Emergency Diesel Generators Simultaneously Inoperable During Portion of Test.Change removed.W/891220 Ltr ML19332E7431989-12-0808 December 1989 LER 88-037-01:on 881214,one of Two Supply Headers Supplying Fire Suppression Headers in Auxiliary Bldg Isolated.Caused by Lack of Procedural Guidance & Inadequate Procedural Controls.Standing Order G-58 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr ML19332E2681989-12-0101 December 1989 LER 89-016-02:on 890616,for Unknown Period Since 890614, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Operated Outside Design Basis for Certain Accident Conditions.Caused by Inoperable Speed Control Loop.Action Plan implemented.W/891201 Ltr ML19351A4541989-11-22022 November 1989 LER 89-020-00:on 891012,determined That Two of Four Component Cooling Water HXs Simultaneously Inoperable for More than 24 H.Caused by Inadequate Controls Re Return of Equipment to Svc.Standing Order revised.W/891122 Ltr ML19327B5481989-10-24024 October 1989 LER 89-019-00:on 890924,indication of High Temp for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3A Upper Motor Thrust Bearing Received in Control Room.Caused by Damaged Cable for Bearing Resistive Temp Device.Damaged Cable replaced.W/891024 Ltr ML19325D2471989-10-13013 October 1989 LER 89-012-01:on 890502,main Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator a Found Inoperable Due to Improperly Set Torque Switch.Caused by Inadequate Program for Maint of Motor Operated Valves.Torque Switches reset.W/891013 Ltr ML20028C7711983-01-0606 January 1983 LER 82-020/03L-0:on 821207,during Main Steam Safety Valve Test,Four Main Steam Safety Valves Had Lift Setpoints Out of Tolerance.Caused by Normal Drift of Valves Over Operating Cycle.Valves Readjusted ML20028B5451982-10-28028 October 1982 LER 82-019/03L-0:on 821024,MSIVs HCV-1041A & HCV-1042A Stopped Three to Four Degrees Off Seat When Signaled to Close.Caused by Binding Between Valve Packing & Shaft. Packings Sprayed W/Penetrant Oil ML20052J0631982-04-27027 April 1982 LER 82-009/03L-0:on 820411,while Exchanging Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers,Associated Outlet Valves HCV-490B,HCV-491B & HCV-492B Failed to Open.Cause Not stated.HCV-491B Reassembled & Tested ML20052B2361982-04-0707 April 1982 LER 82-006/03L-0:on 820323,during Surveillance Test ST-ISI- WD-1,F.1,valve HCV-506A Failed to Close Via Control Room Switch.Caused by Solenoid Valve Malfunction.Solenoid Valve Disassembled,Cleaned & Reassembled ML20052D9291982-04-0606 April 1982 LER 82-008/03L-0:on 820330,during Performance of ST-FW-1, F.2(b)(6)per Tech Spec 3.9,steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Failed to Start.Caused by Back Pressure Trip Lever in Tripped Position.Lever Reset ML20041G1291982-02-22022 February 1982 LER 82-005/03L-0:on 820210,at 98% Power,Control Element 24 Inserted Into Core.Emergency Procedure EP-13,CEDM Malfunctions,Implemented & Power Stabilized at 88%.Caused by Erroneous Operating Instruction.Instruction Changed ML20041F7481982-02-17017 February 1982 LER 82-003/03L-0:on 820203,containment Isolation Valve Associated W/Gas Vent Header HCV-507A Failed to Close on Demand.Caused by Solenoid Valve Plunger Sticking in Energized Position.Plunger Freed ML20041F6251982-02-0505 February 1982 LER 82-004/03L-0:on 820203,small Quantity of Radioactive Gas/Particulate Released to Auxiliary Bldg During Routine Operation.Caused by Failure of Stack Gas Monitor RM-062 to Alarm at Appropriate Setpoint Due to Faulty Alarm Module ML20041B1051982-01-28028 January 1982 LER 82-002/03L-0:on 820114,at 99% Power,Lockout Relay 86B1, Containment Radiation High Signal,Failed to Actuate on Demand by Plant Radiation Monitoring Sys.Caused by Burnt Coil on Lockout Relay.Coil Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML20041B1171982-01-19019 January 1982 LER 82-001/03L-0:on 820111,during Normal Operation,Two Fire Barrier Penetrations Found Nonfunctional.Shift Supervisor Immediately Notified;However,Fire Watch Not Posted.Insp & Supervisor Personnel Instructed on Proper Actions ML20039B4561981-12-11011 December 1981 LER 81-011/03L-0:on 811113,containment Isolation Valves Opened & Ventilation Process Initiated W/Containment Air Monitor RM-050/051 Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Valves Closed ML20010H8581981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-0:on 810813,86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When RM-062 Was Placed in Alarm,Resulting in Failure of 86B1/CRHS Relay to Actuate.Caused