ML20043G714

LER 90-009-00:on 900522,determined That Requirements of Tech Spec 3.14.2,Actions 105 & 107 Not Met.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Normal Range Monitoring Sys Restored to Operable Status & Procedure 64CH-SAM-005-OS revised.W/900615 Ltr

ML20043G714
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/15/1990
From:	Hairston W, Tipps S GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HL-1142, LER-90-009-01, LER-90-9-1, NUDOCS 9006210049
Download: ML20043G714 (8)

Text

i 0 Geog'a Power Company - ,

.? 333 P.edmont twenae ,i e/ i Atlada Georoa 30308 l

, ' *I L lek # tone 404 520 3195 e

Ma$ng Address 40 inwrnew center Par >way Post Ofice Box 1295 Onminghami Alat>ama 35201

- Telephone 205 808 5581

. He smbwta c!vct'sc sntem W. G. Hairston, til Somor Vice Pretdont '

- Nucinar Operahons HL-1142 1 000669 '

June 15, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i ATTN:' Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 i

, i PLANT HATCH-- UNITS, 1 2 l NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5  ;

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT  :

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY RESULTS IN  :

VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

' Gentlemen:

~In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), Georgia Power.' Company is submitting the . enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning, a procedure deficiency which resulted in a violation .of 1

- Technical Specifications requirements. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1.

Should you have any questions in this - regard,' please contact this office at-any time. ,

Sincerely, hM. .

W. G. Hairston, III RDG/JKB/eb s

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Enclosure:

LER 50-321/1990-009 l c:- (See next page.)

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 15, 1990 Page Two c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant 1 Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch GO-NORMS U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Washinaton. D.C. r Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Reaion 11 ,

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On 5/22/90, at approximately-1355 CDT, Unit 1 was in the Refuel mode with fuel loaded in the core, and Unit 2 was in the Run mode at approximately 2436 CMRT (approximately 100% rated thermal power). At that time, it was determined that the requirements of Unit 1 Technical Specifications, section 3.14.2, Actions 105 and 107, and Unit 2 i Technical Specifications, section 3.3.6.10, Actions 105 and 107, had not been met.

Specifically, with the Main Stack Normal Range Monitoring (NRM, EIIS IL) system inoperable, it was discovered that samples taken to comply with the action statements

-had been drawn from an isolated line and were not representative of main stack ef fl uent. The NRM system became inoperable on 5/19/90 when a fuse blew in the internal power supply for Process Radiation Monitor 1D11-K600B. This caused a . false high-high radiation signal to be generated which resulted in isolation of the normal

. range system and automatic start of the accident range system. A potential did not exist for exceeding gaseous effluent release limits during this event because other instrumentation providing equivalent protection remained operable.

The root cause of this event is a less than adequate procedure. Sampling procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S did not provide provisions for taking samples with the Main Stack NRM System isolated.

1 Corrective actions for this event include: restoring the NRM system to operable l status, revising procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S, and providing training to Chemistry '

personnel.

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SUMMARY

OF EVENT I On 5/22/90, at approximately 1355 CDT, Unit 1 was in the Refuel mode with fuel l'oaded in the core, and Unit 2 was in-the Run mode at approximately 2436 CMWT (approximately 100% rated thermal power). At that time, it was determined that the requirements of Unit 1_ Technical Specifications, section 3.14.2, Actions 105 and s 107, and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, section 3.3.6.10, Actions 105 and 107, had  !

not been met. Specifically, with the Main Stack Normal Range Monitoring,(NRM, EIIS I

_IL) system inoperable, fit was discovered that samples taken to comply with the i action statemerts had been drawn from an isolated line and were not representative ,;

of main stack effluent. The NRM system became inoperable on 5/19/90 when a fuse i blew in the internal power supply for Process Radiation Monitor 1011-K6008. This caused a false high-high radiation signal to be generated which resulted in j

_j isolation oflthe normal range system and automatic. start of the accident range  !

system. A potential did not exist for exceeding gaseous effluent release limits during this event because othar instrumentation providing equivalent protection .l remained operable, j i

The root cause of this event is a less than adequate procedure. Sampling procedure i 64CH-SAM-005-0S did not provide provisions for taking samples with the Main Stack NRM = System isolated.  !

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Corrective actions for this event include: restoring the _ NRM system to operable status, revising procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S, and providing training to Chemistry l

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DESCRIPTION OF EVENT  !

- On 5/19/90, at approximately 1630 CDT, a fuse blew in the internal power supply for  ;

Process Radiation Monitor 1Dll-K600B. The loss of power caused generation of a j false Hi-Hi Radiation Alarm trip signal which resulted in isolation of the NRM. i' system and automatic start of the accident range monitoring system (KAMAN system)

(EIIS Code IL). The. system design is such that both the. normal- and accident range systems share a comon sensing probe in the main stack. When a normal range monitor trips, a. motor operated valve for the normal range system closes and a motor  ;

operated valve for the accident range system opens in order to provide adequate flow to the accident range monitor. Thus, the NRM system, common to both units, was inoperable and Operations personnel initiated Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) 1-90-337 and 2-90-154. Deficiency Card 1-90-3384 was critten to document the condition.

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0l0l9l- 0p 0l3 oF 0 l6 A qualified replacement fuse was not available from warehouse stock. Consequently, on 5/20/90, at approximately 1630 CDT, daily grab samples and continuous monitoring were initiated in accordance with with Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 3.14.2,

' Actions 105 and 107, and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 3.3.6.10, Actions 105 and 107.

