ML20044G494

LER 93-006-00:on 930118,Halon Fire Suppression Sys for Switchgear Rooms Disabled to Allow Repair/Replacement of Halon Sys Piping.On 930427,individual Responsible for Fire Watch Not Present.Individual Relieved of Responsibilities

ML20044G494
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/26/1993
From:	Blessie W OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20044G493	List: ML20044G492 ML20044G494
References
LER-93-006, LER-93-6, NUDOCS 9306030201
Download: ML20044G494 (3)

Text

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 31t@o'io4 pe2) EXPIRES 5/31/95 EST! MATED BURDEN PER RESPr 4SE TO COMPT.Y WITH THis UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) gh"nEuYES "unDYE' ATE i b""E'iNrORuAb""'

AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 205554001. AND TO (see reverse for required number of digits / characters for each block)

NAG AND AS ON, FACILH7 NAME (1) " DOCKET NUMBER R PAGE R Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 05000285 1 OF 3 Tms m Failure to Maintain Continuous Fire Watch for Impaired Halon System EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT NUMBER (r) OTHER FACILTTIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NU BE B 04 27 93 93 --

006 --

00 05 26 93 3 000 OPeR - 2 1s,S REPOR1,S eueM,TTeo PuRSuAN110 THe ReOu,ReMeN1 0,1o CrR .: (omecx ee ., m.,e) (11) 3 MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)0) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 0 2o.405(a)($)ci) 50.36(e)(2) OTHER LEVEL (to) 50.73(a)(2)(vir) 20.405(a)(1)0ii) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in

{Poc 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)01) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) po,q 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) i William J. Blessie, Shift Technical Advisor (402) 533-6896 COMPLETE ONI UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER O IPRD CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURCR g SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH W YEAR YEs SUBMISSION l (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMSSON DATE) X N DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximate!y 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) i On January 18, 1993, the Halon fire suppression system for the Switchgear Rooms was j disabled to allow repair / replacement of Halon system piping. A continuous f. ire watch  ;

with back-up fire suppression equipment was established. On April 27, 1993 at_1941 CDT,  !

a security officer on an hourly fire door check entered the Switchgear Rooms and noticed ,

that the individual responsible for the continuous fire watch was not present. Computer i records revealed that the individual had exited the Switchgear Rooms at 1930 CDT.

Consequently, the Switchgear Rooms were without a continuous fire watch for eleven minutes, resulting in a violation of Technical Specification 2.19(8).

It has been concluded that the root cause of this event was personnel neglect and that i the 3roblem was isolated to this individual. The individual responsible for the fire watc1 at the time of the incident was a temporary contract employee.

The corrective action taken as a result of this event was to relieve the individual of his responsibilities, block his access to the Protected Area and terminate his services.

9306030201 930526 PDR ADOCK 050002B5 S PDR me ronM aso me2)

NRo FORM 308A U.S. NUCLEAR RE@ULATORY COMM188 ON APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 oS04 Pa4 , EXPIRE 8 5/31/95 ESTNATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY W:TH TH:S CW C M HR OR A UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) =^gN E ow TEXT CONTINUATION Aw y _ueegNTy,gng "u do W AND A TON, mmmwasn nooiermem a umumaa rams a g SEQUENT &AL REVISON NUMBER NUMBER Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 05000285 2 OF 3 -

TEXT pr more space is required, use as:mional cop.es of NRC Form 306A) (17)

BACKGROUND FortC-lhounStation(FCS)TechnicalSpecification(TS)2.19(8)requiresthattheHalon fire suppression systems protecting the Control Room, the Switchgear Rooms and the Cable Spreading Room be operable. With a Halon system inoperable, a continuous-fire watch with back-up fire suppression equipment is to be established.

On January 18, 1993, the Halon system for the Switchgear Rooms was disabled to' allow repair / replacement of Halon system piping under Modification MR-FC-86-093, "Switchgear Room Halon System Improvements." .A continuous fire watch with back-up fire suppression equipment was established. An outside contract agency was utilized to suppl individuals to stand the continuous fire watches due.to the length of time (yseveral months) that the Switchgear Room Halon System was to be disabled. These individuals were trained by OPPD on the requirements for standing a fire watch and were under the supervision of OPPD personnel. OPPD security officers were designated to provide relief and periodic monitoring of the fire watch personnel.

EVENT DESCRIPTION On April 27, 1993, FCS was in Hot Shutdown (Mode 3) for scheduled maintenance. At 1941 CDT, a security officer on an hourly fire door check entered the Switchgear Rooms I and noticed that the individual responsible for the continuous fire watch was not i present. ThesecurityofficerimmediatelycontactedtheSecurityShiftSupervisor(SSS)

-and assumed the continuous fire watch duties.

The SSS traced the location of the individual through the plant security computer. The computer records revealed that the individual had exited the Switchgear Rooms at 1930'CDT. Consequently, the Switchgear Rooms were without a continuous fire watch for eleven minutes, resulting in a violation of TS 2.19(8). This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Plant management and the responsible OPPD supervisor were notified of the event, and a decision was made to relieve the individual of his responsibilities, escort him from the site, block his access to the Protected Area and terminate his services.

werem aam pas

NRC FOFM SOSA U.S. NUCLEAR REGul.ATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3154o104 pea . EXPIR28 5/31/95

. EST! MATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) = ,* L e go'ano "y ,LJ3fo ,"gb "^'S w CONDNUADON ggggamNew Nsa ng MANAO E AND ASH'NGTON, FACUTY NAME (1) DCCKET NUMBER la LER NUMBER R PAGE p)

UEQUENTIAL FEVISION NUMBER NUMBER Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 05000285 93 -- 006 -- 00 TsxT p mo,. - N ,.aoir.a. u .oomon.: oP o, Nac ro,- 3 84 5 73 SAFETY ASSESSMENT The effect of this event on nuclear safety was negligible due to the short amount of time the continuous fire watch was not in place. During this event, eleven minutes elapsed in which no continuous fire watch was in place. The modification which disabled the Halon fire suppression system for the Switchgear Rooms did not affect the fire detection system in the rooms. In the event of a fire, the Control Room would have been alerted to the situation and the fire brigade could have been dispatched.

CONCLUSIONS It has been concluded that the root cause of this event was personnel neglect and that ,

the problem was isolated to this individual. A review of the fire watch program and interviews with other individuals associated with the job have concluded that the responsibilities associated with standing a continuous fire watch were clearly stated and understood by the agency personnel. The periodic monitoring by OPPD security officers was effective in limiting the significance of the event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS As previously noted, the corrective action taken as a result of this event was to relieve the individual of his responsibilities, block his access to the Protected Area ,

and terminate his services. ,

I PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS LERs90-001, 90-024,90-027, 91-006,92-003, 92-021,92-030, 92-031 and 92-032 discuss other recent events involving Technical Specification 2.19 fire watch requirements. l None of these events involved a failure to maintain an established continuous fire 1 watch.  !

'l i

NKC FORM 366A 544