by Dirt in Relay Latching Mechanism ML20041F6291981-08-27027 August 1981 LER 81-008/03L-1:on 810813,containment Radiation High Signal 86B Lockout Relay Failed to Actuate When Radiation Monitor RM-062 Placed in Alarm.Caused by Bound Relay Latching Mechanism Due to Dirt & Grease.Latch Cleaned ML20010C2271981-07-0707 July 1981 LER 81-006/03L-0:on 810624,reactor Protection Sys Nuclear Power Recorder Channel B Trip Setpoints Determined to Be Nonconservative.Caused by Faulty Temp Change Power Calculation Due to Grounded Hot Leg Temp Loop ML20004B1111981-05-0606 May 1981 LER 81-005/03L-0:on 810423,dc Sequencer Timers AC-3A (Component Cooling Water Pump) & AC-102A (Raw Water Pump) Failed to Time Out within Prescribed Limit.Cause Unknown Mechanisms Satisfactorily Inspected 1993-07-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B5401999-10-0606 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-40 ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data LIC-99-0096, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20211J9321999-09-0202 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety. Proposed Alternatives Authorized for Remainder of Third ten- Yr ISI Interval for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 LIC-99-0084, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20216E6431999-08-26026 August 1999 Rev 19 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R1961999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 ML20210G2181999-07-27027 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-40 ML20210D9951999-07-22022 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-40 ML20216E6361999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 18 to TDB-VI, COLR for FCS Unit 1 ML20210R2081999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1 LIC-99-0065, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20210P5461999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 0,Vols 1-5 of Fort Calhoun Station 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, to Be Conducted on 990810. Pages 2-20 & 2-40 in Vol 2 & Page 4-1 in Vol 4 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20195B4581999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to CE NPSD-683, Development of RCS Pressure & Temp Limits Rept for Removal of P-T Limits & LTOP Requirements from Ts ML20207H7401999-05-31031 May 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for May 1999 LIC-99-0053, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 11999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1 ML20195B4521999-05-17017 May 1999 Technical Data Book TDB-IX, RCS Pressure - Temp Limits Rept (Ptlr) ML20206L4241999-05-10010 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions to Ensure That Valves Are Capable of Performing Intended Safety Functions & OPPD Adequately Addressed Requested Actions Discussed in GL 95-07 ML20206M2601999-05-0606 May 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee IPEEE Complete Re Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 & IPEEE Results Reasonable Given FCS Design,Operation & History LIC-99-0047, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20195E8621999-04-30030 April 1999 Performance Indicators, for Apr 1999 ML20205Q5831999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-40 ML20210J4331999-03-31031 March 1999 Changes,Tests, & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval for Period 981101-990331.With USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 ML20206G2641999-03-31031 March 1999 Performance Indicators Rept for Mar 1999 LIC-99-0034, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Fcs,Unit 1.With ML20205J8181999-02-28028 February 1999 Performance Indicators, for Feb 1999 LIC-99-0025, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20207F3291999-01-31031 January 1999 FCS Performance Indicators for Jan 1999 ML20203B0991998-12-31031 December 1998 Performance Indicators for Dec 1998 LIC-99-0026, 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Omaha Public Power District Annual Rept. with LIC-99-0003, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station.With ML20198S3771998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-40 ML20198S4831998-12-31031 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License DPR-40 ML20196G2251998-12-18018 December 1998 Rev 2 to EA-FC-90-082, Potential Over-Pressurization of Containment Penetration Piping Following Main Steam Line Break in Containment ML20198M3141998-11-30030 November 