The sampling was performed in accordance with procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S, " Gaseous Effluents: Sampling." However, the sampling points called-for in the procedure are '

downstream of the NRM system isolation valve. Since the isolation valve was closed, the grab samples were not representative of main stack effluent. This was not  !

immediately apparent to the Chemistry technicians performing the sampling for two reasons. First, the position indications for the isolation valve are on a separate ,

elevation of the main stack building from where the sample is taken and the procedure did not require the technician to verify that a sample flow path exists. Second, sample flow was indicated because leakage existed from a set of quick disconnects giving a misleading indication that the flow was from the sensor probe.

On 5/19/90, chemistry technicians performed a routine changeout of the particulate sampler filter. During reassembly, the quick disconnects apparently were incorrectly installed resulting in leakage. The daily grab samples initiated on 5/20/90 were obtained and analyzed with no deficiencies identified (i.e., flow and activity were  !

within nominal ranges). On 5/22/90, chemistry technicians performed another routine changeout of the particulate sampler filter. During this activity, the leakage from the quick disconnects was identified and corrected.

On 5/22/90 at approximately 1355 COT, a chemistry technician reviewing the sample data obtained subsequent to correcting-the leakage noticed the flow rates were unusually low. Upon investigation by a chemistry supervisor it was discovered that the samples had been taken on the isolated normal range sample line and were not representative of main stack effluent. Deficiency Card 1-90-3467 was written to document the condition.

On 5/22/90, at approximately 1430 CDT, the NRM system was returned to operable status .

following installation of a qualified fuse in monitor 1D11-K600B.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The root cause of this event is a less than adequate procedure. Procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S did not provide provisions for taking samples with the NRM system i solated. A contributing factor was lack of training on the interaction between the NRM and the Kaman systems.

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This report is required per 10 CFR.73(a)(2)(1) because a condition existed which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, representative Main

-Stack effluent samples were not obtained and analyzed while the Main Stack NRM system was inoperable. These actions are required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 3.14.2, Actions 105 and 107, and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3.3.6.10,  !

Actions 105 and 107.

The Main Stack NRM system monitors gaseous effluents released to the enviorns from each unit's Main Condenser Off-Gas system (EIIS Code WF) via the common Main Stack. A gaseous effluent sample is continuously drawn at a fixed rate of flow through an isokinetic probe. The probe is located high enough in the Main Stack to assure representative sampling. The sample passes through two shielded chambers where the 4 radiation level of the effluent is measured by two scintillation detectors which provide inputs to two separate monitoring systems.

Each monitoring system has two upscale setpoints and one downscale setpoint. .Each setpoint initiates an alarm in the Control Room. The upscale alams indicate high and high-high radiation and the downscale alarm indicates instrument trouble. The high radiation alarm is set at a level equivalent to or below the average quarterly release rate limit. The high-high radiation alarm is set at a level equivalent to or below the -

instantaneous release rate limit. This alarm contact also provides the start signal

for the Kaman system and isolates the NRM system.

l In this event, a false high-high radiation alarm isolated the NRM system. This L rendered it inoperable. Due to procedural problems, representative samples were not obtained and analyzed during the period the system was inoperable as required by l Technical Specifications.

It is concluded that no release limits were exceeded during the time the Main Stack's NRM system was inoperable as each unit's Off-Gas Radiation Monitoring system was operable. These systems are designed to alarm whenever the radioactivity level of the off-gas from the respective unit's Main Condenser reaches the Technical Specifications average release rate limit and to isolate that unit's off-gas releases to the Main Stack- and~ the enviorns to prevent exceeding instantaneous release rate limits with respect to Unit 1 section 3.15.2.7 ad Unit 2 section 3.11.2.7.

Each unit's off-gas radioactivity levels are monitored by two separate monitoring i systems. The first is the pretreatment monitor. This monitor provides input to low, high, and high-high alarm circuits. Both alarm in the Control Room. +

Similarly, the second monitor, the post-treatment monitor, provides input to low, high, high-high, and high-high-high alarm circuits. The lower level upscale trip (high) is used to close the bypass line, open the treatment line, and alarm; the intermediate upscale trip (high-high) is used to alarm; and the upper level upscale trip (high-high-high) is used to isolate the off-gas system outlet valves and alarm.

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Specifications limits. Based on the above, it is concluded this event did not l adversely affect the public's health and safety. This analysis is applicable to all

- power levels.

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions for this event include:

1. Chemistry personnel involved were instructed on the interaction between the Main Stack NRM system and the KAf%N system.  ;

'2. Procedure 64CH-SAM-005-0S will be revised to provide provisions for sampling of I Main Stack effluents with the NRM system isolated. This revision is expected to l be completed by 7/15/90.

3. This event will be included in applicable continuing training lesson plans for i Chemistry personnel. Also, the NRM system lesson plans will be revised per the changes made to 64CH-SAM-005-0S. These actions will be completed by 7/15/90.

d ADDITIONAL-.INFORMATION  !

1. Previous Similar Events j There have been previous similar events in which less than adequate plant procedures resulted in a violation of the plant's Technical Specifications. These events were reported in the following License Event Reports:

50-321/1990-004, dated 03/19/90 50-321/i989-016, dated 11/30/89 50-321/1989-011, dated 09/26/89 E 50-321/1989-009, dated 09/21/89 l' 50-321/1989-005, dated 04/21/89 50-366/1989-006, dated 10/23/89 l- 50-366/1989-002, dated 03/14/89 l

l The corrective actions for the above events would not have prevented this event l because the involved procedures and Technical Specifications requirements were unique to those events.

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2. Failed Component Information j No failed components caused or resulted from this event. Although a blown fuse l

caused the NRM system to isolate,-it did not contribute to the failure to obtain a l representative grab sample. This was the result of an inadequate procedure.

3. Other Affected Systems No systems other than the Main Stack's normal range monitoring system were affected by this event.

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