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Nov 1998 LIC-98-0172, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With LIC-98-0160, Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated1998-11-25025 November 1998 Special Rept:On 981113,MSL RM RM-064 Was Declared Inoperable Due to Leakage Past Isolation Valve HCV-922.Troubleshooting Has Indicated That Leakage Has Stopped & Cause of Leak Continues to Be Investigated ML20203B0721998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 6 to HI-92828, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion ML20196E4981998-10-31031 October 1998 Performance Indicators Rept for Oct 1998 ML20196G2441998-10-31031 October 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Carried Out Without Prior Commission Approval. with USAR Changes Other than Those Resulting from 10CFR50.59 LIC-98-0154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20154M4881998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 186 to License DPR-40 ML20154N2411998-10-19019 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-40 LIC-98-0136, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station,Unit 1.With ML20155G4261998-09-30030 September 1998 Performance Indicators for Sept 1998 ML20154A1251998-08-31031 August 1998 Performance Indicators, Rept for Aug 1998 LIC-98-0122, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1.With ML20238F7231998-08-17017 August 1998 Owner'S Rept for Isis ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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< = Omaha Public Power District s 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247
> 402/536-4000-
+ February 5, 1990-
.LIC-90-0042-d I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:. Document' Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
' Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 89-024 for the Fort Calhoun Station
- Please find attached Licensee Event Report 89-024 dated February 5, 1990. A two week delayed submittal date was-agreed upon by T. G. .
Therkildsen of OPPD and-T. F. Westerman of NRC Region IV on January 22, 1990. This. report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
If-you should-have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely,
. W$
W. G. Gates Division Manager Nuclear Operations WGG/tcm
, LAttachment c: R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator A. Bournia, NRC Project Manager P. H; Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center American Nuclear Insurers K@$2ggock00 [
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, ACILiTv984848 ni DOCK 8T .svaleth ui PAGE GI I Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 o ls l 0 l0 l 0121815 1loFl016 TITLE ses -l Potential Use of Containment Spray System Outside Design Basis event oAn m Len NvMun m a PonioAn m oTnen e ACiLifies iNvotvio sei ;
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l NAME TELEPHONE NvMSER ARE A COD 4 David Buell - Shift Technical Advisor 41012 513 1 31-16 I 81714 COAPLEf t ONE LINE FOR E ACM COMPONENT F AILumt DieCRIDED IN TMi$ etPORT H31 4 %Kl,'j}' CAvs: system CoMPoNaNr R('00^jgt CAuss syst M COMPONENT d'lW3C- *^*W3C- ,
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""X] vis in v .m . surerto svewwoN oarts -} No 014 01 1 4 In A T.ACT, - . - ... . - - .,. . . ,n.1 An engineering review revealed that the Fort Calhoun Station Containment Spray (CS)pumpsandsuctionheaderppingwerenotoriginallyconstructedforuseas-a backup to the Low Pressure Sa ety Injection (LPSI) system for shutdown t cooling. Such use could be outside the pressure and temperature design-basis
-for the CS system. This use was incorporated into Operating Instructions and procedures, as well as Appendix R fire protection commitments. Existing Technical Specification 2.1.1 allows credit for use of the CS system as redundant to the LPSI system for shutdown cooling. Technical S)ecification
~3.16 requires pressure testing of the CS piping to a value whici exceeds the original code hydrostatic test of the piping. These conditions were a)parently the result of inadequate review of-the assumptions and submittals whic1 were incorporated into the Technical Specifications and operating guidance. Interim
-guidance on proper use of the CS system has been provided to Operations personnel. Appropriate )rocedures and commitments will be revised to reflect use of the CS system wit 11n design parameters. Corresponding proposed Technical Specification changes will be submitted to NRC.
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TheContainmentSpray(CS)systematFortCalhounStationUnitNo.1is designed to limit the containment structure pressure rise thereby reducing the leakage of airborne radioactivity from the containment by providing a means for cooling the containment atmosphere after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The system takes suction from two independent headers which extend from the Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) and the Containment sump to the High I Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps, the Low Pressure Safety Injection 1 (LPSI) pumps,.andtheContainmentSpraypumps. The Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) states that the design temperature and pressure of the two i suction headers are 300 degrees F and 60 psig. The LPSI pumps, whica are i identical in design to the Containment Spray pumps, provide the normal means of decayheatremoval(shutdowncooling)whentheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)is at a temperature and pressure of less than 300 degrees F and 250 psia.
The Fort Calhoun Station Operating Manual contained two Operating Instructions:
! OI-SC-3, " Alternate Shutdown Cooling Utilizing Containment Spray Pum)s",
I initiall 30, 1974, and 01-SC-4, " Termination of Slutdown Cooling"y approved on Sept., initially approved on Oct. 4, 1974. These procedu of the CS pumps as an alternate means of shutdown cooling and were intended to be used if both LPSI pumps became inoperable. This alternative use of the CS system for shutdown cooling was later incorporated into other operating i procedures.
l l
' Technical Specification 3.16 requires hydrostatically testing the return lines from the containment to the discharge isolation valves of the LPSI and CS pumps at no less than 100 psig on a refueling interval. This requirement has I apparently been included in the Technical Specifications since initial issuance i
of the operating license. ,
In May of 1980, the NRC issued IE Bulletin No. 80-12, " Decay Heat Removal System Operability", which required licensees of Pressurized Water Reactor facilities to review and ensure the redundancy of decay heat removal capabilities. As a part of Omaha Public Power District's (0 PPD) response to this bulletin, the Containment Spray pumps were identified as an available means of shutdown cooling; however, it was stated that the use of the ) umps would be restricted to times when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is )elow 150 psig. IE Bulletin 80-12 and a followup letter from NRC dated June 11, 1980 also requested that Technical Specifications be revised, if necessary, to resolve the stated issues. In response OPPD submitted a proposed Technical l Specification revision on November 17, 1980. Facility License Amendment No. 56 l 10, 1981. The amendment to Technical was issued section Specification by NRC on February (3) (a) (iii) and (iv) incorporated the 2.1.1 use of th Containment Spray pumps as a means of possible decay heat removal when the reactor is in cold shutdown condition or the RCS cold leg temperature is between 210 and 300 degrees F. The amended Technical Specification did not contain the restriction of using the pumps below 150 psig.
N C Pese 308A (649)
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On October 17, 1988 the NRC issued Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, which discussed the consequences of losing decay heat removal during nonpower operation. Various actions and enhancements were recommended by this letter, which superseded Generic Letter 88-12. OPPD responded to GL 88-17 by letters dated January 4 and February 10, 1989. Included in the actions taken was implementation of procedural requirements to have a CS aump available with a backup power source when shutdown cooling is required to >e operable. ,
On November 1, 1989, the NRC. issued Information Notice No. 89-73 titled
" Potential Overpressurization of Low Pressure Systems" which described an ,
j overpressurization event during a surveillance test being performed on a residual heat removal system. During a Licensing review of this Notice, a
! concern was presented to System Engineering 3ersonnel as to whether the design parameters of the two suction headers from tie SIRWT and Containment Sump to the Safety Injection and Containment Spray pumps would be exceeded when utilizing the Containment Spray pumps as a means of shutdown cooling.
Investigation into the design pressure and temperature limits revealed that the CS suction aiping was originally designed for 350 degreer. F and 66 psig, which indicated t1at the piping was not intended for unrestricted use as an alternate means of shutdown cooling.. .These values were taken from original construction documents of the piping and are slightly higher than the USAR values of 300 degrees F and 60 psig which conservatively must consider the various flow configurations and thermal transients. After further investigation of design documentation and available calculations, Design Engineering confirmed the conclusion that the CS suction header piping were not intended for unrestricted i use in shutdown cooling. The conclusion was made at 1650 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.27825e-4 months <br /> on December 21, i 1989 that the use of Operating Instructions 01-SC-3, 01-SC-4 to implement the reliance on the Containment Spray pumps in Technical Specification 2.1.1 (3) i (a)(iii)and(iv)wouldbecontrarytothedesignbasisofthesystemas defined in the USAR. A notification to NRC was made at 1740 hours0.0201 days <br />0.483 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.6207e-4 months <br /> on December 21 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). This written report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
A review of the history of Operating Instructions 01-SC-3 and 01-SC-4 showed that these two procedures were written and approved shortly after initial commercial operation of the facility in 1973. A search of existing files revealed no documentation of a 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation or other technical analysis to justify using the CS system in this configuration. The apparent cause of this event was an inadequate review of the design basis and safety implications for unrestricted use of the Containment Spray system for shutdown cooling requirements. This deficiency was compounded when Technical Saecification Amendment No. 56 was reviewed and approved without identifying tlat the potential for operating the system outside the design basis already existed.
R RC Form 308A (649)
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0l0 0l4 or 0l6 ftXT /# mere assee e seenmed was septemW N4C Form M/ (1h A review of the analysis for Amendment No. 56 revealed no documentation that identified this condition. Additionally, the Technical Specification was amended without adding the restriction to limit the use of the pumps to times when the RCS was~less than 150 psig, a lim'itation that was-identified in the response to NRC IE Bulletin 80-12. Finally, the actions taken in response to Generic Letter 88-17 did not include appropriate restrictions on use of the CS system for shutdown cooling, s Following the conclusion that the Containment Spray pumps should not be used as en unrestricted alternate means of shutdown cooling, an extensive review of the Plant Outage Reports and Control Room Logs from August 25, 1973 to the present was conducted to identify occurrences when the pumps were used for alternate shutdown cooling. The review identified two time periods when the l pumps were used in this configuration and sufficient detail exists in the logs to verify that the design pressure of 66 psig was not exceeded. Both of these
- occurrences were during refueling outages when the RCS was either vented to
- the atmosphere or pressure retaining components were disassembled for l maintenance. Although the potential existed for the plant to use the l
Containment Spray pumps as alternate means of shutdown cooling by having an approved operating instruction and a Technical Specification which allowed this configuration, based on the review of logs and operating history of the system it was determined that the system was not operated outside of the L original design basis.
i Additional review revealed that Technical Specification 3.16 (1) b, Surveillance Requirements - Recirculation Heat Removal System Integrity
' Testing, specifies that the two suction headers be hydrostatically tested to no less than 100 psig during each refueling outage. Surveillance Test ST-RHRS-1 which satisfies this Technical S)ecification has been performed each refueling outage; the test has subjected tie two suction headers to pressures which are above the original code hydrostatic test values of the piaing. OPPD Design Engineering has performed a preliminary analysis to verify 21at the 100 psig test versus an original hydrostatic test of a) proximately 88 psig (per the piping code-USAS B31.7-1968) has not damaged t1e piping.
A review of prior commitments involving the availability of Containment Spray pumps for shutdown cooling was conducted. The review identified a commitment made to the NRC in Licensing memorandum LIC-84-338, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Exemption Request Revisions, dated January 9, 1985. The commitment involved providing a written procedure (SP-SI-5) and readily available equipment to perform emergency repairs to Containment Spray pump SI-3C to restore the pump
-for shutdown cooling requirements. The emergency repairs would be required in the event of a worst case fire in Fire Area 6 (Corridor 4, 989' elevation of theAuxiliaryBuilding)whichcoulddisablepowerandcontrolcablesforLPSI and Containment Spray pumps. Since temperature and pressure entry conditions for shutdown cooling after a fire would exceed the original design basis of the CS system, the aforementioned commitment cannot be satisfied. OPPD informed the NRC of this condition in a supplemental telephone notification on January 19, 1990. Corrective actions are noted later in this report.
NRC Penn asea (6491
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The safety evaluation process per 10 CFR 50.59 has been significantly improved at Fort Calhoun Station during the plant operating history and involves a thorough review of potential reductions in the margin of safety provided by the Technical Specifications and a review of how the proposed change will affect the USAR and previously analyzed accidents.
The following corrective actions have been completed in response to this event:
(1) Operating Instructions 01-SC-3 and 01-SC-4 have been deleted from the Fort Calhoun Operating Manual.
(2) Operations Memorandum 89-05 was issued on December 22, 1989 to provide guidance to the operating crews that the Containment Spray pumps are not available for shutdown cooling as allowed in Technical Specification 2.1.1 (3), although the pumps inay be used per Technical Specification 2.1.1 (4) when the RCS is in refueling or shutdown I conditions only when the RCS is below 120 degrees F and vented to the atmosphere, p (3) A preliminary engineering analysis has been performed which verified L that the.CS piping system has not and would not be adversely affected
, by the 100 psig pressure test required by Technical Specification 3.16.
(4) An hourly firewatch was established in Fire Area 6 as a compensatory measure since no credit can be taken for repair and use of a CS train .
following an Appendix R worst case fire. i (5) SafetyAnalysisforOperation(SA0)90-01-00 was implemented to justify continued plant operation with the compensatory action noted above.
The following corrective actions will be completed in response to this event:
(1) Abnormal Operating Procedure A0P-19, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, which
. allows the use of a Containment Spray aump if both LPSI pumps are inoperable, will be revised to limit tie conditions for use of the pumps. This action will be completed before initiation of shutdown ,
cooling during the scheduled 1990 refueling outage.
(2) Emergency Operating Procedures and other appropriate operational guidance will be revised to limit the conditions for use of a Containment Spray pump in the event both LPSI pumps are inoperable.
These procedures will be revised prior to Cycle 13 initial criticality.
. NRC Psem 30.A (6495
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0 l2 l 4 - 0j0 0l 6 or 0 l6 1:nn,, . m ,unaw nn (3) An application to amend appropriate Technical Specifications will be ,
submitted which will limit the conditions 'or use of the Containment t Spray pumps as an alternate means of decoy heat removal. A schedule for submittal of this application will be provided in a supplement to this LER by April 1, 1990.
4 (4) An application to amend Technical Specification 3.16 will bq submitted to lower the hydrostatic test pressure from 100 psig to a pressure consistent with code pressure test requirements on the suction header l piping from the containment to the shutdown cooling system. A schedule i for. submittal of.this application will be provided in a supplement to this LER by April 1, 1990. ST-RHRS-1 will be revised to reduce the i hydrostatic test pressure following approval of the revised Technical l Specification. 1 (5) The Repair Procedure, SP-SI-5, will be deleted from the Operating Manuals and a new procedure will be provided as an attachment to Abnormal Operating Procedure A0P-6, Fire Pegency. The new procedure c will provide for the repair of LPSI pump 5! !B for shutdown cooling '
following a fire in Fire Area 6. The required materials and tools will be procured and maintained dedicated for this repair work only on site. These actions will be completed by May 1, 1990.
(6) A recuest will be submitted to NRC to revise the Appendix R commitments and cesign basis relative to use of the Containment Spray system for shutdown cooling following a fire. This will be completed by June 1, 1990.
-(7) The OPPD responses to Generic Letter 88-17 and Bulletin 80-12 will be ':
supplemented to reflect the procedure changes noted in Corrective '
Actions (1)and(2)above. This will be completed by June 1, 1990.
LER 89-22 also involved potential operation outside design basis partially attributable to inadequate safety evaluation.
. N.c v m.A u.i
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